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Introduction 
Methodology 
In this work I wish to address some philosophical diffiGUIties regarding the extension of 
rights to children. In particular I wish to draw attention to the difference between the 
freedom rights which are traditionally assigned to rational, autonomous persons and the 
welfare rights children need if they are to become rational, autonomous persons. These 
reservations include reservations about the centrality of rationality and autonomy to 
possession of rights. My thesis is that insofar as various versions of rights apply to children 
they apply with specific qualifications which derive from the differences between children 
and adults. 
Arguing a case in favour or against children's rights is no longer appropriate. Children have 
rights. The Convention promulgated by the UN in 19891 is not an aspirational case for 
children to have rights but a forthright statement of the rights they must, from now on, be 
presumed to have. It is a legally binding agreement on the States Parties which have 
ratified it (as Ireland did in 1992). 
In a philosophical approach one is not attempting to establish a causal connection, or a 
scientific result. One is trying to argue a case, to prove a point, to persuade others that a 
certain perception of the way things are or might be is preferable to other perceptions. In an 
empirical study one can declare that such and such a causal theory is right or wrong: 
empirical evidence (measurement, counting, demonstration) can be adduced to prove a 
position independently of the wishes or pre-conceptions of the proposer. It may well happen 
(in principle it can happen) that the researcher, whatever his or her preconceptions, can be 
surprised, delighted, or dismayed by the results. But the results stand. Philosophical 
research is different. 
Positivist or empirical research is the dominant paradigm for educational research at 
2 
present. There is a consequent danger that the need to question fundamentals will be 
passed over in favour of a concentration on technique and measurable findings. The latter 
approach takes the world as given and concentrates on measuring the interactive 
causalities within the natural or human environment. But the questions we ask, and the 
answers we accept, depend on the meanings we assign to words and concepts in the first 
place. 
For example, there are a number of ways in which one might address the question of rights 
for children. We could concentrate, say, on the extent of the implementation of the 
' U. N. General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Document AIRES/44/25,12 December, 1989. 
2 See, for example, Cohen, L., Manion, L., Research Methods in Education, London, Routledge, 1994. 
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Convention in a particular State (or, comparatively in a number of States Parties to the 
Convention ; the effects of such implementation on the laws, welfare provisions, and social 
practices of the States Parties; the measurable effects of such mediating processes on the 
condition of children and their families 
These approaches would require some form of empirical measurement. But any such 
approach requires a theory of rights, a theory of parental prerogatives, a theory of 
childhood and of child/parent relations, a theory of family/GOmmunity, family/state, 
individual/state relations. We can only operate on such theories by default if we do not 
challenge and engage with the conceptual bases and the prevailing understandings. 
The idea of rights for children, for example, faces us with three possible interpretations: 3 
The first is that rights are children's protection against abuse or neglect by the adults who 
are supposed to care for them. Rights in this interpretation belong to the child as a 
separable individual and it is the role of the State to act as guarantor. In other words the 
State, on the basis of rights ascribed to the child, must intervene to protect the child against 
others including parents and other adult carers. 
On an alternative interpretation children's rights serve to protect children from State power 
by reinforcing the privacy and primacy of the family. This conception joins the child with the 
parent (i. e. the child is not deemed to be a separable individual), in opposition to an 
intrusively threatening State. 
A third possibility is that it is the children themselves who should assert their rights against 
both parent and state. A case in point would be schooling. At present children are obliged to 
attend school by their parents in the first instance and by the state in the event of parental 
failure. Ascribing rights of choice to children would leave the determination to the child. 
This might appear a very extreme interpretation but it is more consistent with the nature of 
rights as conventionally conceived than either of the other two. It is after all because of 
their status as rights bearers that adults claim the freedom to make their own choices. 
This division Of the meaning of children's rights (which view is to prevail when decisions are 
being taken which affect children) has major consequences for social and legal practice. 
My approach to the issues of children's rights is interpretivist. 
The constructivist or interpretivist believes that to understand (the) world of 
meaning one must interpret it. The enquirer must elucidate the process of 
3 See Minow, Martha, 'Rights for the Next Generation: a Feminist Approach to Children Rights', in Ladd, Rosalind 
Ekman, ed., Children's Rights Re-visioned: PhilOSODhical Readings, London, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996, 
52/3. 
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meaning construction and clarify what and how meanings are embodied in 
the language and actions of social actors. To prepare an interpretation is 
itself to construct a reading of these meanings; it is to offer the inquirer's 
,4 construction of the constructions of the actors one studies . 
Any research approach may be characterised in terms of its ontology (the nature of the 
phenomena being studied), of its epistemology (how we know about the phenomena being 
studied), and its methodology (how the research is conducted). 5 The ontology of rights is 
relativist: that is, there is no such thing as a right out there waiting to be discovered. Rights 
exist and are important only relative to certain social, i. e. interpersonal, situations. The 
epistemology of rights is transactional: that is we come to know the meanings of rights only 
in the course of experiencing rights with others. (They are not known through introspection, 
for example). The methodology is dialectical, dialogical, hermeneutic. (We talk, we discuss, 
we critically interrogate texts. ) The inquiry aims of an interpretivist project 'are oriented to 
the production of reconstructed understandings, wherein the traditional positivist criteria of 
internal and external validity are replaced by the terms trustworthiness and authenticity. '6 
The focus is the point of view of the interacting individual rather than the point of view of 
the 'detached, objective' observer or measurer. The findings must be defensible, but it 
makes no sense to say that they must be repeatable. The findings in the interpretivist 
paradigm are the considered contribution of the researcher him or her self to the ongoing 
dialogue in the field. It should be noted also that within the field of rights there is not a 
single paradigm of rights-talk but a series of ongoing conversations regarding the nature, 
extent, application and value of rights. This conversation is frequently between holders of 
mutually exclusive points of view. 
The meaning of rights is not objectively there to be 'discovered' or 'found'. The process of 
elucidating meaning is (re)creating it. There is no independent verification procedure. We 
judge success by invoking 'criteria such as thoroughness, coherence, comprehensiveness, 
and so forth, and ask whether the interpretation is useful, worthy of adoption, and so on. 7 
We might also, in the long run, use the criterion of persuasiveness. To what extent will the 
proffered interpretation be perceived to contribute to 'improvements' in the world, in 
bringing about desirable states of affairs at the level of experience and action. 
Inquirers in this field do not have a value-free stance from which they can critique the 
process of meaning construction and negotiation: 'they participate in the very production of 
4 Schwandt, Thomas, A., 'Constructivist, Interpretivist Approaches to Human Inquiry, in Denzin, Norman K., Linclon, 
Yvonna S., Handbook of Qualitative Research, London, Sage, 1994,118. 
5 Guba, Egon G., Lincoln, Yvonna S., 'Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research', in Denzin, Linclon, Handbook, 
esp. 108, 
" Ibid., 100. 
7 Ibid., 122. 
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8 meaning via participation in the circle of meanings or interpretations'. This is not just a 
methodological but a logical requirement. It is illogical to expect an enquiry into our 
fundamental beliefs to uncover beliefs which were not part of our faith in the inquiry itself. 
For any kind of research there is an initial position in relation to the field which is not neutral 
- even in the most rigorous empirical research: the choice of topic, the choice of method, 
the choice of samples etc. all belie the claim to absolute objectivity. 9 This is especially true 
in relation to interpretative research. 
Throughout this work I will maintain a consistent communitarian position which embraces a 
developmental theory of childhood and of children's rights which is rooted in a social 
context. If we are to build a defensible thesis for a democratic society then we must begin 
with an inter-subjective account of the development of autonomy in the young. 10 Although 
children are not born with autonomy they are, to paraphrase Locke, born to autonomy. 
Childhood is a process of developing this autonomy from the toddlers first tentative 
exploratory steps to the adolescent's radical assertion of independence. This development 
occurs within a sustaining community and conforms to the parameters set by the 
community's conception of childhood and development. In societies like ours the reactions 
of individual adults (whether parents or teachers) to this developing assertion of 
independence can range from repression to radical permissiveness. Each of these extreme 
reactions fail the needs of the growing child. The repressive reaction because it fears the 
child's independence, the permissive reaction because of lack of courage to exercise the 
adult's formative authority. 
It may be instructive to begin with a review of the relationship between children, parents, 
rights, and communities through the relevant work of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Mill, and 
Spencer. This review will reveal two contrasting traditions in the theory of children's rights, 
an exclusionary tradition and an inclusionary tradition. Hobbes, Locke, and Mill excluded 
children from the realm of rights while Rousseau and Spencer, in different ways and in the 
context of significantly different discourses, argued for their inclusion. These traditions 
persist. The review will identify a number of crucial questions in relation to children and 
rights which will be addressed fully as the argument progresses. 
Schwandt, 'Constructivist, Interpretivist Approaches', 121. 
See Polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, 2nd. edition, London, 1962 and also 
chapter 10 below. 
'0 Jonathan, R., 'Liberal Philosophy of Education: a Paradigm Under Strain', Journal of Philosophy of Education, 29,1, 
1995,106. 
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Exclusion 
Hobbes denied that children, in common with 'fools and madmen', have the right to initiate 
and take responsibility for their own actions" and set a pattern of excluding children from 
the centre of rights-talk on the basis of a 'competence argument' that would remain 
unchallenged for more than two centuries. According to the Hobbesian view children have 
no natural rights and cannot have rights by social contract because they are not competent 
to make covenants with others or to understand the consequences of such contracts. This 
exclusion undergirds a model of parental power which gives parents (or one of them) 
absolute authority over their children. It is only when they become adults themselves that 
children acquire freedoms and rights. 12 
Hobbes argued that, since there were two parties to the begetting of the child, it would 
appear that the dominion over the child should, in a state of nature at least, belong to both 
of the parents. But this could not be since 'no man can obey two masters'. 13 Hobbes 
continues that, '(i)n this condition of mere nature, either the parents between themselves 
dispose of the dominion over the child by contract ... (but) if there be no contract, the 
dominion is in the mother' 14 because only the mother can declare who the father is and so 
the dominion over the child depends on her will 'and is Gonsequently hers. In any case the 
child owes its continued existence to the mother'and is therefore obliged to obey her. If the 
mother is subject to the child's father then it is the father who has ultimate dominion over 
the child. If the mother abandons the child dominion passes to whomever finds and 
nourishes the child. For the child 
ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life 
being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man 
is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or 
destroy him. 15 
It is not clear however how a child, who is considered unable to make or understand 
contracts, will nonetheless be able to 'promise obedience' instead of merely submitting to 
greater force. 
Locke argued that analogies between divine, regal, and paternal authority (which were used 
to bolster the notion that kings, being above the law, could do no wrong) were illicit and that 
" Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. XX, in Stephen M. Cahn, ed., Classics of Western Philosophy, Indianapolis, Hackett 
Publishing Co., 1977,392-397. 
12 See Worsfold, Victor, 'A Philosophical Justification for Children's Rights', Harvard Educational Review, 44,1,1974, 
142-157. 
13 Hobbes, Leviathan. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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the authority of fathers was far from unlimited since it extended only until such time as the 
child was capable of taking responsibility for his own actions. 
In a detailed analysis of the fathers' authority over their children Locke disputed the widely 
held view that the mothers relationship with the child was any way inferior: on the contrary, 
'if we consult Reason or Revelation, 
we shall find she hath an equal title. This may give one reason to ask, 
whether this might not be more properly called Parental Power. For 
whatever obligation Nature and the dght of generation lays on children, it 
must certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it. And 
accordingly we see the positive Law of God everywhere joins them 
together, without distinction, when it commands the obedience of 
children. 16 
Any analogy with the absolute authority of a single monarch is illicit because the reality of 
the familial situation is not the absolute authority of a father but the shared authority of both 
parents: it is not a question of Paternal power but of Parental power. 
The parental authority is neither discretionary ('nothing can absolve them from taking care 
of it"), absolute, nor permanent: it is contingent on the child's need for restraint and 
education and is strictly circumscribed by the child's ability to take rational control of his 
own freedom. 
God hath made it (the parents') business to employ this care on their 
offspring, and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and 
concern to temper this power, to apply it as his wisdom designed it, to the 
children's good, as long as they should need to be under it. 18 
So, when does this temporary parental authority over the child come to an end? As with 
Hobbes the criterion is competence. Childhood is an imperfect state: the child is bom in 
possession of freedom and rationality but he must learn the exercise of both. Locke's 
conception of childhood appears to be developmental: although bom with the capacity for 
knowledge and reason the child must grow into the exercise of these. 
The bonds of this subjection (to parents) are like the Swaddling Cloths they 
are rapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of their Infancy. Age and 
Reason as they grow up, loosen them till at length they drop quite off, and 
leave a Man at his own free Disposal. 19 
Dependency ends when the child's understanding is equal to the task of controlling his will: 
that is, when the individual has arrived at the requisite state of knowledge and reason to 
'a All quotations from Locke's Treatises are from'Paternal Power, in O'Neill, 0., Ruddick, W., (eds. ), Having Children: 
Philosophical and Lggal Reflections on Parenthood, Oxford University Press, 19-79,24&246,241. 
17 Ibid., 243. 
'a Ibid., 242 (emphasis added). 
19 Ibid., 243. Locke also refers to'the improvement of growth and age. 
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exercise control over his own affairs. Parental power, then, does not rest on the same 
foundations as legitimate civil power. The latter is properly exercised only with the consent 
of the governed and lasts only so long as that consent is forthcoming . 
20 The former is 
contingent, not on consent, but on a developmental fitness to rule oneself. 
When he has acquired that state he is presumed to know how far that law 
is to be his guide, and how far he may make use of his freedom, and so 
comes to have it; till then, some Body else must guide him, who is 
presumed to know how far the Law allows a liberty. 21 
Locke's refusal to consider the child the equal of the adult in respect of knowledge and 
rationality appears to be due to his belief that both knowledge and rationality are 
22 incremental . The adult is not significantly different from the child with respect to basic 
cognitive abilities. It is just that the adult has had more time to reflect and more experience 
upon which to reflect. However Locke advocates that the treatment of children as rational 
beings should be relative to the child's particular capacities which increase with age. 
Children's ability to reason grows as they mature. Since Locke thought that parental 
authority was grounded in the child's inability to reason 'it follows', in Archard's words, 'that 
the exercise of the former should be proportionate to the degree of the latter. 23 This 
appears to endorse a gradual growth of freedom from parental power and the concomitant 
exercise of autonomy which such freedom would entail. That he considers the growth of 
knowledge and rationality to be developmental is illustrated by Locke's swaddling cloth 
metaphor quoted earlier. The removal of the supports is gradual and ends in a man being 
'at his own free disposal'. Yet the end of the parental obligation, when the child achieves 
the state of maturity sufficient to enable him to know the law of Nature so that he may act in 
accordance with it, appears to be a once-for-all matter. If there is an emergent freedom it 
has no social significance. 
If we accept Locke's general stance there is no necessary difference with respect to legal 
freedom and responsibility between a one-year old and an seventeen year-old, despite 
observable developmental differences. Childhood, as a period of subjection to parental 
power, and absence of legal power, is integral. None of the developmental changes 
20 Leites, Edmund, 'Locke's Liberal Theory of Parenthood', in O'Neill, Ruddick, Having Children, 316-7. 
21 Locke, 'Paternal Power, 244. 
'2 Archard, D., Children: Rights and Childhood, London, Routledge, 1993,2-6. 
23 Ibid., 4. It is worth noting in passing that Archard commends Locke for not subscribing to 'any naive belief in the 
innocence or goodness of the child. His comments on the readily observable cruelty of young people are down to earth 
and perceptive'. (4) Apparently Archard does not consider the possibility that the propensity for cruelty (does 'readily 
observable' mean universal? ) may be acquired and may in fact be one of the ways in which childhood 'degenerates once 
it gets into the hands of Man' to use Rousseau's memorable phrase. 
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requires a differentiation. Nowhere does Locke explain why we should accept a particular 
age 24 as the definitive age of transition between childhood and adulthood. 
Locke is clear however that the parental right to rear and control the child until the age of 
majority derives from the child's interests and not the parents'. The parental prerogatives 
will continue only until the child becomes capable of pursuing these interests for himself. 
The power, then, that parents have over their children, arises from that 
duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their off-spring, during the 
imperfect state of childhood. To inform the mind and govern the actions of 
their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place, and ease them of 
that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound to. 25 
Parental power persists only until such time as children come to the use of reason or reach 
a state of knowledge adequate to understand the natural or civil law. Ontil the child 
achieves the age set by law he is to have no will of his own: he is subject to the will and 
understanding of his parents. Although both parents and children possess natural rights, 
because Locke attributes rights to individuals as though these rights were intrinsic 
properties of individuals, he does not envisage conflict between the rights of parents and 
those of their children because he presumes an identity of interests. Parental benevolence 
is sufficient to ensure the fulfilment of the child's rights. 
In sum then Locke argues that power over the child is equally shared between the parents: 
it is parental not paternal power; the duty of parental care is neither discretionary nor 
absolute; childhood is developmental: the parental obligation ends when the child is 
capable of acting in accordance with the law, natural and civil; the parental right to rear and 
control the child derives from the child's interests and not the parents'. 
Both Hobbes and Locke agree that children are not competent to make claims of their own 
although Locke acknowledges a developmental growth of competence throughout 
childhood. Yet once the general perception of children as lacking competence is accepted 
society is hindered from seeing them asworthy of respect as individuals'. 26 
In On Liberty Mill deals with 'the nature and limits of the power which Gan be legitimately 
exercised by society over the individual'. 27 Law and custom (opinion) are needed to place 
restraints on the activity of others because 'all that makes existence valuable to anyone' 
24 Whether the age of majority is 21 or 18. Neither age appears to be premised on a rational understanding of a 
qualitative difference between childhood and adulthood. The UN Convention declares that childhood ends at 18 'unless, 
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier'. (Article 1) The Convention does not provide a 
justification for this age. 
25 Locke, 'Paternal Powee, 244. 
26 Worsfold, 'A Philosophical Justification', 145, 
27 Mill, J. S., Qn Libeft, in H. B. Acton, ed., Utilitarianism, Libeft. Representative Government, London, J. M. Dent & 
Sons Ltd., 1972,65. 
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depends on such restraints. 28 However, since there is 'no recognised principle by which the 
propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested' Mill proposes the 
principle 'Mhat the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, 
29 in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection' . 
The only purpose for which power can be exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own physical or moral good, or 
happiness, is not a sufficient warrant. Nor is it sufficient that in the opinion of others it would 
be wise or right to interfere with his freedom. We may remonstrate, or reason, attempt to 
persuade, or entreat, but we may not compel or coerce. 
The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to 
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns 
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign. 30 
Society is not justified in intervening in the affairs of an individual where these affairs 
concern only himself or, if there are others affected, if they have freely, voluntarily and 
without deception participated. 31 
The liberty that Mill envisages comprises three elements: freedom of thought and opinion, 
freedom of tastes or pursuits ('of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character), and 
freedom of association with others. 
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own 
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of 
theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his 
own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. 32 
Mill intends that his principle of liberty is meant to apply 'only to human beings in the 
maturity of their faculties'. It is not intended to apply to children or to 
young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or 
womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by 
others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against 33 
external injury ... 
The exclusion of children up to 'the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or 
womanhood' is justified on the grounds that children must be 'protected against their own 
28 Ibid., 69. Mill acknowledges that 'opinion' often has its source in the interests of a dominant class: Wherever there is 
an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of 
class superiority. ' (70) This would equally apply to the ascendancy of adults as a class over children. 
29 Ibid., 72. 
30 Ibid., -73. 
31 Ibid., 75. 
32 Ibid., 75/6. 
33 Ibid., 73. 
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actions as well as against external injury' and on grounds of the general utility of the 
community. 34Unlike Locke, Mill does not consider rights to be something intrinsic to human 
beings, they are a function of utility. One may claim a right not because one is human but 
because the exercise of the right is useful to one's own and others' pursuit of happiness. 35 
'Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, 
than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.: 36 
In specifying 'children, or ... young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of 
manhood or womanhood' Mill clearly acknowledges a difference between children and 
young people who as yet have not attained their majority, but he is content to treat them 
similarly in the matter of exclusion from the principle of liberty. He also leaves open the 
possibility that other categories may be excluded: adults who share with 'children and young 
people' the incapacity to care for or protect themselves adequately. A different category of 
exclusion refers to states, '(t)hose backward states of society in which the race itself may be 
considered as in its nonage ,, 37 not to individuals as such. Despotism is justified in states in 
which the population has not reached a stage of being 'capable of being improved by free 
and equal discussion 1.38 This point illustrates Mill's view of rights as the means to the 
promotion of utilitarian happiness, not as characteristics of individuals. For if rights were the 
possession of individuals then there could be no question of their being over-ruled by a 
despotic leader in the name of the public good. If it is possible - even laudable 
39 - to over- 
rule the principle of liberty then it is clear that the warrant for such liberty is not anything 
pertaining to the individual human being but to the welfare of the community as a whole. 
Childhood is analogous to a state in this regard. Children too must be governed in such a 
way that their development as 'progressive beings' is promoted. 40 
Mill's views present many difficulties. In the first place there is the problem of what 'maturity 
of faculties' might mean. We know what it means negatively: where the individual is not 'in 
the maturity of his faculties'we are entitled to intervene because such an individual is both 
incompetent to judge what is in his own interest and incapable of promoting the happiness 
of the community. But such intervention must always have an educational objective 
involving the 'permanent interests of a man (or woman) as a progressive being'. 
34 Mill, gn LlberIM, 73. 
35 See Kim, Ki Su, 'Mill's Concept of Maturity as the Criterion in Determining Children's Eligibility for Rights!, Journal o 
Philosol2hy of Education, 24,2, V990,235-244,237. 
36 Mill, Qn Ubedy , 
76. 
37 Ibid., 73. 
38 Ibid. 
39 'Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and 
the means justified by actually affecting that end'. Ibid., 73. 
40 What Mill means by'maturity of faculties' in relation to children is discussed by P(Jrn, 'Mill's Concept. 
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In summary, with respect to the status of children, Mill argues that the 
denial of rights and intervention are justified not only on the basis of the 
collective utility of a community but also of the proper development of the 
child 'as a progressive being I. 41 
How, in any case, is the gap between adult and child in relation to rights to be bridged? One 
possibility is that achieving 'maturity of faculties' implies that adult rights descend upon the 
individual in a once-for-all manner (as is the case with Locke). Another is that maturity is 
gradual and developmental and that the acquisition of rights mirrors this gradualism. We 
can, that is to say, consider maturity as an all-or-nothing end state or as a process 
(maturing) which is developmental and ongoing. 42 
In summary, Mill's ascdption of the right to liberty from interference requires that the 
individual possess maturity of faculties, not be in a state to require being taken care of by 
others, and be capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. The first 
requirement is so general and vague as to be of little value. The second raises critical 
questions regarding the rights of adults who are infirm or handicapped. The last is more 
promising since '(t)he child, lacking the capacities necessary to being a self-governing 
moral agent, Gan improve only as a result of chance or the intervention of others'. 43 Here is 
a recognition of the developmental nature of childhood and of the necessity for adult 
intervention to protect and direct the development. Like Locke, however, Mill does not 
leave us with an open-ended criterion. Irrespective of the developmental maturity of any 
individual it appears as if the legal, institutional definition of 'manhood or womanhood' will 
be the ultimate test for inclusion in the realm of liberty. 
Inclusion 
Rousseau's Emile. 44 details the upbringing of a boy from infancy to adulthood. It proposes 
well developed theoretical principles of education and nurturing to meet the two conflicting 
aims of education: the natural development of the child, and preparation for life in society. 
The keynote is the liberty allowed to the growing Emile to pursue his own interests and to 
grow in accordance with his human nature. While the book is not couched in the language 
and rhetoric of rights it is clear that the liberty afforded to Emile is in stark contrast to 
the 
formation of a child seen simply as an 'imperfect' adult temporarily excluded from the 
universe of rights. 
Rousseau describes the role of Emile's tutor as subtly establishing limits which organise the 
boy's capacity to relate to his environment. It is only when he has learned to restrain 
his 
41 Ibid., 237. 
42 As we will see, for Rousseau there was no conceptual contradiction in the phrase'maturity of childhood'. 
43KJeinig, J., 'Mill, Children and Rights', Educational Philosophy and Theo 8,1,1976,1-16,6. 
44 Rousseau, J-J., -Emile, 
trans., Alan Bloom, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1991. 
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desires that he can experience and exercise freedom i. e. govern himself. It is only then that 
he is deemed capable of encountering the life of society. This is similar to Locke's position 
though couched in the terms of a different discourse. In both Rousseau and Locke the 
growing child must await what might be called a certain maturational attainment before he 
can exercise freedom as an autonomous adult and active citizen. Until then he must be 
subject to the rule or guidance of an adult. For Rousseau, whatever misconceptions might 
have been engendered in the popular mind through confusion between the Noble Savage 
and the bucolic setting for Emile's education, is in no doubt that the growing Emile is under 
the control as well as the tutelage of the ad Ult. 45 
At the age of twelve Emile has attained the limit of boyhood. Rousseau's rhapsodic 
description of what Emile, the ideal child, is like at this age concludes: 'He has come to the 
maturity of childhood. He has lived a child's life. He has not purchased his perfection at the 
46 
expense of his happiness'. It is the use of the phrase 'the matudty of childhood' that is 
significant. Rousseau means that each stage of human being has its own proper 
excellence: it is not simply a preparation for another stage culminating in the maturity of 
adulthood. In this view we can see each stage (up to and including old age) as valuable in 
itself and with its own proper and unique excellence. 47 Rather than raise questions about 
the conventional view of dghts Rousseau establishes a different context, a different 
discourse. It is no longer sufficient to perceive childhood in terms of something lacking, 
deficiencies defined by some idealised notion of adulthood. In this context it is possible to 
ask, not whether the child is entitled to the putative rights of adulthood but whether there 
are rights which the child has as a child independently of his/her relation to a future stage of 
development. 
The first specific opposition to the exclusion of children from the realm of rights came nine 
years before the publication of On Liberty, in a section entitled 'Children's Rights' in Herbert 
Spencer's Social Statics. 48Spencer was the first child 'liberationist'. The issues which he 
raised have continued to occupy a prominent place on the agenda of philosophy of 
children's rights ever since. 
45 Ibid. ' 51/2. 46 Ibid., 162. 
47 There is a reprise of this view in the Writing of Januz Korczak. See Berding, JW. A., 'Meaningful Encounter and 
Creative Dialogue: The Pedagogy of Januz Korczale, Journal of Thought, 30,4,1995. Erikson, E., IdentAy and the Life 
gycle, Norton, 1980, charts the successive stages of development through the full life-cycle of the individual. This is 
further developed in Erikson, E., Childhood and Soci , London, Vintage, 
1995, especially chapter 7, 'Eight Ages of 
Man'. 
48 and the First of Them DeveloRgd, 
London, Williams and Norgate, 1868 (1 st published 1850). 
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Spencer's derivation of rights follows a fairly straightforward syllogistic structure which 
leads from Divine will to the law of equal freedom: 
God wills man's happiness. Man's happiness can only be produced by the 
exercise of his faculties. Then God wills that he should exercise his 
faculties. But to exercise his faculties he must have liberty to do all that his 
faculties naturally impel him to do. Then God intends that he should have 
that liberty. Therefore he has a right to that liberty. 49 
From this simple argument Spencer derives a principle of liberty very similar to that of 
Mill's: 'Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal 
1 50 freedom of any other man . 
It is not my purpose or intention here to examine the process of derivation or the principle 
that it leads to. No doubt searching questions could be asked with regard to both. The 
significant aspect of Spencer's work for present purposes is the inclusion of children under 
the application of his principle of liberty. Spencer is satisfied that his principle applies 
equally to children: 
(A) true rule has no exceptions. When therefore that first principle from 
which the rights of adults are derived, turns out to be a source from which 
we may derive the rights of children, and when the two processes of 
deduction prove to be identical, we have no choice but to abide by the 
resu It. 51 
Spencer argues that the process of derivation applies equally to children as to adults since 
The child's happiness, too, is willed by the Deity; the child, too, has 
faculties to be exercised; the child, too, needs scope for the exercise of 
those faculties; the child therefore has claims to freedom - rights as we call 
them - coextensive with those of the adult. We cannot avoid this 
conclusion, if we would. Either we must reject the law altogether, or we 
must include under it both sexes and all ages. 52 
In effect Spencer changes the ground. rules of the debate. Hobbes, Locke, or Mill did not 
really subject to anything approaching rigorous scrutiny what amounted to a presumption of 
exclusion of children. Spencer begins with a presumption of inclusion which he 
acknowledges to be 'a proposition at war with the convictions of almost all,. 
53 The burden of 
justification is now shifted onto whoever would exclude children from the realm of rights. 
Spencer anticipates the kinds of difficulties such justification would have to overcome. 
Spencer, social _Statics, 
93. 
'o Ibid., 121. 
51 Ibid., 191. 
52 Ibid., 192. 
53 Ibid., 195. 
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The first of these difficulties is: when does a child become an adult? 'When does the child 
become a man? at what period does the human being pass out of the condition of having 
no rights, into the condition of having rights? '54 Spencer will not be satisfied with appeals to 
'the arbitrary dictum of the statute book'. 55 The law simply articulates a consensual view. 
What Spencer seeks is the moral justification for such a consensus. 
The difficulty is that any characteristic ('an attribute of manhood'n that we might choose as 
the distinguishing characteristic between adult and child will exclude people generally 
considered adult as it will include people generally considered children. 
And who can answer the objection, that whichever qualification is chosen, 
will class many as men who are not at present considered such; whilst it 
will reject from the list, others who are now by universal consent included in 
it? " 
Even if we could find a universally agreed criterion to discriminate between adulthood and 
childhood where would this leave those excluded - the minors (children) with regard to 
rights? Are we to understand that they have no rights at all? Not even rights of protection? 
Can they be killed, robbed, enslaved? If they have such rights (what Spencer calls 'primary 
rights', the right to life, to possess property, to liberty in the sense of not being enslaved) 
then why only these rights and no others? For their acknowledged possession of such rights 
means that being children does not preclude them from being rights holders. The issue now 
becomes a criterion of demarcation between rights that children may have and those they 
may not, which in turn resolves into the problem of finding a principle of discriminating 
between adults and children. 
Those who 
maintain that whilst children have certain rights, their rights are not equal 
with those of men, are called upon to draw the line, to explain, to define. 
They must say what rights are common to children and adults and why. 
They must say where the rights of adults exceed those of children, and 
why. 58 
So even if we admit some common rights we are left with the problem of drawing a line of 
demarcation ; between the common rights and those exclusively held by adults: for any right 
we may attribute to adults we can legitimately ask why children are not entitled to the same 
right. This inevitably leads back to the matter of specifying and justifying reievant 
differences between children and adults. Spencer will only be satisfied with answers which 
54 Ibid., 192. 
55 The legal age of majority in Locke's case, 'the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood', in Mill's. 
' Spencer, Social _Statics, 
192. 
57 Ibid., 1 ga 
58 Ibid. 
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are morally defensible, drawn from 'the original constitution of things' and not merely based 
on expediency. 
Parental obligations give rise to two related problems. Firstly we can ask whether the 
obligations of the parent confer dominion over the child so that even if the child has rights 
the obligations of the parent are superior and may over-rule the rights of the child. 
Secondly, if this is the case then the question must be asked whether afi obligations confer 
dominion - does a doctor, for example, have dominion over an adult patient? If not, why 
make a distinction between children, over whom dominion is conferred by the existence of 
an obligation, and adults over whom dominion is not conferred by the existence of an 
obligation? Even if we acknowledge that there is a difference between adults and children 
in this regard what, if any, are the limits to the dominion of the parent? This again begs the 
59 question of the limits on the rights of the child . 
Spencer concludes that 
Unless, therefore, the reader can show that the train of reasoning by which 
the law of equal freedom is deduced from the divine will, does not 
recognise children, which he cannot; unless he can show exactly at what 
time the child becomes a man, which he cannot; unless he can show why a 
certain share of liberty naturally attaches to both childhood and manhood, 
and another share to only one, which he cannot; he must admit that the 
rights of the youth and the adult are coextensive. 60 
Spencer identifies what he calls a 'plausible-looking' way of meeting these objections. This 
would be to argue that the faculties of the child are not developed. 61 Since the faculties of 
the child are not developed and since rights are 'primarily dependent' on faculties (in 
Spencer's own derivation) then it appears to follow that the rights of children cannot be 
coextensive with those of adults for the faculties of children are not coextensive with those 
of ad UltS. 62 
Such an approach would miss the point completely, however. 
The fullest endowment of rights that any being can possess, is perfect 
freedom to exercise all his faculties. And if each of two beings possesses 
perfect freedom to exercise all his faculties, each possesses complete 
rights; that is the rights of the two are equal; no matter whether their 
53 faculties are equal or not. 6 
5ý0 Ibid., 194. 
60 Ibid., 1945. 
a' This would be similar to Locke's position that the child has only the capacity for knowledge and reason but has not 
developed these and to Mill's exclusion of children because they lack'maturity of faculties'. 
62 Spencer, Social Statics, 195. 
63 Ibid. (emphasis in original. ) 
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In other words since the rights involved are rights to the freedom to exercise the faculties 
they cannot follow from having had the opportunity to exercise the faculties. Rights relate to 
the possession of freedom, not to the possession, or state of development, of faculties. 
In summary Spencer argues that 'implicit faith in the conclusions of abstract equity' which 
'eschew prejudice and feelings' compels the conclusion that 
the law of equal freedom applies to children as much as to adults; that 
consequently the rights of children are coextensive with those of adults; 
that, as violating those rights, the use of coercion is wrong; and that the 
relationship now commonly existing between parents and children is 
therefore a vicious one. 64 
Spencer anticipates one final objection to his argument for children's rights which is a 
logical corollary of the position he maintains: 
if the rights of children are coextensive with those of adults, it must follow 
that children are equally entitled with adults to citizenship, and ought to be 
similarly endowed with political power. 65 
Instead of endorsing this conclusion as a rational (and reasonable) corollary of his 
argument Spencer shies away from the prospect of advocating political power for children. 
It is not the principle of equality of rights which is called into question by the objection, he 
contends, but the imperfection of human society. If the moral law were 'universally obeyed, 
government would not exist'. 66 If government did not exist then there would be no need for 
the enfranchisement of children. So the objection is a comment on the imperfection of 
human society and not on any defect in the conclusion that the rights of children are 
coextensive with the rights of adults. Whatever incompatibility there may be between 
children's rights and daily experience is due, not to any error in the arguments in favour of 
children's rights but to 'the necessary incongruity between the perfect law and the imperfect 
humanity'. 67 
Spencer does not elaborate on the political objection extensively. He must have been 
aware that in a perfect state of human society, in which law and government were 
unnecessary, not alone would there be no question of the enfranchisement of children but 
there would be no question of rights at all. It is precisely because of the imperfection of 
human society that rights are deemed to be a necessary moral phenomenon: ideal beings, 
in a perfect society, do not require rights. Nonetheless he anticipated once again a 
" ibid., 197. 
65 Ibid., 211/2. 
88 Ibid., 212. 
87 Ibid., 213. 
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significant direction which the debate on children's rights would subsequently take and a 
significant difficulty it would encounter: the demand for political empowerment. 
Spencer advances one final argument in favour of the rights of children. This argument is 
based, not on fundamental principles, but on the observation of the social and political 
progress that is brought about by the spread of liberty. 
'Mhe truth of a belief may be judged by the morality with which it is associated. 68 If a 
particular social practice or theory (such as the social subordination of women) is 
associated with 'the most degraded sections of our race' then we may 'safely pronounce 
that theory to be a false one'. The denial of rights (to women in particular) betokens a 'low 
type of social life 69 and the emancipation of women is a sign of social progress and the 
growing emancipation of society. In the same way the amelioration of the 'despotic rule' 
which parents and adults generally exercise over children can be seen as a sign of social 
progress for it is only in societies which are socially and politically undeveloped that women 
and children hold radically inferior positions in relation to men Tý Spencer adduces 
anthropological evidence purporting to show that in such societies 'wives are slaves and 
exist by sufferance, but that children hold their lives by the same tenure, and are sacrificed 
to the gods when fathers So Willo. 71 In general the advent ofGonstitutional liberty has been 
accompanied by a decline in the oppression of women and by a simultaneous 'decline in 
the rigour of paternal authority and in the severity of political oppression'. 72 There is a 
'uniformity of moral tone'which 'must necessarily pervade a nation's arrangements': 
As surely as a man's character shines through all his deeds, so surely does 
the character of a people shine through all its laws and customs .... The change which reforms one must at the same time reform all. The progress 73 
which perfects one must eventually perfect all . 
Ibid., 197. 
Spencer, Social Statics, 198. 
70 Spencer claimed also to see 'a tendency towards systems of non-coercive education' (198). These did not transpire. 
If anything, compulsory education became more wide-spread and more coercive in the succeeding century. 
71 Spencer, Social Statics, 198/9. 
72 Spencer, Social Statics, 199. ý 
73 Spencer, Social Statics, 200. For a co, mplementary, contemporary view see Bross, Donald C., 'The Rights of Children 
and National Development: Five Models', Child Abuse and Ngglect: The International Journal, 15, Supplement. 1,89-97, 
199. Bross argues that children's rights Cintended to be understood in the more general sense of the broad interests of 
children') 'are necessary, if not sufficient, to establish modem economic and political systems'. (90) He argues that 
national development will be impaired if children are not given rights; and that national development cannot occur without 
children's rights. In support of this thesis he identifies the causal connection between certain social phenomena and 
national development. He instances the centrality to economic development of literacy and education (92), the 
associated ideas of a strong school system and an emotionally supportive familial context (93), the centrality of 
questions about health, nutrttion and immunization (94), and the dependence of democracies on adequate development 
of children's sense of basic trust, autonomy, empathy, and self-discipline. (94) 
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So, as a consequence of the general improvement in the social, political, and moral quality 
of a nation's life brought about by the spread of liberty, relations between adults and 
children will also undergo transformation. 
Spencer's promotion of the rights of children at a time when there was a general 
presumption against extending rights to children and the objections he considered 
anticipated the major issues which have dominated the debate on children's rights ever 
since. In particular he realised that the issue of definition and the possibility of conflict 
between the putative rights of children and the obligations of adults to children would be 
problematic. He also realised that it was unsustainable to argue that children might have no 
rights at all and that the growth of children's rights as part of the general improvement of 
social and political conditions in liberal democracies was inevitable. 
Plan of work 
In Section 11 will try to identify those aspects of rights which are relevant to the ascription 
of rights to children. Chapter 1 examines the meaning, function and justification of rights. I 
will adopt there a view of rights as social constructions which are historically determined in 
and by concrete institutions. Chapter 2 addresses some of the issues raised in ascribing 
rights to children, in particular whether the distinctions which have been introduced since 
Spencer first raised the issue can be used to justify differential ascription in relation to 
adults and children. It also explores the contingent nature of rights of freedom: in order to 
become capable of exercising rights of any kind one must achieve certain minimal 
standards of human and social functioning. iRights are contingent on the capacities to 
exercise them being developed in the individual. Chapter 3 explores the connection 
between rights and the good life, and the role that needs and interests play in identifying 
and justifying rights, both freedom rights and welfare rights. 
Section 2 deals with the moral status of parents. Are parents in any sense the owners of 
'their children? What are the limits to parental powerl What weight and significance should 
be accorded to the natural (biological) relationship? Is there an identity of interest between 
the parent and the child? Chapter 4 considers whether there is a right to have children and, 
if so, whether this right is subject to limitations of any kind. I conclude that the right to beget 
and bear children is contingent on accepting the obligation to rear or to make provision for 
the rearing of the child. This in turn raises the question of the appropriateness of the 
concept of ownership in relation to children (Chapter 5). A trust model is proposed as the 
most likely to explain features of the parent/child relation which appear to invoke some 
conception of ownership. Finally the crucial question of the rights of natural parents over 
alternative carers is addressed in Chapter 6. 
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Is it necessary, or even possible, to arrive at a universally acceptable and defensible 
definition of 'childhood'? Can we go beyond the perception of childhood defined primarily in 
terms of a lack of adult characteristics to a more positive view of childhood as a 
developmental process within which there are discernible stages of progressive 
development? Section 3 begins with a consideration of some of the difficulties associated 
with defining the differences between adults and children for purposes of readng, control, 
and rights ascdption. In Chapter 71 argue that children must be seen in the psycho-social 
context in which they develop and acquire their most fundamental capacities. Adolescence 
is identified as the crucial transition from childhood to adulthood and the period during 
which the child begins to assert her separate identity as a significant person. The 
relationship between freedom and responsibility is an essential feature of the assertion of 
independence. Chapter 8 is devoted to an exploration of the idea of paternalism, its nature 
and limits. The political question is addressed in Chapter 9: should children have political 
rights given that they are intimately affected, as the children they are and as the adults they 
will one day be, by political decisions? Proposals to enfranchise children are examined. I 
suggest a richer and more developmental view of political participation than simply 
extending the franchise, one which would demand significant changes in the way we 
organise our children's lives. 
Finally, in Section 4, Chapter 10 looks at the communal context of rights and argues that a 
proper understanding of moral matunty is impossible without taking into account that moral 
functioning is based on virtues which are embedded in particular communities. The 
associated problems of subjectivity and parochialism are addressed. 
In the conclusion I will briefly identify some consequences for schools in terms of providing 
opportunities for meaningful moral/political formation within the educative community of the 
school itself. 
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Chapter 1: The Meaning Of Rights 
Moral and legal rights 
Rights are not natural phenomena. The exploration of rights will not follow the scientific 
model of observation, hypothesis formation and testing used to establish theories about the 
natural world. Rights are social or political phenomena created by, and operative in, the 
social realm. They pertain to persons, that is, to self-conscious human beings, who 
conceive of themselves as initiators of purposive actions. 1 Since rights are a human 
invention, not a natural phenomenon, the history of rights is largely the history of the 
struggle for their extension to hitherto excluded categories of people: 
The common-sense world in our culture has traditionally been mapped in 
such a fashion that some inhabitants, not all, were endowed with 'certain 
inalienable rights. These were the white males; the very construct 'men' 
specifically excludes women, members of minority groups, slaves, 
'barbarians' and children as well. 2 
Human rights pertain to what is essentially human. Other categories of rights are 'more 
specific, limited and, normally, derivative. '3 The reason for this priority is that as human 
beings we value a world in which human beings flourish. This is not because human 
existence is necessarily good but that it is, in the first instance, human. To abandon this 
anthropocentric priority would be to declare a moral neutrality as between various 
categories of living (and inanimate) thingS. 4 We consider human rights to be of supreme 
importance because they relate to 'those conditions that must be fulfilled if human action is 
to be possible either at all or with general chances of success in achieving the purposes for 
which humans act'. 5 
There are two categories of rights - legal rights and moral rights. The former are instituted 
by legal rules, the latter justified by 'principles of an enlightened conscience. 6 The validity 
of legal rights as claims is adjudged by reference to legal rules and principles; the validity 
of moral rights as claims is adjudged by reference to moral rules and principles. While legal 
and moral rights may be analogous they have different grounds and sanctions. Moral rights 
1 Freeden, Michael, ffig-his, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1991,6. 
2 Greene, 'An Overview of Children's Rights: A Moral and Ethical Perspective', Vardin, P. A., Brody, I. N., eds., 
Children's Rights: Contempgrary PersDectives, New York, Teachers College Press, 6. 
3 Freeden, Rights 6. 
4 Ibid., 9. The priority is not logical in its derivation: 'The waiving of human rights is humanly destructive rather than 
logically impossible. ' 
5 Gewirth, Alan, d9MAME! ", University of Chicago Press, 1962,3. 
6 Feinberg, J., 'The Nature and Value of Rights', Journal of Value Inqui , 4,1970,255. But see 
Young, R. 'Dispensing 
with Moral Rights', Political Theo , 6,1978,67-74. 
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may be among the grounds of legal rights but the converse is not the case: legal rights 
never create moral rights. 'A legal right ... describes an existing entitlement; a moral right 
prescribes a justifiable entitlement. ' 7 P, 
Evidence for the existence of a moral right is not empirical. Even anthropological or 
sociological evidence that a certain practice is widespread, or widely encouraged or 
tolerated, tells us nothing about its specifically moral value or desirability. Empirical 
evidence for legal rights may be found in legal codes, statutes, adjudications, court records, 
and so forth, but the legal right continues to require moral justification and critique. 
'Genuine moral rights, if there are any such things, are prior to and may be used to criticise 
positive rights, whether these are societal or legal'. 8 
If rights talk could be confined to legal contexts things would be straightforward. But then 
we might overlook the delicate relation between legal rights and moral principles or ideas in 
general. At least some moral principles or ideas are sources for the formulation of legal 
rights: the idea of equality has paved the way for the struggle for the rights of minorities and 
other oppressed groups such as black people, women, and children. This casts doubt on 
the foundational role of rights for it would indicate that moral ideals and principles come 
first and that rights are only a means of expressing these. 'Rights' may be just a shorthand 
for saying that an individual or group should be treated in accordance with a particular 
moral principle. If anything, the moral principles define the duties that people have, or 
support a teleological view that there is an end state which gives ultimate justification to the 
invocation of rights. 
The extension of rights to hitherto excluded groups has not been automatic. It has been 
(and continues to be) a matter of political struggle: rights are asserted, not received. 
An histodGally important factor in the generation of vadous rights, their 
acknowledgement and implementation, and their extension to increasingly 
larger segments of the population, has been the claims put forward and the 
demands made by individuals and groups against individuals and groups. 9 
7 Franklin, B., The Rights Of Children, London, Basil Blackwell, 1986,13. 
8 Campbell, T. D., 'The Rights of the Minor: as Person, as Child, as Juvenile, as Future Adult', Alston, P., Parker S., 
Seymore J., eds., Children. Rights and the Law, Oxford University Press, 1992,7. Acceptance of moral rights is not 
universal: Walker (D. M., The Oxford Compgnion to Law, Oxford University Press, 1980) holds that moral claims may 
be 
no more than mere wishes, aspirations, or assertions. 'in most political discourse, "we have a right' reaiiy only means 
"we want". ' 1070B. 
9 Golding, M., 'Towards a Theory of Human Rights', Monist, 52,4,1968,521. He refers later to'the plausible historical 
thesis that the granting and expansion of rights resulted from a struggle for rights 525. 
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The idea of natural law, and hence natural dghts, underlay the foundation of the American 
and other ConstitutionslO and so affected the daily lives of millions of people. If the 
relationship between legal rights and moral principles or moral ideas is recognised, then the 
idea of moral rights, which serve as a bridge between legal rights and moral pdnciples or 
ideas Gan also be acknowledged. 
Are rights necessary? 
Do we need the moral concept of rights at all? Bentham" was sceptical about moral rights 
because, while he accepted that legal rights follow from (positive) law, he held that moral 
rights follow from imaginary laws: 'from laws of nature, fancied and invented by poets, 
rhetoricians, and dealers in moral and intellectual poisons, come imaginary rights, a bastard 
brood of monsters'. The command of a sovereign is the criterion. Natural rights are just 
imaginary rights by contrast with the real rights produced by actual systems of law which 
flow from the command of a sovereign. 'From real law come real rights ... from imaginary 
laws come imaginary ones'. The so-called 'rights of man' are in fact merely 'counterfeit 
rights'. The language of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, for example, which 
looks as if it is describing rights is actually suggesting what rights there ought to be. It is 
giving reasons why there ought to be rights: 'a reason for wishing that a certain right were 
established, is not that right; want is not supply; hunger is not bread'. It is even worse to 
suppose that any of the alleged rights have been found for all time, that they are 
indefeasible, imprescriptible. 'Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible 
rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts'. In short Bentham accepts that there are 
rights within institutions such as laws but not that there are rights 'one might invoke when 
designing or criticising institutions., 12 
Maclntyre also takes the view that rights pre-suppose law, 'a socially established set of 
rules'. 13 He argues that to represent the individual as one who Gan, by his or her own 
untrammelled choice, determine a set of values to live by is simply a reflection of the 
dissolution of a social order and modes of life which give dignity and meaning to human 
activity. His preference is to recapture an Aristotelian teleology which can re-unite the three 
elements which provide the foundation for morality: 'the conception of untutored human 
10 For the historical connection between natural law and the American and French revolutions and subsequently the 
spread of rights as reflected in various international instruments see Bobbio, Norberto, The Age of Rights, Allan 
Cameron, trans., Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996,33-46. 
11 Bentham, Jeremy, Anarchical Fallacies, in A. I. Melden, ed., Human Rights, California, Wadsworth, 1970,28-39. 
12 Lyons, D., 'Human Rights and the General Welfare', Philosophy And Public Affairs, 6,1977,115. 
13 Macintyre, A., _AfftterVlrtUe, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981,67, and, generally, chapter 5. 
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nature, the conception of the precepts of rational ethics and the conception of human- 
nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised-its-te/os'. 14 
Macintyre claims that the notion of human rights is simply another attempt to 
rescue the autonomous moral agent from the predicament in which the failure of the Enlightenment project of providing him with a secular, rational 
justification for his moral allegiances had left him. 15 
We have lost the meaning of our moral language although we continue with its use. 
Maclntyre's dismissal of belief in rights as'one with belief in witches and in unicorns' is well 
known. 16 Every attempt to give adequate reasons for belief in rights has failed: they are not 
derivable from self-evident truths because there are no self-evident truths; intuition as a 
basis is notoriously unreliable; the 1949 UN Universal Declaration Of Human Rights gives 
no good reasons at all (neither does the more recent Convention on the Rights of the 
Child . Maclntyre concludes that natural or human rights are fictions. A further reason why 
we should not take rights seriously is that there is no cognate expression in any of a wide 
range of languages up to relatively modem times. He concedes that it does not follow from 
this that there are no natural or human rights but that no one Gould have known that there 
were. 17 Rights might have either have had to await discovery (they were there but no one 
knew it, and so they could not have been named) or invention (they were not there and so 
could not have been named). 
Of course Macintyre is essentially correct: there has not been an unambiguously successful 
attempt to prove the existence of rights. Yet belief in them persists. When belief in witches 
exercised a significant influence on people's moral, social, and political lives they were 
taken seriously. 18 This did not mean however that witches had objective existence: belief in 
them engendered their social consequences. The social consequences were real. Rights 
differ ontologically from witches in this respect: rights are their moral, social, and political 
effects. There is no sense in asserting that there are (objectively existing) rights which, 
somehow, incidentally to their objective existence exercise an influence on our moral, 
social, and political behaviour because that is not the kind of entity a right is. 19 A right is no 
14 Ibid., 51. 
15 Ibid., 65. 
16 Ibid., 67. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See Boyer, P., Nissenbaum, S., Salem Possessed: the Social Origins of Witchcraft, Harvard University Press, 1974, 
especially chapter 8; Evans-Pritchard, E. E., Witchcraft, Oracles. and Magic Among the Azande, (abridged), Eva Gillies, 
ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976. 
19 See Ingram, A., A Political Theo! y of Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, esp. 93-96. When we take rights as 
'ways of expressing moral judgements made within a conception of persons we avoid any metaphysical commitments'. 
(93) We do not have rights in the same way as we have bodily parts or functions. Rights cannot be asserted or denied 
'independently of the theoretical context in which they are embedded. ' (94) 
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more than its effect on these aspects of human relations. If belief in rights leads to the 
adaptation of human behaviour to accommodate the rights in question then the rights 
exist. 20 The same cannot be said of witches. Rights are brought into existence, in effect, by 
persuading people that they exist and that they must adjust their behaviour to 
accommodate them. This is precisely what happened historically: moral rights were neither 
discovered nor invented as objectively real entities. They evolved or were created as part 
of the human conversation, as a persuasive device and as a regulatory mechanism. Their 
persuasive function is to urge the extension of moral principles to hitherto excluded groups; 
their regulatory function is to arbitrate between competing claims of individuals or groups. 
It has been strongly argued, however, that the language of rights is redundant. 21 Brown 
distinguishes two conceptions of rights: the derivative and the foundational. 22 According to 
the derivative conception rights are of secondary importance to some higher moral order 
(or some more basic moral principles) from which they derive. This position is also argued 
by Mary Wamock. 23 Like Bentham she argues that there is no legal right without a 
corresponding law. 
(T)he important thing about dghts is that they are necessadly contained 
and defined by law (or at least a convention) and that they are therefore 
universal. Anyone who is govemed by the law is given the dght under that 
law. And the claim to a dght must be proved (or disproved). Whether or not 
you are being deprived of something dghtfully yours should be capable of 
being settled, if necessary, in CoUrt. 24 
Secondly, she argues that the moral rights we claim are simply intermediary concepts 
which cloak the reality that talk (and disagreement) about moral rights is simply talk (and 
disagreement) about morality. 25 
This also appears to be the view of Feinberg. 26 He argues that rights are valid claims which 
are claims to something and claims against someone. 'To have a right is to have a claim 
against someone whose recognition as valid is called for by some set of goveming rules or 
moral principles. '27 The act of claiming does not justify having a claim: to have a claim is to 
be in a position to make a claim. The validity of the claim must be antecedently 
established, presumably on other grounds. That is to say that the validity of the claim 
20 It is the common consent that rights have effect which ultimately gives them the effect. 
See Searle, John, R., The 
Construction of 3ocial Reaft Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1996. 
21 Brown, A., y: Theodes-of the Just Socift London: Penguin Books, 19B6,102 - 
110. 
22 Ibid., 102 
23 Warnock, M., Oxford, Blackwell, 1992,17-20. 
24 Ibid., 71. 
25 Ibid., 72. 
26 Feinberg, 'The Nature and Value of Rights', passim. 
27 Ibid., 257, emphasis added. 
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cannot be justified simply by appealing to the right which is being claimed: this would be 
circular. There must be some principle, which is independent of the claim itself, which can 
be appealed to in order to validate it. 
Does the term 'rights' add anything significant to our moral discourse? Is it only of rhetorical 
or ideological significance? Could we, in fact, abandon the language of rights entirely and 
still say everything we need to say about our moral relations? What is the difference 
between saying that something is wrong, or that there is a duty not to do it, and saying that 
someone (or something) has a right that it not be done? 
(I)s there any difference between saying, for instance, that it is wrong to 
torture animals or that there is a duty not to torture animals, on the one 
side, and saying that animals have a right not to be tortured, on the other: 
28 that is the problem of the significance of rights language. 
Moral discourse can go quite a distance without employing the 'quasi-legal conception of 
rights'29 and has done so for much of human history. Do principles about what it is morally 
right to do underpin rights? If there is a basis for ascribing a moral right to someone, and if 
this basis requires us to act in accord with the right, then it would seem that the basis and 
the requirement can be interpreted as indicating a morally obligatory course of conduct with 
respect to that person independently of whether we Gall it a right or not. 
Golding illustrates the distinction between 'right' and 'rights'with the example of Socrates in 
the Crito. Socrates wants to know whether it is just or unjust, right or wrong, to escape his 
sentence: in rights terminology, does Socrates have the right to escape his sentence? It is 
the same moral dilemma but the latter form switches our perception of the problematic 
situation from an 'objective' notion of rightness to a 'subjective notion of rights possessed 
by individuals': 
The word 'right' has a dual use and, therefore, an ambiguity that can 
bedevil the ethical theorist. It may be that in the last analysis the notions of 
moral, natural or human rights are parasitic on the idea of 'what is right'. 30 
Historically the importance of rights was reinforced by the increasing influence of legal 
ideas on ethical thought and the rise of individualism and the nation state. 31 
The language of rights has a special significance within moral discourse because it marks 
out a special domain of morality. Firstly, the language of rights carries with it, in a way that 
28 Golding, M., 'The Primacy of Welfare Rights', Social Philosophy and Polic , 1,2,1984,122. 
29 Ibid., 128. 
3C) Ibid., 126f7. For an account of the etymology of the word and the relationship between 'rights' and 'right' see Dagger, 
Richard, 'Rights', in Terence Ball, et al., eds., Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, Cambridge, University 
Press, 1989,292,308. 
31 Golding, 'The Primacy of Welfare Rights', 119-128. 
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non-rights moral discourse does not, a recognition that the object claimed as a matter of 
right is an element of, or a means to, another's personal good. While it could be argued that 
there is in any event a personal duty to promote the personal good of others the language 
of rights establishes their claim to the promotion of their good. 32 The moral centre of 
gravity, as it were, switches from the moral obligations of the agent to the moral 
entitlements of the recipient. Talk of rights is 'one with talk of what is right and wrong from 
the perspective of individual agents'. 33 Talk of right and wrong represents the point of view 
of the agent whereas rights talk represents the point of view of the recipient. When a right 
holder's right is violated, he is wronged, (whoever has violated his right has done wrong), 
and the relevant demands, claims or complaints can be validly made on his behalf. 34 This 
is not to say that rights are a substitute for power; they are not, except in the restricted 
sense of moral power. While rights are conventions for according power to the otherwise 
powerless by themselves they are ineffectual. 'Mhey depend upon governmental power, 
which is external to them, for any effectiveness in the real world'. 35 They also depend, as 
Mill realised, 36 on the power of social opinion whether this is enshrined in law or not. 
Rather than confer immediate power a right ascribes status or worth to the rights-bearer: 
'Mhe ultimate purpose of ... rights is to secure for each person a fundamental moral 
status. '37 This status or worth requires, as well as the specific duty called forth by the right 
in question, a certain regard for those who are rights-bearers. 'This attitude is best not 
described as a duty at all; it is an ideological or ontological view of the social world'. 38 It is a 
recognition (or an assertion) that the world is populated, not by potential recipients of the 
duty of others (the ideology of charity), but by autonomous individuals of equal standing 
one with the other. Feinberg's characterization of rights expresses the distinction succinctly: 
rights are 
especially sturdy objects to 'stand upon', a most useful sort of moral 
furniture ... Having rights enables us to 
'stand up like men', to look others in 
the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone. To think 
of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but properly proud, to 
32 bid., 134-136. 
33 Ingram, A Political Theo , 93. 
34 Haskar, Vinit, 'The Nature of Rights', Archiv fur Rechts und Sozialphilosophie, 64,183-204,1978. 
-35 Heslep, Robert D., 'The Power of the Right of Education', Proceedings of Philosophy of Education, 48,1992,205. 
36 mill, i. S., gn Libedy, in H. B. Acton, ed., Utilitarianism. Libeft Representative Government, London, J. M. Dent & 
Sons Ltd., 1972,69. 'All that makes e)dstence valuable to anyone, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the 
actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on 
many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. ' 
37 Gewirth, Humaa R[gh_ts, 5. 
38 Freeden, BAi-h-ts, 9. 
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have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be worthy of the love 
and esteem of others. 39 
The difference can be illustrated with reference to children's rights. There are two ways of 
describing our moral relation to children. We can say that children ought to be looked after 
or we can say that children have a right to be looked after. We can justify the former with 
reference to motives which have nothing to do directly with the welfare of the child. Swift's 
'modest proposal' to fatten children for consumption is a clear example, as are educational 
policies designed exclusively, or primarily, with a view to promoting economic or 
technological development. The assertion that children have a right to be looked after is 
based on a conviction that 
each and every child is a being whose needs and capacities command our 
respect, so that denial to any child of the wherewithal to meet his or her 
needs and to develop his or her capacities would be wrong in itself ... and would be wrong regardless of the ulterior disadvantages or advantages to 
anyone else, 40 
Brown claims that rights are only a strong way of presenting a moral claim, that when we 
claim something as a right we are asserting that there is a good moral reason to respect or 
promote our freedom in this particular case. He considers Dworkin's point that someone 
can have the right to do something that is wrong for him to do thus showing that rights have 
independent moral existence. He objects that 'if something is morally wrong, isn't it merely 
perverse to say you have a right to do it? ... the rights thesis implausibly maintains the 
existence of a sui generis right to do wrong. '41 The perversity of the claim of there being a 
right to do wrong might be given sharper focus if we try to imagine whether a legal right 
could confer the right to break the law. 
Brown concludes that rights are not foundational entities and that we can construe them, 
without loss of plausibility, as claims which can be expressed in terms of familiar moral 
considerations such as need, desert, merit, or Utility. 42 
The function of rights 
Rights are means to the protection and promotion of human well-being. It is not the rights 
which have special protection but the developmental capacities which the rights protect. To 
39 Feinberg, 'The Nature and Value of Rights', 251. Similarly a right is 'a just (or justified) entitlement for making 
effective claims and demands'. To have rights is to be free of a master-slave authoritarian relation. Bandman, B., 'Some 
Legal, Moral and Intellectual Rights of Children', Educational Theo , 27,3,1977,170. 
40 MacCormick, N., 'Children's Rights: a Test-Case for Theories of Rights', Archiv fur Rechts und Sozialphilosophi 
62,1976,309. Part of Rousseau's contribution to the growth of children's rights was to shift our perceptions from the 
extrinsic value of children to the intrinsic value of childhood. 
41 Ibid. ' 10&7. 
42 Brown, Mode n Polftigýýý, 107. 
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assert that human beings have ýdghts is to assert that it is not just the existence of human 
beings which is of value but 'their development, self-expression, mutual support and 
happiness'. 43 Rights are not basic theoretical items, but instruments for the protection of 
these basic values which are. 
The strongest contemporary rights theory holds that a right is a 'side-constraint' on the 
action of others. '(W)here some goal or good conflicts with someone's right his waiver must 
be sought if that goal or good is to be legitimately pursued'. 44 A weaker theory is that 
although rights are in some way independent, foundational, or sui genefis, ' and require 
special consideration from others, they can be over-ridden without the consent of the rights 
holder but only in the most extreme cases. The weaker view attempts a compromise 
between rights and consequential Gonsiderations. 45 
The first of these theories is an absolutist view of rights whereby rights can never be 
legitimately violated, that is, overridden without the consent of the right holder. They are 
absolute in the sense not that they can never be overridden but that the consent of the 
rights holder is required. Brown takes the absolutist view to be 'untenable' because 
ultimately it fails to address the question of 'moral catastrophe'. He might have added that, 
within its own terms of reference, it is also incoherent: any theory of rights in which one is 
required to respect the rights of others cannot be absolutist and must be, however 
minimally, consequential ist: there is always a hidden 'unless. 
The weaker view, the 'compromise theory' recognises the 'unless'. This theory will need to 
specify exactly when a right may be outweighed by other considerations. But then the 
decisiveness which rights are supposed to confer in problematic situations is lost to 
'interminable casuistry concerning just how much suffering, real or expected, sanctions 
overriding rights'. 46 In short the weaker theory gives us no guide in determining, in specific 
cases, whether rights or consequences should finally prevail. 
47 So rights cannot play the 
role assigned to them. 
Rights express moral judgements within a particular conception of persons. Whatever 
scheme of rights we endorse is inevitably tied to our judgements about 
the importance of 
certain freedoms and capacities, our 'philosophically favoured conception of 
the person'. 48 
43 Freeden, Ejah-ts, 10. 
44 Brawn, Mode n Pol tical Philosol2by, 104. 
46 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 105. 
47 Ibid., 106. 
48 ingram, &-P-Olftical TheOrN, 94. 
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Moral rights may be regarded as those interests which are thought to be of 
such significance to the life of the human individual that they ought to be 
given priority in the organisation of societal existence whenever possible. 49 
As already noted rights do not have objective existence: they are features of human 
thinking and practice. Moral entities such as rights (or values or standards) are defined in 
social situations which promote particular views of human capacity and the conditions 
necessary for human flourishing. 50 Various social contract scenarios are not accounts of 
some supposed actual historical happening, they are simply heuristic devices which attempt 
to clarify an already existing situation. They do not create the political reality, they attempt 
to understand and explain it. Nonetheless the design of social contract situations 'must 
embody some assumption about the political context (they aim) to clarify', 51 including a 
view on human capacity and flourishing. A right-based moral or political theory has to 
explain whether the rights it endorses are universally determinable a priori by some kind of 
reason, or are historically determined in and by concrete institutions. 52 
In this work I will adopt the latter position, agreeing with Mackie when he writes 
I am confident that no normative theory ... can 
in the end be held to be 
objectively valid. Normative systems ... are made 
by men, independently 
or collectively, by explicit invention or by unconscious development. ... But 
these fundamental principles are not a matter of truth or falsehood, but of 
choice and endorsement. So we are not to look for any set of self-evident 
truths about what basic rights people have, nor to think our theory any the 
weaker because we cannot discover such truths. Rather we have to look for 
some system of basic rights which we are ourselves prepared seriously to 
ascribe to people in general, and which there is some hope that people in 
general may come to recognise one another as having. 53 
Not all rights, of course, are basic. Non-basic derivative rights draw their authority and force 
from the basic rights. Rights can be derived from other rights in 'fairly obvious logical ways' 
including 'a causal derivation of rights from rights'. Mackie concludes that it seems to be 'at 
least formally possible to have a system of moral ideas in which some rights are 
fundamental and other rights ... are derived 
from these'. 54 Basic rights might be of the kind 
identified by Mill, freedom of thought and opinion, freedom of tastes or pursuits, freedom of 
association with others. Derivative rights might be the specific forms of expression that the 
49 Campbell, 'The Rights of the Minor, 9. Campbell appears to confuse the rights and the interests: they are not 
identical. The rights are devices to protect the interests. 
50 Mackie, J. L., I Wrong, Penguin Books, 1990,108. 
51 Ingram, A PolkaLlbM, 97. Her'social contract situation' of choice is 'liberal democracy, a political culture 
that 
insists on the democratic equality of all citizens and recognises 
the importance in their lives of certain fundamental 
liberties'. 
52 Mackie, _Ethics, 
116. 
53 Mackie, J. L., 'Rights, Utility and External Costs', in Mackie, J., Mackie, P., eds., 
Persons and Values: Selected 
Pa rs Vol. 2, oxford, Clarendon Press, 22011. 
54 Mackie, _Ethics, 
107. 'Fundamental' here does not mean derived from a pfidd principles, but simply logically prior. 
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basic rights may take: the freedom to be an anarchist (or conservative), the freedom to 
collect butterflies, the freedom to belong to a trade union. 
The fundamental source of the rights is'optimal human functioning. This is 
a practical, common-sense desideraturn inasmuch as we want human beings to exist and to exist well. The needs and capacities protected by 
rights are humanly functional and necessary for the rights-bearer, rather 
than logically entailed by our understanding of what is objectively right. 55 
Human rights 
The statement that all men (human beings) are equal can be shown to be empirically false 
by a wide variety of tests. But it is not an empirical statement: it is a declaration of an 
aspiration. There are certain respects in which all persons should be deemed equal. One of 
these respects is the belief that all human beings have common developmental capacities 
which need to be protected and enhanced. Rights are based on this belief. These 
developmental capacities56 are crucial to human flourishing and are the basis of 
fundamental rights. Rights are socially constructed devices through which constraint may 
be imposed on the action of others in the service of certain values (including these 
developmental capacities) when it is held that these values justify constraints. Rights also 
express empirical beliefs about the fate of those values with and without the constraints. 57 
Is being human a necessary and sufficient condition for enjoying rights? As long as being 
human does not admit of degrees then all human beings would appear to have these rights 
to the same degree. This would allow us to give a meaning to the slogan 'all human beings 
are equal' which is not descriptive (they are not), or normative (they are not to be treated 
equally but according to relevant inequalities). It is so if we consider'all human beings are 
equal' as an analytic proposition to the effect that the predicate 'human' has an 'all or 
nothing' character, that it does not allow of gradations of 'humanness', of being more or less 
human. This being so then all human beings are equally human beings and therefore have 
rights to the same degree. 58 
Is it true that the predicate 'human' does not admit of gradations of completeness i. e. has 
this 'all or nothing' character'? There are two alternatives in analysing the concept. We can 
read it in relation to certain biological properties which are universal among human beings 
or we can read it in relation to differential traits such as rationality, knowledge, experience, 
autonomy, 'maturity of faculties', etc. 
55 Freeden, BAIMMS, 9. 
56 Freeden's'vital attributes', Ibid., 9. 
57 Ingram, &Egftjgýý, 1145. 
58 Nino, C. S., The Ethics Of Human Rights, Oxford, University Press, 1991,35. 
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The biological interpretation appears to give a non-gradual character to 'human'. But is it 
relevant to the ascription of basic moral rights? It is difficult to see how biological facts can 
of themselves be morally relevant. It is a commonplace (though contested) of ethical 
discourse that statements of fact (descriptive) cannot lead logically to statements of value 
(prescriptive) without the mediation of some ethical principle. Of themselves the biological 
facts appear not to provide the kind of warrant necessary to conclude that we ought to treat 
all human beings in a particular way59 much less identify the ways in which we ought to 
treat them. 
The legitimacy of the fact/value dichotomy has, however, been challenged in a way which 
is relevant. MacIntyre identifies functional concepts as concepts (watch, farmer) which 
cannot be defined independently of their particular excellence (good watch, good farmer). 
Each of this class of concepts (which includes persons and actions) 'has a given specific 
purpose or function'. Excellence (for a watch, a farmer) is part and parcel of the definition 
of the entity. To understand what a watch (or farmer) is, is to understand what a good watch 
(farmer) is. If we take 'Man' as a functional concept (that is as having essential human 
purposes or functions) as the ancients (e. g. Aristotle) did then there is no warrant for 
concluding that 'ought' does not follow from 'is' in moral matters. That is to say, 'man' 
stands to 'good man' as 'watch' stands to 'good watch' or 'farmer stands to 'good farmer 
within the classical tradition. To talk about a good watch, a good farmer, a good man is to 
make factual statements. On this view human action is to be explained teleologically, that 
is, 'with reference to a hierarchy of goods which provide the ends of human action ... the 
facts about human action include the facts about what is valuable to human beings 
However, 'once the notion of essential human purposes or functions disappears from 
morality, it begins to appear implausible to treat moral judgements as factual statements'. 60 
The differential traits invoked in the second option would seem to be more relevant to the 
ascription of rights but they are of a gradual kind so that if the predicate 'human' were 
defined in terms of them it too would acquire a gradualist character. Thus the slogan, 'all 
human beings are equal', would be false even in its analytic interpretation since the traits 
are not equal from individual to individual or within an individual from time to time. Nino 
concludes that the presupposition 
that the concept of moral person must denote a class of individuals (like 
the class of hurilan beings) distinguished by factual properties that are 
mentioned in fundamental moral principles as conditions for being entitled 
to certain rights 
-99 Maclntyre, _AfterVirtue, 
54-57. Mary Midgley (The Ethical Primate: Humans. Freedom. and Moral , London, 
Routledge, 1994, passim) argues cogently that human morality is a function of factual human sociability, not a result of 
some rational process like the Enlightenment project which 'divides thought radically 
from feeling. ' 152. 
60 Macintyre, A_fterVirtue, 81. 
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must be rejected. 61 His preferred strategy is Kantian, to start from the moral principles from 
which basic rights are derived, rather than beginning with the concept of human being. 
Once this has been done we can then proceed 'to define the class of moral persons as the 
class of all those individuals (or entities) who posses the properties which are in fact 
necessary to enjoy or exercise those dghts'. 62 
But this will not do. The moral principles themselves are abstracted from pre-existing 
human practices. The Kantian and other constructivist approaches to the problem are 
premised on selecting only one or two human capacities (rationality, freedom) and 
disregarding others like love, loyalty, sociability, generosity, which are indisputably part of 
lived moral experience. 
Justifying rights: a case study 
Gewirth63 identifies a number of unsuccessful attempts to justify moral rights. These 
include intuitionism which (like claims to self-evidence) provides no way of choosing 
between conflicting intuitions, and institutionalism (i. e. rights arise from transactions 
grounded in formal or informal rules of institutions, such as promising) which is irreparably 
damaged by the fact that some institutions may be judged to be morally wrong. 
Gewirth also rules out claims that rights are grounded in interests for two reasons. First of 
all, interests are at best a necessary condition for having rights, they are not, on their own, 
sufficient. The argument from interests raises the problem of making the transition from the 
empirical identification of interests (descriptive) to the (prescriptive/normative) identification 
of rights. In response to this we could say, however, that the statement of interest itself 
must invoke some normative criteria. Interest is a developmental concept: in both the 
dispositional and normative senses (interested in and in one's intereso there is at least the 
echo of an evaluation. In the first case a preference for X over Y; in the second case an 
appeal to some end or end-state (teleological) which allows discrimination between this or 
that interest. To say that it is in one's interest to be, to have, or to do X only makes sense if 
there is some end-point which gives X value and relevance. Gewirth's second objection to 
interests is stronger: if interests entailed rights then there would be an unmanageable 
proliferation of rights. This would be so only if we conceded the principle of a right for each 
and every interest. But why should we not accept that universal human characteristics 
rather than restricted inegalitarian characteristics are the generators of human rights? 
61 Nino, The Ethig ýOf HN-Man-Rig-hts, 36. 
62 Ibid., 36. 
63 Gewirth, HqM? _n_R_i9Lh_1 , 
43,44. 
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Gewirth further objects that the argument that rights devolve from intrinsic worth or dignity 
is question begging. There is no more reason to accept intrinsic worth in the first place than 
there is to accept dghts in the first place. The intdnsic worth argument adds nothing to what 
we already know: how do we identify that which has intdnsic worth? This position with 
regard to 'worth' appears to be based on a confusion, however. 'Worth' is not an empidcal 
quality like mass, colour, location, nationality etc., it is an ascribed quality: things have 
worth for us. To describe this worth as intrinsic is not to aftdbute some objective reality to 
the worth: it is more like an assertion that the asedption of worth is more than subjective 
preference, that it is universally ascribed within a particular community to a particular thing, 
and that therefore ithas a status which goes beyond the particular evaluation or preference 
of any individual. It is an aspect of social reality. 64 
Gewirth accepts, however, that questions of justification may ultimately be irrelevant. 
Rights judgements and moral rights are prescriptive, advocatory, urging that 'certain facts 
be brought into existence'. 65 Nevertheless, we continue to be persuaded that it is possible 
to adjudicate between competing rights claims. Therefore there must be at least a belief in 
some basis from which we can judge between competing claims. 
Gewirth attempts to ground human rights in a rationalist conception of the person as an 
autonomous, purposive agent. Human rights are a species of moral rights which are equally 
possessed by all humans by virtue of their humanity. Human rights are moral because they 
are based upon or justifiable through some valid moral pdnciple. A moral principle 
sets forth as categodcally obligatory certain requirements for action that are 
addressed at least in part to the actual or prospective agents and that are 
concerned with furthedng the interests ... of persons or recipients other 66 than or in addition to the agent or the speaker. 
The importance of human (ights resides in the fact that they are rights to the necessary 
conditions of : human action. The necessary conditions of human action are those conditions I 
which must be fulfilled if human action is to be possible 'either at all or with general 
chances of success in achieving the purposes for which humans act'. 
67 
Gewirth argues that as prospective purposive agents human beings frame objectives 
before pursuing them. In order to be a prospective purposive agent you must recognise 
that 
freedom and well-being are necessary goods, that is they are necessary means 
to any 
objective you may have. Consequently any agent must claim rights 
to freedom and well- 
64 See Searle, The Construction of Social Reafily, chapters I and 2. 
65 Gewirth, H9MRIBi", 45- 
66 ibid., 1. 
67 ibid., 3. 
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being, or he will be denying the conditions which are necessary to his being 'able to act 
either at all or with general chances of success in fulfilling the purposes for which he 
acts'. 158. As a further consequence an agent must recognise that everyone else has these 
rights to freedom and well-being since all agents equally possess the same sufficient 
grounds. Freedom and well-being also comprise the object of human rights. 
The reasons for basing human rights on the necessary conditions of human action are the 
crucial importance of the latter. They connect rights directly to morality, they are more 
specific than other concepts, they emphasise that the 'ultimate purpose of the rights is to 
secure for each person a certain fundamental moral status', and, finally, they provide a way 
of proof that there are human rights. 69 
Human rights are not contingent but necessary: the form of human rights is not if/then (as 
in 'If a promise has been made, then ... ') but 
Because every human being must have certain goods if he is to be able to 
act either at all or with chances of success in general in achieving his 
purposes, it follows that , he has rights to these necessary goods. The 'because' and 'if in the antecedent are necessary in relation to the general 
conditions of action: they are not contingent on persons'variable choices or 
decisions, since they pertain to the very possibility of action and successful 
action. Hence no person can rationally disavow either the necessary goods 
or the consequent human rights. 70 
All human beings have human rights in full 'to the extent that they are inherently capable of 
exercising them'. 71 This inherent capacity requires that one is a rational agent in the 
minimal sense of having purposes one wants to fulfil, being able to control behaviour 
accordingly, while knowing the particular circumstances of the action. Variation in the 
possession of human rights matches variations in the inherent capacity: '... the human rights 
pertain equally to all humans who have the minimal degree of rationality needed for 
action'. 72 The requirements of intentionality, control, knowledge, and rationality would 
appear to exclude at least infants and very young children from the category of rights 
holder. 
There are two categories of individuals for whom the rights might be restricted: those who 
may not be capable of exercising the right at all (he instances the right to education for 
persons with severe mental handicap) and those who may not be capable of exercising the 
68 Ibid., 4. 
69 Ibid., 5. Human rights are 'normative relations to objects which one must have in order to be an agent ... they are the 
necessary basis and focal point of all morality since no morality ... is possible without the necessary goods of action 
which are the objects of human righW. 6. 
70 Ibid., 7. 
71 Ibid., 8. 
72 Ibid., 8. 
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right without causing serious harm to themselves or others (he instances very young 
children). 73 
There are three stages in Gewirth's argument. Firstly a rational agent claims rights of 
freedom and well-being as essential conditions of action. Secondly, these claims are 
transformed into moral rights by an appeal to a principle of universalization. Thirdly, the 
scope, content, and limits of the rights are spelled out. 74 
The first difficulty in Gewirth's position is the logical gap between the assertion of a 
necessary good and the declaration of a right. Even if something is acknowledged to be a 
necessary good there is still the problem of deriving a right from this fact. Claiming that 
something is an essential means to some end does not necessarily give one a right to it in 
the sense that there is a moral obligation on others to respect the claim. The move from 
claim (I want, I need) to right is 'dubious in its rationality'75 and certainly appears to be illicit 
by virtue of the fact/value dichotoMy. 76 To say that something is a necessary good for 
someone (A needs X) is not sufficient to establish the necessary good as a right (A has a 
right to X). 77 Gewirth does not succeed in showing that anyone other than the agent himself 
has an obligation to respect his freedom and well-being as a moral agent. The objection is 
not to the primacy of freedom and well-being in moral agency but to the way in which 
Gewirth proceeds from this recognition to the assertion of rights, that is the obligation on 
others to respect the freedom and well-being. 78 This difficulty is conceded by Gewirth. 
Secondly, rights claims presuppose that there is a set of rules which come into existence 
only in specific historical circumstance because they are socially established. While the 
needs or wants which underlie the rights claims may be 'universal features of the human 
condition' rights are not; they are expressions of the prioritization of selected needs and 
wants by specific human communities: rights and rights-related duties 'can arise only in a 
social context'. 79 Gewirth's analysis neglects the inter-personal which is vital to the very 
existence of the comprehensibility of rights. A conception which relies on historical 
contingencies does not belong to the characterisation of the rational agent upon which 
Gewirth bases his argument. 80 This is a crucial issue. Gewirth begins from a position of 
73 The vagueness of the category'very young children' is notable. 
74 Gewirth, Human Rights, 41-78. 
75 Brown, Mode -n Political Philosophy, 110. MacIntyre makes essentially the same objection. After Virtu , 645. 
76 See Paul, Jeffrey, 'Gewirth's Solution to the "Is-Ought" Problem', The Personalist, 60,1979,442-7. MacIntyre's 
critique of the'No "oughr' conclusion from "is" premises' principle may be relevant here, however. 
He argues that the 
principle proceeds from'an impoverished moral vocabulary. See MacIntyre, After Virtue, 
Chapter 5. 
77 Golding, M., 'From Prudence to Rights: a Critique', Nomos: Human Rights, 23,1981,165-174. 
78 Lomasky, L., 'Gewirth's Generation Of Rights', Philosophical Quarterly, 31,1981,248-253. 
79 Golding, 'The Primacy of Welfare Rights', 130. 
80 MacIntyre, -AfterVlrtue, 
6415. 
Paqe 16 
Chapter 1: The Meaning Of Rights 
moral neutrality: his agent is a 'rational [or prudential] amoraliStI. 81 The rational amoralist 
Gan recognise certain objects as goods for himself or even concede that they are goods for 
others but such 'goods' are always qualified because the approach of the rational amoralist 
is prudential, not moral. He recognises goods only as means for his own or others' desired 
ends. 
More importantly terms such as 'right', 'duty', and 'obligation, are not part of the rational 
amoralist's lexicon. The term ... a right" does not occur in his basic language. The amoralist, 
so to speak, does not play in the moral ballpark. '82 The rational amoralist never claims 
anything as a right. He can make claims, what he wants other's to do or to give to him, but 
such claiming does not amount to having claims (rights) without the intervention of other 
factors. 83 The nearest that the rational amoralist can get to rights is to claim a 'prudential 
right', i. e. one that derives from prudent self-interest. This can be the case when a plurality 
of rational amoralists engage in a situation (the pursuit of a mutually desirable outcome) 
which requires 'mutual co-operation and mutual undertakings. 84 But the principles to which 
they appeal are not moral principles in the sense that they apply to all in all relevant 
circumstances. At best they are rules which apply only in the immediate circumscribed 
circumstances. 
Gewirth concedes the logical gap between the identification of a necessary good for an 
agent and the declaration of a right. But he claims that this logical gap will be closed when 
we move from an outside view of the situation to an intemal, conative view. Even from this 
conative view, however, it is difficult to see how a statement of one's own wants (or even 
'needs'), or an assertion that such-and-such are necessary goods, can be prescdptive for 
other's. 
In short, the claim on the co-operation of others is being made on the basis of self-interest 
and for purely prudential reasons. It is not a claim of right. For the rational amoralist to 
claim that something is 'due to him' from his own standpoint is no more than the tautology 
that'his necessary goods are necessary for him'. 85 
A third major weakness in Gewirth's theory is that freedom and well-being are not 
necessary means to some objectives human beings might have. Freedom is not an 
advantage to the incompetent or weak willed, or generally to those who are unable to 
exercise the freedom. There are legitimate objectives for which well-being is not necessary: 
81 Golding, 'From Prudence to Rights', 167. 
82 bid., 168. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 169. 
85 Ibid., 171. 
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suicide, martyrdom, terminal hunger stdke. 86 Objecting to the counter-examples involves 
criticising the ends involved and hence invokes more than the notion of agency. To see 
Gewirth's 'necessary good' as such we must have a prior system of ends for which they are 
necessary and this 'undermines any claim the theory has to provide foundations for morality 
in rights'. 87 
Gewirth's attempt to find a conclusive fundamental justificatory principle for human rights 
shows a number of weaknesses which characterise all such attempts to found rights on 
purely rational considerations. There is a logical gap between the description of putative 
real situations and any moral principle binding on all; the account neglects the inter- 
personal which is the context which give rights their substance and meaning; basing such a 
heuristic on the interests of an isolated asocial individual, who is by definition rationally 
amoral, makes it impossible to connect the experience of the individual to the real world of 
social interaction; while freedom and well-being may be necessary means to some moral 
objectives there are legitimate human objectives fdr which they are neither appropriate nor 
necessary; an adequate account of moral action requires an understanding of ends towards 
which the moral action is directed. 
It is not just Gewirth's but all attempts to find a foundational rational principle for rights or, 
more generally, for morality, which are doomed to failure. What Maclntyre calls the 
'Enlightenment project'88 had to fail because it was radically separated from the context 
which gave sense to the moral language that it used and the moral precepts that it 
attempted to justify. In particular the loss of any conception (indeed, the abandonment of 
the entire concepo of a human essence or telos meant that, in a sense, there was nothing 
for ethics (or the practice of morality) to do. While we retain the concept of untutored 
human nature ('human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be') we have lost the concept of 'human- 
nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised-its-te/os' and so, consequently, have also lost the 
functional understanding of morality, which was the means of transforming the former to 
the latter. Attempts to provide a rational grounding for morality fail because, in short, they 
have no place to go, there are no ends towards which moral action is directed. 
A foundational principle? 
Human beings are not interchangeable one for another; they are not just individuals, they 
are persons. There is no supreme impersonal standard against which all individuals are 
interchangeable or in terms of which all ends are commensurable. There cannot be a 
rational obligation or duty 'to sacrifice for the sake of someone else's interests that which is 
86 More prosaically, parents will often sacrifice their own well-being for the benefit of their children. 
87 Brown, MgdgM29ft! Oýý, 109. 
88 Maclntyre, A_fterVIrtue, chapters 4 and 5. 
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essential to (one's) own ability to construct a worthwhile life'. 89 The latter would be 
supererogation not duty 
The main function of rights in a deontological theory is to ensure that on specifiable 
occasions we cannot be forced to do or suffer something for the sake of some good. In 
other words it is morally unacceptable to subordinate an individual to a purpose to which 
she has not freely consented. If the good is the good of the individual then the rights rule 
out paternalism, if it is the general good then rights rule out consequentialism in general. 90 
Bobbio believes that the search for an absolute foundational principle for human rights is 
misconceived. In the first place human rights are ill-defined: every attempt to find, or 
derive, universal foundational principles has proved to be inconclusive. 'Human rights' is 
conceptually vague; most of the attempted definitions are tautologous: if they tell us 
something about the status of the concept it is at the expense of the content and vice 
versa; where content is the issue it is bedevilled by value judgements and the ideological 
position of the interpreter. 91 
In the second place human rights constitute a variable category: they are historically 
contingent and change in keeping with historical developments. They are not fundamental 
by their nature. 'That which appears to be fundamental in a given historical era or 
92 civilization, is not fundamental in other eras or civilisations'. 
Thirdly, human rights are heterogeneous: many of the demands in declarations of human 
rights are mutually incompatible. Bobbio argues that instead of looking for a single all- 
embracing principle we should talk of principles of human rights. Some human rights are 
'valid in every situation and concern all human beings without distinction, such as the right 
not to be enslaved or not to be tortured'. 93 Such rights have 'absolute value', a privileged 
status which only arises in 'a situation in which fundamental rights do not compete with 
other fundamental rights'. 94 In the case of slavery and torture, for example, any putative 
right to own slaves or to inflict torture 'is universally condemned'. 95 On the other hand many 
rights are adversarial: it is not possible to assert one (the right not to be enslaved) without 
denying another (the right to own slaves). 96 Both the right which is being asserted and the 
89 Lomasky, Persons. Rights, and the Moral Communay, Oxford, University Press, 1987,53. 
90 Brown, Modem Political Philosol2hy, 104. 
91 Bobbio, The Age of Rig-hts, 5. 
92 Ibid., 6. 
93 Ibid., 7. How does this fit with his assertion that human rights are not fundamental? He surety does not mean that 
new historical circumstances could return us to a situation when torture or slavery would be acceptable? 
94 Ibid., 27. 
95 Ibid. It is not condemned by those who continue to use torture as an instrument of control. 
96 This is particularly apposite in relation to parents and children: for it is only in opposition to, and at the expense of, 
traditional parental rights that the rights of children can be expanded. 
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right which is being repressed will have arguments in their favour. Clearly both cannot 
derive from the same justificatory principle. 97 It appears that we can only decide between 
them by appealing to deeper justification. This would seem to indicate that a completely 
rights-based morality is not possible. 
Fourthly, even the rights claimed by the same category of persons can be contradictory, the 
rights of freedom (which require others to forbear) for example, and the welfare rights 
(which require others to interfere). It is clear that two rights which are claimed to be 
fundamental 'but which are found, at the same time, to be contradictory cannot be grounded 
in a single absolute principle which makes them both 'irrefutable and irresistible. ' The rights 
of private property (rights of freedom) were used for a long time to obstruct the 
development of more equitable social legislation (welfare rights). 'The absolute principle is 
not only an illusion; on occasions it is also a pretext for defending conservative positions'. 98 
Finally, even if we could find an absolute foundational principle it would make very little 
difference. What prevents the implementation of rights is not their justification but their 
infeasibility. It is not how we might justify human rights which is the central contemporary 
problem but how we might protect them: it is a political not a philosophical problem. 99 The 
real task is much more modest than the search for an absolute principle, 'a sublime but 
desperate undertaking'; it is to find the relevant principles for 'each particular 
circumstance,. 100 
So the search for an absolute foundation is illusory since human rights are not all of a 
piece. They are vague with regard to content, historically variable, heterogeneous (in the 
sense that some appear to be unlimited in application and valid for all, while other's can 
apparently be restricted according to circumstances), and frequently mutually contradictory. 
Any invocation of absolute values is redolent of the kind of religious fanaticism or political 
absolutism which inevitably leads to intolerance of the kind that rights were intended to 
prevent in the first instance. 101 Bobbio's recourse is to accept the universal adoption (or 
acceptance) of human rights (as articulated in various international agreements or 
declarations) as sufficient basis for action and decision. His position appear's to be 
analogous to Marx's dictum that 'philosophers have only interpreted the world in various 
97 See Mackie, J. L., 'Can There be a Right-based Moral Theory, in Waldron, J., (ed. ), Theories of Rights, Oxford U. P., 
1984, Warnock, The Ethical Primate, 70-75. 
98 Bobbio, The Age of Rights, 9. 
99 Ibid., 10. 
100 Ibid., 11. 
101 Historically rights 'were the product of sober English philosophies, English Puritanism and non-conformism, 
"respectable" English resistance to absolutism and concern for freedom and toleration'. Eugene Kamenka, 'The 
Anatomy of an Idea', in Kamenka, T., Tay, A. E. S., eds., Human Rights, London: Edward Arnold, 1978,1. 
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ways; the point, however, is to change it'. 102 He is, as it were, promoting a pragmatic 
course of action rather than a search for rational grounding of rights. Bobbio favours 
'ideological or conventional' grounding to 'axiologiGal or deontological' foundations. 103 
The historicist thesis 
So, rather than become enmired in apparently irreconcilable attempts to provide 
foundational theories of rights it may be more fruitful to accept rights, which have an 
identifiable point of origin in human history, 104 as a reality of contemporary moral relations 
and to proceed accordingly. 
Bobbio adopts what Freeden Galls a quasi-contingent approach to the historical 
development of rights: that is the belief that rights emerged only at a specific point in time 
but became lasting 'even if their appearance depended upon a particular set of events that 
might not have come about'. 105 Bobbio proposes that natural rights are historic rights; that 
they came into existence at the beginning of the modem era, together with an individualistic 
perception of society; and that they provide one of the principal indicators of social 
prog ress. 106 
Bobbio's historicist theory is his basis for disputing 'not only the legitimacy but also the 
practicality of the quest for an absolute principle'. 107 The history of rights shows their 
development from their proclamation to their implementation, and from their 
implementation within individual states to their implementation within the international 
community. 108 
Rights have their origins in the radical inversion of the political relationship between the 
state and the citizen, or the sovereign and the subject, 'which typifies the formation of the 
modem state. ' The relevant emphasis has moved from the duties of a subject to the rights 
of a citizen. The central, definitive viewpoint is no longer that of the sovereign but that of 
102 Marx, K, Engels, F., Fuerbach: OpMition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlooks, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 
1976,98. 
103 This is why Nino refers to Bobbio's position as'positivism in action'. Nino, C. S., 'Positivism and Communitarianism: 
Between Human Rights and Democracy, Ratio Juris, 7,1,1994,14AO, 15. 
104'A time, however, came in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that 
their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves'. Mill, On Libedy, 66. 
105 Freeden, Rights, 38. As the socio-economic circumstances which led to the formulation and assertion of some 
rights change the rights themselves may also have to be modified. See McGinn, R. E., 'Technology, Demography, and 
the Anachronism of Traditional Rights', Journal of Applied Philosoph , 11,1,1994,57-70,. 
1()6 This last it will be remembered was also the view of Spencer. 
t- 107 Bobbio, The Agg_qf Rights, viii. 
As exemplified in the almost universal adoption of the U. N. Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217A (111), 10 
December, 1948, and, more recently, in the adoption and ratification of the U. N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
Document A/RES/44125,12 December, 1989. 
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the individual citizen. This reflects'the success of the individualistic concept of society over 
the traditional perception of it as an organic whole. 1109 The relationship between rulers and 
ruled is increasingly seen in terms of the central rights of citizens who are no longer merely 
subjects but who play an active part in deciding how they will be ruled, and a concomitant 
decline in the powers of the sovereign in line with a more individualistic concept of 
society. 110 As a citizen the free individual becomes the bearer of rights and duties which 
are distinguished from the rights and duties which attach to particular occupations and 
roles. 111 
The experience of the religious wars at the beginning of the modem era 'gave rise to the 
right to resist oppression'. This right presupposes 'a primary and more substantial right': this 
is the right of each individual 'not to be oppressed and to enjoy a few fundamental liberties'. 
These liberties do not depend on the consent of a sovereign, they are not held on a basis of 
grace and favour, they are not conferred or given by any one or by any agency. They are, 
to that extent, natural, not because they somehow inhere in the natural world but because 
they are not contingent on anyone's consent or permission. 112 Where for example a natural 
right was once taken to be derivative of the natural law it has now, de-coupled from natural 
law theory, taken on an independent existence and is 'ascribed to people solely in virtue of 
their humanity or some aspect of it' and hence'becomes the foundation on which the rest of 
morality is raised'. 113 In Bobbio's view no single unifying principle can explain rights or 
provide a derivation. However fundamental human rights are, they are historical rights: they 
arise from specific historical conditions which are 'characterised by the embattled defence 
of new freedoms against old powers'. 114 They are established gradually. Bobbio does not 
deny the relevance of first principles to the problem of rights. There are three ways of 
demonstrating values: 'deduction from a constant objective fact' e. g. human nature, 
considering them as self-evident truths, and the test of consensus. The first method leads 
to an array of theories of human nature which makes a resolution of the problem difficult if 
not impossible. The second is unreliable because of divergent and changing views about 
what is, or is not, self evident. In addition 'self-evidence' often masks dominant historical 
b 
109 Bobbio, The Age of Rights, ix. 
110 Ibid., x. See chapter 3, 'The Age of Rights', for a full discussion of this analysis. Locke, of course provided the 
theoretical impetus for the transformation. 
111 See Plamenatz, J., 'Liberalism', Philip P. Weiner, ed., Dictiona! y Of The Histo! y Of Ideas, Vol. 111, New York, 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974,36 - 61. 
112 Bobbio, The Aqe of Rights, x. In a sense Bentham was correct; he became wrong as the historical context of the 
discourse changed, that is as the relationship between ruler and ruled was inverted. Power shifted 
from the will of the 
sovereign over the subject to the will of the subjects collectively (but acting as 
discrete individuals) over the state. 
113 Brown, Mode n 103. 
114 Bobbio, The Agg -OfR! 
", X. 
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and social patterns of thinking about human nature. 115 Only the third, the test of consensus, 
offers the hope of progress. 
The proof of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is not to be found in 
any transcendent ethical or metaphysical first principles but 'in the general consensus over 
its validity'. 116 Macintyre's comment is correct: there is no justification in the sense of 
evidence or argument establishing validity. Consensus replaces objectivity with 'the test of 
inter-subjectivity'. 1 17 As the ascription of worth to the interest which the right is designed to 
advance becomes more wide-spread (perceived as 'recognition' of the worth) consensus 
about the validity of the right grows. It is consensus which is the test (proof) of the right; it 
does not establish the right (although consensus is necessary before the right can be 
enshrined in positive law). Social and political recognition and status 'are not an essential 
precondition for claiming or identifying a right'118 but they mark the transition from the 
status of moral (or aspirational) right to positive right whether as statutorily established or 
established by the 'acclaim' of universal acceptance and endorsement by the international 
community. 119 
We can discern three stages in the development of rights: the first stage is the stage of the 
development of theory. 120 The second stage is the transition from theory to practice as 
exemplified by the various declarations of human or citizen rights such as the American 
Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. The iast 
stage comes when the 
assertion of human rights is both universal and positive: universal in the 
sense that the principles it contains no longer concern only the citizens of 
this or that state, but all human beings, and positive in the sense that it 
initiates a process whose end is that human rights should no longer only be 
proclaimed and recognised as ideals, but effectively protected even against 
the state which violates them. 121 
115 Freeden, Rýights, 29. 
116 Bobbio, The Age of Rights, 13. In the context it is legitimate to use 'proof in the sense of 'test or 'trial' as in 'must 
be brought to the proof, or'will stand a severe proof . 
117 Ibid. ' 14. 
By this standard the validity of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is assured. And yet there are 
fundamental questions which can be asked about apparent internal contradictions and tensions 
in that document 
despite the almost universal consensus and without undermining the validity of the whole. 
118 Freeden, Rights, 8. 
119 The perception of rights as timelessly valid is no more than a function of their 
historical development. Rights are 
perceived as 'imbued with immutable character, as if, although originating 
in specific historical circumstances, (they 
were) nevertheless timelessly valid'. McGinn, 'Technology, Demography, 
62. 
120 Historically this stage is exemplified in the writings of John Locke. 
121 Bobbio, jh9AQft-9LRi", 16. For an alternative view to Bobbio's on the role of the international community 
in the 
protection of individual human rights see Przetacznik, 
F., 'The Socialist Concept of Protection of Human Rights', Social 
Research 38,1971,337-361. 
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At the second stage in the development of rights it was the state itself which was deemed to 
be the protector and guarantor of fundamental freedoms. The 'sphere of the individual', 'the 
private sphere' could only be defined in legal and moral terms which derive from the state 
and they can only be protected and enforced by the institutions of the state. This raises the 
fear of the paternalism of the state as much as fear of its oppression: both extremes are in 
their different ways subversive of the rights of the individual, the first by rendering the 
individual unfit or unwilling to practice the rights by undermining his self-reliance, the 
second by denying the rights altogether. 122 
The completion of this process means that the rights in question are no longer merely the 
dghts of citizens against their state but the dghts of all citizens against all states, that is 
'human rights as a positive reality'. 
Each category of rights resulted from a different historical and political experience: religious 
freedom from the religious wars; civil liberties from parliamentarian struggles against 
absolutism, and 'political and social freedoms from the birth, growth, and experience of 
movements representing workers, landless peasants and smallholders. "23 The first 
generation of rights were a recognition of personal freedom and negative freedoms. The 
second generation of rights (which introduced the so-called welfare rights) provided 
provision for basic needs: employment, education, care etc. A third and fourth generation of 
rights is now being forged as a result of industrialisation and scientific/technological 
progress. 124 In short rights do not originate together but come into existence piecemeal at 
an appropriate time as a result of human action. In other words specific rights demands are 
created in response to specific needs. New needs are created by changes in social 
conditions, and when technical developments make it possible to satisfy them. 
Talk of natural, fundamental, inalienable or inviolable rights may represent 
a persuasive formula to back a demand in a political publication, but it has 
no theoretical value, and is therefore completely irrelevant to human rights 
theory. 125 
In summary, then, there is reason to believe that rights are not the GonsequenGe of either 
social contract theories or of other rationalist attempts to ground them in foundational 
principles. They are, rather, historical social phenomena which arose as a result of social 
and political transformation and which now operate to protect favoured human attributes. 
So, what is a right? I will take the following definition as reflecting the discussion so far 
122 Plamenatz, 'Liberalism', 36 - 61. 
123 Bobbio, The Age-gLRig-hts, xi. 
124 These would include, for example, rights relating to environmental issues and genetic engineering respectively. 
125 Bobbio, The -me of 
RiGNS, xii. 
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A human right is a conceptual device, expressed in linguistic form, that 
assigns priority to certain human or social attributes regarded as essential to the adequate functioning of a human being; that is intended to serve as 
a protective capsule for those aftdbutes; and that appeals for deliberate 
action (including deliberate non-action) to ensure such protection. 126 
The notion of a right as a' conceptual device' reflects its contingent, human origin. 
Freeden's definition also picks out the relationship between the right and some notion of 
human functioning (individual or social) with respect to which certain attributes are 
prioritised as being essential to this view of human functioning. The dght serves a dual 
purpose: the promotion of the designated attributes and an appeal for appropriate 
intervention or non-intervention (as appropriate) to ensure their protection. 
This definition does not and cannot determine a particular view of human functioning, does 
not specify the relevant human or social attributes, and does not stipulate the action or non- 
action required. These matters are separate from the anatomy of rights. 
Summary 
Rights are a public, social phenomenon which express moral ideals and aspirational social 
principles. They evolved as part of the human conversation, as a persuasive device and as 
-f 
a regulatory social mechanism. Belief in rights persists despite the fail u re. 'successiv e 
attempts to vindicate their legitimacy. The efficacy of rights must be judged on 
their effect on aspects of human relations. To the extent that belief in rights leads to the 
adaptation of human behaviour to accommodate the rights in question, then the rights exist. 
A right establishes an individual's claim to the promotion of her own good. Rights switch the 
moral centre of gravity from the moral obligations of agents to the moral entitlements of 
recipients. Rights do not confer immediate power; they ascribe status or worth to the rights- 
bearer which serves as a basis for appropriate claims. 
Rights are prescriptive and advocatory. They promote and defend particular human 
capacities and the conditions necessary for particular views of human flourishing. By 
protecting selected developmental capacities deemed necessary to human well-being they 
protect and promote human well-being itself. 
An adequate theory of rights cannot legitimately be justified by constructivist methodologies 
which, selecting one or two human capacities (principally rationality and freedom) disregard 
others (love, loyalty, sociability, generosity) which are indisputably part of lived moral 
experience. The moral principles which undergird rights are abstracted from pre-existing 
human practices and the rights should reflect the richness and diversity of these practices. 
126 Freeden, Eights, 7. 
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Attempts to ground rights in purely rational considerations share a number of weaknesses. 
In particular, such accounts neglect the communal context which gives substance and 
meaning to rights. In addition, such accounts typically focus on the interests of an isolated 
(and therefore asocial) individual and it is difficult, if not impossible, to connect the 
experience of such an individual to the real world of social interaction. Further, although 
capacities such as freedom and well-being may be necessary means to some moral 
objectives, there are legitimate human objectives for which they are neither appropriate nor 
necessary. Finally, an adequate account of moral action requires an understanding of the 
ends towards which moral action is directed. 
The search for an absolute foundational principle for human rights is misconceived because 
rights are vague, historically variable, heterogeneous, and often mutually contradictory. 
Even if such a principle were available it would make very little difference: what prevents 
the implementation of rights is not their lack of justification in the first instance, but their 
practicability. The crucial problem is not how we might justify rights but how we will protect 
and implement them: it is a political not a philosophical problem. 
Natural rights are part of an individualistic conception of society. They originated in the 
radical inversion of the political relationship between sovereign and subject (an inversion 
which, I will argue in Part 3, is perennially recapitulated in the transformation of the 
adolescent/parent relationship). The fulcrum of power moved from the duties of a subject to 
the rights of a citizen. The liberties protected by rights are not conferred or bestowed: they 
are natural because they are not contingent on anyone's consent or permission. In short, 
rights are historical social phenomena which arose as a result of social and political 
transformation. The ultimate test of rights is the test of consensus. 
If we accept that a right is a socially constructed conceptual device that commands 
intervention or forbearance to protect favoured human or social attributes regarded as 
indispensable to the adequate functioning of a human being, we are not thereby endorsing 
any particular account of human functioning, or any particular selection of favoured human 
or social attributes. Neither are we stipulating the action or non-action required by rights. 
It is now necessary to consider whether rights are, relevant to children. 
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The issue as to whether it makes sense to ascribe rights to children must be clarified before 
the question of substantive theories as to the particular rights they should be accorded can 
be addressed. One of the crucial features affecting such a decision is the relation of rights 
to children (and vice versa), the kinds of rights there are, and how rights are exercised. 
The will or power theory of rights 
According to the will or power theory rights are normative powers to determine the 
obligations of others by the exercise of the will of the rights holder. They are related to 
capacities for choice and rational action and have the function of protecting and furthering 
these capacities. 
The will or power theory posits rights as 'the legal or moral recognition of some individual's 
choice as being pre-eminent over the will of others as to a given subject matter in a given 
relationship'. ' The bearer of the rights may choose to invoke them (or not) to further his or 
her interests or projects. Invoking rights in this view is an exercise of legitimate moral 
control over others. Only those who are capable of claiming, demanding or waiving a right 
2 can be rights' bearers. If rights as moral possessions have, as a distinctive feature, that 
they can be claimed, asserted, waived, or forgone i. e. that they are discretionary in 
character, then they cannot extend to entities which cannot claim, assert, waive or forgo. In 
other words rights can only be held by entities that can exercise them. According to this 
view one may have duties regarding plants, animals and young children one does not have 
duties to them. 3 On this view, then, a right is seen as a capacity to impose an obligation on 
others or to release them from an obligation. 
If it is assumed that children of a certain age do not have the relevant volitional capacities 
to claim or assert rights, then accordingly such children cannot properly be said to have any 
rights. If it is claimed that the right is being exercised on the child's behalf by another, that 
is, if the child's right is exercised by proxy, then it is arguable that it is the proxy who is the 
4 right bearer and not the child . MacCormick's version of 
the will theory is that a right exists 
only when people have a legal or moral power of waiver or enforcement of duties: 'powers 
of waiver or enforcement of duties are essentially constitutive of 'rights,. 
5 Since a child ('a 
1 MacCormick, N., 'Children's Rights: a Test-Case for Theories of Rights', Archiv fur Rechts und Sozialghilosophie, 62, 
1976,305-317,305. 
2 Campbell, T. D., 'The Rights of the Minor: as Person, as Child, as Juvenile, as Future Adutr in Alston, P., Parker S., 
Seymore J., eds., , Oxford 
University Press, 1992,4. 
3 1ý(Ieinig, J., 'Mill, Children and Rights', Educational Philosol2hy and Theo! y, 8,1,1976,10. This view is attributed to 
Benn, S. I., 'Abortion, Infanticide and Respect for Persons', in Feinberg, J., ed., The Problem of Abortion, California, 
Wadsworth, 1973. 
4 Campbell, 'The Rights of the Minor, 4. 
' MacCormick, 'Children's Rights', 307/8. 
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baby') 'cannot in fact, cannot in morals, and cannot in law, relieve his or her parents of their 
duty towards him or her' regarding care, nurture and love then it is linguistically 'inept' to 
ascribe to children the right to such. 6 (It may be a moral obligation on the part of the parents 
but it is mistaken to describe it as a right which is the possession of the child. ) Is claiming a 
right for another such as a ward, a child, or an incapacitated individual actually in any real 
sense claiming the right for the other or is it merely asserting the right of the claimant to 
assert what is in the other's best interests? Is it not the right of the guardian to choose what 
is in the best interests of the other that is being asserted and to have his/her definition of 
'best interests' endorsed? 
(I)t is at least possible to imagine a legal system in which a parent's duty to 
care for and nurture his or her own child is neither subject to the parent's 
issuing a self-directed request on the child's behalf nor indeed to any 
possibility of waiver by the parent as the child's representative. 7 
What MacCormick appears to be saying is that the notion of a parent giving him- or her-self 
permission - or worse still denying him- or her-self permission - to care for, nurture, and 
love the child is simply absurd. It is only as the child comes to resemble the adult and to 
develop the capacity to exercise the rights for her-self that she can be said to be a rights 
8 bearer, but then she is no longer a child . 
Campbell, however, differentiates between intrinsic rights and extrinsic or instrumental 
rights. 9 The justification of an intrinsic right does not depend on its having a role in securing 
some other goal, such as some more basic rights. Intrinsic parental rights are directed 
toward the protection of the interests of the parents themselves. Instrumental parental 
rights are ascribed to parents so that they Gan further the interests of their children. The 
existence of the instrumental rights to further the children's interests affirms that children 
have their own share of intrinsic rights. 10 
The will theory is not without difficulties, however. It fails as a full explanation of rights 
because it cannot explain acknowledged rights such as children's rights to care, nurture and 
a In the Gregory Kngsley case, a case which was widely publicised on both sides of the Atlantic as an instance of a 
child 'divorcing' his parents, it appeared that a child could file a petition for termination of the parental rights of his 
natural parents. Inter afia, the trial court ruled that the child 'as a natural person who had knowledge of the facts alleged, 
had standing to initiate the action' on his own behalf. This is the interpretation taken as definitive by Matthews. 
(Matthews, Gareth B., The Philosophy of Childhood, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994, chapter 6. ) The 
appeal court, however, overturned this particular aspect of the trial court decision on the grounds that 'the disability of 
nonage prevents a minor from initiating or maintaining an action for termination of parental rights!. The application for 
termination of the parental rights was upheld, however, because separate petitions were filed on the child's behalf by 
others. See Kngsley vs. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Florida 1993). 
MacCormick, 'Children's Rights', 307. 
Campbell, 'The Rights of the Minor', 5. 
Ibid., 9. 
10 Ibid., 101111 
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love. 11 Campbell objects to the will theory on the grounds that it is premised on too narrow 
a definition of human being and human relations. Its exclusive stress on self-sufficiency 
and autonomy is a 'woefully partial expression of why people count and why we matter to 
each other'. 12 (Lomasky, for instance, is willing to acknowledge that children have rights 
even though his theory of project pursuit does not extend to children. 13 Since he uses 
descriptive ethics as the touchstone for his theory he must find a mechanism whereby 
children will not be excluded: for even though they are not primary rights holders the 
practice of including them in the moral community is widespread, if not universal. ) 
Children's rights appear to be givens, but the will/power theory says that a right is 
something that must be asserted or waived. Like Freire's account of freedom and 
liberation14 the assertion of rights must be a continuing assertion by the rights-holder. In this 
view those who cannot assert the rights (babies, young children and so on) even in relation 
to welfare rights (either because they do not know what their interests are or they are 
unable to articulate them) cannot have them asserted by others any more than I can have 
my freedom asserted on my behalf by another. For example, if a parent asserts the child's 
right to X it is only to be understood metaphorically that the child is the bearer of the right. 
What the parent is in fact asserting is the parent's own (instrumental) right to determine 
what is in the child's best interests. (This is the paradigm of paternalism which will be dealt 
with in chapter 8. ) If the child were capable of asserting such a dght on her own behalf she 
would no longer be a child and would not require the agency of the parent to assert the right 
on her behalf. The definition of a child is not chronological but relates to the capacity of the 
individual to make and sustain claims. If the individual can make and sustain claims it is no 
longer a child. Ultimately, childhood is defined by power, not age. 15 
The net result of the will theory is that it excludes children from the realm of rights or 
includes them only by proxy. This exclusion reveals both its intellectual and moral 
limitations. Children are of no less value as human beings on account of the immaturity of 
their characteristically adult capacities. ' 6 Yet this itself is a value judgement which seems to 
be supportable only by choice or dictat: there is no contradiction in asserting the contrary. 
All that we can do is either to accept children as part of the moral community or not. As a 
poweriess sector of the human community children are incapable of pressing the case of 
their own value. Yet if children had not been consistently valued in the past the human race 
would not have survived. As with the present, depictions of child abuse in the past should 
" MacCormick, 'Children's Rights', 316. 
12 Campbell, 'The Rights of the Minor', 3. 
13 Lomasky, Loren E., Persons. Rights. and the Moral CommUM, Oxford University Press, 1987,40M. 
14 Freire, Paulo, The Pedagggy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos, Penguin Books, 1972. 
15 This issue will be discussed in more detail in Part 3. 
'e Campbell, 'The Rights of the Minor', 4. 
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not be taken as the norm. The thesis of de Mause for example 17 should be tempered with 
the realisation that children survived childhood and became the adults who were 
responsible for human social and moral development. 
In societies like ours there is near universal agreement 18 regarding the value of children as 
human beings. Adopting the power theory of rights exclusively is likely to promote a 
tendency to see children's rights as relating to their future as adults and their developmental 
progression to adulthood rather than directing our attention to their present needs, interests, 
and experiences. 19 To address the latter we must turn to the interest theory of rights. 
The interest theory of rights 
According to the interest theory rights can be the possession of any being capable of 
having (normative) interests. Interests are the basis for having rules which require others to 
behave in certain ways with respect to these interests. These rules are rights: 'having one's 
interests protected in certain ways by the imposition of (legal or moral) normative 
constraints on the acts and activities of other people with respect to the object of one's 
interest. 120 
It is not necessary for an individual to assert the rights generated by interests on her own 
behalf: this may be done by others without the complication of their seeming to be 
exercising their own rights only. If parents, for example, assert the right of their child to 
some provision then they are, at the same time, asserting their own right as parents to 
represent and promote their child's interest. This right is not unlimited. It is subject to a 
measure of communal agreement regarding the kinds of things which may be considered to 
be genuine interests of this or any other child and will probably be based on consensus 
regarding needs. Of course parents are not the only ones who may represent the child's 
interests. It may also be done by welfare agencies (governmental or voluntary) and also by 
concerned individuals. But in such cases the agencies and individuals are acting in loco 
parentis whether in the absence of the parents or in cases of (proven or alleged) parental 
incapacity or failure. In any case the primary right being exercised is the child's: the adult's 
right to promote the child's right is derivative. If rights are defined in terms of interests, 
then, assuming that they have interests, it follows that children have rights. 
17 de Mause, L., Histo! y of Childhood: Untold Story of Child Abuse, Bellew Publishing Co., 1991. 
a The exceptions appear to be moral philosophers. See for example Tooley, M., 'Abortion and Infanticide', in Singer, P., 
ed., Applied Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1986, for an argument that infants are not human persons. 
19 Campbell, 'The Rights of the Minor, 7. Campbell is here invoking the Rousseauist tradition which places central value 
on the experience of childhood itself. 
20 MacCormick, 'Children's Rights', 305. 
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In the interest theory of rights there is no necessary connection with rationalit Y21 or with the 
will of the rights bearer. But the theory raises questions about which interests generate 
rights, and are any of these interests distinctive to children? 
Problems with the interest theory include the difficulty of identifying the interests in the first 
place. Desires, needs and interests are not identical. 22 Distinguishing between them is not 
unproblematic. Insofar as interests are constitutive of a given individual's good or, more 
generally, of human good, there appears to be a circularity involved in their identification. 
Do interests simply point out a means to the good or are they constitutive of it? In either 
case there is the perennial problem of defining human good in the first place. 
MacCormick urges that tying rights too closely to 'want regarding categories' such as needs, 
interests and desires is the characteristic failing of the 'interest theory'. While satisfaction of 
needs, interests and desires is clearly part of 'the good' for individuals, it is not so clear 
whether these categories are exhaustive and whether individually or collectively they are 
constitutive of the good. 'A formal account of rights can and should be neutral on that 
, 23 substantive moral question. 
Which theory? 
Is the choice between the competing theories of rights a matter for arbitrary decision or is 
there a substantive resolution? 24 The answer appears to be that if we want rights to apply to 
children (to reflect 'the moral and value status of children 2) then we must have a theory 
which allows for this. The will theory on its own does not. On the contrary it appears to 
exclude children systematically from the realm of rights. The inclusion of children is not an 
arbitrary matter. They must be included in the realm of rights if they are to be fully 
considered in the social and political arrangements which are decided and to be given full 
moral weight in such arrangements. For'(w)hether we like it or not, the language of rights is 
26 the language in which political priorities are settled' . This means that the substantive 
resolution is a matter of political necessity rather than theoretical consistency. We choose 
the interest theory not because it is in any rational way more compelling than the will theory 
but because it is more likely to secure the political purpose of supporting a particular view 
of society. The choice is not, primarily, between the ethical theories but between the vision 
21 Although there may be a contingent one if the development of rationality is one of the interests. 
22 Golding, M., 'Towards a Theory of Human Rights', Monist, 52,4,1968,523 n. 3. According to Golding needs appear 
to be a special sub-class of interests. For a full discussion of the relationship between desires, needs, and interests see 
Thomson, Garrett, Needs, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987. 
23 MacCormick, 'Children's Rights', 311. Interests and needs will be considered more fully in chapter 3. 
24 Campbell, 'The Rights of the Minor', 516. 
25 Ibid., 5. 
26 Ibid., 7. 
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of a social order in which children are excluded from full membership and one in which they 
are included in a particular and vital respect. The latter vision does not say that children are 
or ought to be the full equals of adults in all respects but that there is a vitally important 
respect in which they ought to be. So the social vision, an aspect of the definition of the 
good life, has priority. 
It is not that 'the language of rights is the only one with real moral force, so that a change in 
that language, supported by purely formal arguments, is a sufficient reason for changing 
27 moral attitudes" but that the practical introduction of rights as a determining feature (one 
among many) of human relations has changed the language of moral attitudes. Midgley is 
unhappy with this. She argues that the great philosophers and moralists do not come before 
us competing for our exclusive support: 'afi moral problems contain many aspects, which 
may need to be dealt with by different ways of thinking. Half the 'business of moral thinking' 
lies in reconciling the conflicts which ensue. Appeal to rights is no more than a habit; 'rights 
talk' is 
simply the most competitive and litigious of moral concepts. If rights appear 
to clash, then one of them must give way. The legal model which is very 
close here, dictates a zero-sum solution. If I win, you lose. There is a 
conceptual deadlock; the losing party must leave the court. 28 
Yet rights-talk reduces complex ethical issues to a simpler political choice. And, perhaps, in 
practical terms, this is its function. In the real world complex moral issues must be decided 
eventually. The function of rights is to provide a focal point, a fulcrum for arbitration 
between competing (and frequently mutually exclusive) claims. 
Whatever the philosophical complications of this difference of opinion there is no doubt that 
'rights talk' has become an increasingly powerful discourse in the structuring of human 
affairs . 
29 But surely, from an historical point of view, that is the point of rights talk. It is not 
just a different way of talking about moral or social obligations. It is a new way of talking 
about moral and social obligations. Its introduction marks the displacement of control from 
the individual sovereign to the sovereign individual. Rights acknowledge my control over 
myself (insofar as they reflect my autonomy, my self governance) and at the same time 
acknowledge my control over others (insofar as these others must - morally or legally must 
- respect this autonomy and self governance and also meet my needs/interests so that I 
27 Archard, David, 'Child Abuse: Parental Rights and the Interests of the Child', Journal of Applied Philosoph , 7,2, 
1990. 
28 Midgley, Mary, 'Rights Talk Will Not Sort Out Child Abuse: Comment on Archard on Parental Rights', Journal of 
Applied RN! gý, 8,1,1045. 
29 Golding, ('The Primacy of Welfare Rights', Social Philosol2hy and Polic , 1,2,1984,136) concludes with 
the question 
'If other people claim rights why shouldn't 17 This seems to be a case of prudence rather than moral conviction. It may 
be that the only claim that the language of rights has on us in our moral discourse is that everybody else is doing ft. It 
has become the principle language of political and moral debate. 
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can become capable of autonomy and self governance). Now it may be that with the 
extension of rights a good idea is coming to the end of its usefulness as a means of 
asserting certain moral or legal realities (realities which were in fact created by the dghts). 
Increasingly, demands for provision or concessions in societies like ours are being made in 
rights terms; as rights proliferate their lose their force. 30 
Option-rights 
In addition to the competing theories which claim to explain or justify the operation of rights 
there is a difference in the kinds of rights which are being asserted or demanded. In 
particular, dghts are descdbed in terms of option-rights or welfare dghts. 31 
Option rights, often considered to be the only kind of right, correspond to areas of individual 
sovereignty where the individual is morally free to act on the basis of his own choices 
implying 'some kind of rightful control over the actions of others' . 
32 Option-rights invoke the 
idea of the freedom of the individual, autonomy. The fundamental value is the autonomy of 
the individual to shape her life as she chooses as the creator of moral value. Option rights 
give sovereignty over others, over one's property, and over oneself. This sovereignty is not 
unlimited or unbounded. It 'is bounded by the (limited) sovereignty other persons have over 
me, by the duties I have towards others, and : by my duties in respect of myself. 33 This is 
consistent with a view that the sovereignty must be learned and exercised within a 
community. It will be a consistent feature of this presentation that a supportive community 
is essential to the acquisition and exercise of rights. 
Of course the acknowledgement of option-rights carries with it the risk that individuals 
endowed with such rights may not use the freedom they confer for desirable purposes. 
To allow for option-rights (and freedom) in any way that is more than trivial 
is to take the fisk that their possessors will do what is wrong, harmful, or 
foolish. ... To opt for option-rights is to opt 
for a special ideal that subsumes 
a particular style of life for their possessors: in effect they are allowed to do 
30 A consequent and serious difficulty with welfare rights is 'the thinning out of rights' and 'a declining possibility of 
imposing correlative obligations'. The expansion of rights trivializes rights. Sandman, B., 'Some Legal, Moral and 
Intellectual Rights of Children', Educational Theo , 27,3,1977,175. 
See also McGinn, Robert E., 'Technology, 
Demography, and the Anachronism of Traditional Rights', Journal of Applied Philo§pghy, 11,1,1994. He argues that 
the increasing rights-based claims to the use and benefits of technology are in danger of seriously diluting the societal 
quality of life, even to the point where we shall have to re-consider the centrality of modem Western individualism and 
the rights claims that support ft. 
31 The terminology of option and welfare rights was introduced by Golding in his 1968 essay 'Towards a Theory of 
Human Rights'. Option rights are variously referred to as choice rights, liberty rights, rights of freedom, or rights to 
forbearance. Welfare rights are variously referred to as rights of recipience, benefit rights, interest rights, rights to 
intervention. Whether there is any substantive difference intended by the different labels they will be taken here to mean 
roughly the same thing and the terms will be used interchangeably. 
32 Golding, M., 'The Primacy of Welfare Rights', 122/3. 
33 Golding, M., 'Towards a Theory of Human Rights', 542. 
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what is wrong, harmful, or foolish within the spheres of autonomy. Completely to opt for option-rights is to opt for a laissez-faire morality. 34 
Given that option rights are predicated on the freedom of the individual must we expect and 
accept that the individual will sometimes choose to do what is wrong or self harmful? 
Option rights presume the capacity of the individual to make informed choices with respect 
to her own future behaviour. 35 Often, however, the capacity is less than perfect, the 
information available is incomplete (as it usually is), or the will to make the 'correct' choice 
is absent. But within what limits of tolerance? The limits are set by social consensus 
regarding what is acceptable in this regard. This consensus is not absolute, it is subject to 
change, to evolution in order to accept new limits. 
Choosing for oneself is not as free of conceptual difficulty as it might at first appear. Sutton 
distinguishes between choosing and deciding. To choose is to perform a physical act 
whereas to decide is to 'come to a conclusion after some more or less extensive process of 
deliberation'. Choosing Gan be a spontaneous or thoughtless act; in this sense of 'choosing' 
it is obvious that children can choose. Decision must always be deliberative. Children's 
exclusion from option rights is based on their presumed incapacity to choose on the basis 
of deliberative reflection. 
The value of option rights resides in the fact that they 'protect the fundamental interest all 
humans have in the unimpeded (within certain spheres of autonomy and under certain 
social limitations) exercise of rational choice. '36 This follows from Mill and from the 
argument that it is the exercise of choice itself which is valuable independently of the things 
opted for: 'The value of choosing for oneself resides not in the production of better 
decisions, but in the improved quality of the life of the man allowed the opportunity to 
exercise his option'. 37 However one could ask whether the alleged relationship between the 
improved quality of life and the opportunity to exercise one's options is a necessary 
(analytical) truth or an empirical fact? It is questionable whether it is always (empirically) 
the case that free choice opportunities lead to an improved quality of life for the individual 
who may wish to leave all threatening choices and responsibilities to others. 
38 
34 Ibid., 547. In a note (547 n. 51) he quotes Kant, 'The freedom of man as the constRution of the commonwealth (may 
be stated in ) the following formula: ... everyone may seek 
his happiness in the way that seems good to him as long as he 
does not infringe on the freedom of others to pursue a similar purpose, when such freedom may co-exist with the 
freedom of every other man according to a possible and general law. ' 
35 Sutton, Thomas L., 'Human Rights and Children', Educational Theo , 
28,2,1978,102-110,108. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 The problem is that for many'being oneself or'doing one's own thing' poses perhaps insurmountable 
difficulty. Byron 
or Napoleon could do their own thing, in the latter case'by imposing his preferences on others'. 
But how are those who 
have'limi'ted means, limited ability, and limited vision - to be themselves and do their own thing7 Weidhorn, 
M., 'Doing 
One's Own Thing: The Genealogy of a Slogan', Journal of Th2gght, 31,4,1996,28. 
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The view of human being put forward by negative dghts theodsts is of self-determining and 
self-developing individuals. The exponents of these theories not only believe that it is 
possible to be neutral between competing conceptions of the good life, but they also 
'bestow on that neutrality a high moral stance, arguing that each individual is the best judge 
of his or her development, or life-plan'. 39 But they also believe that human beings are such 
that as a rule they need to be protected from one another. That is, that the primary function 
of rights is to protect what is most essential in human beings from the intrusions of others. 
Welfare Rights 
If animals or human babies have rights they must be welfare rather than option-rights. An 
animal or a baby does not exercise any rights over itself, over things, or over people. If we 
admit rights only for beings who are capable of choice then we are committed to defining 
rights in terms of autonomy. If the capacity to choose is a necessary condition of having 
rights then we must conclude that incapacitated and senile people may not have rights, and 
we must be circumspect regarding any claim that children have rights. However, we do 
acknowledge the rights of such persons - their welfare rights. 'They have a claim to some of 
the goods of life under the social ideal, although others must make claims for them, when 
necessary. '40 
Freeden argues for a theory of rights which is richer, and more true to the realities of 
human experience than that provided by the negative rights theorists. Even when the 
emphasis on autonomy is reinforced by considerations of a functional well-being4l the latter 
is insufficient to account for the variety and richness of human experience. For human 
beings are more than simply atomistic moral agents who inhabit an idealised Kantian 
universe of moral agency: in addition to moral properties humans have inescapable 
physical, emotional, and mental properties. These are no less important to the pursuit of the 
good life, nor are they unconnected with the moral: human well-being must address all of 
them, and all equally. Freeden calls for a 'pluralistic theory of rights' which will protect all 
human functions. 42 
Human nature is developmental but it is neither inevitable nor wholly self-determined. 
Empirically we know that it requires a good deal of intervention both to sustain and promote 
human growth. Exclusive emphasis on non-interferenGe does not indicate how this 
fundamental reality will be served by rights at all. In order to promote human development 
some interference is not only warranted but necessary. Such intervention may well be 
3" Freeden, Michael, 'Human Rights and Welfare: a Communitarian View, Ethics, 100,3,1990,489-502,492. 
40 Golding, 'Towards a Theory of Human Rights', 545. 
4' Gewirth, Alan, Human Rights, University of Chicago Press, 1932. 
42 Freeden, 'Human Rights', 490/1. 
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paternalistic but, as we shall see, objections to paternalism take the greater part of their 
force from negative rights theories in the first instance. 
As well as being developmental human nature is also essentially social. Human beings are 
primarily co-operative and sociable. 43 Mutual threat or harm is the exception. intervention is 
not, in the first place, threatening but mutually sustaining and beneficial. Consequently, 
rights theory must find a more adequate grounding (than the extreme individualism of 
freedom and well-being) and a more sociable direction. The answer is welfare rights. 
A right constitutes a claim that directly or indirectly enhances the quality of life in a 
commun itY44 by promoting the welfare of individuals within that community. The ability and 
capacity of the individual to develop and flourish is intimately connected with the health of 
the community as a whole. The individual's development and flourishing should not be 
confined, narrowly, simply to what is necessary to her engagement in a rational process as 
an autonomous agent but should also embrace 'a whole range of human capabilities such 
as the human capacity for enjoyment'. 45 
In addition rights are reciprocal. Freeden argues that in addition to the community having 
rights-based obligations of welfare to its members the community itself also has rights. The 
rights of the community must be respected by the individual exercising her own rights. 
'Autonomy as individual self-determination (is) socially beneficial, provided such self- 
determination (takes) into account both the individual's role in society and the common 
1 46 47 good . There must be a mutual constraint. If there is not mutual constraint and benefit it 
is difficult to see why a community should protect the rights of individuals. 
Welfare rights'are derived from the claims to the goods of life which are conferred by the 
social ideal of a community'. 48 Although some of these may be claimed (i. e. that which they 
are rights to may be claimed) and are subject to waiver (there is no obligation to claim 
them) they are distinct from option rights. The right to education is an example. Golding is 
correct in saying that insofar as there is a right on the part of adults to education such a 
right is claimable and waivable. But this does not seem to be true of children. Feinberg 
considers some welfare rights as mandatory rights: e. g. the right to education or the right to 
inoculation. He says about such rights: 'You have no choice in the matter. Whether you like 
43 Midgley, Mary, The Ethical Primate: Humans. Freedom. and Mocft, London, Routledge, 1994. 
44 Freeden, 'Human Rights', 494. 
45 Ibid,, 496. He criticises Gewirth for the narrowness of his conception of well-being. It is not clear whether Freeden 
intends us to make the distinction here between 'enjoy in the colloquial sense (as in 'enjoying oneself) or in the stricter, 
more legalistic (enjoying the use of one's limbs). See Taylor, Charles, 'Atomism', Philosophical Papgrs Part 2: 
Philosophy and the. Human Sciences, Cambridge, University Press, 1985,192. 
46 Freeden, 'Human Rights', 498. 
47 ibid. 
48 Golding, 'Toward a Theory of Human Rights', 542. 
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it or not you have to exercise these rights' . 
49 This means that children, at least, are left 
without a choice in the matter of, say, an education: they must meet certain preconditions 
for the right to an education - attend school, study, keep the rules etc. This is defensible 
because children lack the knowledge, rationality, experience, and capacity for responsibility 
to know what their interests are and to pursue them on their own behalf. To rectify these 
lacks they may be required to avail of their welfare rights which, in addition to education, 
include medical treatment, adequate nutrition, and so forth. 
Golding thinks that '(w)hether some given right is waivable will depend on the law or on the 
social ideal'. 50 But it goes beyond law or social ideal. For the existence of a law or social 
ideal begs the question why is this the law or social ideal? In the case of education it is a 
recognition that in order to become capable of exercising rights of any kind one must 
achieve certain minimal standards of human and social functioning. If this view is correct 
then it appears that 'a certain minimum education'51 is a precondition of being a rights 
holder, not just a right in itself. It is, in the first instance, an obligation of the community 
which is committed to human freedom. 
Welfare rights (rights of recipience) are entitlements to goods. Such rights imply that those 
who are entitled to these goods have desires and/or interests. Like option rights a 
welfare right also implies some kind of rightful control over the actions of others. 52 
To be a potential right-holder one must possess welfare interests. 
Moreover, the primary rights possessed by rights-holders are to the 
components of their welfare. These can be briefly stated as physical and 
mental health, a developed intellect, stable interpersonal relationships, 
material security, and a Gertain measure of liberty from interference. 53 
Welfare rights must be seen in the context of welfare interests (i. e. normative interests). 
Welfare interests are interests which are indispensable to moral agency, indeed to any 
conception of a fully human life. It is for this reason that they have a special claim to 
protection, 'through enforcement, if necessary'. 54 Welfare interests are not the same as 
Rawls' primary goods. Rawls considers 'good' to refer to a set of goods deemed to be 
universally useful - things that are useful no matter what ends a person may pursue. These 
are the so-called 'primary social goods' comprising 'rights and liberties, opportunities and 
powers, income and wealth'. 55 In a later list Rawls elaborated this to: freedom of thought 
and liberty of conscience; the political liberties; freedom of movement and free choice of 
49 Quoted in Bandman, 'Some Legal, Moral and Intellectual Rights', 175. 
"0 Golding, 'Towards a Theory of Human Rights', 543. 
51 The phrase 'a certain minimum education' is from the Irish Constitution. 
52 Golding, 'The Primacy of Welfare Rights', 12314. 
53 l(leinig, 'Mill, Children and Rights', 12. 
54 Ibid., 12. 
55 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, University Press, 1973,92. 
Paqe 37 
Chapter 2: Rights and Children 
occupa ion; equal opportunities to take political, social, and economic offices; income and 
wealth; and the social bases of self-respect. 56 Now it is clear that Rawls' primary goods are 
'primary' only in the sense that they are necessary for the pursuit of self-defined ends. But 
the human capacities necessary to exercise these goods (the capacity to think and to 
inform one's conscience, the capacity to formulate and execute plans of action, the 
capacity to exercise whatever political liberties may be available to one, etc. ) do not come 
ready made and are not the inevitable consequence of undirected human development. 
They are developmental capacities without which the Rawlsean primary goods would be 
nugatory. So in a real sense the Rawlsean goods are not primary in either a literal, 
temporal, developmental, or logical sense. They are contingent on the capacities to 
exercise them being developed in the individual. Prior to this development the individual is 
(in the relevant liberal sense) only a potential rights holder. 
Welfare as a primary notion underlies any theory of rights: welfare rights have 
developmental priority. If there are to be any rights at all there must be welfare rights. The 
notion of welfare rights has a 'theoretical primacy, conceptually and normatively, over 
option rights'. 57 Welfare rights have priority because of their kinship with justice (or, at least, 
consistency). It is not sufficient to have a notional right to be free one must also have an 
equal right to whatever means are necessary, including an appropriate education, to the 
effective exercise of this freedom. 58 While we may be acting in another's interest if we help 
him to get what he wants, unless we inculcate the kinds of habits that will be useful in 
satisfying wants which children may conceive when they grow older, 'we are not justified in 
frustrating any of their present wants, as we are not justified in trying to alter or mould their 
character'. 59 This account qualifies children, as candidates for freedom rights, and as 
having a present welfare which is indispensable to their future interests. 
However, whether children actually possess rights depends also on whether their welfare 
interests 'constitute the ground of our obligation to them'. 60 (The ground of our obligation to 
them need not be a right . 
61) Children's welfare differs from that of adults in one critical way. 
Being free from interference is of no value without the provision of other welfare interests. 
'A young child left to itself is not free. To be free one must first have developed physically 
56 Rawls, J., 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, Journal of Philosop , 88,1980, cited 
in Ingram, A., A Political 
Theory of Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994,170. 
57 Golding, M., 'The Primacy of Welfare Rights', 135. 
58 Bandman, 'Some Legal, Moral and Intellectual Rights', 178. 
59 Brian Barry, Fggigýý, New York, The Humanities Press, 1965,185. 
8'3 Keinig, 'Mill, Children and Rights', 12. 
a' 'Many legal philosophers, especially positivists, maintain that '(a) right may 
be defined in terms of 'duty and 
'obligation', the lafter two connoting the fundamental concepts whiie the former is derivative. 
' But this 'misrepresents one 
use of the term 'right in judicial thinking. At least some 
duties and obligations are imposed in consequence of the 
possession of a right, Golding, 'Towards a 
Theory of Human Rights', 537n. 
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and intellectually'. 62Until this happens the child's rights (dghts to the conditions necessary 
to become an exerciser of freedom dghts, i. e. welfare dghts) must be asserted and 
defended by others on its behalf. This does not establish the rights: it simply speculates on 
what might be the case if children have rights. 
Education, the development of one's personal capacities, and that (sic) 
means by which individuality is cultivated, is something to which they have 
a right, since it is partially constitutive of their welfare. But it is a right the 
securing of which must initially be through the representations of others, 
since they do not have the capacity to assert it on their own behalf. The 
capacity to assert one's right to education comes only as a result of 
education. 63 
What, on this view, is the advantage of asserting that children (by definition, those who are 
incapable of conceiving, articulating, expressing, and claiming the relevant dght) have 
rights? Surely it is more correct - and more economical (Ockham's razor) - to say that we 
are dealing with social obligations which are not grounded on rights. In the first instance it is 
the duty of parents to ensure that their children receive the kind of intervention which will 
enable them (the children) to become capable of asserting their own rights. What we are 
dealing with is the right of parents (or others acting in loco parentis) to determine, within 
certain social constraints, the course of their children's development. To persist in talking 
about the children's dghts is redundant since the children by definition have no capacity to 
assert claims contrary to those of their parents or other adults. When they have that 
capacity (or begin to exercise it) they are in the process of becoming adults (that is, rights 
claimers) in their own right. When the community intervenes on behalf of the child it is on 
the grounds that the parents have failed in their obligations or have abused their own rights 
(and in relation to their children this amounts to the same thing). Now the definition of the 
child's interest is articulated by the community (in the courts, for example) rather than by 
the parents. 64 The child's perception of his or her own interest may be consulted but it is not 
decisive . 
65 (it is proportional to the child's matudty. ) The child's best interest is always 
articulated by someone else. 66 In such circumstances it is difficult to see why the notion of 
62 Keinig, 'Mill, Children and Rights', 12. 
63 Ibid., 13 (emphasis added). 
84 This is usually done only by invoking a notion of the reasonable or good and wise parent, a notional personage who 
embodies the virtues which the communityin question ascribes to the ideal parent. 
65 For an insight into the difficulties associated with interpreting the child's best interests see Fordham Law Review, 64, 
1996 (A Report on the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 1995) esp. Margulies, 
Peter, 'The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Clients Competence in Context, 1473-1504; Mlyniec, Wallace J., 'A Judge's 
Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose', 1873-1915; 'Report of the Working Group on Determining 
the Best Interests of the Child', 1347-1350; 'Report of the Working Group on Determining the Child's Capacity to Make 
Decisions', 1339-1345. 
" Does a lawyer, for example, place the priority on attempting to advance the child's wishes, or the lawyers view of the 
child's best interests (which may be contrary to the child's wishes)? Can the wishes of the child be taken, in particular 
cases, to indicate that the child lacks the competence to make a decision or express a preference which is consistent 
with the child's best interests? Should the lawyer use her position to counsel the child (who is dependent and 
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children's rights is necessary at all. The same applies mutatis mutandis to other categories: 
persons in a permanent vegetative state, the insane, animals, etc. The difference in the 
case of children is that there is a progressive development of the relevant capacities so that 
part, at least, of what determines their best interests is the developmental goal of becoming 
capable of exercising rights. In the final analysis it may be that we accord independent 
rights to children as a recognition of their moral status as equal in certain respects to other 
human beings. 
However welfare rights and rights of freedom in relation to children may be more 
appropriately considered in terms of their orientation rather than in terms of their 
substantive content. Rogers and Wrightsman make the distinction in terms of a 'nurturance 
67 orientation' (welfare rights) as against a 'self-determination orientation' (freedom rights) . 
This helps us to pick out the developmental nature of childhood and the function of the 
rights in promoting this development. Children are not yet capable of claiming their welfare 
rights or asserting their option rights but they must, in some sense, be growing towards the 
requisite capacities. 'Nurturance' is preferable to recipience because it stresses the 
developmental nature of the process we refer to indiscriminately as childhood. Instead of a 
'self-determination orientation' however a 'participative orientation' might be preferable 
because it stresses the interpersonal over the isolated autonomy evoked by the former. In 
order to grow into participation children require the active, positive, planned interventions of 
adults to ensure that they acquire the powers, skills, and competencies necessary to 
participate in human life in all its dimensions. The parameters of these dimensions - 
individually and collectively - are set by the community in which the child is reared. 
Rights, duties, and obligations 
Rights and rights-related duties 'arise only in a social context' . 
68 Inter-personal relations are 
vital to the very existence and comprehensibility of rights. Given the social context, 
however, why should rights claims be conceded to anyone by anyone? Rights language 
69 
exists as a device for making claims and demands against others. Possession of a right, 
whether it is a welfare or an option right, implies some kind of legitimate control over 
others. Having a duty does not necessarily entail that there is a corresponding right; having 
a right does entail that there is a corresponding duty. Who has the responsibility for the duty 
which corresponds to a welfare right? 
vulnerable) and so cause the child to change her preference to be more consistent with the 
lawyers perception of the 
child's best interests? Fordharn Law Review, 64,1996,1282. 
67 Rogers, C. M., Wrightsman, L. S., 'Attitudes Towards Children's Rights: Nurturance or Self Determination', Journal of 
Social issues, 34,2,1978,5MB, 61. 
6" Golding, 'The Primacy of Welfare Rights', 130. 
" Bearing in mind that making and having a claim are two different things. 
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The correlativity between rights and duties and the weight which has been placed on it in 
order to try and show that rights are always the source of obligations has been criticised 
effectively by ONeill. She gives precedence to obligations arguing that it is obligations 
which give rise to rights (all children have a right not to be abused because all adults have 
an obligation not to abuse them) but that not all obligations do so. This approach leaves 
room for what she calls imperfect obligations. These are obligations which are binding on all 
agents (all adults, say); they are fundamental (they do not 'derive from any more basic 
ethical claim or relationship and (do) not depend on specific social and political 
arrangements or on prior acts of commitment'); but they are not universal in that they are 
not owed to either specified others or to all others. The example, 'to be kind and 
considerate in dealing with children' helps to illustrate that although we may acknowledge 
such an obligation it could not be discharged to all children at all times, we cannot intervene 
in respect of all children all of the time. In the case of imperfect obligations it is not the act 
which is indeterminate but the recipients of the obligation to act. '(So) long as the recipients 
of the obligation are neither all others nor specified others, there are no right holders, and 
nobody can either claim or waive performance of any right'. 70 So here are obligations which 
do not have corresponding rights. 
It has been argued that the correlation between rights and duties is a logical, not a moral or 
legal relation. If a rule gives rise to a right it does not give rise to a duty as something 
different. The two terms describe the same normative relation albeit from different points of 
view. 71 Montague 72 says that for this reason the term 'correlativity doctrine' is itself 
misleading because to speak of aGorrelation (of rights and duties) suggests that rights and 
the corresponding duties are distinct moral entities. This is not always the case. Much talk 
about rights is really talk about obligations and in manyGases it would be better to confine 
such discussions to references to obligations rather than references to rights. 
73 All 
statements about rights imply statements about obligations but only some rights serve as 
the grounds of obligations and, as we have seen, there are important obligations which do 
not entail corresponding rights. 
70 O'Neill, 'Children's Rights', 31/2. 
7' Benn, S. I., Peters, R. S., Social Principles and the Democratic State, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1969, En. 
This is brought out in the following definition by Finnis: 'In short, the modem vocabulary and grammar of rights 
is a 
many-faceted instrument for reporting and asserting the requirements or other 
implications of a relationship of justice 
from the point of view of the person(s) who benefit(s) from that relationship. It provides a way of 
talking about "what is 
just" from a special angle: the viewpoint of the "other(s)" to whom something 
(including, inter alia, freedom of choice) is 
owed or due, and who would be wronged if denied that something'. 
Finnis, J. M. , 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
Clarendon Law Series, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980,205. 
' Montague, P., "Two Concepts of Rights', Philosol2hy and Public Affairs, 9,1980,372-84. 
73 Ibid. 
' 
376. 
Paqe 41 
Chapter 2: Rights and Children 
It is important to identify rights which are the basis of obligations: the right to practise the 
religion of one's choice, for example, is itself the basis of another's obligation to forbear 
from interference, 74 The distinction between dghts which are the basis of obligations and 
those which are not resolves itself, in part at least, into the distinction between dghts of 
freedom and rights of recipience. Rights of freedom are exercisable dghts and are the 
grounds for others' obligation not to interfere. Rights of recipience, as we have seen, are 
sometimes non-exercisable rights and are not distinct from the obligation to which they 
correspond. Consequently they cannot serve as the grounds of those obligations. 75 
It could be argued, for example, that the obligation to promote the development of the child 
through education follows from the child's right to fullest development. But is the latter a 
right of freedom or a right of recipience? On the argument that the child is incapable of 
waiver or enforcement it can only be a right of recipience. In other words the child's right is 
not exercisable. Hence the child's right to education cannot be the basis for the parental or 
societal obligation to provide for the child's education. It follows that these obligations are 
independent of the putative right of the child to an education. The same would not be true 
of a claim that an adult had a right to an education. In such a case the asserted right is an 
exercisable right (the adult is free to choose whether to avail of the right or not) and is 
therefore, once the right is recognised, the basis of consequent obligations. 
The adult's right to education is an exercisable right in the sense that one acts in a 
particular way (Montague says, actions which 'are intentional under some description 7) in 
order to further one's education: one enrols in classes, attends classes, uses books and 
other research tools, etc. In this sense the right to education is the basis of others' 
obligation not to obstruct the pursuit. But the right to education is not an exercisable right if 
we mean to imply that there is an obligation on another to make substantive provision for 
the education (as is the case for children). In this sense (and there may be an obligation on 
others, parents or the state) we are referring to a right of recipience and, according to 
Montague's analysis, this right cannot be the basis of the obligation for the right and the 
obligation are simply the same relationship of conferring and receiving seen from the 
opposite points of view of the giver and receiver respectively. 
The most interesting implication of Montague's analysis is that 'individuals who are 
incapable of intentional activity are incapable of exercising rights, and may not even 
possess those rights that are exercisable'. This rules out infants and 'human adults who, for 
whatever reason, are incapable of the kind of mental activity required for the performance 
74 Ibid., 378. 
75 Ibid., 379. 
7e Ibid., 383. 
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of intentional actionse. 77 (Although he does allow that adults who have once had the 
capacity andGonsequently the rights do not lose the rights if they lose the capacity. )78 
It might be concluded then that if children have rights at all these must be welfare rights 
based in some way on their separable needs and interests. They cannot have freedom 
rights since the children (by definition) lack the capacity to make the kinds of decisions 
which possession of freedom rights necessitate. They are, in a sense, potential rights 
holders requiring that certain capacities (intellectual, moral, social) be developed before 
they can participate fully in the community of rights. 
What rights should children have? 
The acknowledgement that there should be some rights does not determine what rights 
there should be. Mackie proposes two negative theses: firstly, that specific rights cannot be 
determined a priori, on general grounds and, secondly, that whatever rights are recognised 
79 
should not be absolute . 
Mackie takes issue with Mill's liberal principle of non-interference on two grounds. Firstly, 
many people are not the best judges or guardians of their own good. Secondly, hardly any 
part of anyone's conduct concerns only him/her self. Liberty of thought and opinion, for 
example, are explicitly defended by Mill on the grounds that their effect on others and on 
society generally is more likely to be beneficial than harmful: but in either case it is the 
effect on others which is the criterion. The kind of rational persuasion that Mill advocates is 
a double-edged sword since 
It is all too clear that people can be persuaded to destroy not only the 
freedoms of others but also their own, including the freedom of discussion 
which that persuasion exemplifies. 80 
What we need is not a universal principle of non-interference in the first instance but 
pfinciples which will enable us to judge when interference is legitimate. We need rules 
which enable us to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable ways of influencing other 
people. In general the acceptable ways will be those that 'harmonise with the general form 
of conditions for the good life'. 81 We need to be able to adjudicate between particular rival 
claims to freedom. Mackie uses the example of parents' claims to raise their children within 
their own beliefs and moral outlook, and the problem of indoctrination. 
77 ibid», 384. 
78 lbid. ' 
384 n. 13. 
79 Mackie, -Ethics, 
174. 
'30 fbid., 181. 
al lbid., 181. 
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(W)e can object to indoctrination in the sense of a style of teaching that tends to preclude any subsequent rational reconsideration of the issues, 
and we can object to it as an interference with a legitimate freedom of the 
children. 82 
How extensive should basic rights be? We should be wary of moral universalism. 
Communities differ in history, ideals, practices, self-definitions, and so forth. It is highly 
unlikely that any but the most general of moral principles (or rights) will cover the reality of 
all human communities. Communities differ in their answers yet each community may have 
attained the optimum for itself, what Lomasky calls 'the nugget of truth contained in the 
otherwise dubious theory of moral relativism'. 83 
The ideal world for a negative rights holder would be one in which she could exercise her 
own rights while everyone else defers to her. This is either the totally egocentric world of 
the infant or a reversion to the totalitarian world of the absolute monarch. But it would not in 
fact be an ideal world, it would be a denial of the very meaning and function of rights, in the 
case of the monarch no less than that of the infant. The process of becoming human is the 
82 jbid ,, 182. What is this 'legitimate freedom of the children'? What he has to say about indoctrination presumes that 
there is 'a style of teaching that tends to preclude any subsequent rational reconsideration of the issues'. Is this claim 
empirical or analytical? We could for example take it as the definition of indoctrination that 'any subsequent rational 
reconsideration of the issues' is in fact precluded. How does this square with freedom of will? Maybe'is rendered less 
likely would be more persuasive and more consonant with the empirical facts of teaching and learning. It is useful to 
remember that the word indoctrination received As most forceful definitions in the context of the Cold War when the 
West could only accept the lack of opposition to the Eastern Regimes by persuading themselves that the capacity to 
resist had been educated out: the alternative was to acknowledge that the repressive regimes had some persuasive 
force with their populations. More recent events proved that if there had been indoctrination, it was not universally 
successful. 
We could distinguish 'hard' and 'soft' forms of indoctrination. The hard form is difficult to sustain since it runs counter to 
all our beliefs regarding human freedom and freedom of will. For if we accept that the hard version is in fact possible 
then we accept that a totally deterministic view of human behaviour is possible or sustainable. (The fate of Winston 
Smith in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-four was not a result of childhood indoctrination but of a merciless brain-washing and 
conditioning in which it is arguable that his self, his personality, was destroyed. ) The soft version would simply state that 
future behaviour may be more or less influenced by the indoctrination but that it is always open to the individual to 
question. This of course presumes that he/she has the capacity (mental, intellectual) to question and the openness of 
mind to conceive of alternatives: this is a definition of liberation. The soft version would also raise questions about the 
other elements involved in teaching and learning, that is elements other than 'style of teaching', which would contribute 
to the 'less likely. If we take an empirical approach - and presume the continuing operation and development of free will 
- then we could list issues which make abandonment, or radical revision, of a set of beliefs less likely on the part of any 
individual: the completeness of the set of beliefs; their range and adequacy; their coherence; their consistency; their 
emotional appeal and context (adequacy of source, rituals etc. ). R. M. Hare ('Adolescents into Adults', in T. B. H. Hollins, 
ed., Aims in Education, Manchester, University Press, 1964,47-70) argues that the difference between education and 
indoctrination is not to be found in content or method but in the aim. For a fuller account see Gaden, G., 'Indoctrination 
and Power, Irish Educational Studies, Dublin, Educational Research Association of Ireland, 1981, and Callan, E., 
'Indoctrination and Parental Rights', Philosol2hy of Education Proceedings, 41,1985,97-106. McLaughlin suggests that 
a broader approach to the question of indoctrination is necessary, both a deeper exploration of the underlying concepts, 
and a richer range of perspectives. McLaughlin, T. H., Review of Spiecker and Straughan, eds., Freedom and 
Indoctrination in Education:: International PersMtives, London, Cassell Educational, 1991, in Journal of Philosoghy o 
-Education, 
29,1,1995,155-157. 
83 Lomasky, Persons. Rights, 79. 
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process - among other things - of learning that there is a reciprocity in rights recognition 
and that we inhabit human communities on the basis of this reciprocity. 
We have seen that the will or power theory of rights is inadequate to explain the moral 
status of children insofar as it excludes children even though they have acknowledged 
rights. The interest theory, on the other hand, includes children as bearers of rights but 
raises the problem of the identification and evaluation of the corresponding interests. 
Option rights are restricted to those who can exercise autonomy and freedom and as such 
are denied to children and to others who are, for the time being at least, incapable of 
exercising autonomy and freedom. In any case there are other human needs and capacities 
which are arguably as important as autonomy and freedom. These capacities are 
recognised by welfare rights which do not require the capacity to choose deliberatively, But 
welfare rights raise the question whether, since the rights in question must be claimed by 
others on the child's behalf anyway, it is necessary to invoke rights in the case of children at 
all rather than simply focus on adult obligations. It is not clear whether the provision of the 
goods necessary to enable the child to become an adult rights bearer is a response to the 
child's right or simply a fulfilment of independent adult obligations. It may be that by 
switching the moral focus to the rights of the child we are diverting attention from the 
obligations of specific adults. We are replacing adult obligations which are specific with 
children's rights which are amorphous as to where the specific duty lies. Children's rights 
becomes a debate between adults as to who has the ultimate obligation. While ascribing 
rights to children we may be acknowledging their moral status as the equals of adults, in the 
final analysis we may have to continue to speak in terms of rights for the simple reason that 
rights talk has become the predominant discourse in moral and political debate. 
Summary 
Can we ascribe rights to children? Not if we regard rights as relating to capacities for choice 
and rational action since children appear to lack the relevant capacities. Yet there are, as 
Spencer realised, acknowledged children's rights such as their rights not to be mistreated or 
to be cared for. The will or power theory, which favours self-sufficiency and autonomy, is 
too narrow. If children are to be included in the 'realm of rights' we need a more inclusive 
account of human being and human relations. 
The interest theory allows rights to be the possession of any being Gapable of having 
(normative) interests. These interests are the basis for rules which require others to behave 
in certain ways with respect to these interests. This allows for children's rights but raises 
questions about which interests generate rights. 
If we want rights to reflect the moral status of children then we must have a theory which 
allows for their inclusion. Children must be included in our moral discourse if they are to 
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have full moral weight in social and political arrangements which affect them. The interest 
theory is more likely to secure a social order in which children are included as significant 
members. This does not mean that children ought to be considered the full equals of adults 
in all respects. 
The contrast between the will and interest theories reflects the differences between the 
kinds of rights which will be given moral and developmental priority. Option rights invoke 
the idea of the freedom of the individual to shape her life as she chooses. Welfare rights, 
on the other hand, are necessary to protect the interests of those who are unable to pursue 
their own claims to a wide range of human goods which are necessary for moral 
personhood. 
Human development, especially in childhood, requires sustained, unsolicited intervention: 
interference is both warranted and necessary to promote human development. 
Human nature is irreducibly social. Human beings are primarily sociable and rights and 
rights-related duties must reflect their origins in social contexts. Inter-personal relations are 
vital to the comprehensibility of rights. An adequate rights theory, therefore, must look for 
adequate grounding in the inter-personal activities of human communities. 
If children are to become capable of exercising rights of any kind they must achieve 
minimal standards of human and social functioning. Freedom rights are contingent on the 
capacities necessary to exercise them and consequently welfare rights must have 
developmental priority. There cannot be any rights at all if children do not benefit from 
welfare rights in the first place. They must have a right to the means necessary to the 
effective exercise of freedom. Children are candidates for freedom rights; their present 
welfare is protected by welfare rights (to nutrition, security, education, etc. ) which at the 
same time promote their future interests as adult rights bearers. 
A distinction between a 'nurturance orientation' (welfare rights) and a 'self-determination 
orientation' (freedom rights) helps us to pick out the developmental nature of childhood and 
the function of rights in promoting this development. Children must receive interventions 
which will enable them eventually to assert rights on their own behalf. 
Communities differ in their selection of favoured capacities and the extension of the 
associated rights. Part of the developmental process of humanisation is the growing 
realisation that there is a reciprocity in rights recognition both between the individual and 
other individuals, and between the individual and the community. We participate 
in human 
communities on the basis of this reciprod y. 
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Contrary to the thrust of the mainstream tradition of European moral philosophy Mackie' 
holds that the belief that moral judgements point to or invoke something which is 
objectively prescriptive are mistaken: there are no objective moral valueS. 2 On the 
contrary, our moral thinking appears to be relative to particular ways of life and to express 
the preferences of these ways of life rather than objective moral requirements. This is the 
argument from relativity. There is also what he Galls 'the argument from queerness': there 
would be great difficulty in describing objective moral precepts if they did exist; they would 
have to be different from everything else in the universe; they would require some 'special 
faculty of moral perception or intuition' in order to discern them and to link them to features 
of actions; they would be related to natural features in the world in ways that we do not 
understand. 3 Anyway, it is possible to account for moral values in terms of the relationship 
between social practices and traditional moral language in such a way that the persistence 
of the belief in their objectivity is explained. 4 
The good life 
Aristotle'sý5 formal sketch of the structure of the good life does not specify content. 
The good life is not pleasure, wealth, honour, or other such things. Nor is it Plato's form of 
the good. A human being has a function over and above particular functions of the several 
members of the human body (eye, hand etc. ) and also superior to mere growth and 
sentience. It has to do with the active rational part of human being. Aristotle concludes that 
'the good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, or if there are more 
kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind'. This is over a 
complete lifetime, not just on brief occasions. 6 Aristotle's is an outline account and he has 
already warned that we should not 
expect more precision in the treatment of any subject than the nature of 
that subject permits; for demanding logical demonstrations from a teacher 
of rhetoric is clearly about as reasonable as accepting mere plausibility 
from a mathematician. 7 
1 Mackie, J. L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1990. 
2 Mackie, Ethics, 35. 
3 See also Langford, Glenn, Education. Persons. and Socigly: a Philosophical ELiquýia, London, Macmillan, 1985,27/8. 
4 Mackie, Ethics, 35. Lomasky is mistaken when he takes issue with Mackie on the matter of the objective reality of 
value. What Mackie is arguing is that there are no objective moral values independent of our desires, choices and 
preferences. This is not, I think, contrary to Lomaskys position. See Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral 
Commungy, Oxford, University Press, 1987,237-241, 
5 Aristotle, 
-Ethics, 
J. A. K. Thomson, trans., revised, Hugh Tredennick, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976. 
6 Ibid., 76. 
7 Ibid., 65. 
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While the supreme good consists in the exercise of virtue8 happiness also requires a 
certain kind of prosperity and good fortune: friends, wealth, political influence, good 
ancestry, good children. 9 
Happiness, the Good Life, 'a kind of virtuous activity of the soul', is the end of political 
science. It is the chief concern of political science 'to endue the citizens with certain 
qualities, namely virtue and the readiness to do fine deeds'. 10 Significantly Adstotle's 
sketch excludes children because the child's age 'debars it as yet from such activities' as 
are appropdate to the practice of virtue. If children are described as happy it is 'by way of 
congratulation on their future promise'. 1 1 
In sum, the happy man is 
one who is active in accordance with complete virtue, and who is 
adequately furnished with external goods, and that not for some 
unspecified period but throughout a complete life. 12 
So 'good' in the question 'What is the good life for man? ' is indeterminate. The good life 
must satisfy the interests of those who actually participate in the good life as defined. A 
universal substantive definition is probably impossible. The variety of views of the good life, 
historical differences, social, cultural, political, religious differences make consensus 
impossible, 'men's real goals are irresolvably diverse'. 13 The Universal Declaration and 
other modem charters of human rights do not offer a comprehensive vision of human good. 
Their purpose, on the contrary, is to secure only what might be termed 'minimum 
conditions'. Articulating a comprehensive vision of 'the good for man' and how this is to be 
attained is the province of religions, philosophies, and ideologies. Christianity, Buddhism, 
and various secular philosophies provide alternative views of human nature and its 
fulfilment. 14 The definition of the details of the individual good life is more appropriately the 
work of imaginative literature or speculative fiction: even then the literature simply shows 
the variety of real possibilities and leaves readers to draw their own moral conclusions. 15 
8 Ibid., 78. 
9 Ibid., 80. As we will see these may correspond very roughly to freedom rights and welfare rights respectively. 
10 Ibid., 81. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 84. 
13 Mackie, 
-Ethics, 
178. 
14 Keown, Damien, 'Are There Human Rights in Buddhism7, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 2,1995,3-27. 
15 One may query here, though, whether the writer for children shows her hand a little more? 
Is there a 'good life' being 
defined in children's literature? I think that there is. Is it the same good life in all literature 
for children? This is more 
problematic. Perhaps there are certain fbundadonal values - like 
Williams' thick concepts - which all literature for 
children promotes. This is the child reader's initiation into the realm of 
human values: a set of deep values which is 
universal. One can ask whether there is a society or culture 
(even notional) which promotes in its children dishonesty, 
falsehood, disloyalty, cowardice, betrayal etc. consistently as a foundational morality? 
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The good life will be characterized by two features: egoism and self-referential altruism, 
which are 'kinds of activity and kinds of motivation'. 16 
flor any individual a good life will be made up largely of the effective 
pursuit of activities that he finds worthwhile, either intrinsically, or because 
they are directly beneficial to others about whom he cares ... the happiness with which I am, inevitably, most concemed is my own, and next that of 
those who are in some way closely related to me. 17 
Two comments are necessary here. 'Intrinsically' appears from the context not to mean 
inherent in the activity itself, in some way detached from the actor, but worthwhile to the 
actor, worthwhile in the first person. It is also distinct from the benefit to the significant 
others. Secondly, Mackie does not mean 'related' as in blood relation only but intends it to 
encompass wider, more fluid and distant relationships such as tribe, community, locality, 
nation, ethnic group etc. 
The natural proclivity of human beings to look after themselves and those who are nearest 
to them in the first instance is not a defect of human nature: it is what ensures the survival 
of the individual, the family, the tribe, and the community. The fact of the matter is that 
'(a)ny possible, and certainly any desirable, human life is social'. 18 Each individual is united 
with others in a variety of ways both synchronic (at one point in time - our present relations) 
and diachronic (our historical relations, both past and future). These relations are not just 
biological and familial but also cultural in the widest sense: each of us is linked not only to 
biological ancestors but also to cultural traditions which embody favoured activities, forms 
of thought, belief and value systems. We are indebted for what we are as individuals to 
many others. Part of the good life for us is inheriting and transmitting in our turn a valued 
cultural inheritance, and 'this too is a social relation to which there belong appropriate sorts 
of conflict as well as co-operation'. ' 9 The function of morality is to counteract the excesses 
of egoism and self-referential altruism. Different kinds of co-operation can transcend them: 
it is one of the main functions of political and economic systems to ensure that they do. 20 
16 Mackie, Ethics, 173. 
17 ibid., 17o. 
18 Ibid" 172. Aristotle: 'man is by nature a political animal. Anyone who by his nature and not simply by ill-luck has no 
state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman ... ' , Politics, trans., 
T. A. Sinclair, revised and re- 
presented by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, 1992,59. See also Mary Midgley, The 
Ethical Primate, London, 
Routledge, 1994 for a forceful argument in favour of basing a theory of human morality on the contingencies of human 
evolution. 
19 Mackie, _Ethics, 
172. See also Langford, Education, Persons. and Soci , chapter 
2 and Paddy Walsh's examination 
of history in 'hilOSODhv in 
Practice, Cassell Education, 1993, chapter 12. 
20 Mackie, -Ethics, 
170. 
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One's self-referentially altruistic moral principles will not be entirely determined by the 
choice of a specific ideal: they wIll be embedded in the social relationships in which one 
finds oneself, or into which one enter's voluntarily and in which one hopes to remain. 
Project pursuit 
So a rights-based theory of morality must take account of three factors: firstly, a plausible 
goal for human beings would be something like Aristotle's eudaimonia, it would have to be 
in the category of an activity rather than an end or termination; secondly, there is an 
indefinite variety of conceivable goals, since there is a wide variety in the kinds of life that 
people choose; thirdly, even this way of expressing the situation (i. e. talking about goals) is 
misleading for people do not, as a matter of fact, make a single, once-for-all choice of a 
total plan of life, '(t)hey choose successively to pursue various activities from time to 
time'. 21 Mackie's third point is endorsed by Lomasky's theory of rights in relation to 'project 
pursuit'. At least some of the kinds of ends that motivate a person's actions persist through 
time in the individual's life, establish a coherent pattern which is retrospectively discernible, 
and thus can be seen to have provided a degree of 'structural stability' to that life. These 
kinds of ends are projects. 'Some of these projects are directed at becoming and remaining 
a certain sort of person. ' In this sense projects 'explain more than an action; they help to 
explain a life'. 22 
But choice of activity is not wholly arbitrary or gratuitous: there are overarching goals which 
give certain activities priority over others. People's choices of a total plan of life are limited 
by the way in which their perceptions have been formed and their practical options limited 
by their cultural tradition. Project pursuit does not necessarily depend on having 
antecedently deliberated over a choice of future. In fact Lomasky takes exception to the 
conventional insistence on the centrality of autonomy defined very stringently as being free 
from, or unconstrained by, external influences. Being a project pur, *r is not equivalent to 
being morally autonomous in this sense. Although one's projects may be the product of 
explicit deliberation about whatever vision of the good one will pursue, 23 they need not be. 
'They may instead be ingested with one's mother's milk ... and never 
be trotted out to be 
examined at the bar of reason. '24 
In all societies persons iregularly attach themselves through their actions to 
the welfare of parents or children or clan or nation, display fealty to their 
gods, view the contours of the land that is theirs with special affection, 
21 Mackie, J. L., 'Can There be a Right-based Moral Theory, in Mackie, J., Mackie, P., eds. 
Persons and Values: 
Selected Paotr-s- VOL 2, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 105-119,113. 
ýR 
22 Lomasky, aersons Rights, 26/7. 
23 mill, 'framing the plan of our life'. Mill, j. S., On Libe , in H. 
B. Acton ed., Utilitarianism, Libedy. Representativ 
_Government, 
London, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1972,75. 
24 Lomasky, Person_s_, RW_ht_s, 44. 
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show allegiance to the virtues and responsibilities of a craft or tradition. 
Because these constitute pattems of motivated activity that form the 
structure of a scrutable life, they medt recognition as projects. 25 
In other words projects do not necessarily occur as the result of reflective planning and 
commitment. (And even where they are the product of explicit deliberation this does not 
mean that they are, or can be, formulated ab initio by the individual unconstrained in choice 
by any kind of social or cultural influences. ) They are simply the direction and order which 
can be discerned in a human life when one sees it from the point of view of the consistent 
values and principles which inform it. Projects are motivated dispositions that 'project 
themselves temporally through various stages of a life and render it one connected life 
rather than a jumble of discrete episodes. 126 Like Aristotelian virtues projects give 
motivational structure to a human life and concurrently they provide a standard of value for 
practical judgement. 27 But the Aristotelian virtues are discovered and provide an 
impersonal standard of value rather than created (as some values can be) by commitment 
to one's own projects. 
(A liberal conception) recognises in each individual project pursuer value 
that springs from his ability to generate value through his own personal 
commitments. He is not merely a place holder at which external value can 
express itself. 28 
This is true, but only to the extent that the project pursuer cannot be the exclusive begetter 
of his own values. According to Lomasky the project pursuer's value 'emerges from 
commitment'. A commitment generates a standard of personal value which allows us to 
arbitrate between alternative outcomes. Since the value follows the commitment it does not 
influence our choice of commitment. But this is only partly true. Our choices themselves 
are influenced (not determined) by prior values that we believe to be worth pursuing: when 
we see the consequences of our choices we shall turn to a revaluation of our values or 
consider our values to be vindicated. Which comes first, the value or the existential 
choice? 29 And do we follow the existential choice willy nilly or reconsider our position 
according as we might find the consequence abhorrent? Why, if the choices create value, 
should we find some of the consequences abhorrent? 
25 Ibid., 45. 
26 Ibid., 42. 
27 Ibid., 49. 
28 Ibid., 4950. 
29 This is the Polanyian problem. See Polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, 2nd. 
edition, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, part 3. But see also 
Rawls' notion of 'reflective equilibrium' whereby 
we attempt to strike a balance between our considered 
judgements in attempting to ground our morality and our 
cherished principles. Rawls, John, A 
Theo! y of Justice, Oxford, University Press, 1973,2011. 
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For most people their moral options are ultimately limited by the moral community in which 
they originate. As well as empowering us to play our part in our inherited moral community 
our developmental experience severely delimits the parameters beyond which we cannot 
go in moral matters (and not only moral matters) without the most improbable heroism. In 
the history of the human race only a handful of heroic iconoclasts have broken the mould 
into which they were bom. 30 
Ultimately, the specifics of the good life are historically worked out by communities for 
themselves. Such specifications might articulate the shared values and aspirations of the 
individuals who make up the community and who have made it up (in both senses of 
comprised and created) in the past. But the process is circular: as each individual is born he 
is initiated into the values and rituals, beliefs and forms of life (and knowledge) of the 
relevant community. He may be free to challenge the orthodoxy and develop the self- 
knowledge of the community, but this will have to be done from within the sustaining 
community. 31 There are communities where such individual critique is very difficult - 
access to alternative modes of experience, interpretation or expression is restricted, and 
the tradition itself is intimidatory - but it is never eliminated. 32 No matter how effective 
indoctrination, repression and intimidation might be they can never completely eradicate 
the human capacity for freedom without, as in the exemplary case of Winston Smith, 33 
destroying the entire personality which is the wellspring of free will. 
One of the things that distinguishes cultural communities is the diversity of the ways in 
which they identify and respond to human needs. 
Needs and well-being 
A need is related to some further state of affairs. A 'basic need' is a need that, if unfulfilled, 
and the further state not attained, will result in some fundamental harm. What we refer to 
as 'need' must be necessary to the desired state of affairs in the sense that its absence 
: ly one of a range of renders the state of affairs unattainable. That is, it cannot be simil) 
alternatives which would be equally efficacious in bdnging the desired state of affairs about. 
The need is necessary to the attainment of the objective but it is not sufficient. 
34 
30 See Mead, George Herbert, Mind. Self, and Society, Charles W. Morris, ed., 
University of Chicago Press, 1962, 
215-219. Even in such cases the mould-brealdng is more likely to be a re-interpretation of 
the received tradition rather 
than a revolutionary destruction and innovation. 
31 The more appropriate metaphor is of an ascending spiral rather 
than an enclosed circle. 
32 See Langford, Edu 36-43, for an account of social criticism 
from within and from 
outside communities. 
33 Orwell, George, _Nin_eteen5E-I! 
"hm-f-Our, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967. 
34 Sutton, Thomas L., 'Human Rights and Children', 
Educational Theo 28,2,1978,102/3. 
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Fundamental or basic needs relate to our overall quality of life, our well-being, rather than 
to a particular goal or purpose. 35 
Well-being is the converse of harm. The constituents of well-being are activities in, and 
experiences of, the real world as well as awareness of these activities and experiences. 
This means that harm Gan have two possible forms: things which prevent a person from 
actually engaging in worthwhile activities (incarceration, for example) and things which 
prevent the person from appreciating the value of what she is doing (depression). 36 Harm is 
not the same as the frustration of desire; to lack what one desires does not in itself 
necessarily constitute harm. Harm must be judged with reference to our needs rather than 
to our immediate desires. 37 Our fundamental needs are permanent (and definitive of being 
human or of being ourselves) whereas immediate desires can be transitory and 
intermittent. -38 The concept of a need relates to the notion of serious harm whereas the 
concept of a desire does not. 39 
While it is 'logically impossible for a person to lack what he needs without being sedously 
harmed, '40 this is not true of desires. Desires are mental acts which pertain to the 
motivation of action whereas needs are 'passive dispositions to suffer certain harms 
because of certain lacks. '41 I may desire an ice-cream but I need water. Although I may 
sometimes desire water it continues to be the case that I need it even if the immediate 
desire is fulfilled. Needs are necessarily important, desires are not. Desires can be 
whimsical and fleeting, words we would never use in relation to needs. It is unusual not to 
know what we want or desire; it is not unusual not to know what we need: in the case of 
needs'we have to enquire to determine what they are'. 42 
Although needs are not the same as desires and wants '(t)he fulfilment of desires is (itself) 
a psychological and emotional need which will have to be accommodated to other needs I 
35 Thomson, Garrett, Needs, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967,8. 
36 Ibid., 41. 
37 Thomson, Needs, 90. 'Desire may be capricious; need always claims to be taken seriously ... A need is imperative; 
it 
is something which, by definition, has a right to satisfaction'. Minogue, K. R. The Liberal Mind, 
London, Methuen, 1963, 
103. Minogue differs from Thomson in relating the concept to happiness/unhappiness rather than to the stronger 
concept of harm. In general his account of need as a moral concept is skeptical. (103 
ff. ) 
38 'Interest is a more useful term than needs or wants because it can contain both without resolving 
the tension 
between them. 'If something is in one's interest it will be advantageous. If it is also fundamentally so, 
it requires rights- 
protection'. Freeden, M., Rights, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 
1991,50. 
39 Thomson, -Needs, 
101. Needs are not simply strong desires: the assertion 'I need you' to a loved one can be either 
an expression of strong desire or a statement that without the 
loved one one's personality is irretrievably damaged 
(harmed). 
40 Thomson, -Needs, 
99. 
41 Ibid., 100. 
42 McCloskey, H. J., 'Human Needs, Rights and Political Values', American Philosophical 
Quarte 13,1976,4. 
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and others have'. 43 The point to note here, however, is that the psychological and 
emotional need for the fulfilment of desires is a general need, it does not specify any 
particular desire. In effect it is a negative point: if none of my desires are fulfilled then I will 
be harmed. 
To say that something is a fundamental need is to say that to lack that something is to 
suffer serious harm. 44 Fundamental needs, however, do not depend on there being a 
corresponding conscious aim. For even if a person does not consciously wish to improve 
his life and to avoid serious harm 'his fundamental needs as a human being will be the 
same. In the fundamental sense the agent may be completely unaware of what she needs 
(a baby does not know that it needs nutrition). Needing in this sense is 'not something that 
we actively do, and therefore is not something that we can have reason to do. '45 In general 
the logic of fundamental need restricts choice to the alternatives of meeting the need or 
suffering harm. Usually the only viable course of action is to seek what we need. 46 We can 
forego, or disrupt, the satisfaction of our fundamental needs in the pursuit of a higher goal 
or aspiration but not without what is normally considered to be self-harm: this is the 
meaning of self-sacrifice. 47 
Fundamental need does not imply a lack nor is it necessary to feel the need as Waldron 
asserts: 'To need something is to suffer a lack, but ( ... ) it is also to suffer a lack - to 
experience it as a burning frustration and as a crippling and overwhelming debility'. 48 
Waldron appear's to be confusing the concept of fundamental need and the idea of 
immediate deprivation. 49 We are generally not conscious of our fundamental needs at all: I 
am aware of my need for water only when I am thirsty - and then it is a desire for water 
which is at the forefront of my consciousness and a motivator for my action - although it is 
non-trivially true that I have a fundamental need for water, that is, that without water my 
well-being will be seriously, even fatally, damaged. Certainly acute hunger or thirst may 
lead to 'desperate and reckless activity'50 but the subjective experience of hunger and thirst 
43 Freeden, Rights, 50. 
44 Thomson, Needs, 14. 
45 Ibid., 16. 
46 Thomson, Needs, 27. The alternative, self-harm to the point of self-destruction, does not count as a viable course of 
action although it is a possible, morally legitimate, course of action voluntarily to opt for self-harm (as in the case of 
martyrdom in the name of a'higher ideal). 
47 Thomson, Needs, 107. Although life is 'valuable because it is a condition of any desiring; death is the end of all 
desiring and therefore the worst possible evil. ... 
(But in the) circumstances of martyrdom ... the continuation of desiring 
is subordinated to spiritual integrity. Minogue, The Liberal Mind, 27/8. This means that in relation to rights we may, on 
appropriate occasions, waive our rights whether these be option or welfare rights, if and when we 
judge some aftemative 
state of affairs to be worth the sacrifice. 
48 Waldron, J., lapgrs 1961 -1991, Cambridge, University Press, 1993,264. 
419 Ibid., 26516. But Waldron is correct that unmet needs pose a threat to the stability of social organisations. 
5) Ibid., 264. 
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are not the same as the needs for food and water. The former are contingent, intermittent 
states which can be satisfied by the provision of sufficient quantities of food and water. The 
latter are permanent conditions, individually necessary for my well-being as a human 
animal. 
For example, as a human being I may have a need for Gompanionship. 51 This does not 
mean that I lack companionship now or at any particular time but only that if I am deprived 
of companionship for a prolonged period I will be harmed as a human being. This is in 
direct contrast to Sutton, S52 assertion, following Komisar's analysiS53, that the use of 'need' 
presupposes a deficiency: to say that someone needs something is to say that she lacks 
that thing at that particular time. However it is plainly in accordance with correct usage to 
say that I need fresh water, clean air, companionship, nutritious food, shelter etc. without 
the implication that I am bereft of these at a particular time. To say that I have just enjoyed 
a hearty meal is not inconsistent with saying that I need food. 
Neither are needs the same as drives. While drives explain behaviour, needs justify it: 
hunger and thirst explain why someone might behave in a certain way in order to acquire 
food and water but only appeal to needs can justify the behaviour. Needs indicate what we 
should do in the name of our own interests: needs justify rather than explain. 54 
Fundamental needs are not socially or culturally relative (although the ways in which the 
needs are met may be). They relate to our common humanity and to our specific 
individuality, not to a particular historical or cultural specificity. For something to qualify as 
a need what is needed must be crucial to the general humanity or to the specific 
individuality of the person(s) in question. Human needs have to be defined in terms of 
human nature and human ends. The ends are determined by our natures as human beings 
and by our potential as individuals to become what we are capable of becoming. Certain 
conditions must be met if this development from potential to actual is to be realised. A need 
is something which, if it is not met, will result in fundamental harm to an individual either in 
terms of her human nature or of her individuai nature. This harm can be in relation to 
present existence or to future development. 
51. (P)eople have a need for friendship even when it is clear that they will not die without ft. So, survival needs can count 
as fundamental needs, and yet fundamental needs cover more than survival. ' Thomson, Needs, 38. 
52 Sutton, 'Human Rights', 102-110. 
53 Komisar, B. P., "'Need' and the Needs-Curriculum' in Smith & Ennis eds., Language and Concepts in Education, 
Chicago, Rand McNally, 1961. 
54 Thomson, Needs, 13114. 
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Interests 
We ran identify three senses of 'interest'. 55 The occurent use of the word means 'to be 
attracted to X or to be inclined to give attention to it'. (The visitor showed great interest in 
the antics of the baby. This interest is conscious; it is an act of interest. ) The dispositional 
use indicates that one is disposed to show or take an interest in something ongoing. Hence, 
one pays attention though not at any particular time. (The grandfather took a great interest 
in the achievements of his grandchild. We would also expect this interest to be conscious; it 
is an ongoing act of interest. ) The normative use denotes those things considered both 
worthwhile and in some way appropriate to the well-being of the individual in question. ('To 
say that X is in the interest of A is to say that X is good for A, or is a constituent of A's good, 
or is a means to A's good. 5b) This is the sense in which we say that something is in one's 
interest. (It is in everybody's interest to have an efficient and equitable justice system. ) This 
is interest as welfare. In this case we are not referring to an occasional act of interest 
(occurent), or to a disposition to show interest in the continuing sense (dispositional). In fact 
this use is not active or dispositional at all. The judge of the welfare interest may be the 
individual involved or some outside observer: the individual does not necessarily know 
what his or her interests are in the normative sense since wants or desires are not 
conceptually necessary to interest in the normative sense: infants may have welfare 
interests but not feel the corresponding wants or desires. 
Normative interests are more extensive than needs. While it is in one's interests to have 
one's needs met, interests also embrace things other than needs. Needs are just one 
component of one's interest and there is more to the needs than simply their satisfaction. 
Human friendship, for example, is valuable not just because it fulfils some need or other 
but because it confers some benefit on us. To say that we have a need for water is not to 
understand the benefit water confers on US. 57 
(I)nterests relate to a person's good, where the good is determined not 
simply by a man's needs, but also by his goals, aspirations, values, and 
achievements, and where a man may be ignorant of, mistaken concerning, 
confused about his interests. 5B 
The concept of a (normative) interest defines the variety of activities and experiences that 
are constitutive (in part at least) of a worthwhile life. It also defines the nature of the worth 
55 The analysis of 'interest which follows is based upon Sutton, Thomas L., 'Human Rights and 
Children', Educational 
Theo , 28,2,1978,107, 
and KJeinig, J., 'Mill, children and Rights', Educational Philosophy and Theo[y, 8,1,1976, 
11/12. 
56 Golding, M., 'Towards a Theory of Human Rights', Monist, 52,4,196B, 523. 
57 See Minogue, The iberal Mind, 195. 
58 McCloskey, 'Human Needs', 7/8. 'Needs appear to be a special sub-class of interests', Golding, M., 'Towards a 
Theory of Human Rights', Monist, 52,4,1968,523 n. 3. 
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of these activities and experiences. Interests are essentially general and non-particular, 
they can be expressed in a range of needs, wants, or desires. 
'Interest' in the relevant sense should not be identified with self-interest. 'Self-interest' 
means to be consciously pre-occupied with one's own personality or affairs, to be actuated 
by, or absorbed in what one conceives to be for one's own interests. One's interests, 
however, like one's needs, are not necessarily the object of conscious attention. The 
example of the small child is apposite. Although it may truly be said that the new-born 
infant is self-preoccu pied or self-absorbed it is also the case that the new-bom has no idea 
of what his or her true interests are. 'Interest' in the sense of 'self-interest' refers to the 
dispositional use of the word. The crucial use here is normative. 
Human nature 
Inquiry into human needs and interests involves value judgements. In order to establish 
what constitutes a person's well-being we need a theory of human nature, a model of 
human being. 59 Needs and interests can be explained and invoked only against 
a background belief in the existence of a common human nature and 
specific and unique individual natures with certain inherent potentialities (as 
distinct from mere possibilities). 150 
Such a theory will comprise two distinct, though related, elements: the general human 
nature which we share with all others of the species and a specific personal nature which is 
unique to each individual ('a human and personal nature, with inbuilt potentialities of 
natural development'). 61 In other words, there is the good for human beings generally and 
also the good for each individual. When the basic needs which are common to all human 
beings have been met we encounter the concept of self-making. The distinction between 
development and self-making fits with a distinction between welfare rights and rights of 
freedom. Until such time as I have achieved a minimal human development in terms of 
making my human potential actual I will be unable to make full use of my freedom rights, to 
develop, that is, my capacity for self-making. 
There are natural limits to the extent to which we Gan change ourselves to adapt to the 
world or change the world to suit ourselves. That is, there are natural constraints on what 
interests we have and on what Gan have primary value for us. 62 Things are relevant to our 
well-being or harm by virtue of contingent features of our being human. We have little, if 
any, choice over what counts as a primary good or a basic human interest. This is not to 
59 1 mean 'human being' as a process rather than as a thing. 
60 McCloskey, 'Human Needs', 1 
61 Ibid., 8. 
62 Thomson, -Needs, 
77. 
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say that we are passive victims of our human nature. 63 We can change aspects of the 
natural world to suit our interests and we can also accommodate/adapt ourselveS64 to Suit 
the demands of the natural world. In the last analysis, however, we are creatures of the 
natural world and have flourished because of our capacity to control what we can, to adapt 
when we Gan, and to tolerate the residue. There are natural limits but we can never be 
certain where they are. 65 
Certain basic avenues of development are dictated by our nature as human beings. In the 
sense being argued human needs are teleological, that is, they can be ascertained and 
defined only with reference to some desirable end state or level of functioning. Although 
there is a relativity in respect of human needs which allows for a range of diversity between 
individuals and cultures, it is still a requirement that certain fundamental conditions of 
human well-being be met. Requirements of food, shelter, communication, companionship, 
or a sustaining set of beliefs do not pre-determine what food, what housing, what language, 
what friends, what beliefs. This should not be taken to mean that any beliefs whatsoever 
are acceptable, simply that there must be some belief set. It is only when this condition has 
been met that we can begin to discriminate between belief sets. 
So, needs must be defined with reference to human nature, to human potentialities for 
good, and 'what is necessary for the continued existence of the possessor of that nature in 
a way that is not impaired or marred, and for the actualisation of those potentialities for 
good. '66 What is culturally sanctioned by any society is the particular form of the 
community's response to the basic human and perceived individual needs. 67 Needs relate 
to what it would be detrimental to us as men and as specific persons not to have. In other 
words 'detrimental' is explained by reference to our natures as human beings and as 
specific individuals. 68 The lack of the things we need as human beings and as specific 
63 MacIntyre, following Aquinas, explains that there are two ways in which someone may have an end. We have 
naturally established ends which it is not in our power to change. But it is in our power to decide whether or not we will 
direct our activities towards the achievement of these given ends. MacIntyre, A., 'Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: 
Rules, Virtues and Goods', American Catholic Philosophical QuaCgrl , 1,196. 66 3- , 64 Piagers cognitive stage theory provides an example of an ontogenetic process of such adaptation. Adaptation 
involves two processes, assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation involves refining and reviewing our experience so 
that it fits into our current cognitive organisation. This can only go so far as it involves a certain distotton of reality so 
that our conceptual schema remains untroubled. At times , however, our experience of the world is such that only an 
alteration of the cognitive schema itself will allow it to be satisfactorily assimilated. See Miller, Patricia, H., Theories of 
Develogmental PsyghgLogy, (3rd ed. ), New York, W. H. Freeman & Co., 1993,67-70. 
65 Human technology is one way of extending these limits unpredictably. 
66 McCloskey, 'Human Needs', 5. 
67 Erikson suggests that 'to understand either childhood or society, we must expand our scope to include the study of 
the way in which societies lighten the inescapable conflicts of childhood with a promise of some security, identity, and 
integrity. In thus reinforcing the values by which the ego exists societies create the only condition under which human 
growth is possible'. Erikson, Erik, Childhood and Socie , Vintage Books, 1995,251. 
68 McCloskey, 'Human Needs', 6. For example food, drink, clean air. 
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persons, however it comes about, will not only impair our present existence, but also 
diminish our future development. 
In general we can say that a human being's basic or fundamental needs are what each one 
requires in order to flourish (as against merely surviving) as the kind of individual he or she 
is; that is to say, that it is in the interests of the individual to have the needs met: the 
individual will be harmed if the needs are not met. Human needs are objective in that they 
can be ascertained independently of the desires and wants of any particular individual. The 
basic needs (such as the need for air, water, food, shelter, human companionship, etc. ) are 
universal but cultural responses to these needs are varied and diverse. 
If there are any rights at all then there must be a right to have our fundamental human 
needs met at a level appropriate to sustaining at least a minimum of human functioning. 
There seems to be little point in promoting claims to autonomy, freedom, rationality and so 
forth if the fundamental requirements for basic human well-being have not been met. But 
how are these fundamental human needs to be identified and ordered? 
Maslow's theory of needs 
Maslow's theory69is a theory of motivation not primarily a theory of needs: it explains why 
the lack of a particular component of our well-being will disrupt normal functioning until the 
lack is met. Its value to the present enquiry lies in the fact that it gives an account of human 
needs and their hierarchical organisation which may prove useful in helping to establish the 
relationship of rights to needs. 
Needs are the needs of whole individuals, not just a part of them. 'It is John Smith who 
wants food, not John Smith's stomach'. 70 There are 'certain need satisfactions that seem to 
be ends in themselves and seem not to need any further justification or demonstration .... 
(these are) ultimate human goals or desires or needs'. 71 It is not these ultimate needs which 
are subject to cultural variation but the means that various cultures find to fulfil these 
needs. 72 
69 Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2nd ed., London, Harper & Row, 1970. Maslow uses the words need, 
want, desire interchangeably but it is evident from the context when he is referring to needs as distinct from wants or 
desires as defined so far. He also speaks of 'fundamental goals or needs'. 27. Although his taxonomy of needs has 
been criticised (see, for example, Doyal, L., Gough, D., A Theofy of Human Need, London, Macmillan, 1991, esp. 
chapter 3, 'The Grammar of "Need"') I shall take it as an example of the kind of objective identification of human need 
which is required to underpin a theory of rights. 
70 Maslow, Motivati , 19. 
71 Ibid., 22. 
72 Ibid., 22/3. 
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Maslow identifies five separate levels of human need: 73 physiological needs, safety needs, 
belongingness; and love needs, esteem needs, and the need for self-actualisation. These 
needs are hierarchically ordered in the sense that only as one level of need is met 
consistently does the next level begin to exert its influence on the behaviour of the 
individual. The physiological needs, for example, take up all our attention when they are not 
satisfied: our consciousness is almost completely dominated by them. 
For the man who is extremely and dangerously hungry, no other interests 
exist but food. He dreams food, he remembers food, he thinks about food 
... and he wants only food. 
74 
Domination by a particular need affects the way we see the wodd, present and future: 
For our chronically and extremely hungry man Utopia can be defined 
simply as a place where there is plenty of food ... Anything else will be defined as unimportant ... Such a man may fairly be said to live by bread 
alone. 75 
When the physiological needs have been met the individual is preoccupied, to the 
exclusion of other needs, with the need for security, comfort and reassurance. When the 
physiological and the safety needs have been met, the next to appear are the needs for 
love, affection and belongingness. People who have not got them feel keenly the need for 
friends, sweetheart, wife or children, for a place in the family or in the group. They feel, as 
sharply as they once may have felt hunger or fear, the pangs of loneliness, of rejection, of 
friendlessness, of rootlessness. 
Once the needs for food and shelter, for security and for love and affection have been met 
in a consistent way the next group of needs affecting individuals is for 'a stable, firmly- 
based, usually high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the 
esteem of others'. 76 Maslow divides these 'esteem needs' into two subsidiary sets of related 
desires, There are first of all the desire for strength, achievement, adequacy, mastery and 
competence, 'confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom'. 
Secondly there are desires for deserved 'reputation or prestige ... status, fame and glory, 
dominance, recognition, attention, importance, dignity, or appreciation'. 77 
73 Ibid., 35 - 58. 
74 Ibid., 37. For a chilling confirmation of this insight see Primo Levi If This Is A Man, Stuart Woolf, trans., Sphere 
Books, 1987. 'One can hear the sleepers breathing and snoring; some groan and speak. Many lick their lips and move 
their jaws. They are dreaming of eating; this is also a collective dream. It is a pitiless dream which the creator of the 
Tantalus myth must have known. You not only see the food, you feel it in your hands, distinct and concrete, you are 
aware of As rich and striking smell; someone in the dream even holds it up to your lips, but every time a different 
circumstance intervenes to prevent the consummation of the act. ' 67 and passim. 
75 Maslow, _Motivabon, 
37. 
76 Ibid., 45. 
77 Ibid., 45/6. 
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The ultimate need, the final level, the need for self-actualization, 'the need to become 
everything that one is capable of becoming' appears with full force only when the lower 
needs have been met. This is the need to be true to one's own nature and potential, to be 
what one can be. 78 
Two other possible basic needs are mentioned by Maslow: the need to know, or ongoing 
curiosity (cognitive or intellectual need), and the need for order, balance and beauty in 
one's surroundings (aesthetic need). The need to know takes many different forms (the 
desire for more detail, the desire for more generalised theories, system atisation, 
organisation and analysis of knowledge, significant relationships) but each appears to be an 
expression of a basic need for knowledge. Maslow does not include this, however, in his 
proposed hierarchy. It would not fit; for there are too many examples of the search for 
knowledge over-riding what might be thought of as more fundamental needs. It is not clear 
whether the need for knowledge and the aesthetic need 79 (which does not appear to be as 
universal or as compelling) are to take a pre-eminent position in the hierarchy or serve as a 
kind of background to the others. It is also arguable that there is not, in fact, a permanent 
basic need for knowledge (what appears to be a generalized curiosity). Many people as a 
matter of fact are content to accept unquestioningly what they are told and wish nothing 
more than to have their present state of knowledge left undisturbed. 80 
In general the lower needs are stronger than the higher needs i. e. they are more powerful 
motivators. They also appear earlier in the life of the individual. The higher needs are less 
important for sheer survival, their satisfaction can be postponed longer (they are less 
urgent), and they can disappear permanently. The higher needs produce a better quality of 
life and a healthier mental/spiritual condition but they also require better sustaining 
conditions (family, economic, educational, social etc. ) to flourish. 
Failure to meet the dominant need at any particular time results in illness or 'ill-being' (the 
opposite of Well-being'). Satisfaction of the need restores well-being. 
Rights and Needs 
McCloskey relates rights to our primary needs as human beings or as specific individuals. 
Human needs, the needs of men as men, and the individual needs of 
particular persons as the unique persons they are (and not as holders of 
78 Ibid., 46. 
79 Ibid., 51. 
80 The state of perplexity following the Socratic process of elenchus is not universally welcomed. 
See Dillon, 'Curiosity 
as a Non-sequitur of Socratic Questioning', The Journal of 
Educational Thought, 14,1,1980,17-22, and Pekarsky, 
Daniel, 'Socratic Teaching: a Critical Assessment', Journal of Moral Education, 23,2,1994. 
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roles or stations) are the needs with which we are most concemed, when we are concemed with human and personal fights and political values. 81 
Needs which we might have as holders of assigned roles or stations are secondary to our 
basic needs as human beings, and to our needs as the individual persons we are. 82 
The relationship between rights and needs Gan therefore be put in the following forms 
(positive and negative): 
As a general, ideal, prima facie right, we have a right to the satisfaction of those needs which human action can cause to be satisfied or thwarted ... We do not have a right to the satisfaction of those needs which it is impossible to have satisfied by human action, and where human action 
does not frustrate the realisation of the need. 83 
If we apply this to Maslow's taxonoMy84 we can certainly agree that it is appropriate to the 
two lower levels (physiological and safety needs) for both can be, and commonly are, 
satisfied by human actions. It is not so clear when we attempt to apply it to level 3 
(belongingness and love needs) however. For while 'a sense of belonging' requires the 
action of other's (they must in some way express their recognition of me as a member of the 
group, my own wishes are not sufficient) it is not clear that they can be obliged to accord 
me this recognition. 'Belongingness' in Maslow's scheme is an emotional condition: it will 
not be satisfied by administrative measures (granting membership, affording appropdate 
privileges, etc. ) which can be enforced by invoking a right. I may insist on having my 
membership of the group formally recognised without having my (emotional) need to 
belong met. The latter requires an affective response from others which, if it is not 
forthcoming, cannot be wrested from them by the imposition of a duty or obligation. 
This is clear in relation to the need for love and affection. While the need for love and 
affection Gan be satisfied by human action, the love of others is not something that I Gan 
81 McCloskey, 'Human Needs', 3. 
82 Ibid., 10. McCloskey will only acknowledge roles such as mother, father, parent as 'quasi natural' which 'become 
basic to the fabric of most human social organisations' and which are 'secondary to the needs of men as men, and 
thoseof individual persons as those unique persons'. (34) It is part of the argument being put forward here that ý is the 
parent-child relationship which has both evolutionary and moral priority. Most people do not, and never have, become 
parents simply as an option among others. What people have done, as a matter of historical fact, is refrain from 
becoming parents in the service of some perceived greater cause or as symbolic of commitment to such a cause, that 
is, as a se/f-sacrifice. Parenthood is not an optional extra to the full dimension of being human. Where parenthood is 
impossible it is commonly considered a tragedy, where it is freely foregone it may be an admirable sacrifice. 
83 McCloskey, 'Human Needs', 9. 
84 For a related scheme of needs see Hobson, Peter, 'Another Look at Paternalism', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 1, 
2, which includes a section on the relation of needs to paternalism and harm. Hobson identifies three different types of 
need: physical needs, psychological needs (which are 'necessary to the maintenance of a minimal level of mental 
stability and emotional well-being'), and what he calls'personal needs', that is'any of the personal needs and interests of 
an individual which are of overriding importance to him' and would include things like 'religious belief, career aspirations, 
or personal possessions ... 
(and) things he does not necessarily see the importance of at the time, such as the need for 
education'. 298/299. 
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claim as a right: the requisite response cannot be commanded. We can no more oblige 
others' love than we can oblige them to be amused, outraged, or happy. If 'right' means that 
there is always a correlative obligation or duty then 'right' is inappropriate in relation to a 
concept such aslove'. There cannot be an obligation to love, much less to love a particular 
person; it is not something that can be done to order, like the exercise of a skill or a 
deductive procedure. O'Neill is correct that children's lives are 'particularly vulnerable to 
unkindness, to lack of involvement, cheerfulness or good feeling' and that these things may 
not be visible from the perspective of rights. '(C)old, distant, or fanatical parents and 
teachers, even if they violate no rights, deny children "the genial play of life": they can 
wither children's lives'. 85 But 'the genial play of life', including the experience of loving and 
being loved, cannot be ordered into existence. The verb 'to love' has no imperative mood; 
we have needs which cannot be appropriately addressed as matters of rights. 86 
Sutton attempts to confirm a theory of welfare rights based on an analysis of the ties 
between the needs of the rights bearer and the duties of others to satisfy those needs. 
Welfare rights are 'rights to the goods of life from which we derive the satisfaction of our 
most basic needs'. 87 There must be 'some minimal level of consensus' as to the kinds of 
objectives 'which may be appropriately protected by ascriptions of human rights'. This 
'minimal level of consensus' is a pre-condition 'to the effective possession of any particular 
welfare right'. 88 There are two levels at which consensus is necessary. At the more general 
level consensus is required regarding the desirable outcome of human development, that 
is, a definition of human good. At the more specific, instrumental, level consensus is 
needed as to the most efficacious means of attaining that objective. The latter will be 
largely, though not exclusively, an empirical matter. The former, more general consensus 
will constitute, in part at least, the aspiration of a particular society as a whole, while the 
latter, instrumental consensus will include the child-rearing and child education practices of 
that society. 
The concept of needs has two advantages in relation to the identification of rights. In the 
first place needs are reasonably objective with reference to a common humanity and 
accepted norms of human functioning. (Maslow's taxonomy demonstrates this in principle 
although we may disagree with the substantive needs or their ordering. ) Secondly needs 
relate to the development and the maintenance of the capacities necessary for the exercise 
85 O'Neill, Onora, 'Children's Rights and Children's Lives', in Rosalind Ekman Ladd, ed., Children's Rights Re-visioned: 
Philosophical ReadirIgs, London, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996,29-41,38. 
86 1 am aware that we are famously enjoined to love our neighbour but I am not aware how we might do it contrary to our 
natural inclinations. The best we can hope to achieve is respect and tolerance. 
87 Sutton, 'Human Rights', 102. 
88 Ibid., 104. 
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of freedom and rationality. 89 As shown by Maslow's scheme, assurance of physical survival 
is not sufficient. In order for the capacities required to develop any conception of the good 
and to respect the moral personality of others to be present 'the human animal requires 
certain conditions of nurture and instruction'. 90 We require at least the promotion of 
intelligence and 'minimal conditions of care and affection' in order to promote our capacity 
'to relate to other human beings and to make a life among them'. 91 Freedom rights are 
essential to meet the higher levels of need, the needs for esteem and for self-actualization, 
but welfare rights are essential to meet the lower levels which have developmental priority. 
The central concern here is with needs and capacities that are essential for human 
functioning. Now even when human nature is defined by the primacy of some developed 
capacity, such as rational agency or autonomy, such capacities are contingent on the 
fulfilment of relevant needs. Welfare-rights ensure the provision of these needs. '(I)f the 
point of a given right is to ensure that a given choice can actually be exercised at a certain 
time ( ... 
) then it seems clear that facilitating the exercise may sometimes be as important 
as not obstructing it'. 92 In other words as well as imposing a duty to forbear a right to 
freedom may also impose a duty to at least facilitate meeting the needs without which the 
capacity to choose will not develop. These needs will include physical necessities, health, 
and some level of educational provision. We cannot exercise rational choice or undertake 
autonomous action without having enjoyed the conditions for their realization. 
However, human beings are not just rational and autonomous beings but also, crucially, 
'vulnerable and needy beings in the sense that their rationality and their mutual 
independence - the very basis of their agency - is incomplete, mutually vulnerable and 
socially produced. 93 Children, for example, need physical care and appropriate 
socialization without which they could never become competent agents. If as rational 
human beings we act in ways which are indifferent to our mutual human needs and 
interdependence then 'agency would fail or diminish for some, who then could adopt no 
principles of action, so undermining the very possibility of action on principles that can be 
universally shared'. 94 Where we can anticipate needs in broad outline and identify 
opportunities to satisfy or deny such needs (as we can for those who, in a given society, are 
charged with the care of children) then we may have compelling reasons to establish 'a 
legal and social framework that secures certain positive obligations and so positive rights' in 
relation to these needs. Crucially we recognise children's developmental needs for 
'care 
89 Fried, C., Right awn-d-A-E-0-09, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1978,120. 
90 Ibid., 120/1. 
91 Ibid., 12 1. 
92 Waldron, Libe I Rights, 19W, 9. 
93 O'Neill, 'Children's Rights', 34. 
94 Ibid. 
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and education of a certain standard' and have established legally supported sociai practices 
which recognise the rights of children to have those needs met. 95 
There are human capacities, other than autonomy and choice, which are equally valuable 
in themselves. Giving choice and autonomy a central importance appears to cast other 
human capacities (physical, emotional, psychological, and mental) in a secondary and 
subservient role: welfare-rights are made to appear as complementary but subservient to 
freedom rights. 96 This appears as a distinction between rights which have an instrumental 
function in empowering other rights and rights which are arguably ends in themselves. 97 
As an alternative to the welfare/choice rights dichotomy Freeden proposes that 
encompassing all rights under the rubric of welfare would challenge the assumption that 
choice rights are superior to welfare rights. 98 We could escape the constriction of the 
welfare/freedom rights distinction by recognising that welfare is 'attached to the concept of 
interest', and that the concept of interest can be 'purged of its conventional association with 
private interests-cum-wants alone'. Secondly, we must acknowledge the equality of human 
capacities other than autonomy and choice. Failure to develop and nurture all of these 
capacities leads to serious harm. (Who will say, for example, that the capacity to love is 
inferior, or subordinate to, autonomy? Or that where the capacity for self expression - not 
just the freedom for self-expression - is unrealised the individual is not seriously harmed? ) 
The good of the individual is promoted by 'a generous view of welfare-rights as promoting 
all aspects of his or her well-being, subject only to a reasoned recognition of what that well- 
being currently constitutes'. 99 
The conventional liberal preference for rights of freedom over welfare rights reflects a 
concept of human society which embodies 'an ideology of conflict in which people are 
potentially hostile to each other. 100 In the Gase of freedom rights the right is seen 'only as a 
protective device for a self-sufficient individual, and not also as an enabling injunction to 
assist a mutually dependent and Go-operative individual'. There does not have to be a 
95 Ibid., 35. 
ýrO Freeden, Eights, 51/2. 
97 The claim that the concept of rights is exclusively concerned with liberty has now been diluted, if not entirely 
abandoned. See, for example, Waldron, Liberal Rights, 11. '(T)he contrast between liberty and the satisfaction of 
material needs must not be drawn too sharply, as though the [after had no relation at all to what one is free or unfree to 
do'. 317. 
98 Freeden, Rights, 52. See also Freeden, Michael, 'Human Rights and Welfare: a Communitarian View, Ethics, 100, 
3,1990,489-502,490-492. 
99 Freeden, Eig-hts, 52. 
1'00 Ibid., 53,55. The dominant freedom-rights approach characterises society as 'a broadly individualistic network of 
human relationships, in which people enter into mutual voluntary agreements, while a 
large area of private space is 
retained round each person'. It is an atomistic conception of society which sees 
the actions of the society as potentially 
threatening to the free action of the basically self-sufficient individual. 
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competitive relationship between the two conceptions of rights so that a new emphasis on 
welfare rights automatically leads to a down-grading of choice rights. Rather, 'it is plausible 
that autonomy, too, is in one's interest and a constituent of one's well-being. 101 This is 
bome out by Maslow's taxonomy. 
It has been argued that having interests 'indicates at most a necessary condition for having 
rights'. 102 If having an interest was sufficient to generate a corresponding right there would 
be 'an enormous and unmanageable proliferation' of rights. Even if 'interests' are restricted 
to a minimum of basic interests or needs, there still remains the logical problem of deriving 
a normative conclusion about rights from factual premises about interests or needs. There 
is also the substantive question of why moral rights are generated by common human 
characteristics 'rather than by more restrictive, inegalitarian characteristics that pertain only 
to some persons, or to persons in varying degrees, such as expert knowledge or will to 
power or productive ability'. 103 
Lomasky argues that '(n)eed confers rights only when what is needed is recognisable as a 
need by the one who is to meet it. But he dismisses needs as 'an inchoate class that ill 
support (sic) a theory of basic rights'. 104 Even when the needs are recognised by others 
they are 'not an adequate springboard for a jump to rights' because there is, as yet, no 
reason why others, even when they recognise the need, must comply. 
But it is not the case that there is no privileged need and that all needs are equal and in 
competition. Clearly a taxonomy such as Maslow's gives reason to at least consider, if not 
accept, a hierarchical structure. The need for security, for example, may often conflict with 
the need for autonomy and self-esteem. But it is also plausible to argue, as Maslow 
appears to do, that the need for self-actualization (which includes autonomy and self- 
esteem) is contingent on the need for security having been met at crucial times in the 
developmental life of the individual. 105 In any event there is no conclusive reason for 
claiming that the pursuit of total autonomy (if this is an achievable goal, or a desirable 
ideal, at all) is likely to lead to greater human happiness than the development of other 
human charactedstics. Certain choices (to sell oneself into slavery, to become addicted to a 
mind destroying drug) are actually inimical to the ideal of human autonomy. The exercise of 
choice per se is not necessarily an unalloyed benefit. 
101 Ibid., 53. 
102 Gewirth, A., Justification and Applications, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 
1982,44. 
103 ibid. 
104 Lomasky, 61 
1M See also Erikson, Childhood-a-n-d-S-00ie-IX Passim. 
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The concept of need as the basis of rights sometimes requires that others make 
judgements on what the needs actually are and that they implement measures to meet the 
needs. 'For even granted that non-intervention protects one's moral capacities, intervention 
may be far more important in protecting one's physical and emotional capacities. ' Such 
patemalistic interventions will deliberately influence the ways in which an individual will act 
(and think) as a consequence. We have to distinguish between protecting the purely moral 
capacities of people and protecting all human capacities 'which is, in a general sense, to act 
morally towards people by respecting their rights to function and flourishi. 106 
The perspective of welfare rights is more comprehensive than the perspective of 
freedom rights. Welfare rights require action on the part of others in order to promote a 
culturally agreed standard of well-being. 107 This view reflects a more realistic view of 
human nature and human society. Human nature is mutually dependent and human action 
can only be exercised within the constraints, as well as with the support of, a human 
community. In such a community 'mutual dependence is the norm and ... human 
personality, needs and conduct are shaped through human interaction., 108 Human beings 
cannot adequately function without the help and co-operation of others and therefore 
'membership of a society is itself a fundamental human need that demands protection'. 109 
Do rights follow needs? 
Rights are 'precious commodities which require positive action (or forbearance) from 
others. ' 10 This does not mean that the need must necessarily be met, as a duty, by a 
specific person (although there may, in fact, be a specific person whose individual duty it is 
to meet the particular need). What it means is that the need requires the effort, as a duty, 
of 'one of a specific set of personsl II any one of whom can fulfil the relevant needs. 
This 
emphasises the notion of group, or communal, responsibility for meeting individual needs. 
A link between the needs of the welfare rights bearer and the duties of others to satisfy 
those needs is sustainable provided we recognise that the duty can be owed 
by a set of 
possible candidates not necessarily by a specific individual. 
112 This is consistent with the 
notion of rights as being embedded in community rather than being exclusively a 
function 
of individual freedom. 
So, could we have rights to the basic needs of life? 
106 Freeden, 
-ffig-hts, 
54. 
107 Ibid. ' 
57. 
1 C)8 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Sutton, 'Human Rights', 104. 
111 Ibid., 106 
112 Ibid., 10415 
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One cannot exercise the initiative of a human being (which is what the rights of liberty are intended to protect), or indeed remain a human being at all, unless the 
basic needs of life are satisfied, and if a man is not in a position to do this for 
himself, it seems to me reasonable to say that he has a right, as a human being, to 
the assistance of others in meeting these needs. 113 
Lomasky articulates three objections to this position. His first objection has two strands one 
empirical, one conceptual. The empirical strand is that we cannot have a right to something 
which is not available or is in critically short supply. This is similar to Fried's dismissal of 
needs as the basis of welfare rights because of the immense burden of cost involved in 
satisfying the needs for everyone. 1 14 This objection raises a crucial question with regard to 
rights. If scarcity can be used as an argument for denying a right (rather than an argument 
for postponing or diluting its implementation) then rights have little force in political or 
economic matters at all. It is surely not a sufficient argument in favour of the retention of 
slavery, apartheid, or discriminatory pay, to say that the implementation of the 
corresponding right is prohibitively costly? The force of a right is precisely that we must 
undertake to change practical arrangements to conform to the right. Once it is accepted 
that there is a right it is incumbent on the society to reorder its priorities in order to find the 
means to implement the right as far as is practically possible. The reality is that 'problems 
of scarcity mean that we may have to opt for very basic needs or acknowledge that needs 
may always outstrip resources. '115 But doing so does not deny that there is a right 
established by the fundamental need. 
The conceptual strand to Lomasky's objection is that we cannot have a right to something 
which is in principle not transferable from person to person. For example: no satisfactory 
life, he says, can be lived by someone lacking a directive conception of the good, 
motivational energy, fixity of purpose, flexibility of response, or self-respect. While these 
can be regarded as among the basic needs of human beings, they are not the kind of 
commodities that Gan be supplied to those in need of them from those who are in 
possession of a superfluous amount. 116 The best we Gan hope for is that society is 
arranged so that individuals 'are not impeded' in developing these non-transferable goods 
for themselves and that others will provide 'support and encouragemenf. 1 17 
The conceptual objection is not quite as dissimilar from the empirical as the logical 
distinction might suggest: the goods listed by Lomasky are all ends or possible ends of 
education; they are not commodities that one can normally acquire through one's unaided 
113 Raphael, D. D., (ed. ), Polftical Theory and the Rights of Man, London: Macmillan, 1967,64, quoted 
in Lomasky, 
Persons. ft-h-ts, 86. 
114 Fried, Elabt Man'd -WrO'Elg, 
12314. 
115 Freeden, RigMts, 50- 
116 Lomasky, -Per§9ft&-R-i9-hts 
86- 
117 ibid., 87 (emphasis in original). 
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efforts. Admittedly the community cannot 'offer these goods to all who are in need of them 
as a matter of right' and equally it must be admitted that these characteristics 'must be 
internally generated'118 but this does not mean that the community has no role to play in 
their generation or development. While accepting that they are things which cannot in 
principle be transferred from person to person, which people are ultimately responsible for 
providing for themselves, social measures can be put in place to render them possible (or 
at least their absence less likely) and to maximise the likelihood that they will occur. This 
'support and encouragement' must take the form of some kind of positive intervention, 
especially in the areas of family support and schooling. If an individual lacks all of the 
qualities mentioned there is no likelihood at all that she will be able to take the initiative to 
rectify matters for herself. If 'support and encouragement" mean anything in this context it 
must surely mean more than purely moral support and encouragement. This is where the 
empirical and conceptual strands of the objection come together: it is incumbent on the 
community to provide the resources necessary to support an adequate education system so 
that each individual has the opportunity to acquire and develop the characteristics 
necessary to the pursuit of a conception of the good. 
It is equally necessary, however, that the educational system provided actually does 
promote the acquisition and development of the relevant characteristics. Providing the 
resources without the specific educational objectives is pointless and it is no more than 
tokenism to proclaim the right of the individual to acquire and develop the characteristics if 
she is not going to receive the necessary assistance from others. If there is an 
acknowledged need for certain material and non-material goods without which a minimal 
standard of human functioning is impossible then economic scarcity, while it might be a 
reason to defer satisfaction of the relevant needs, or to target initially only the most urgent, 
or to follow a minimalist policy, is not sufficient reason to deny the right to satisfaction of 
the needs. It is a question of economic priorities, which are ultimately based on human 
values. If we are expending economic resources for non-essential purposes, or for 
purposes which are generally regarded as of lesser importance than the satisfaction of 
fundamental needs (bingo halls instead of hospitals), then we are not morally justified in 
denying the rights in question. 
Lomasky's second objection is that the argument from needs ignores the supply side of the 
equation. It is not always the case that the giver can give without a loss to himself which will 
be greater than the advantage to the recipient. In general 'there can be no general 
obligation to give up that which is of considerable instrumental value to the pursuit of one's 
own projects on the grounds that someone else has pressing need for those items'. 
' 19 It is 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
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not necessary that the loss be greater than the transferred benefit: it need only inte ere I rf 
with the potential donor's own legitimate project pursuit. 120 The recognition of a need 
simply entails that one ought to provide the requisite good, not that one must provide it; that 
is it does not entail that the one in need has a right to it. It indicates, on the contrary, that a 
positive response would be supererogatory, a matter of discretionary charýity, not required 
justice, a matter of should or ought, not must. 
But other human beings have a demand on us which is stronger than our moral goodness. 
There is something about human beings 'such that neglecting their well-being Gan raise 
questions of justice and right, and not merely of moral goodness. ' 121 Lomasky 
acknowledges that in relevant cases there are non-trivial needs which Gan be met by 
others. Yet a right to provision is dismissed. Is there a reasonable case for the dismissal or 
is it just that the positive argument has not been made adequately? It appears that in 
making the positive case Lomasky has so overstated the case for the right of the one in 
need that the relevant response is egregiously excessive: diversion of 70% of the GNP of 
the US to India, donation of a healthy cornea to a blind person one doesn't even know. In 
both cases there are other, less dramatic, responses to the need; responses which would 
equally meet the need (albeit in a different way) without presenting us with the necessity for 
extreme courses of action. It is not the case that a blind person has a right (an enforceable 
moral claim) to a healthy cornea from a stranger. A blind person has the same rights to the 
conditions necessary to pursue a conception of the good as anyone else. In her case, 
however, the educational and social provisions required will be different: they will include 
appropriate teaching and leaming experiences which will enable her to compensate for her 
blindness, social and architectural arrangements which facilitate her unhindered movement, 
training and employment policies which will equalize her chances in the labour market. It is 
reasonable to assert that there is a right to have needs met in practical ways which, 
although they put pressure on the community, are not so far fetched as to render the very 
idea of meeting them absurd. In the same way there has never to my knowledge been a 
serious proposal to appropriate 70% of the GNP of any developed nation for relief in the 
Third World. Those who assert a right of people in underdeveloped nations to minimal 
meeting of their needs make much more modest claims. 122 The rights of the poor to have 
their needs satisfied will not be met by the impoverishment of anyone else. On the contrary, 
it can be plausibly argued that only strong First World economies can be relied upon to 
provide adequate resources to alleviate immediate need and to empower the poor to 
prepare for their own future. 
120 Ibid., 88. 
121 Benn, Stanley, I., 'Human Rights - for whom and for what7 in Kamenka, T., Tay, A. E. S., eds., Human Rights, 
London, Edward Arnold, 1978,66. 
122 The UN mandated level of GNP to aid programmes is 0.7%. 
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Lomasky's third objection is that response to need on the part of others can range from 
none at all to a mandatory provision (i. e. a right). He correctly dismisses the former as 
morally implausible, it yields'a desiccated view of the moral realm'. 123 A practical morality 
must address the issue of rectifying inadvertent inequalities within the moral order need 
does confer dghts. Lomasky accepts this but argues that it entails only that the recipient be 
assisted in acquiring the good in question. At most there is a 'shared or sociaf obligation 
which each individual can meet through contribution to the State. 124 But that response need 
only manifest itself as refraining from preventing. (His example is not polluting the only 
available source of fresh water. ) 'A takes account of Bs need for G if A brings about a 
condition necessary for B's attainment of G, even though that condition is not 
simultaneously sufficient. '125 But a logically necessary condition can be practically trivial. 
For A to be educated it is necessary that there be at least one functioning school. This 
might not be of much significance to A if the school is effectively inaccessible. 
Lomasky's argument against rights based on need is far from compelling. He succeeds in 
showing only that in the case of welfare rights individuals do not have the full obligation to 
meet the needs. This is correct. He has not shown that there are no welfare rights or that 
rights cannot be successfully argued on the basis of need. His argument that there cannot 
be a right to the provision of self respect by others (for example) is conclusive; but his 
corollary should be handled with care. To say 'if there is a right to self respect, it can only 
be a right to certain necessary conditions and not to sufficient conditions'126iS correct. But, 
as shown above, necessary conditions can be trivial. Simply to refrain from degrading 
others or rendering them servile is to do little. We must, surely, collectively provide the 
conditions - all of the conditions insofar it is in our power - necessary to maximise the 
likelihood that self respect will develop. This is crucial if the 'right' to education is to have 
any meaning at all. And also crucial if the community is to benefit from the well being of its 
several members. 
Rights conflict 
The fundamental rights that people have can be no more than prima facie rights since 
people's final rights result from compromises between the fundamental rights of all. 
The 
compromises will be morally defensible 'only insofar as they reflect the equality of the prima 
facie dghts'. 127 
123 LomaskY, F9MOa3l", 89- 
124 ibid. 
125 Ibid., go. 
126 Ibid" 91. 
127 Mackie, 'Can There Be a Right Based Moral Theory7,1 IS. 
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The foundational right to a rights-based theory that Mackie suggests is 'the right of persons 
progressively to choose how they shall live'. 128 
If we assume that, ..., what matters in human life is activity, but diverse activities determined by successive choices, we shall, ... take as central the right of persons progressively to choose how they shall live. 129 
This fundamental dght is put forward as universal. Mackie does not claim that it is 
objectively valid, or that its validity Gan be discovered rationally: he is 'merely adopting it 
and recommending it for adoption as a moral pdnciple. '130 But why then should we accept 
it? We can accept it as a fundamental postulate. A postulate is a presumption which is so 
basic in nature that it 'antecedes everything which is said in the logical system which it 
supports'. 131 We may question the truth of the fundamental postulate but as soon as we do 
so, it no longer functions as such: its truth or otherwise must be debated with reference to 
other postulates which may be explicitly stated or implicitly believed. It is not necessary to 
accept the postulate as an ultimate statement of truth but only to accept it tentatively in 
order to see where it may lead us. 
This does not mean that the postulate that we choose can be completely arbitrary. We will 
choose one postulate rather than another because it appears to promise more (to be more 
fruitful), it appears to be more likely than any other to be supportive of a form of life that we 
desire and value ( our version of 'the good life'). 132 Once adopted (or acknowledged) the 
fundamental right provides us with the wherewithal to evaluate features in our moral 
environment. 
Our version of the good life Gan only come out of a context in which we have learned to 
perceive certain activities and aspirations as valuable, remembering that 'valuable' is an 
ascribed quality. If we represent these activities and aspirations as valuable in themselves 
it is only because the ascription of the value is universal or almost universal within our 
community of experience. Not everyone within that community of experience will value a 
specific activity (swimming, say) which an individual may choose. The communal 
evaluation will be broader (athleticism, health) so that a wide range of specific activities 
may qualify as acceptable. Some hitherto valued activities may become problematic or 
even disvalued (professional boxing, for example). 
l-'18 This seems ptima facie to promise a developmental theory of rights or, more correctly, a theory of developmental 
rights. 
129 Macide, 'Can There Be a Right Based Moral Theory7,114. 
130 Ibid., 116. 
131 Kelly, George A., A Theory of Personaldy: The Psypholggy of Personal Constructs, New York, Norton, 1963,47. 
132 Polanyi, Eens-On-a-l-K-00-w-ledge-, especially chapter 10,299-324. As with Polanyi any investigation into the bases of 
our moral life can, ultimately, only be described as 'a systematic course in teaching myself to hold my own beliefs', 
Pe )nal noke-d9e, 299. 
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The progressive dimension and the individual's capacity for choice is constrained by the 
community which provided the basis for the individual's capacity in the first place: the 
sustaining community. While the principle of the fundamental right offers a defence of the 
interests (or some interests) of individuals it is not committed to the view that individuals 
are 
spontaneous originators of their thoughts and desires. It can recognise that the inheritance of cultural traditions and being caught up in movements help to make each individual what he is, and that even the most independent individuals constitute their most independent characters not by isolating themselves or by making 'existential' choices but by working with 
and through inherited traditions. 133 
A conception of human rights requires a view of the social ideal of the good life and also 
requires an understanding of the nature of human community. 134 Mackie's principle will 
also allow us to discriminate between collectivities which acknowledge and value the rights 
and autonomy of their members and those which will subordinate the interests of the 
individual 'to some maximized aggregate of interests'. ' -35 
The good life is an activity which is not limited by specific undertakings, nor is it a static 
state. Nonetheless the choices which we are able to make are neGessadly constrained by 
our specific personal circumstances, the existential reality into which we are bom, our 
sustaining community. Our freedom to pursue our own ends is empowered and endorsed, 
but also constrained, by our given circumstances. 
Summary 
Aristotle's formal sketch of the structure of the good life does not specify content. Although 
the good life will satisfy the interests of those who participate in it, a substantive universal 
definition is unattainable because of the diversity of human history and the variety of social, 
cultural, political, and religious practices. Our moral thinking is relative to particular ways of 
life and expresses the preferences of these ways of life. 
It is in the nature of human beings to look after themselves and those who are nearest to 
them. This ensures the survival of the individual, the family, the tribe, and the community. 
Human life is inescapably social; the constitutive relations are cultural as well as biological 
and familial. 
The individual's pursuit of the good life cannot create values ab inifid. Our choices are 
influenced by received values regarding the objects of our pursuit. The specifics of the 
133 Mackie, 'Can There Be a Right Based Moral Theory7,117. 
134 Golding, 'Towards a Theory of Human Rights', 521. 
135 Mackie, 'Can There Be a Right Based Moral Theory7,117. 
Paqe 73 
Chapter 3: Rights and Human Being 
good life are largely worked out historically by communities, not individuals. For most 
people moral options are significantly limited (although not entirely constrained) by the 
values they inherit from family and community. Any version of the good life odginates in a 
context in which certain activities and aspirations come to be perceived as valuable. They 
appear to be valuable in themselves only because they have been endorsed within a 
community of experience. Hence, the choices available to us are necessarily limited by the 
existential reality into which we are born, our sustaining community. Freedom to pursue our 
own ends is empowered and endorsed, but also constrained, by our given circumstances. 
Needs and interests are relevant to rights and to the pursuit of the good life. A taxonomy 
such as Maslow's demonstrates in principle that needs are reasonably objective with 
reference to a common humanity and norms of human functioning. Although fundamental 
human needs are not socially or culturally relative, the ways in which the needs are met 
are. Needs and interests can be explained and invoked only against a belief in a common 
human nature and a specific personal nature (identity) which is unique to each individual: 
there is the good for human beings generally and also the good for each individual. These 
goods correspond to a distinction between development and self-making and are 
consistent, in a general way, with a distinction between welfare rights and rights of freedom 
respectively. 
There must be a basic right to have fundamental human needs satisfied in order to support 
a minimum of human functioning. The value of autonomy, freedom, rationality and so forth 
is nugatory if fundamental requirements for basic human well-being have not been met. In 
any case there are human capacities, other than autonomy and choice, which are valuable 
in themselves. Welfare rights give a more comprehensive perspective than freedom rights 
and reflect a more realistic view of human nature and human society by requiring 
intervention to promote a culturally agreed standard of collective, as well as individual, 
well-being. 
Many of the issues raised in this chapter will be further addressed in chapter 10, 'The 
Communal Context of Rights'. 
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Chapter 4: Begetting and Bearing 
This chapter will explore what it might mean to have a right to have children and what such 
a right might entail. This will be followed in the two succeeding chapters with an exploration 
of the notion of children as property and then with the question as to who has the right to 
rear children and especially whether there is a presumptive right on the part of the natural 
parents. 
The right to have children - the negative programme 
Is there a right to have children? l The existence of such a right would have significant 
consequences for the relationship between parents and children, between prospective 
parents and society (community), and between the family and the community. If there is a 
right to have children then it is important to know what the status of this right is and also 
what kind of right it is. If there is no such right on the other hand, or if the right is less than 
absolute, then it is important to establish in what ways the community, or the state, can 
intervene in the decision of individuals to have children. 2 
A fruitful way to address the issue may be to examine a proposal to control human 
procreation. It has been suggested3 that it would be both 'theoretically desirable' and 
'workable and jUSt'4 for the state to license all parents. Society already regulates potentially 
harmful activities which require 'a certain competence' for safe performance, and for which 
there is a 'moderately reliable procedure'to assess competence. 
(A)ny activity that is potentially harmful to others and requires certain 
demonstrated competence for its safe performance, is subject to regulation 
- that is, it is theoretically desirable that we regulate it. If we also have a 
1 Archard points out that the terms 'have' and 'bear are not synonymous in this context: an infertile couple can have 
children. See Archard, D., Children: Riqhts and Childhood, London, Routledge, 1993. In what follows however I use the 
terms interchangeably to denote the begetting and bearing of children since the phrase 'Having a baby is commonly 
used to denote 'Bearing or giving birth to' a baby. 'Having' in the possessive sense raises other questions which will be 
addressed in chapter 5. 
2 It should be noted that there is no question being raised of there being no right not to have children even though this 
too is a significant issue. See Smilansky, S., 'Is There a Moral Obligation to Have Children7, Journal of Applied 
Philosoph , 12,1,1995. 3 LaFollette, H., 'Licensing Parents', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9,2,1980,186 - 197. The case is also made by 
Westman, Jack C., Licensing Parents : Can We Prevent Child Abuse and Ngglect?, New York, Insight Books, 1994. 
Westman argues that the enormous waste of human and economic resources which he alleges results from 
incompetent parenting could be reduced by licensing. Licensing parents would symbolically set a societal standard that 
parents may raise their children as they wish subject to the requirement that they do not damage their children's abilities 
to become contributing members of society. A licensing system would recognize children's basic civil rights and create 
a context of providing help for parents in difficulty. It would recognise the parents right to be competent as well as the 
child's right to competent parenting. 
4 LaFollette, 'Licensing Parents', 182. 
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reliable procedure for determining whether someone has the requisite 
competence, then the action is not only subject to regulation but ought, all 
things considered, to be regulated. 5 
Parenting is an activity that is potentially harmful and requires competence: 'Therefore, 
child-rearing manifestly satisfies both criteria of activities subject to regulation'. 6 To avoid 
this conclusion we would need to show either that there are special reasons why licensing 
parents is not theoretically desirable, or that there is no reliable and just procedure through 
which such a programme could be implemented. It is first necessary to point out, however, 
that licensing of itself does not eliminate harm to others. We cannot even say that it 
minimises it. The most we can claim is that licensing moderates harm to others. 
LaFollette contends that the phrase 'the right to have children' is ambiguous denoting either 
the right to be given children (in the case of, say, infertile couples7) or meaning 'that people 
have rights to intentionally create children biologically without incurring any subsequent 
responsibility to them'. 8 The latter would be an extraordinary claim for it is neither more nor 
less than a claim for irresponsible parenthood. Certainly some children are born to parents 
who fail to take adequate care of them or to make adequate provision for their care by 
others. Such occasions do not, however, establish a right any more than any other form of 
human behaviour arbitrarily establishes a right. Nor does such behaviour reflect any pre- 
existing right; it does, however, bear on a feature of rights-talk which dichotomises rights 
and correlative obligations. The conventional view is that rights entail obligations of others' 
forbearance or intervention, but it is largely silent on the obligations of the rights holder 
him- or herself. It is not unreasonable to expect that a rights holder will exercise the 
relevant right responsibly i. e. with due consideration for those who may be affected by the 
exercise of the right. This is surely the intention of Mill's requirement that the liberal 
freedoms he advocates are exercised without infringing the equal freedoms of others. in 
the present case, for example, the right to bear is contingent on the understanding that the 
right will be exercised responsibly, that the parent will exercise the right in the context of an 
undertaking to acquit the concomitant duties. Asserting a right to bear children is not 
asserting untrammelled fecundity. 
Although people have a 'plausible but not self evident' right to have children this right, 
LaFollefte argues, may be restricted to protect innocent people, in this case the children 
they may have. The analogies he uses to support this view are not strictly relevant: 
it has 
never been claimed that anyone has a natural right to drive, or to practiSe medicine or 
law. 
5 Ibid., 183. 
6 Ibid., 185. 
7 This interpretation is dealt with in Archard, Chil en: Rights and Childhood, 
97. 
8 LaFollette, 'Licensing Parents', 186f7. It should be noted that there 
is no straightforward logical connection between 
the act of bearing and the duties of rearing. 
If there were, then the ýght to rear would not be as contentious as it is. 
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Some people may desire to do these things but this does not establish a dght equal in force 
to that of a putative right to have children. When one is debarred from driving or from 
practising medicine or law there are alternative ways of achieving the desired end: other 
means of travel or other means of occupational self-expression. We would not claim that 
debarring a person from driving (because they failed a test) or from practising medicine 
(because they failed to acquire a place in college or failed the subsequent courses) 
contravened a fundamental right. Yet this is what we might plausibly claim in the case of 
someone prevented from having a child. 
The right to have children is stronger if it means the right to 'rear procreated children the 
best way (the parents) see fit'. 9 However, if such a right is accepted then licensing would 
require too much intrusion. LaFollette argues that the necessary intrusion 'would not often 
be substantial, and when it is, it would be warranted. Those granted licences would face 
merely minor intervention; only those denied licences would encounter marked intrusion'. 10 
But surely the intrusion must come before a licence is issued. How then can we differentiate 
the extent of the intrusion between 'those granted licences' and 'those denied licences' in 
order to determine who will actually be granted a licence? In addition he compares this 
proposal to the process of selecting adoptive parents: again, however, prospective adoptive 
parents are vetted before they are given custody of a child. If they are not given custody as 
a result - not licensed - there is no reason for further intrusion. It is when they are given 
custody - licensed - that there may be a period of monitoring or surveillance to ensure that 
they are fulfilling their obligations to the child. 
There are no unconditional rights. Raymond is correct in her view that having a right 'does 
not mean that the right is without limits or restrictions ... the 'right to parent', 
if indeed it is a 
right at ag, may be so only if one Gan demonstrate that one's children will receive proper 
care. 'l 1 Although she concludes that LaFollefte's proposal is 'logically sound, theoretically 
desirable, and practically feasible', she objects that the proposal is vague in relation to the 
kind of behaviour that it wants to proscribe. There are no precise indicators or universal 
characteristics of child abusers. 12 
The right would be contingent on competence. This position, however, appears to confuse 
possession of competence with the exercise of the competence. A licence is a permission 
9 Ibid., 187/8. 
10 Ibid., 187. 
11 Raymond, Diane, 'Philosophy and Parenting: a Critical Perspective', Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 14,1963,31-41, 
33 (emphasis added). The final, conditional part of this statement is also in agreement with 
O'Neill's condition that the 
right to bear is contingent on 'on begetters and 
bearers having or making some feasible plan for the child to be 
adequately reared by themselves or by willing others'. 
See O'Neill, 0., 'Begetting, Rearing and Bearing', in O'Neill, 0., 
Ruddick, W., (eds. ), lical and Lggal Reflections on 
Parenthood, New York, OUP, 1979,25. 
12 Raymond, 'Philosophy and Parenting', 33-35. 
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to practise, it is not a guarantee of competent or ethical practice. It is entirely plausible that 
someone of attested competence may, in the event, be incompetent through carelessness, 
lack of interest, lack of commitment, etc. Although competence may be a necessary 
condition for acquisition of a licence possession of a licence is not a guarantee of 
competent practice. A high level of surveillance - whether by the state or by some 
regulatory agency - must be a continuing factor. So, ironically, those who acquire licences 
to practiSe must be watched and monitored most closely. 
A more credible claim of the right to have children (if there is an undertaking not to abuse 
or neglect them and to provide for their basic needs) is compatible with licensing. The 
purpose of the licensing LaFollefte tells us is 
to determine whether people are going to abuse or neglect their children ... if the determination is made that someone will maltreat children, then that 
person is subject to the limitations of the right to have children and can 
legitimately be denied a parenting licence. 13 
LaFollette acknowledges that objections might be raised to the capability to predict, or to 
the 'moral propriety of prior restraint' which the programme would impose. He attempts to 
reassure us that 'the prior restraint required by licensing would not be terribly onerous for 
many people"I 4 The 'prior restraint' in question here is presumably the denial not just of the 
right to have a child (in the sense of begetting or bearing) but of the opportunity. This 'prior 
restraint' would be far less extensive than 'the presumably justifiable prior restraint of, say, 
insane criminals, criminals preventively detained and mentally ill people ... '. 
15 There 
appears to be a confusion here: criminals can be so designated only as a result of due 
process in relation to specific charges; in such cases the restraint is not primarily preventive 
(a crime has already been committed) but punitive, and it certainly is not prior. We do not, 
in democratic societies, lock people away on the basis of a predictive assessment that they 
may commit crimes. We lock them away because it has been established in open court, 
beyond reasonable doubt, that they have committed crimes. So the only category that he 
can legitimately associate with his proposal is the category of the mentally ill/insane. Even 
in this case, however, support for the restraint of those designated mentally ill or insane 
would not be universal. And it is difficult to understand what 'prior might mean in the 
circumstances. One would have thought that the restraint of the mentally ill/insane in the 
present day would be for purposes of treatment, amelioration or cure and not primarily for 
purposes of the protection of others. 
13 LaFollette, 'Licensing Parents', 188 (emphasis added). 
14 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
15 Ibid., 189. 
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LaFollette's proposal is a proposal to license having children (in the sense of begetting or 
bearing) in the first instance. 'How would one deal with violators and what could we do with 
babies so conceived? '16 This clearly indicates that conception is the violation of the 
licensing system. Thus a further complication of the argument is that the people whom 
LaFollette wishes to protect do not exist. His way of protecting them is to prevent their 
existence in the first place. This raises very complex metaphysical problems not least of 
which is whether non-existent persons (if that is not a contradiction in terms) have rights or 
can be described as being better off than actual persons. 17 
Whether the denial of the opportunity to have a child 'would not be terribly onerous for 
many people' is an empirical matter as well as an evaluative one. It certainly is not a 
judgement which can be made lightly. If we are to judge the seriousness with which it 
should be taken we need only look at what LaFollette has to say later regarding the 
punishment of violators. 
There are also practical objections to the licensing proposal especially regarding the 
development of adequate criteria. LaFollette claims that he is not looking for cdteria for the 
best but for the worst parents: 'Although we do not have infallible criteria for picking out 
good parents, we undoubtedly can identify bad ones'. 18 This confuses being able to identify 
gross neglect or abuse when it occurs with being able to predict when it is most likel to Y 
occur. He does not anticipate a 100% accuracy rate for such tests. He seems to think that 
the kind of accuracy suitable for issuing driving licences or fitness to practice certificates 
will do: 'it would be imprudent to demand considerably more exacting standards for the 
tests used in licensing parents'. 19 But surely the reliability of the procedure should be 
proportional to the seriousness of the issue? (Equating having children with the dght to 
drive a car is trivializing the former for purely rhetorical reasons. ) There appears to be 
confusion regarding the purpose of the test: is it designed to qualify those who want to be 
parents or to eliminate those who would be unsuitable? Is this a positive or a negative 
licensing? 20 LaFollette is sure, however, 21 that such tests as he requires could be 
developed. He dismisses charges that there will be unintentional misuse or intentional 
abuse of the tests: in relation to the former he argues that there will always be mistakes in 
16 Ibid., 193. 
17 Can non-existent 'persons' have rights? See de-Shalit, A., 'Community and the Rights of Future Generations', 
Journal of Appli d Philosophy, 9,1,1992,105-115; Marshall, Peter, 'Thinking for Tomorrow Reflections', Journal of 
Applied PhLIosoRh 10,1,1993,105-113; Elliott, Robert, 'The Rights of Future People', Journal of Applied Philosoph J, 
, 6,2,1989,159-169; Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, Part Four. 
18 LaFollette, 'Licensing Parents', 190. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 191. 
21 Ibid., 1 _q3. 
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human affairs, 22 in relation to the latter while we have no reason to believe that there will 
be abuse of the testing system there is always the possibility of appeal and re-test. 23 
The whole edifice of LaFollette's argument reduces to the assertion that the restraint in 
denying people the opportunity to have children 'is minor ýrelative to the harm we are trying 
to prevent'. Bearing in mind that what is at issue here is the denial of the right to procreate 
to certain 'identifiable' people it may be well to remind ourselves that to say that someone 
has a right is not to say that they ought to behave in a particular way. Human rights are 
rights which people have as human beings not as good human beings much less as 
prospectively good human parents. Exercising the rights properly cannot be a condition of 
having the rights in the first place. 24 This is undoubtedly true of freedom rights of which the 
right to beget and bear is an example. Yet the harm principle applies with an immediacy 
which is not found in the exercise of other freedom rights: for the exercise of this right 
creates another human being who is directly and instantly affected by the exercise of the 
right. Once the right to bear has been exercised there is an obligation on the parents to 
care for the child or to make appropriate arrangements for its care by others. The right to 
bear cannot be separated from the obligations created by exercising that right. 
LaFollette thinks that his is a practicable proposal. Violators could be dealt with not by 
punishing them but just by taking the babies away! 'We might not punish parents at all - we 
might just remove the children and put them up for adoption'. 25 If taking the babies away 
from their parents is not punishment it is difficult to imagine what would be. Punishment has 
been defined as 'An authority's infliction of a penalty, something involving deprivation or 
distress, on an offender, someone found to have broken a rule, for an offence, an act of the 
kind prohibited by the rule. '26 Although it is unclear what would constitute a violation 
(engaging in (unprotected) sexual activity? becoming pregnant? giving birth? abusing a 
born child? ) LaFollette is sure that 'a reasonable enforcement procedure can be secured ... 
At least we should assume that one can be unless someone shows that it cannot'. 
27 This is 
a strange inversion of the usual procedure which places the onus of proof on the one 
making the radical proposal. 
LaFollette speculates that the opposition to his proposal springs from an attachment 
to the 
notion of parental ownership of children, a belief which 
he declares to be 'abhorrent'. 
Parents who hold the belief that they own their children 'may well maltreat 
their children' 
22 Ibid., 192. 
23 Ibid., 192f3. 
24 See Page, Edgar, -parental Rights', Journal of AM lied Philosophy, 
1,2,1984,189. 
25 Ibid., 1,93. 
26 Honderich, T., Punishment, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1976,15 (emphasis in original). 
27 LaFollette, 'Licensing Parents', 193. 
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and will treat them well only because they want to, 'not because they think their children 
deserve or have a right to good treatment'. ' 28 In addition the children of such parents are 
likely to be ill-prepared for adulthood. LaFollette gives us no reason to accept these 
assertions. At any rate ownership of children is a more complex issue than these 
statements would lead us to believe and even if we accept a simple conception 
(comparable to the ownership of animals, say) there is no necessary connection between 
such a conception and abuse and neglect. 
Neither does he consider the possibifity that having children may, in itself, bring about 
significant changes - for better or for worse - in the emotional circumstances of the 
individual parent. The experience of begetting and bearing may, in itself, change the 
attitudes and behaviour of the individual. This means that the parent-child relationship 
would have to be subjected to constant monitoring by an authoritative agency. 
Archard29 acknowledges that a right to have children comprises at least two rights: the right 
to bear and the right to rear. Like LaFollette he denies that the former is absolute. Like 
LaFollette, Archard also bases his case on the well-being of the child (even though the 
former would protect the child by denying it existence). Archard argues that the right to bear 
would have to be circumscribed by an obligation to ensure that the life of the child is both 
'secure and free' i. e. that the rights to life and liberty of the new-bom are ensured. 30 Can 
one 'ensure that the life of this new being is both secure and free' in the case of a new-bom 
infant? Security is non-problematic: individuals or societies can take measures to maximise 
the child's security in relation to the provision of physical and psychological needs. But what 
could the right to liberty mean for a new-born? Here Archard appears to confuse two kinds 
of rights. New-born infants cannot have a right to liberty because such a right is 
meaningless in such a case. In order for a right to liberty to mean anything there must be 
the capacity to exercise the liberty in some substantive way: to exercise freedom of speech, 
for example, one must have something to say and, more to the point, be able to say it. In 
order to have freedom of movement or freedom of association one must have the capacity 
to move or to associate independently. An infant does not have these capacities and 
consequently to speak of the new-born child"s right to liberty is mistaken. The only rights 
which a new-born infant may be said to have are rights of recipience: the only capacity the 
28 There is a growing realisation that animals may'deserve or have a right to good treatmenr and that 
they should not 
have to depend on the arbitrary whims of their human handlers. Why should children be any different? A claim of 
ownership does not entail cruelty or lack of moral decency. People who are 
likely to maltreat children (or animals) are 
unlikely to be swayed by afternative philosophical arguments. 
29 Archard, David, 'Child Abuse: Parental Rights and the Interests of the Child', Journal of Applied 
Philosoph 
, 7,2, 
1990; see also Archard, D., Children: Rights and Childhood, 97/8. 
30 Archard, 'Child Abuse', 186. 
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new-bom has is the capacity to have things done for it. 31 Liberty rights impose a duty of 
non-interference on others: non-interference is precisely what the new-bom does not 
require, want or need. 'The child is not born with autonomy, nor is the ideal of autonomy 
advanced by giving children of all ages the right to be free of all adult control. Autonomy is 
something that has to be learned 
... '. 
32 This does not mean, of course, that the parent's 
needs and interests qua parent, do not require liberty dghts for the proper execution of his 
or her duty as a parent. 
In a later work however, Archard shifts the focus of concern from liberty to welfare and puts 
the well-being of the child firmly at the centre of the issue, 'a new human being should not 
be brought into being unless its own rights - to life and to the provision of an adequate level 
of welfare - can be secured'. 33 Archard also argues that the right may be restricted for 
reasons of public welfare: the possibility that the child might 'threaten the lives or seriously 
worsen the welfare of other human beings already existing' (raising issues of population 
control and public health). The right to bear might be constrained, for example, where a 
'highly dangerous and contagious illness' would be automatically transmitted to the 
foetus. 34 
Archard's general argument is built upon the denial of an absolute right to bear children: in 
order to bear children you must prove your fitness, the state must monitor, and if you are 
deficient then the state may intervene to prevent your begetting and bearing. It is difficult to 
see how this differs from a totalitarian approach to the family. 35 
O'NeiII36 asserts that a right to beget or bear is 'contingent on begetters and bearers having 
or making some feasible plan for the child to be adequately reared by themselves or by 
willing others: 37 the right is not absolute. She would be unimpressed by claims that the 
pregnancy and birth occurred despite best efforts to prevent it: in general such births are 
31 
6eee% 
It haS 4 argued that the rights of recipience or developmental rights are the means to the rights of freedom 
usually associated with the liberal ideal of human autonomy. 
32 Blustein, Jeffrey, 'Parents, Paternalism and Children's Rights', Journal of Critical Ana! yýis, 8,1980,91/2. 
33 Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, 97/98. 
34 Archard's position is, perhaps unintentionally, se)dst. He specifically deals with the right to bear, 'strictly speaking, 
only women could be possessors of such a right, (which is conceptually true but is not the full story of human 
procreation), and does not anywhere address the role of the begetter. This is unfortunate as it makes the case appear to 
be a case against the rights of women when it is, in fact, a case to limit the right of people to procreate. 
35 Midgley dismisses Archard's proposal for more state intrusion on the grounds that 'every serious attempt of this kind 
has resulted in highly confused oppression'. And of course any change of the kind that Archard proposes would require 
radical change in public perceptions. 'In general, deterrence is less effective than legalists tend to think when it is not 
supported by shared standards'. Midgley, M., 'Rights Talk Will Not Sort Out Child Abuse: Comment on Archard on 
Parental Rights', Journ 31 of Applied Philosooh , 8,1,1991,103-114,111. 
36 O'Neill, 'Begetting, Rearing and Bearing'. 
37 bid., 25. It is clear later (34) that O'Neill considers this to be only one possible restriction on the right to beget or 
bear. 
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not 'an unforeseeable risk'. She uses the analogy of strict liability38 but she leaves the 
matter of unintended or unplanned births unresolved since her main concern is with those 
who have decided to procreate 
Those who have good reason to believe themselves unable or unwilling to 
rear or arrange for the rearing of a child cannot reasonably choose to 
procreate ... A person who faces (serious ill health, abysmal poverty or distaste for children) might reasonably be held to have no right to procreate 
under those conditions. If decisions to procreate create parental 
obligations, then those who realise ... that they can neither discharge nor transfer such obligations have no right to procreate at that time. 39 
O'Neill is not saying that such people lose the right to procreate permanently but only for so 
long as the specific disabilities or the unwillingness to undertake the concomitant duties 
persist. Her argument makes it clear that she considers that the loss of right to procreate is 
temporary. So 
if persons procreate without having or making any feasible plan for their 
child to be adequately reared, then a policy which prevented those persons 
from procreating would not infringe on their right to procreate - for their 
proposed procreation would have gone beyond that right. 40 
This appears to mean that the right to bear is, as a moral phenomenon, contingent. Unlike 
LaFollefte and Archard, however, O'Neill does not propose more than a moral policy i. e. 
she does not suggest specific state intervention (such as licensing or monitoring) to prevent 
particular people from having children. It might reasonably be argued, however, that if she 
establishes a sound moral case then the implication is that it should, if possible, be 
implemented in positive law. This is not her purpose: her concern is with procreation and 
population policy, not with individual cases. The state's positive obligations to children are 
essentially 'backup' obligations which are meant to support parental care. 41 
Hobson42 endorses O'Neill's position regarding the existence of morally defensible 
limitations which can be placed on people's right to procreate: 'The general principle that 
only those who can give a child at least the minimal care and attention it needs in the early 
years should have an unrestricted right to procreate is a sound one. 43 LaFollette, Archard, 
O'Neill, and Hobson do not deny that there is a right to have children: they attempt to 
identify theoretical, practical and procedural limits to the exercise of the right. 
35 Ibid., 28. 
39 Ibid., 29 (emphasis added). 
40 Ibid., 35. 
41 Ibid., 31. 
42 Hobson, P., 'Some Reflections on Parents' Rights in the Upbringing of Their Children', 
Journal Of Philosophy 0 
-Education, 
18,1,1984,63-74. 
43 Ibid., 64. 
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BayleS44 defines the human right to procreate as 
the opportunity or liberty to decide when and how many children one will 
have. This liberty may be called the liberty to pirocreate. 45 
The right to have children is not absolute; any human right can be subjected to limitations. 
Bayles bases his case for limitation on the need for population control, i. e. a social good (as 
opposed to LaFollefte who bases his case exclusively on the welfare of the individual child). 
Human rights are inalienable but not absolute. They are inalienable 
because they belong to people by virtue of their being human. So to lose a 
human right one Must Gease to be human. But since human rights are 
claims they can be outweighed by other justifiable claims. That is, 
sometimes there are sufficient moral reasons for not respecting, or 
completely respecting, human rights. 46 
What does 'inalienable' mean in a rights context? It means that the 'owner*ship' of the right 
cannot be renounced, transferred, or given away. 47 It is not the same as 'imprescriptible'. 
The latter means that the right cannot be legally taken away. (Certain rights are inalienable 
'because if these rights would be given up, man would cease to be a person and become a 
case of alienation; imprescriptible, because if these rights ceased to exist (extinctive 
prescription), man would likewise cease to be a person in his prescribed condition'. 48) Now 
none of the writers cited, and certainly not Bayles, suggests that the right to bear is 
imprescriptible. On the contrary they are suggesting that it is not: they all identify 
circumstances in which it can be legitimately and morally be taken away. It is in this sense 
that it is not absolute: if the right is not imprescriptible then there are (possible) 
circumstances in which it can be superseded, suspended, or even taken away. But this 
raises a problem: if, as Bayles says, 'to lose a human right one must cease to be human' 
does it follow that one ceases to be human by losing the right to procreate? Does it follow 
that if the right is proscribed that the erstwhile rights holder is, somehow, less than human 
for the duration of the proscription? Bayles repeats the point at his summing up: '(A) 
human right to procreate, assuming there is one, does not constitute an insuperable moral 
objection to population control. Human rights are not absolute. '49 Can we accept then, that 
44 Bayles, Michael D., 'Limits to a Right to Procreate', in O'Neill, Ruddick, Having Children. 
45 Ibid., 14. 
46 Ibid. 
47 'Inalienable' means that the right cannot be 'voluntarily renounced and transferred', 
Freeden, M., atýghts, Milton 
Keynes, Open University Press, 1991,31; 'Inalienable means that which cannot 
be transferred or given away. Mr. 
Justice Kenny, Ryan v. A-G., Kelly, J. M., Fundamental Rights in the Irish Law and 
Constitution, Dublin, Allen Figgis 
and Co., 1967,205. 
48 Foriers, P., Perelman, C., 'Natural Law and Natural Rights', Philip P. Weiner, ed., 
Dictiona! y Of The Higm 0 
Ideas, 111, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974,14. 
49 Bayles, 'Limits to a Right to Procreate', 21. It should be noted that he 
is, in all the cases he proposes, advocating the 
fimitadon or restricdon not the aboffion of the right 
to procreate. But it should also be noted that if there is a limit placed 
on the number of children a couple may 
have then their right to procreate disappears once that limit has been reached. 
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human rights claims can be 'trumped' by other claims. Are there occasions when we ought 
not respect human rights? Where such conflicts between human rights and other justifiable 
claims appear they must be resolved by 'an as yet poorly understood and ill-defined 
process'. 50 Can we conclude that as a result of some 'poorly understood and ill-defined 
process' human rights can be proscribed and people rendered less than human as a result 
(that they can 'cease to be human)? 
There are possible interventions which do not deny the right to procreate. These include 
providing relevant information, identifying moral objections, providing incentives favouring 
one course of action rather than another; Bayles would not include coercion which does 
limit liberty to decide 'and is per se morally objectionable'. 51 Nonetheless he recognises the 
context in which population control must be exercised: 
Most people value having children. The reasons and causes for this 
evaluation are complex. There are historical factors in the sexual ethic 
which suggest that the purpose of marriage is to have children. Many 
couples want a child of each sex, and it may take three or four children for 
them to realise this goal. Children provide companionship, love, and a 
purpose to life. ... it all boils down to the fact that people desire children 
and derive great satisfaction from having them. 52 
Raising children is a long-term project or commitment that most people choose to enter 
into. But this is not so for everyone. There is nothing unnatural or antisocial in not having 
children. 53 
Given this acknowledgement of the reality of human sexuality and parenthood however, 
two difficulties present themselves in relation to the denial of the right to have children. The 
first is a theoretical difficulty: if the force of rights can be disqualified by other moral 
considerations then what value do rights have as a moral category? 54 The second difficulty 
is procedural: who decides on the criteria for disqualification and on their application in 
particular cases? 
The first difficulty might be spelled out as follows: let us suppose that there are human 
rights and let us further suppose that one of these rights is the right to beget and bear 
He is not, therefore, advocating a temporary loss of right - as O'Neill does for the duration of specific 
disabifides - but an 
absolute loss once a certain prescribed number has been reached. 
50 Ibid., 14 
51 Ibid., 15. O'Neill (Begetting, Rearing and Bearing', 34) is surely correct to point out that in circumstances of extreme 
poverty providing incentives is coercive. 
52 Bayles, 'Limits to a Right to Procreate', 18. See also Page, 'Parental Rights'. 
53 But see Smilansky, 'Is There a Moral Obligation'. Also Wringe, C., 'Family 
Values and the Value of the Family, 
Journal of PhilgMhy of Education, 28,1,1994,77-88, especially his defence of 
'singledom'. 
54 See Brown, A., , London, 
Penguin Books, 1986,102 - 110; 
also Warnock, M., The Uses of Philosophy, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1992. 
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children. Certainly there is nothing counterintuitive about such suppositions; there is a 
general acceptance that people in all circumstances may exercise their right to procreate. 
People may be criticised for exercising the right iffesponsibly (as when, for example their 
families are too large) but this is not the same as denying the right. 
The right is either absolute or it is not. If it is absolute then it trumps every consequentialist 
consideration: an absolute right to do X is a licence to do X irrespective of the 
consequences to oneself or to others. This position certainly is GOunter-intuitive and it is not 
consistent with the liberal origin and context of rights: a right can never be absolute 
because it is always constrained by the rights or welfare of others. And in the case of child- 
birth there is always another who is materially affected by the decision to beget and bear, 
the child herself. In any event Bayles concludes that population control policies are justified 
if the social gains are more significant. 55 But none of the policy proposals he outlines 
completely denies the liberty to procreate. 
The procedural difficulty is highlighted by Raymond who is critical of Bayles' proposed56 
'voluntary' sterilisation programmes as a response to overpopulation on the grounds that it 
will disproportionately affect the poor. Her principal criticism of both LaFollette and Bayle, 
however, has to do with the narrowness of the views they represent. She objects that 
Bayle's use of phrases like 'public good' and 'collective decision' are 'frighteningly vague'. 57 
Both Bayle and LaFollette 'seem essentially to ignore society's responsibility to provide 
adequate social services' and instead propose to punish those who are most in need of 
helpful intervention. In both cases she argues that those who are deprived by economic 
circumstances, 'poor and minorities', would bear a disproportionate burden of the measures 
proposed. Specifically in relation to LaFollette's licensing proposal she concludes: 
The abuse of children will cease only when the sources of alienation and 
frustration so many abusers experience are sought after and erased, and 
when parenting becomes a social concern and not an individual 
responsibility. 58 
The right to have children - the positive programme 
Given that the negative approach to having children is inconclusive would a positive 
approach be any more fruitful? If there is a right to beget and bear children 
from whence 
does it derive? It cannot be from the rights of the child since at that point the child 
does not 
exist. 
55 Bayles, 'Limits to a Right to Procreate', 22. 
56 Ibid., 17-20. 
57 Ibid. Yet they are precisely the phrases that democratic institutions, 
legislative and judicial, sometimes use to justify 
social policies. 
58 Raymond, 'Philosophy and Parenting', 40. 
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Parenthood, as a distinctive form of human activity, has a pre-eminent place in human 
culture and features among our basic values: ithas a point and a value beyond responding 
to the needs of children, however satisfying that might be'. 59 One might wish to be a nurse, 
teacher, or fosterer in order to respond to children's needs without wishing to become a 
parent. Parents' rights protect a fundamental and (to date) irreplaceable form of human 
activity. It is this special value which attaches to parenthood which 'constitutes the ultimate 
foundation of parental rights'. 60 Parenthood is a human experience sui generis, it is unique 
and must be judged according to its own proper criteria. Arguments from analogy (property 
holders, primitive producers etc. ) are ultimately inadequate to explain parenthood, 
Evidence that parenthood has a special value in human life is the fact that people tend, 
universally, to choose parenthood as a major project in their lives; having children is an 
activity that is 'characteristically desired for its own sake, as an end in itself. '61 Parenthood 
enhances human life. Parental rights are justified because they protect parenthood as a 
distinctive form of human activity and enhance the special value of parenthood. Parents 
should have special rights, not to protect the well-being of individual parents or children in 
the first instance, but to protect the human institution of parenthood itself. 62 Abuse of their 
rights by parents in individual cases does not provide warrant for abandoning the rights 
themselves but for intervening in individual Gases. 
Natural parents enjoy a special position because 
(I)f the right of natural parents to possess and raise their own children were 
seriously threatened, this would undermine the possibility of parenthood as 
the valued activity that it iS. 63 
All other adult-child relations are parasitical on the natural parent-child relation (secondary 
carer's act in loco parenfis). Adoptive parenthood, for example, models itself on natural 
parenthood; the commitment of adoptive parents to 'their' child is parasitic on the special 
bond which is perceived as characteristic of natural parents. If the primary relation of 
biological parenthood is not protected then theýwill be serious repercussions for all adult- 
child relations. 
Parents aim not simply at the creation of a new human being but rather at the creation of a 
person in their own image out of material produced from their own bodies. 
Begetting and 
59 Page, 'Parental Rights', 194. 
60 Ibid., 196. 
61 Ibid., 197. A distinction must be made here between this kind of 'reason' for having children and 
the conventional 
sociological reasons - economic, social etc. 
The sociological kinds of reasons are not necessary to make this common 
actMty intelligible as something positively sought as a major 
ingredient in life. 
62 Ibid., 197. 
63 Ibid., 198. 
Paqe 87 
Chapter 4: Begetting and Bearing 
rearing are complementary activities: 'neither is entirely intelligible, as a form of human 
activity, without the other... "64 But parental rights are not absolutes; the wider social interest 
and other rights sometimes place limits on (trump) parental rights. An example of this is 
compulsory education for children65 or a general acceptance of non-coercive population 
policies. 
We shall see later66 that there is great need to clarify the status of the parent/child relation 
in terms of a proprietorial relationship. However we can say that one of the reasons for 
having children is surely to perpetuate the genetic identity of the individual and family. Any 
child won't do: if there is an anxiety to have a child to bear the family genes then it has to 
be my child. It is difficult to understand how a broader right to family continuity can be 
denied. A consequence of any radical licensing programme such as that advocated by 
LaFollette, would seem to be the right of the state to decide, in principle at least, when an 
entire family line might come to an end. 
The need to create bonds seems to be fundamental to human well-being. 67 Of these the 
most fundamental biological bond is the parent/child bond. To debar people from the 
experience of this bond, from the condition of being a parent, for whatever reason, is to 
deny them the most fundamental bond possible. So that if there is a right to create such 
bonds by begetting and bearing children then this right can be interfered with only for the 
gravest reasons. The reasons which have been considered include the danger of abuse to 
the child, the danger to the community if the child is the carrier of a virulent and highly 
contagious disease, the danger to the (world) community of over-population. ýin the first two 
cases the risk can be counteracted by less drastic action: better care, better social and 
health support for parents and children, more equitable distribution of wealth and 
opportunity. In the case of over-population the proposal is not to ban certain people from 
having children simpficiter but to limit the number of children they may have. It has not 
been convincingly argued that certain individuals should not have children at all i. e. that 
there are circumstances in which the right to beget and bear should be denied absolutely. 
Nor have any of the proposals considered fully the clear connection between the economic 
welfare (of states and individuals) and population growth and family size. 
The American Supreme Court has declared that 'the rights to conceive and to raise one's 
children have been deemed "essential" ... and ... rights 
far more precious ... than property 
rights'. While the Supreme Court of Canada has held that a court cannot deprive a woman 
of the privilege of having a child 'for purely social or other non-therapeutic purposes without 
64 Ibid., 201. 
65 Ibid., 202. 
66 Chapter 5 
67 Almond, B,, 'Human Bonds', Journal of AMfied PhiLmýoh 5,1,1988,3-16. 
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her consent'. 68 On the other hand a judge of the Irish High Court dismissed a claim by a 
married couple who were serving jail sentences that they be facilitated in the exercise of 
their Constitutional right to beget children. The judge conceded that the right to beget 
children was a personal right under the Irish Constitution but held that its exercise would be 
'incompatible with the restriction on their liberty which is constitutionally permitted by their 
imprisonment' and that such exercise would 'place unreasonable demands on the prison 
service'. 69 There are two arguments here. The first is conceptual: the penal restriction of 
liberty intends that imprisoned people forego many of their normal rights; that is the point 
and effect of the deprivation of liberty. The second is practical and is of no immediate 
concem. 70 
None of the proposals cited considered the possible harm to prospective parents of not 
being allowed to procreate. Among the reasons that Erikson gives for failure to develop 
what he calls the stage of generativity is 'the lack of some faith, some "belief in the 
species", which would make a child appear to be a welcome trust of the community'. 71 
Generativity is primarily the interest in establishing and guiding the next 
generation, although there are people who, from misfortune or because of 
special and genuine gifts in other directions, do : not apply this drive to 
offspring but to other forms of altruistic concern and of creativity, which 
may absorb their kind of parental responsibility. 72 
This generativity is a stage in the growth of a healthy personality. One can only speculate 
on the effect of denying it to individuals against their wishes. There is no reason to believe 
that such effect would be trivial. 
Summary 
There are negative and positive approaches to human reproduction. A negative approach 
considers how human reproduction might be limited for the protection of the anticipated 
children, to protect the welfare of the community, or as an element of population policy. 
The negative approach holds that the right to have children is not absolute; like other 
human rights it can be limited subject to more compelling reasons. This view is based on a 
perception of parenting as a potentially harmful activity which requires administrative state 
control. 
6B Vogel, Paul, 'The Right to Parent', Entourage, 2,1,1987,346. 
69 Shaffer, A. J., Family Law in the Republic of Ireland, (third edition), Dublin, Wolfhound Press, 1986,33/4. The 
Supreme Court rejected the couple's appeal. 
70 This is not to say that it is not important. The main reason given to the LIN by the Irish Government for its failure to 
raise the age of criminal responsibility to 12 years was because to do so would place an 'intolerable burden' on the 
state's social services. Cf. National report. 
71 Erikson, E. H., Childhood and Socift, London, Vintage, 1995,240. 
72 Erikson, E. H., Identily andl-ItMI-Lif-e-L-CM, New York, Norton and Co., 1994,103. 
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Any opposition to licensing proposals must show either that licensing is not theoretically 
desirable, or that there is no appropriate procedure which is reliable and just. Two major 
difficulties which any proposal to limit having children (in the sense of begetting or bearing) 
must face are the punishment of offenders (for engaging in one of the most compelling of 
human activities) and the disposal of the resulting children. If conception is the violation 
then there is the apparent absurdity that those whom it is intended to protect do not exist 
and are afforded continued protection by being prevented from existing 
A positive approach to begetting and bearing emphasises that human sexuality and 
parenthood are essential to individual as well as collective human well-being. In this view 
parenthood commands a special value in human life and holds a pre-eminent place in 
human culture. Parental rights are necessary to protect this distinctive form of human 
activity and to enhance the special value of parenthood. Special rights for parents protect 
the human institution of parenthood itself. 
Radical proposals to restrict human procreation must confront fundamental issues. One of 
the reasons for having children is to perpetuate the genetic identity of the parent and the 
biological family. A radical programme of restriction would have to decide, in principle at 
least, when an entire family line should come to an end. In addition debarring people from 
the experience of the fundamental bond of parenthood denies them the most fundamental 
human bond possible. 
The question of the right to bear is inseparable from the questions of owning and rearing 
children, and it is to these that we now turn. 
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The 'proprietarian' argument 
Proprietarian accounts of parenthood have been generally deplored. They are 'deeply, and 
rightly, repugnant to present western culture'; 1 it is 'morally repugnant to think of (children) 
as property at all'; 2 the idea that children are 'chattels (of their parents) is repugnant to our 
sensibilities'; 3 there is 'a strong intuitive feeling that infants cannot be property because they 
have special worth or value, as people, and not as objects. 4 It is not clear whether these 
expressed feelings of repugnance are intended as aesthetic arguments or as moral 
arguments. The status of repugnance as a universal experience with regard to any 
particular object is problematic. If it is no more than an intuition it is suspect as any intuitive 
stance is. Intuitions, whether of compassion or repugnance, are unreliable guides to 
morality: there is no guarantee that they will take the same form or have the same object 
universally. The presumed 'proper objects' of repugnance or compassion are variable both 
between persons and in relation to the same person over time. A morally significant 
position can only come about as a result of a rational evaluation of our initial response. If a 
feeling of repugnance is to qualify as morally significant it must have been mediated by 
rational evaluation. A morally significant response is an intuitive reaction which has been 
interrogated by reason. 
The main source of our (modern) repugnance at the idea of ownership of children derives 
from our repugnance at the idea of slavery: the ownership of another human being on 
exactly the same terms as a dog, motorcar or house. The proprietarian account of 
parenthood has not always been repugnant; it is not obvious that it is universally so even 
within contemporary western culture. Children have been regarded as chattels of their 
parents. Even today 'certain puzzling features of the parent-child relationship' seem to 
require a 'proprietodal' explanation of the relationship. 5 The puzzling features include the 
requirement that in cases of adoption biological parents must abandon claim to the child, 
they must waive the presumed rights which parenthood confers. This is analogous to 
waiving claim to a property which has been disposed of to another. The relationship need 
not be perceived as ownership; it can be seen, less repugnantly, as trusteeship. 
Nonetheless there is a relationship similar in this respect to the holding (whether as owner 
1 Archard, David, 'Child Abuse: Parental Rights and the Interests of the Child", Journal of Applied 
Philosýoh , 7,2, 
1990,186; he argues the case at some length in Children: Rights and Childhood, 
London: Routiedge, 1993,98-105. 
2 Page, E., 'Parental Rights', Journal Of ADPIied Philosgphy, 1,2,1984,187. 
3 Bigelow, John, et al., 'Parental Autonomy, Journal of Apglied Philosoph , 
5,2,183 - 196,184. Why the notion that 
'children have no property rights in their own bodies' should of itself be repugnant 
is not explained. It would be 
interesting to know, for example, what property rights in their own bodies new-born 
infants have. Does the notion of 
'property rights' as a moral concept rather than a 
legal concept not require the capacity to exercise the right in question? 
4 Page, 'Parental Rights', 193 (emphasis added). 
5 Bigelow, 'Parental Autonomy, 184. 
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or as trustee) and disposal of property. Secondly, proprietorial notions seem useful in 
describing what has gone wrong in 'various historical incidents involving parents being 
given custody of the wrong child'. 6 Thirdly, the latitude given to parents in the readng of 
their children is much wider than is normally given to other adults in similar situations of 
responsibility; it is more like the latitude afforded to owners or trustees than that afforded to 
managers. Fourthly, anyone wishing to use the services of a child or to relate to the child in 
many non-trivial ways must seek the permission of the parents. 
So there is a tension between the Gontiguity of a proprietorial explanation of the parent- 
child relationship and the intuitive repugnance which such an idea eliCitS. 7 
The reason why we do not accept that parents really own their children is because we 
attribute to children the status of persons and 'we view them as, defeasibly at least, 
autonomous'. 8 This is not unproblematic: infanticide, for example, has been defended on 
the grounds that infants are not persons. 9 The problem of ownership hinges on the 
definition of a person and on the belief that the notions of person and possession are 
mutually exclusive. They are not logiCally exclusive. There is no more conceptual 
contradiction in the assertion of ownership of a slave than there is in the assertion of the 
ownership of a horse or a shirt. The disjunction is a moral one, the perceived repugnance is 
a moral repugnance. The question as to whether past generations were always morally 
wrong in owning slaves - or asserting ownership of their children - or whether the moral 
wrongness only appeared with the realisation that adult slaves were persons is moot. 10 
Interference with a person's property is a threat to autonomy. Bigelow and his collaborators 
seem to argue from this that since children are 'involved in their parents' life plans in such a 
way that interference can easily threaten the parents' autonomy' they Gan, (in some obscure 
way) be considered as similar to property. 11 
6 Ibid., 184. 
7 Ibid., 1845. 
8 Ibid., 191. 
9 Tooley, M., 'Abortion and Infanticide', in Singer, P., ed., A1212lied Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1986. Tooley argues 
- and this should give us pause before we can accept any notion of repugnance as a 
basis of our moral stance - that 
infants are not persons and are therefore not entitled to the same consideration, and in fact may be killed. In answer 
to 
the question, when is a member of the species horno sapiens a person? he answers: 'An organism possesses a 
serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental 
states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity. ' (64) What is the status of 
feelings of repugnance in relation 
to this proposal? Is the feeling of repugnance itself sufficient to refute the claim that 
infanticide is permissible on the 
grounds that the infant lacks the characteristics of a person? 
10 This kind of issue is addressed in Taylor, C., Sources of the Self: The. Making of the 
Modem Ident , 
Cambridge 
U. P., 1989 and Williams, B., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
London, Fontana Press, 1993. 
11 Bigelow, 'Parental Autonomy, 191. See Lomasky, Loren E., Persons, Rights, and the 
Moral Communi , 
Oxford 
Univer., 
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Archard is uneasy that'a long shadow' of the proprietarian account still remains in the belief 
that in some way the bearing of a child grounds the right to rear it. Yet we accord children 
claims against their parents in certain circumstances -a fact which would be inconceivable 
if they were merely the property (or chattels) of the lafter. 12 This view, however, depends 
on the kinds of claims that are meant. Animals, less controversially the 'possessions' of 
people, are entitled to a certain minimal level of care and protection. Whether based on a 
belief in 'animal rights' or simply out of considerations of humaneness, we can consistenfly 
deny anyone the right to inflict gratuitous suffering on animals. That is to say that animals 
can have claims to certain levels of care and treatment against their human owners. It is 
open to non-related others to prosecute a claim on behalf of the animal, just as they may 
do on behalf of a child. So in this regard there is no appreciable difference in principle 
between children and animals: very young children can no more prosecute a claim on their 
own behalf against their parents than animals can against their owners. This fact does not 
mean that in either case they do not have a claim. 
Archard bases his dismissal of the propdetadan claim on the notion that the child's 'liberty 
undercuts any presumptive dghts of another to its ownership'. 13 This is a variation of the 
personhood claim. What is the child's liberty (or personhood) at the time of birth? Or for a 
long time thereafter? There appears to be little point in attributing freedom dghts to those 
who are constitutionally incapable of exercising them. The new-bom child is incapable of 
exercising the dght of freedom of speech, for example. It seems meaningless to attribute to 
such a one a right of liberty, or self-ownership, which Archard claims is the general 
presumption from which the right of liberty derives. The liberty argument does not answer 
the proprietarian argument in the case of very young children. 
The proprietarian argument must be addressed in a different way: not from the conviction 
that it is 'repugnant', or false, but that since it is historically grounded it may have some 
element of truth which needs to be explicated. 
It may reasonably be claimed ... that some qualified notion of at 
least 
temporary ownership does apply in the case of the parent-child relation, 
and that this is linked, however conditionally, to the biological fact of 
generation. It may be that Hobbes was correct in seeing this as more like 
the right people have to their own body14 than their right to ownership of 
12 Archard, 'Child Abuse', 187; Children: Rights and Childhood, 101. 
13 Archard, 100. 
14 Or Aristotle. 'A parent knows better what has come from him than the children know that they are from the parent 
and the parent regards the children as his own more than the product regards 
the maker as its own. For a person 
regards what comes from him as his own, as the owner regards his tooth or 
hair or anything; but what has come from 
him regards its owner as its own not at all, or to a lesser 
degree. ' Aristotle, Ethics, trans., J. A. K. Thomson, (revised, 
Hugh Tredennick), London, Penguin, 1976,279. 
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property. If so the recognition of this right can only be intuitive, and cannot 
be founded on any consideration more compelling than itself. 15 
Yet while the notion of ownership might be 'deep and intuitive'16 it is 'nevertheless (a) 
disputable, assumption'. 17 The Lockean argument that the child is owned by the parents 
because it is the fruit of the parental (maternal) labour is not really sustainable. The 
association of 'labour' with childbirth is no more than a metaphorical connection. It rests on 
a simplistic view of language: because we use the same word it does not follow that we 
mean the same thing. In the case of labour we have a very good example of a dead 
metaphor. 18 Dead metaphors are metaphors which have lost their metaphorical force 
although their origins may be still visible. 19 The use of the word labour in relation to 
childbirth is no more literally intended than is the word sift in relation to forensic evidence. 
The labour of a mother in childbirth denotes the physical exertion (largely involuntary) of 
the uterine contractions involved in the process of giving birth. It may be difficult, painful, 
and exhausting, but it is not labour in the way in which the word is usually used to rnean 
work or toil involved in supplying goods or services. Labour in the sense of working to 
produce or improve something and labour meaning the act of giving birth are homonyms: 
they share a form, they may even share a common etymological origin, but they no longer 
share a substantive meaning. Mill would appear to be in agreement with this view: 
One would almost think that a man's children were supposed to be literally, 
and not metaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the 
smallest interference of law with his absolute and exclusive control over 
them. 20 
Mill is asserting that the use of the notion of possession in relation to children is at best 
metaphorical: parents do not own their children in the same way that they might own a chair 
or a horse. Metaphor does not mean identity: the relationship between the parent and the 
child is like ownership in certain respects. 
In the case of possession of children we are not dealing with an entirely metaphorical origin, 
however. Under Roman law the paterfamilias had 'absolute power of life and death over his 
son; he completely controlled his person and property'. 21 This is a paradigm instance of 
15 Almond, Brenda, 'Education and Liberty: Public Provision and Private Choiceý, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
25,2,193-202, Winter, 1991,199. 
16 Just as the repugnance to the idea is intuitive, 
17 Almond, 'Education and Liberty, 199. 
18 Sharpe, R. A., 'Metaphor, Honderich, T., ed., The Oxford Compgnion to Philosoph , Oxford, 
University Press, 1995, 
555. 
19 Fowier, H. W., Jsage, 2nd ed., Oxford, University Press, 1965,359, 
20 Mill, John Stuart, QE. Liberly, in H. B. Acton, ed., Utilitarianism. Libeqy, Representative Government, London, J. M. 
Dent & Sons Ltd., 1972,160. 
21 Archard, Child_ 10. 'In Roman law (Patria potestas was) the power which a father 
exercised over his male descendants, including 
those adopted into his family. Under it he had control of their persons, 
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possession of another person; the father literally owned his son as he owned slaves, 
animals and other disposable chattels. The origin of the concept of possession as 
descriptive of the relationship between parents and children, then, is not only metaphorical, 
it is literal. If the case is different in more recent times, and Mill appears to think that it is, it 
is either because the concept of possession no longer applies except metaphorically or 
because it applies in a different, i. e. less extreme or decisive, way. 
In the case of both slaves and infants a more compelling argument against possession 
would be the Kantian injunction against using others as means rather than as ends. Infants 
differ from animals in that they can come to share in, or agree to, the ends of our actions 
with regard to them. Yet although children are destined to become autonomous, rational 
beings, treating them as ends will not amount to quite the same as treating adults as ends. 
Control over infants, for example, is not as obviously morally objectionable as similar 
control over (competent) adults would be. This is a significant, and perhaps decisive, 
difference between slaves and infants. Slaves are adults. It is wrong to treat them as 
property because they are persons and because as persons they have rights in their own 
person, rights to action including autonomy, freedom of speech and movement, as well as 
rights to the products of their own labours. It is because children and infants are not adults 
that their case is problematic. What is morally repugnant in treating adult human beings in 
certain ways includes the fact that they are, unreasonably, being treated like children. 22 
Nor are all property rights identical: the kinds of rights which possession of property confers 
differ according to the kinds of property in question 'different kinds of objects elicit different 
ranges of interests'. 23 Perhaps it could be argued that it is not the concept of ownership per 
se which is inappropriate in the circumstances but the particular conception of ownership 
which we bring to the situation. Normally ownership is a relatively unproblematic concept: 
disputed claims to ownership in particular cases are usually differences in the interpretation 
of facts and not in the interpretation of the central concept. The generally accepted 
meaning of ownership carries with it the notion that it is a permanent relationship with an 
object (property) unless a deliberate decision is taken to discontinue the relationship (sell, 
bequeath, or transfer ownership). In all such cases it is the possessor who decides whether 
the relationship will change or not. Dogs, motorcars and houses do not participate in any 
way in decisions to dispose of them. 
Property ... is 
defined by a system of rules that assigns to persons rights 
over things, where the things capable of being owned can range from a 
including in early law the right to inflict capital punishment, and owned all the family property ... 
By classical times the 
Patfia potestas was much reduced, the power of punishment being 
limited to modest punishment Walker, D. M., 
The Oxford companion To Law, Oxford University Press, 1980,935. 
22 This matter will be discussed more fully in chapter 
8. 
23 Page, 'Parental Rights', 195. 
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person and his or her labour to land, natural resources, and what is 
produced by labour from land and natural resources. The rules of property defining dghts of owners and duties owed to owners may be moral, legal, or both. Specific forms of property differ from each other depending on the 
rights and duties which the rules confer, how the rights or duties are 
acquired, and the kinds of things which are capable of being owned. 24 
So even if we accept that the parent-child relation is one of possession it still remains to 
define the rules, and 'the rights and duties which the rules confer', which regulate this 
relation. 
The parent/child relationship is sui generis. No other human relationship is even remotely 
like it. At best we can describe it by drawing analogies with other relationships but without 
committing ourselves to the acceptance of something repugnant. Since, historically, the 
parent/child relationship has been described as one of ownership or possession we are left 
without a distinct language with which to describe it. Using the language of possession is, in 
a sense, not optional in respect of human relationships: there are certain things which, if we 
wish to say them, we must say them in this language or not at all. Great love involves 
possessiveness, the understanding that the person loved belongs, in some non-trivial way, 
to the lover. We must fall back on analogies; the crucial thing is to know that they are 
analogies and to realise when they cease to be useful. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter the genetic makeup of the child makes her the child 
of particular parents: one of the reasons for having children is to perpetuate the genetic 
identity of the family. Natural parents have an interest in the child which others do not and 
cannot have: genetic and familial continuity. If there is an anxiety to have a child to bear 
the family genes, and to perpetuate the family culture, any child won't do: it must be my 
child, The proprietarian picture of the child as 'owned' by its parents may ground a right to 
rear on the vested interest of the parent in the genetic and cultural continuity of the 
particular family. If we accept that having children is a (metaphorical) investment in the 
future then it is reasonable that the biological parent(s) would have the first claim on 
overseeing and directing the process of rearing. 25 
Transgenerational members of a family are not complete strangers, although they may 
never, as a matter of fact, have met. They embody the same genes, the same culture, the 
same family idiosyncrasies, whether these are transmitted genetically or culturally. 
26 This is 
24 Grunebaum, J. O., 'Property, Honderich, The Oxford. Compgnion to Philosol2h , 
723. 
25 There is growing empirical evidence that reported life events, at least in adult life, are not entirely random. Life events 
tend to cluster in families and appear to be influenced by genetic factors. 
See Thapar, A., Mcguffin, P., 'Genetic 
Influences on Life Events in Childhood', Medicine, 26,4, July, 1996,813-820. 
26 See Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 'Contexts of Optimal Growth in Children', in Daedalus- Journal of the 
American 
Acad $ 122,1, 
Winter 1993,34: 'Reproductive success is not simply a matter of passing on 
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not a trivial fact. My daughters grandmother is not just any old woman with whom my 
daughter shares a resemblance; she is her grandmother -a unique individual in a 
continuing story. In a real sense my daughter ownS27 her grandmother in a way that no-one 
else (other than her siblings and first cousins) can. She has a distinct and provable claim to 
her: to her appearance, to her identity, to her culture. The genes and culture are not static; 
they survive through the generations and they are important because they are ours, they 
are elements in our story. 
No-one can replace natural parents; to lose them is not just to lose identifiable people, it is 
to lose rootedness and self-identity which can only be partially made up. The availability of 
excellent parent surrogates does not contradict this; the fact that some natural parents are 
brutes without whom the child may be better off cannot either. Part of the tragedy of having 
to separate children and their parents, and one of the crucial reasons why it should be done 
only in extreme circumstances, is the child's loss, not just of parents but of the 
connectedness with the past, with a family, which the parents provide. Family is more than 
an empirical social organisation, an effective means for society to care for its children. It is 
also a context of personal history, of identity, of belonging. 
The claim of natural parents has two aspects: a deep emotional investment and a 
concomitant probability that their bonding with the child will make them the most suitable 
rearers. The use of words like 'own' and 'belong' in this context have a special use, but it is 
'one that is far more primitive than any institutions affecting property'. 28 When we use 
terms like 'belonging' or'own' in respect of human relationships we are not making property 
claims. 
While it may be true that 'bond-forming is a separate topic from property'29 it is not 
obviously so. We speak of people becoming 'very attached' to their dog, or their house, or 
to a particular item of furniture. Objects acquire sentimental value by which we understand 
them to have a value which is beyond their monetary value and which involves an 
emotional attachment. This fact neither confirms nor denies any statement regarding the 
separation of bonding and property claims. We invest objects with emotional significance 
for a wide range of reasons. What makes human relationships different is the fact that the 
investment can be reciprocal, but the reciprocation must be learned. 
chemical information coded on chromosomes, but involves transmitting extrasomatic 
information coded in words, works, 
and behavioural models. ' 
27 as in 'admits to' as well as in 'possesses'. 
28 Midgley, Mary, 'Rights Talk Will Not Sort Out Child Abuse: Comment on Archard on Parental Rights', Journal of 
Appli bd Philgýq"h , 
8,1,103-114,106. 
29 Ibid., 106/9. For a detailed discussion of human bonding see Almond, 
Brenda, 'Human Bonds', Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, 5,1,1988,3-16. 
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The trust model 
Perhaps the analogy most useful in describing the parent-child relation is the trust model 
which recognises the temporary and contingent nature of parental power. The trust 
relationship lies somewhere between outright ownership and total separateness. Children 
are not the property of their parents in the sense that parents can do whatever they like with 
them; the children are separate human beings. On the other hand children are clearly not 
self-possessed autonomous individuals because this would mean that the parents would 
have no responsibility for them and no obligations to care for them. 'Both of these options', 
Kolakowski correctly comments, 'are absurd'. 
So it must be recognised, in accord with common sense and secular 
tradition, that parents are responsible and must make decisions on behalf 
of their children, and that children are not things but that they depend on 
the decisions of others ... parents have the responsibility to lead their 
children into adulthood. 3c) 
If we accept that children have rights it is also clear that in many instances they are 
incapable of exercising those rights prudently and that they must be exercised on the child's 
behalf by someone else, usually a parent. The analogy of the trust model has been used to 
conceptualise this relationship between the rights-holding child and the parent exercising 
those rights on the child's behalf. 31 This trust-model mechanism allows us to recognise the 
child's rights while continuing to permit others (notably parents) to exercise the rights on the 
child's behalf until such time as the child is capable of exercising them for himself. 
The trust model gets the relationship between rights and duties the right way round; it 
recognises that the right to bear and rear is limited by the duty to meet the requirements of 
the trust: 
The parents acting as trustees, the rights they exercise belonging not to 
them but to their children, this exercise of rights lasting only as long as the 
trust, namely up to that point where the trust's purpose has been 
accomplished and the children are able to exercise their own rights for 
themselves. 32 
30 Kolakowski, Leszek, 'On the Practicability of Liberalism: What About the Children7, Critical Review, 7,1.1993,6. 
31 See Fordh , 46, 
December, 1977,670-780. Also Hobson, P., 
'Some Reflections on Parents' Rights in the Upbringing of Their Children', Journal Of Philosophy Of 
Education, 18,1, 
1984,63-74. Hobson argues that the parent acts in the best interests of the child. The parent acts as trustee rather than 
as agent for these interests. The ultimate purpose of 
the parenrs action is the autonomy of the child. 
32 Archard, 'Child Abuse', 187. 
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A trust must relate to its purpose. The purpose of parental power (as understood by Locke) 
is to facilitate the gradual development of the capacities of children to the state where they 
are capable of the autonomy and rationality necessary to control their own lives. 33 
The corpus of the trust, which the trustee must protect and develop in the 
beneficiary's behalf, consists of the body of rights which are, or should be, 
ascribed to children. It should be clear that the trust law is used here only 
as a conceptual analogy, since no conventional trust could be formed with 
such an unconventional res as a person's rights. One strength of such a 
conceptual model is that it reinforces the fact that the rights in question 
belong to the child as beneficiary and not to either the parent or the state 
as trustee. 34 
That is, the child's interests (which are reflected in the child's enforceable rights) constitute 
the corpus of the trust which is held by parents or state as trustee for the benefit of the 
child. The rights exercised by the trustee are not his own. They belong to the child, the 
beneficial owner. Traditionally, in cases of conflict, the interests of parents usually prevailed 
because it was assumed that the interests of parents and their children were identical. The 
trust analogy helps to make the child's interests separately visible so that they are seen as 
a paramount consideration in practice. At the same time, however, the model also 
preserves the parental discretion necessary for adequate child rearing. 
By viewing the parent child relationship as one of trust, the child's 
individual interests and the parent's discretion are both protected because 
the parent would have an obligation, akin to a trustee's duty of loyalty, to 
exercise his discretion solely for the child's benefit. 35 
A trustee's power is circumscribed in two ways. First of all the trustee is expected to meet 
high standards of care and loyalty. 
A trustee is required to exercise the power given him solely in the interests 
of the beneficiary, allowing neither his own self-interest nor even the 
interests of other beneficiaries to colour his decisions. 36 
The child's (best) interests must be given full consideration with reference to the 
requirement that the child's future options will be protected and preserved. 37 
The second limitation relates to the duration of the trust. A trust terminates when its 
purposes have been accomplished. This point is determined by the child's ability to 
exercise, protect, and enforce his own rights. The trust model, however, allows for a 
gradual assumption of responsibility which is balanced by a gradual relinquishing of control 
33 Montgomery, Jonathan, 'Children as Property, Modem Law Review, 51,1988,323. 
34 Fordh s of Children, 672 (emphasis added). 
35 Ibid., 779. 
36 Ibid., 673. 
37 Ibid., 673. 
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by the trustee. As the child develops the capacity to exercise each particular right on his 
own behalf the need to protect him from the imprudent exercise of the right diminishes 
accordingly. When the purpose of the trust (the emancipation of the competent individual) 
is achieved the trustee finally relinquishes his control and the trust terminates just as a 
property trust automatically terminates when the purpose of the trust has been 
accomplished. The trust is finally terminated when the child is able to exercise all of his 
rights. 38 
Summary 
Proprietarian accounts of parenthood have been deplored because the idea of owning 
another human being is repugnant to the modern sensibility: we do not accept that parents 
own their children because we believe that children are persons, and we believe that the 
notions of person and possession are mutually exclusive. Yet certain features of the parent- 
child relationship appear to demand explanation in terms of ownership. 
Metaphorical justifications of parental possession do not sustain absolute ownership: 
parents do not own their children in the same way that they might own an item of furniture. 
The relationship between the parent and the child may be like ownership in certain respects 
but metaphorical similarity does not mean identity. 
We are not dealing with an entirely metaphorical origin in the case of possession of 
children, however. It has been accepted in the past that the ownership of children conferred 
absolutist powers on fathers. Even so, not all property rights are identical: they differ 
according to the kinds of property in question. Accepting that the parent-child relation is one 
of possession does not specify the rules which regulate the relation. 
Because of the genetic and familial continuity represented by the child the parent/child 
relationship is not identical with any other human relationship. A qualified proprietarian 
picture of the child as 'owned' by its parents may ground a right to rear on the parent's 
vested interest in this genetic and cultural continuity. There is also the element of bond- 
forming: objects acquire sentimental value when we recognise their emotional significance 
for us. What makes human relationships unique is the fact that the emotional investment 
can be reciprocal. 
The analogy which most usefully describes the parent-child relation is the trust model which 
reflects the temporary and contingent nature of parental power. The trust relationship is 
intermediate between outright ownership and total separateness. It recognises that the right 
to bear and rear is limited by the duty to meet the requirements of the trust, that is, the 
-38 Ibid., 6745,777. 
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child's interests, The rights exercised by the trustees are not their own, they belong to the 
child, the beneficial owner. 
A trustee's power is circumscribed morally, by a demand for high standards of care and 
loyalty, and temporally, by the specific termination of the trust when its purposes have been 
accomplished. The trust ends when the child is capable of asserting his or her own 
autonomy and assuming the corresponding responsibility. The purpose of the trust is to 
bring this state of affairs about. 
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Who should have the right to rear children? 
Consulting the needs and interests of children will not of itself identify who should be the 
carers of the children. In cases where needs and interests require liberty rights this is not a 
problem since liberty rights require only that no-one else may interfere with their exercise. 
Children do not live by liberties alone (if indeed they live by liberties at all), they also have 
a claim on the services of others if they are to thrive. A consideration of their needs and 
interests alone 'cannot show who (if anyone) has the obligation to meet the claims of a 
particular child'. ' This raises the question as to who has the right to rear children. 
The intuition that the primary right to rear lies with the biological parents cannot, of itself, 
provide sufficient basis for that right. It must be buttressed by other reasons, in particular 
the religious (or, more broadly, ideological) freedom of the parents, a right to participate in 
intimate human relationships, and a concomitant right to privacy. 2 
There are three conventional arguments in favour of the right of natural parents to rear their 
children: the argument from ownership, the argument that the biological parents are 'best 
suited' (the 'blood ties' argument), the argument firom interests, and the argument that the 
care of the natural parents is the least detrimental alternative. As we have seen, the best 
form of the proprietarian position, which sees the carers as trustees, does not establish who 
should rear a child. It tells us only that the task of rearing a child must be carded out in the 
child's interest and only for so long as the child is unable to pursue those interests for 
herself. 
The'blood ties'argument 
The 'blood ties' argument attempts to show that the natural parents are best suited to 
rearing the child. Irrespective of whether the relationship between a natural parent and his 
or her child is to be described as some form of ownership or not, the related question is 
whether being the natural parent grounds a right to rear the child or even gives a 
preferential claim. This question must be separated from the question whether the 
generation of a child creates an obligation to rear the child or to make adequate provision 
for its rearing. The act(s) of procreation can create an obligation in the sense that there is 
an acceptance that the act entails duties which must be fulfilled and that the right to 
beget/bear is conditional on accepting the obligations involved i. e. it is a contingent right. 
1 O'Neill, 0., 'Begetting, Rearing and Bearing', in O'Neill, 0., Ruddick, W., eds., 
Having Children: Philosoghical and 
L2gal Reflections on _parenthood, 
New York: OUP, 1979,26f7. 
2 Almond, Brenda, 'Education and Liberty: Public Provision and Private 
Choice, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 25, 
2,1991,193-202,199/200. 
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Clearly the obligation can be fulfilled without actually taking on the rearing oneself. In such 
a case the separation of the child from the natural parents would not interfere with the 
obligation provided adequate alternative arrangements are made. 
Midgley is in no doubt about the connection between procreation and the right to rear: she 
opposes Archard's contention that 'in the absence of a proprietarian justification, it is 
difficult to see how the bearing of a child would ground the right to rear it' .4 
To bear 
children, she replies, is 'normally to be put in a situation where their removal will cause one 
great pain and lasting psychological trauma. If that does not ground a "right", it would be 
interesting to know what does. ' The attachment of parents to their children is 'one of the 
innate emotional tendencies that has made possible the success of the human species' .5 if 
there is a right to rear the child arising out of the begetting/bearing, however, it is not clear 
6 how these acts create such a right . 
Page echoes Midgley's concern with the pain of separation, 'the special form of suffering 
that would be inflicted on natural parents whose children were taken from them'. He is 
surely right that the special status of parenthood as a valued human activity would be 
seriously threatened if natural parents could not presume on their priority as rearers. What 
would be the point in having children if one could not confidently expect to rear them? 
Archard considers 'bonding' as more likely to form between natural parents and their 
children: 'parents have an innate tendency to bond to their children, and therefore the 
parents have a claim on their children which amounts to a right to reae. 7 But this is in fact 
only one premise of what he calls the 'best suited' argument. According to this argument the 
child has, firstly, a right to be reared by the person best suited to do so and, secondly, the 
natural parents are the best suited because they are most likely to bond with the child. The 
first of these assertions is a highly questionable proposition. There are undoubtedly many 
people who are better fitted to rear children than many natural parents are (though it is far 
from clear what the standard might be). Yet if 'best suited' became the criterion no natural 
parent would be free from the risk of losing their child to a more adequate carer. In addition 
it should be noted that a care policy based on 'best suited' would radically separate the 
bearing and rearing functions. This has a disturbingly anti-woman ring to it. For inevitably 
3 Nonetheless there is a close connection between the obligation and the right to whatever is necessary to fulfil the 
obligation. 
4 Archard, David, 'Child Abuse: Parental Rights and the Interests of the Child', Journal of Appiied Philo§pphy, 7,2, 
1990,186. 
5 Midgley, Mary, 'Rights Talk Will Not Sort out Child Abuse: Comment on Archard on Parental Rights', Journal of 
Applied Philosoph 8,1,107. 
a That parental rights over children are also biologically based is argued by Charles Fried in 
Fried, C., Right and Wrong, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1978. 
7 Archard, D., Child en: Rights and Childhood, London: Routledge, 1993,102. 
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under such a policy some women, judged to be less adequate as rearers of their own 
natural children, would be reduced to the status of breeding stock. 
The bonding in question is only likely or probable, not certain however, and likelihood or 
probability does not give an unambiguous claim. Yet in Archard's universe these are clear- 
cut matters of either/or: '(e)ither the parent bonds to its child and is best suited to rear, or it 
does not bond and is not best suited' .8 But human bonding is not an all or nothing, either/or 
matter. There are degrees of bonding as there are degrees of affection or dislike. The 
existence of a right cannot be contingent on the possibility that some parents may not bond 
with their children or not bond fully. If they do not then this, in the event, means forfeiture of 
the right in individual cases if in fact the bonding (or maximal bonding) is the basis of the 
right. This is a situation where there must be intervention either to encourage or to develop 
the absent, or weak, bonding or if bonding turns out not to be possible to make alternative 
arrangements which will take into account the interests of the child and of the parent. 
Failure to bond is not necessarily a moral failure and in many, if not all, cases it is a tragedy 
for the people involved and something which we should make every effort to prevent. 
Rather than seeing the bonding as a necessary condition for possession of the right to rear 
we should consider the right as a protection of the opportunity to form the bond. Human 
relations and behaviour do not exist to support rights; rights exist to support desirable 
human relations and behaviour. 
'Biologism' is the notion that all parents naturally love their children. 9 Archard opposes the 
belief that biology alone equips a person to pass the test of adequate parenthood and he 
suggests that we should 'discount any presumption of natural affection'. 10 Natural parents 
abuse and neglect their children and the presumption of natural affection blinds us to that 
fact to a large extent: we are likely to be more shocked that a natural parent will 
abuse/neglect than we are by the substantive abuse/neglect itself. Feeling is no guarantee 
of promotion of another's good and such feeling is not exclusive to blood ties. The capacity 
of a parent to rear the child should be viewed neutrally, Ihat is by discounting any 
presumption of their biologically grounded superiority as guardians'. " 
It is precisely the 'presumption of their biologically grounded superiority as guardianswhich 
must be extended to natural parents however. It is not insignificant that we are more 
shocked that a natural parent will abuse or neglect his or her child. This is because the 
presumption in favour of the natural parent provides the norm by which all adult/child 
a Ibid., T03. 
9 Jordanova, Ludmilla, 'Children in History: Concepts of Nature and Society, in Children. Parents and Politics, Geoffrey 
Scarre, ed., Cambridge: UP, 1989,11. 
'0 Archard, 'Child Abuse', 188. 
" Ibid., 190. 
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relations are judged. It is the paradigm case. It cannot be otherwise: biologically, 
psychologically, historically, culturally we are programmed to see the natural parent as the 
natural guardian of the child. We ascribe to this relationship dimensions of trust, of 
sanctuary, which we ascribe to no other with the same intensity. If we abandon the 
presumption in favour of the natural parent then we have no model of parent/child relations 
to guide us. All human relations, interpersonal, profession al/client, confessor/penitent, lead 
to abuses from time to time. We do not normally consider such abuses as sufficient reason 
for changing our view of the ideal relation in these cases. On the contrary, it is because 
there is an ideal of behaviour in such cases that we are horrified by, and condemn, the 
abuses as a betrayal of trust. 
But perhaps it is appropriate bonding which is the issue. All incidences of child abuse 
should not be lumped together to score moral points: some child-abuse occurs because a 
parent bonds in an inappropriate way; some because the parent does not bond at all or 
bonds inadequately; some because of a lapse of normal care on the part of a parent who is 
disturbed for other, extraneous reasons. There is no such thing in relation to chiid-abuse in 
general as a typical case. In addition it is difficult to see how we can make post hoc 
judgements in advance of particular cases so that we Gan predict when bonding will be 
inadequate. To admit that there is natural bond-forming between parent and child does not 
commit us to believing that parents and children will always bond maximally or that parents 
will never behave badly towards their children. 
Archard considers that the 'trauma of separation' is an empirical matter. 12 He is right to say 
that such feelings 'may help to support a presumption in favour of natural parents' bringing 
up their own children' 13 . But surely this is all that 
is required. Archard is chasing a chimera 
in trying to find unassailable grounds for what is at best a variable situation. If we add to the 
trauma of separation the obligation undertaken in begetting and bearing the child in the first 
place the result is a strong case for a presumption of right for the natural parent. The 
limitations which Archard identifies in all of the attempts to ground the right to rear are no 
more than indicators as to when the presumption might be challenged. A presumption is the 
most we can expect in such matters. Indeed it might be said that, like the presumption of 
innocence in law, a presumption of right is the only suitable recourse here. Just as the guilty 
do not have to establish their innocence, biological parents do not have to establish their 
right to rear their children. It is incumbent on those who would deprive them of their right to 
make the case beyond reasonable doubt. And this can be done only in individual cases. 
12 Archard, dhood, 104; It is tendentious to refer 
to an Weged trauma of separation'. Both 
parents and children, and if there are exceptions 
they are no more than that, feel keenly any separation, even where it is 
known that the separation will be only temporary. 
Consider the situation of children in hospital for example. 
13 ibid., 1 o4. 
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The interest argument 
The child's best interest is not a simple univalent matter which can be set in opposition to 
all other interests. The child is rooted in a social and communal milieu and the ties that bind 
the child are many and complex. There are relevant factors in addition to (the child's) best 
interest. In cases of contested custody, for example, these would include the wishes of the 
parents as to the child's custody; the wishes of the child as to his or her custodian; the 
relationship of the child with his or her parent or parents, siblings, and any other person who 
may significantly affect the child's best interest; the child's adjustment to his or her home, 
14 
school, and community; and the mental and physical health of all individuals involved . 
Parents acquire a dispositional interest in their children (in the child's nonnative interests) 15 
by having them and this begetting and bearing is, in itself, a powerful statement of the 
parents' preparedness to have that interest in the child. Most parents are interested in their 
children without being suffocatingly so. Admittedly some parents are not interested in an 
appropriate way. Nor, we can add, are all parents' interests in their children comparable: 
interest may be defective or deficient but this is deviation from the normal relationship. Like 
bonding, dispositional interest lies along a continuum from virtually none at all to extreme, 
even overbearing interest. But exceptional or extreme situations cannot be allowed to 
invalidate a general rule of human behaviour. People whose dispositional interest in their 
children is defective or deficient need help, not a denial of the rights of others. 
Among the possible reasons for having children Archard lists 
to bring about a life that avoids the errors of its begetter, to create a 
companion"s and an assistant for one's dotage, to add another soldier to 
the army of the motherland or another true believer to the ranks of the 
faithful, to prove it can be done, to spite another adult. None of these 
interests in rearing a child are of self-evident value or obviously consonant 
with the interests of existent adults. 17 
It serves no useful purpose to lump together trivial reasons (to prove a point, to spite 
another) with reasons which are in fact 'consonant with the interests of existent adults' such 
as patriotism or religious belief and duty. Two points need to be made here. In the first 
place people's motivations are rarely uncomplicated, they rarely act for one reason only. 
Most frequently their motives and motivations are mixed, the important with the tdvial, the 
14 Stein, T. J ., 'Child 
Custody and Visitation: The Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parents', Social Service Revie , 70,3, 
1996,435-450. 
See the analysis of 'interests' in chapter 3. 
'The parents' own need for the intimate relationships of child rearing could 
not alone justify any broad authority over 
another person. ' Henley, K, 
'The Authority to Educate', in O'Neill, 0., Ruddick, W., (eds. ), Having Children: 
Phil and. L al Reflectiong on Parenthood, 
New York: OUP, 1979,257. 
17 Archard, 
105. 
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selfish with the generous, the high-minded with the base. Some of the things listed 
(motherland, faith) are precisely the kinds of things which are part of the interests of real 
people, by reference to which they define themselves and which give long-term 
significance to their decisions and on-going commitments. We do not have to agree with 
people's interests to recognise that they are interests. Secondly, Archard's standards are 
either impossibly high or unreal. Having peremptorily dismissed serious matters as not 
being 'consonant with the interests of existent adults' he declares that an interest we might 
recognise as of real value 'would be to bring into existence another human who could be 
0 18 the object of our disinterested love, concern and care . Archard's use of the word 
'disinterested' is inappropriate in the context of parental/child relations. Whatever else we 
would expect of an adequate parent we would certainly expect that he would not be 
impartial as between the normative interests of his own children and those of others: their 
dispositional interests will be partial. To be committed to the best interests of one's own 
child is to pursue the child's advantage. Parents will provide the best life possible, within 
their means and often making significant sacrifices of their own comfort and welfare, for 
their children precisely to give them whatever advantages they can over other children. 
This is not a defect (although the application may be defective), it is a fundamental part of 
what it means to be a parent. 
People have children for all kinds of reasons having to do with their own normative 
interests. They frequently do not realise what they are letting themselves in for when they 
engage, even voluntarily and intentionally, in procreation. This is why parental obligations 
are atypical: prospective parents have only the haziest idea of what they are committing 
themselves to in having children; they frequently misjudge 'their own inclinations and 
capacities'. 19 Even if we could accept Archard's impossible criterion it won't do. As he 
himself acknowledges this would be a child-centred argument, 'it is the child's interest in a 
loving upbringing which does the moral work'. 20 This is not necessarily so. The normative 
interests of the parents as separate individuals 
Ta-Iso 
relevant. 
The normative interests of the child are not the only morally relevant factor in the 
interactions between parents and children. Other considerations may have to be weighed 
against them: the well-being and safety of the community, respect for the interests and 
autonomy of other people (including the parents themselves), the welfare of other children 
(including siblings), for example. The 'best interests' of the child is not necessarily an 
overriding principle in all caseS21 and therefore could not be the exclusive reason for the 
18 Ibid. 
O'Neill, 0., 'Begetting, Rearing and Bearing', 27. 
" Archard, 105. 
21 it is noteworthy that the UN _Convention, 
(U. N. General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Document 
A/RES/44/25,12 December, 1989) in Article 3, asserts that the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
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right to rear. Nonetheless one of the long-term commitments that people commonly choose 
22 to enter into, is that of raising children . Society acknowledges the right of adults to rear 
their own child without undue interference even if this is not in the child's best interests. It is 
often acknowledged that parents will harm their children to some degree (perfection in 
parenting is as rare as perfection in any other human activity), and yet a free society should 
'morally allow their autonomy to overrule ... paternalist obligation to see that the child 
suffers minimal harm. 23 There are two aspects to parental autonomy: rights and duties. 
Parents should be allowed to raise their child as they see fit, as long as 
they do not harm the child too severely: this is their Tight'. Yet it is also 
their'duty' to care for the child, even if they do not want to do So. 24 
The narrow view of parental prerogatives imposed by the liberal ethic has not gone 
25 
unchallenged . According to the liberal view parents when making decisions which will 
affect their children must consider only those principles mandated by the liberal philosophy 
i. e. the 'child's best interests' and the limitation of harm to others. In this way the same 
principles are used to control the prerogatives of parents as are used to limit the actions of 
states. 26 Schoeman points out, however, that while the state may be limited by the best 
interests criterion the parents are not. Often the decisions which parents make regarding 
their children are neither in the child's best interests or made with a view to promoting the 
child's welfare. 
Parents frequently deprive children of rights and in other ways exercise 
authority over children that would be impermissible in other contexts 
between citizens or even between incompetents and state appointed 
guardians. 27 
The primary grounding of the parent's right to rear the child are the normative interests of 
the adult who becomes the parent. But becoming a parent creates a significant 
consideration, not the primary consideration. 'in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration. ' This means that there can be other primary interests. At this point it is unnecessary to 
speculate on what they might be. 
22 Bigelow, John, et aL, 'Parental Autonomy, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 5,2,188; 'Raising children is a long-term 
project which involves a lasting personal commitment to other people. It is an exercise of autonomy and a development 
of a person's potential; and for some people, it is the only long-term project which gives their life direction and 
significance. ', 192. '(H)uman beings have an overwhelming propensity to choose parenthood as a major ingredient in 
their lives ... 
(and) it is clear that this activity is characteristically desired for its own sake, as an end in itself. ' Page, E., 
'Parental Rights', Journal Of Applied Philosoph , 1,2,1984,197. 
23 Bigelow, 'Parental Autonomy, 189. 
24 Ibid., 189. 
25 See Schoeman, Ferdinand, 'Parental Discretion and Children's Rights: Background and Implications for Medical 
Decision Making', Journal of Medical Philosogh , 10, Feb., 1985,45-62. 
26 it seems hardly necessary to point out that even the ideal relationship between the state and its adult citizens is not 
the same as the ideal relationship between a parent and a child. 
27 Schoeman, 'Parental Discretion', 49. 
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responsibility which is not bome by other adults. In allowing people the autonomy to have 
children we are also requiring them to take the consequent responsibility: the right to beget 
and bear children is contingent on the obligation to care for them adequately. This is so 
even where the child was 'unplanned': people must be required to cope with 
inconveniences which result from their own actions. This is a consequence of autonomy: a 
person is not only entitled to pursue his or her own projects, but is reasonably expected to 
accept responsibility for the outcome. 
The least detrimental argument 
Midgley is rightly critical of what she calls Archard's 'strangely legalistic view of the aims of 
life 28 when he argues that 'if there are any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring 
children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves' . 
29 In fact 
Archard eventually acknowledges that there should be a presumption in favour of the 
natural parents as the 'least detrimental alternative' in the choice of rearer. 30 'Arguably', he 
continues, 'this presumption is defeated only if it can be shown that the only feasible 
alternatives have no greater benefits and worse harms'. 31 
Midgley is more robust in her defence of the natural parent: natural parents are taken to be 
the 'least bad' available rearers for their children, not because of rights but because 'it is 
widespread experience that other people are, almost always, much less willing even to try 
to do the job properly than the parents are. 32 Surrogate parents or institutional 
arrangements do not appear to have any guaranteed superiority over natural parents with 
regard to child abuse, for instance. It might be added in support of her point that appeals to 
alternative 'institutional arrangements' simply cloaks the child's need for individual care. 
This individual care may be provided in an institution but if it is not individualised, and the 
care provided really is institutional, then there is no contest between the natural and the 
institutional arrangement. Although we are coming to realise that some natural parents 
have been behaving abominably towards their children the record of other carers does not 
appear to have been any better. Midgley is correct that it is unrealistic to think that there is 
'a vast, reliable majority of respectable citizens' available to rescue children from unsuitable 
parents. 33 We should take it as axiomatic that the natural parent is the model for the carer. 
All other categories of carer (adoptive parents, surrogate parents, institutional carers, etc. ) 
28 Midgley, 'Rights TaIW, 110. 
29 Archard, 'Child Abuse', 188. 
3c) Instead of looking for a way to ground the parents right to rear the child why do we not, alternatively, try to discover 
whose right it is to decide whether the parent will be the rearer or not? 
31 Archard, Child en: Rights and Childhood, 106. 
32 Midgley, 'Rights TaIk*, 106. 
33 Ibid. 
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are parasitic on the presumption that there is an ideal natural parent. This does not mean 
that all parents conform to this ideal - they aspire to it and are successful to varying 
degrees. 34 
Biology, interests, or 'best interests' alone do not entirely explain the basis of parental 
duties; there is also the requirement of social sanction. There are social and cultural 
arrangements where the rearers are not the begetters or bearers (adoptive parents for 
example). As Blustein remarks, '(N)ormally procreation is relevant to parental duty only 
insofar as social practices and customs make it relevant'. 35 That is to say that natural 
parents have priority where this is the arrangement endorsed by the relevant society. The 
source of child-rearing duties lies in established social practices and in the various interests 
of the involved parties (children, parents and the sustaining community) which are co- 
ordinated to yield 'a coherent set of social practices conferring corollary rights and duties 
1 36 which satisfy the interlocking interests of all parties. The childs legitimate (normative) 
interests include an interest in physical care, education and socialization and also in the 
'warmth, consistency and continuity of the relationship he has with the person who takes 
care of him s. 37 As well as being fed and protected children need to be loved, and so do their 
parents. It is no small part of the urge to have children that as well as providing us with an 
object for our affections it creates the opportunity to be loved in return. There is a 
reciprocity in parents' preoccupation with their children which is not the calculation of a 
return on an investment but the expectation of a spontaneous response to loving kindness. 
As Midgley says, 'The reason why having a thankless child is sharper than a serpent's tooth 
is not just that we have sunk a lot of capital in the investment, but that we thought we were 
loved and find that we are not. '38 
As we will see states do not confer parental rights on natural parents, they simply 
acknowledge a biological, psychological, and social reality. The connection between 
evolutionary biology, parental feelings and societal norms is not arbitrary. We are here 
because the social practices which grew up around child bearing and rearing were effective. 
Natural affections 
34 For Hegel the Family is the first moment in the union of moral subjectivity and object". The human spirit 
first 
objectifies itself in the family which is the 'logically prior society 
inasmuch as it represents the universal in its logically 
first moment of immediacy. The members of the family are considered as one, united primarily 
by the bond of feeling, 
that is, by love'. (Copleston, Frederick, A Histo! y of Philosoph , 7,1, 
New York, Image Books, 252. In a note Copleston 
explains: 'Obviously, Hegel is not so foolish as to maintain 
that as a matter of empirical fact every family is united by 
love. He is talking about the concept or ideal essence of the family, what it ought to 
be'. n. 32,252. ) 
35 Blustein, J., 'Child Rearing and Family Interests', in O'Neill, Ruddick, Having 
Children, 115ro. 
3" O'Neill, Ruddick, Mgybg_. 9ý, Editors' Forward. 
31 Blustein, 'Child Rearing and Family Interests', 117. 
38 Midgley, M., ans, Freedom and Moraft, 
London, Routledge, 1994,147. 
PaqellO 
Chapter 6: The Right to Rear 
have served the essential function of making possible strenuous and devoted provision for the young. If all parents had cared as much for every 
passing infant as they did for their own, this provision would have been impossible. In such a casual, impartial regime, few warm-blooded infants 
would be likely to survive at all. 
39 
It is important to acknowledge at this point that the parent's interest in having a child can 
have a legitimate economic dimension: the relationship between parents and child can be 
valued economically as well as emotionally. According to this view 'children are either 
liabilities or assets to be used in family survival strategies,. 40 The economic value of 
children is seen where the survival, or thriving, of the family unit depends on the 
contribution of each family member. This is most clearly seen in pre-industdal communities 
where children begin to contdbute to the family wealth as soon as they are able. Even in 
our own society children of farming families are expected to contribute (within reason) to 
the routine chores of the farm. The same is usually true of small family businesses. In these 
cases the child has a real and measurable economic value. This does not mean that the 
child is valued only for her economic contribution or that the economic contribution is ever 
even measured. It is there none-the-less. 41 
For the parent the fact that the child may be an economic or insurance investment does not 
preclude valuing the child as the embodiment of the parents' love for one another. In this 
case children are valued not for their economic or genetic value but because they 
symbolise the mutual love, the joint normative interests, of the parents: 
(The) mutual love of the child-rearers becomes inextricably bound up with 
a common love for their children. This may happen whether or not the child 
rearers are their children's biological parents. 42 
The State 
Biological parents are normally in a better position to care for and to harm their child 
because they are (in societies like ours) customarily allowed almost exclusive care and 
control of the child. This cannot be justified by repeating that biological parents have a 
special duty: 'If it is only the social practice of assigning care and control to biological 
parents that gives those who cause children to exist parental duties, the source of parental 
39 Ibid. Plato feels it necessary to separate parents and children because he wishes to supplant the natural with a 
rational order. 
40 Jordanova, 'Children in History, 11. There is a number of ways in which a child could be economically active: in paid 
work or apprenticeship outside the family; by taking care of younger children and freeing the adult carer (usually the 
mother) for paid work; by working with parents and so helping to raise their productivity. The need in such cases is for 
regulation and humanisation rather than for abolition. It is not irrelevant that parents in economically depdved 
circumstances tend to have larger families. 
41 Hart, Roger, A., Children's Participgtion: from Tokenism to Citizenshi , Innocenti Essays, 4, Florence, UNICEF, 
1992, section 6,23-28 identifies the relevant issues. 
42 Blustein, 'Child Rearing and Family Interests', 118. 
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duties cannot be the fact of causation itself. 43 Blustein appears to have gotten the causality 
the wrong way round. It is not because they are 'customarily allowed' almost exclusive 
control of their children that biological parents are normally better at it. It is because they 
are normally better at it that the practice continues. 
Blustein's use of the phrase 'assigning care and control to biological parents"' appears to 
imply that some agency, usually the state, has a primary responsibility for the distribution or 
disposition of children independently of the claims of biological parents; that there is 
somehow a prima facie case in favour of state intervention, as if the biological parent is just 
one of a number of possible agents waiting in the wings to take on the responsibility of child 
rearing on behalf of the State. It is not, and never has been (certainly not in any kind of 
democratic society) the function of the state to assign care and control to natural parents. 
Plato's proposal in -The 
Republie 5 to separate all children under ten from their parents so 
that they can be reared by the Guardians would not be abhorrent to us if we accepted the 
prior authority of the state in relation to child rearing. A presumption in favour of the 
biological parents appears to meet the reality more closely: the right (or more correctly the 
duty? ) of the state is to intervene only where the biological parents are clearly not meeting 
their obligations. It is because of the direction of the responsibility that the intervention of 
the state must come in the form of aid and assistance to the natural parents in the first 
instance. The separation of parents and children is a last resort, justifiable only when all 
efforts at remediation have been exhausted. 
The State certainly has legitimate interests in the welfare of children. These interests 
include population policy and the care of children as future citizens. Society has a 
legitimate interest in ensuring that children are not harmed by those who have charge of 
them, that they receive a minimally adequate rearing, and that child-rearing practices are 
co-ordinated with other social practices and policies. The family is not the only child-rearing 
institution and 'institutional co-ordination may dictate the transfer of many child-rearing 
responsibilities to non-familial structures of the society', such as schools, for example, but 
significantly only with parental consent. What is required is the adjustment of competing 
interests, not their 'ranking or aggregation'. 46The State may act as a party to the process of 
adjustment, it may even facilitate the process, but in democratic societies it assigns roles 
and duties in relation to child care only in exceptional Gases. 
43 bid . '115/6. 
44 Or elsewhere, '(A)ssigning children to their biological parents', Blustein, Jeffrey, 'Parents, Paternalism and Children's 
Rights', , 8,1980,89-98,97. 
Compare: 'It is not just because the parent provides the best 
services for the child that the parent is authorised to make decisions for the child. It is because 
the parent and the child 
are presumed to be intimately related that the parent is given authority over the ch#d. 
' Schoeman, 'Parental Discretion', 
60 (emphasis added). 
45 Plato, Ibg ReRtublic, G. M. A. Grube, trans., London, Pan Books, 220. A_ 
48 Blustein, 'Child Rearing and Family Interests', 119/20. 
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We cannot ignore the temporal, logical and Psychological priority of the biological parents. 
To acknowledge that the society has a legitimate interest in ensuring that children are not 
harmed by those who have charge of them does no more than protect the child and 
society's interests: it does not establish any claim over the disposition or distribution of 
children in the first instance. ONeill has written 
Only if the State controls and mandates procreation - as in Plato's , 
Republic 
- could one hold that the State acquires the same sort of obligations as 
persons do by deciding to procreate, so undertaking to rear. Only in this 
case would the State, or certain State agencies, have chosen to bring 
dependent human beings into existence and so be committed to care for 
them and to train them until they can live independent lives. 47 
The State is not, and cannot be, even a surrogate parent except in a metaphorical sense, 
while the notion of 'guardianship' is ambiguous: it means either that the State acts directly 
as the child's guardian in the same way as the parent should have done or that it merely 
acts as guarantor for the child's welfare. All that the State can do in relevant cases is to 
transfer the care of the child from one set of individuals to another who then become the 
surrogate parents. Even if this is transfer to an institution it falls on some identifiable 
individuals within the institution to act as parent surrogates: the alternative is the kind of 
impersonal institutional care which has been condemned repeatedly. The State is not a 
substitute parent: it must provide a substitute parent and there is no absolute guarantee that 
the substitute is any more likely than the original to be adequate. 
The roles of parents and states are not interchangeable; the state's relationship with the 
child is formal but the parent's is intimate. Impositions and practices which would be 
unthinkable outside the context of the family are acceptable within the intimacy of the 
family. Parents' proprietary interests in the welfare of their children is based on a 
sovereignty which is at once more intimate and more benevolent than is possible for an 
impersonal state. 48The state cannot occupy an intimate role with the individual child. Nor is 
the parent's role limited to providing such care for the child as the state cannot practically 
49 provide. The parent is not the functionary of the state . 
Even though we recognise that there are limits on the parents' activities vis-d-vis the child 
we acknowledge that, in part at least, the parents' function is characterised 'as providing 
47 O'Neill, O., 'Begefting, Rearing and Bearing', 30/1 . 
48 Baumrind, Diana, 'Reciprocal Rights and Responsibilities in Parent/Child Relations', Journal of Social Issues, 34,2, 
1978,179-196,189. 
49 Schoeman, 'Parental Discretion', 48. These are different too from the usual insistence that the primary duty of the 
parent is to bring the child to some ideal of liberal functioning characterised 
by autonomy and rationality. Most parents 
would prefer their children to be good, as defined in terms of 
their own conception of the good life, than to be rational 
and uncommitted as between conceptions of the good. 
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opportunities for the emergence of meaning, intimacy, identity, and character - altogether 
inner qualities and not the kind of thing that can develop from abstract relationships'. 50 
The relationship within a family typically has an inner focus and an 
independent meaning which results from sharing of life and its intimacies. 
While the relationships within a family may be very complex and in some 
ways dependent upon the wider social context, responsibilities are aimed at 
making the family as such a working entity. They are not typically 
concerned with the maximization of individual welfare or the promotion of 
social interests. 51 
In general democratic states have set high threshold conditions before intervening to 
protect the dghts of individual family members, or before recognising the right of others to 
intervene. The reason being that although the liberal principles which democratic states 
promote are relevant in the family context they 'are not exhaustive of the principles 
which may legitimately bind people together and structure their relationship'. 52 So there is 
therefore a 'separation of powers' between state and parent. Although the state has 
authority to intervene in extreme situations this does not mean that the parent derives 
authority from the state. The authority of the state is regulatory, not constitutive. Conceding 
its right to intervene in extreme cases is not to acknowledge that it is the ultimate authodty 
in matters pertaining to the family. 
There is a difference between saying that the state has a right to step in 
when an urgent situation emerges and saying that the state has ultimate 
authority in the domain of child rearing, delegating some powers but 
reserving some supervisory powers for itself ... The right to intervene does 
not presuppose possession of ultimate authority. 53 
'Life-or-death' dilemmas, when 'a ýgood case is made for imminent and serious harm 
befalling the child as a result of parental discretion54illustrate that this separation of powers 
principle is not without marginal difficulties But these dilemmas should not distort our 
judgement generally: 
The fact that we think that the child's life is more important to protect than 
the choices of the parents, and possibly even the child, does not show that 
when the situation is less urgent it is still only the child's welfare that canies 
any moral weight in judging the appropriateness of any particular exercise 
of parental discretion. 55 
50 Ibid., 48. 
5' Ibid., 49. 
52 Ibid., 50. For a discussion of such principles see Meyer, Michael J., 'Rights Between 
Friends', Joumal of Philosophy, 
89,9,1992,467-483; Smith-, Tara, 'Rights, Friends and Egoism', Journal of Philosophy, 
90,3,1993,144-148. 
'53 Schoeman, 'Parental Discretion', 5011. 
54 ibid., Ea 
55 Ibid., 52. 
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The obligations of the state towards children must, therefore, rest on different foundations 
than do the obligations of parents. The state's main claim is based on the 'public interest in 
ensuring that the next generation is reared in ways that will make its members at least 
adequate citizens'. 56 This public interest principally requires 'backup' obligations of two 
kinds: to ensure that someone carries out the basic parental task and to supplement the 
efforts of the parents (or surrogate parents) by providing services. This, in turn, leads to a 
tension between the relative roles of 'experts' and parents. 
The battle lies between the champions of the 'helping' professionals, 
employed by state agencies, who trust in the advance of expertise, and 
those sceptics and libertarians who suspect that the choice and decisions of 
ordinary parents may offset ignorance of theory with involvement, 
commitment, and knowledge of the particular case. 57 
If it could be shown that there were demonstrable principles of good child rearing and an 
appropriate concomitant expertise then according to the liberal principles of best interest 
(present welfare and future autonomy) and protection of others, then parents would have no 
real discretion in the matter of rearing their children. They would have to conform in the 
application of the guidelines of the experts, and would have discretion only in matters which 
did not involve the child's best interests: for the experts would define the child's best 
interests and the most efficacious means to attain them. 
Once persuaded that there were right ways of rearing chiidren, from the 
liberal perspective there would be no excuse for not following 
recommended pattems in any field in which limitations on children's 
freedom were being legitimately imposed. 58 
Almond also remarks on the conflict between 'parents on the one hand, representing the 
perceived interests of their children, and professionals, on the other, claiming the authority 
of expertise'. 59 The child is the object of competing claims by the state, the parents and the 
professionals. Unlike the state and the professionals, however, 
56 O'Neill, 0., 'Begetting, Rearing and Bearing', 31. 
57 Ibid., 31. Not all of the'helping professionals! are ignorant of the need for'invotvement, commitment, and knowedge 
of the particular case', nor is the perception of the relative roles of parents and professionals necessarily one of conflict. 
Smith (Smith, Carole, 'Children's Rights: Have Carers Abandoned Values7, Children and Soci , 11,1997,3-15) 
argues that the ascendancy of rights over values in social work practice has dislocated the relationship between the 
client and the professional in a damaging way. The ascendancy of rights talk has emphasised the formal requirements 
of social work practice (regulating, measuring, monitoring the observable and measurable elements of performance) to 
the detriment of the social and emotional content of caring relationships. 
58 Schoeman, 'Parental Discretion', 53. Callan argues persuasively that the obligations of parents cannot by entirely 
explained by the child's interests. In addition the parents themselves have present and future interests which are 
deserving of respect. Callan, Eamonn, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1997,138-145. 
59 Almond, Brenda, 'Education and Liberty, Public Provision and Private Choice', Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
25,2,1991,193-202,196- 
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parents have always had duties laid upon them in respect of their children, 
and it is arguable that duties presuppose rights. If, ff, -- example, parents are regarded as having an obligation to care for, instruct and protect their child, their right to do these things must be simultaneously recognised. It would be inconsistent to admit the 'ought' here, whilst withdrawing the 'can' - to demand fulfilment of the duty but to deny the practical conditions necessary for fulfilment of the duty. '60 
Other child-rearing institutions - in Western democracies at least - are secondary, derivative 
institutions. Schools, for example, provide education for children where parents are unable or 
unwilling to provide this education themselves . 
61 Nonetheless many international agreements 
endorse the right of parents to direct their children's education and to give them an education 
which is consistent with the parents' own philosophical and religious convictions. 62 
Summary 
In Western European and similar cultures there is a general presumption that biological 
parents have the primary right to rear their own children. This presumption is buttressed by 
three kinds of arguments: arguments based on the blood relationship itself, arguments based 
on the interests of the child, and arguments that the biological parent is the 'least bad' choice 
as the child's carer. 
Becoming a parent creates a significant additional responsibility: the right to beget and bear 
children is contingent on the obligation to care for them. The normative interests of the 
individual parents themselves are not inconsequential, however, but they are not entirely 
sufficient. While we will e)pect parents to consider the child's 'best interests' when making 
decisions child there are other relevant considerations which they may also bear in mind, 
including their own interests. Unlike the state, -parents are not strictly 
limited by the child's best 
interests principle. Often the decisions which parents make regarding their children are 
neither in the child's best interests nor made primarily with a view to promoting the child's 
welfare. 
The State has legitimate interests in the welfare of children as future citizens. But this does 
not confer on the state the responsibility for assigning care and control of children to their 
natural parents. The presumption in favour of biological parents is simply an 
80 Ibid., 198. 
61 Cf. the Irish Constitution, Article 42: 1. 'The State acknowledges, that the primary and natural educator of the child is 
the Family and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for 
the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children. 2. Parents shall be free to provide 
this education in their homes or in private schools or in schools recognised or established by the State. ' Also the 
'Education Otherwise' movement in Britain, and private schools in U. S. Though the erosion of the doctrine of in /oco 
parends and the increasing interest of the state in education might indicate that 
there is a change in the traditional 
balance of interests. Cf. Zirkel, P. A., Reichner, H. F., 'is In Loco Parenfis Dead7, Phi Delta 
Kagpgn, February, 1987. 
"2 Almond, 'Education and Liberty, 19&4. 'Children are first educated by their parents, and so must they continue to be 
as long a-, raising children constitutes one of our most valL. rsonal 
libee. 'es. ' Gutmann, Amy, Democr: : -ducation, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1987,50. 
acknowledgement of biological, psychological, and social reality. The state has a right (or 
duty) to intervene only where biological parents are clearly not meeting their obligations. 
Separating parents and children must be a last resort, justifiable only when all efforts at 
remediation of problematic situations have been unsuccessful. 
PART 3: CHILDREN 
Chapter 7: Re-defining Child/Adult 
Every human society has a policy on the treatment of its young. Communal moral decisions 
are taken which affect those who are not themselves included in the decision making 
process; those designated 'children' comprise the major class of people so excluded. 
Children are ruled by adults and society must decide how this rule is to be exercised. All 
political theories carry implications for the treatment of the young for they must take 
decisions about future member's of the body politic) It is not so much that society must 
decide how this rule is to be exercised but that society must decide the acceptable limits to 
its exercise leaving as wide as possible a freedom of discretion within the constraints of 
specific imperatives. Every society embodies certain chiid-rearing practices: it is the limits 
of these which must be defined. A presumption of all such policies is that we know how 
children differ from adults in ways that are relevant to their differential treatment. 
Used to denote a biological or social relationship between one individual and others 
(parents or parent substitutes) that is, as a descriptive term, the words 'child', 'children' are 
unproblematic so long as it is understood that they denote an empirical relationship. In this 
sense it is both conceptually and contingently true that every human being ('rnan who is 
born of woman') is a child since everyone is biologically related in a parent/child 
relationship to a unique pair of other human beings. But 'child' in opposition to 'parent' also 
carries a normative significance. We expect that the designations in such cases imply 
understandings regarding the quality of the relationship, understandings of mutual 
obligations, etc. 
Writers on children's rights, both protectionists and liberationists, use the word 'child' in the 
expectation that we will know what it means. This is so even to the point that many of them 
use the word ambiguously, failing to distinguish between 'child' meaning a young human 
being under the age of 18 (for the upper limit of which a Gert ain range of adult rights may 
be claimed) and 'child' meaning 'infant' (i. e. younger than 7 years old) or 'child' meaning 
'pre-pubescent'or'pre-adolescent', or 'child' meaning 'adolescent-beco ming- adult'. 
Children are not adults. This is not a proposition which requires evidence. It is an 
fundamental feature of human experience. There is a school of thought which holds that 
childhood is a relatively recent 'invention' historically and that childhood 
itself is a socially 
1 Hayclon, G., 'Political Theory and the Child: Problems of the Individualist 
Tradition', Political Studies, 27,3,1979,405- 
420,409. 
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constructed phenomenon. 2 This is the Aries' interpretation which is disputed. 3 Franklin, 
however, for example, seems to take the Ari6s thesis as proven: alternative explanations, 
for example that Ari6s' conclusions about changing views of childhood could be displaced, 
on the same evidence, by changing styles of iconography and conventions of 
representation, are not considered. Repeating Ades' thesis on the role of the rise of 
schooling and the disappearance of childhood4 Franklin concludes that schools Were 
established and middle-class males became the first to undergo a long and segregated 
training for adult life; they became the first children. 5 Could we not equally conclude that 
they became the first industrialised adults? The language used, 'training for adulthood', 
appears to contradict the assertion that they became the first children. More correctly they 
were the first children to be systematically trained for adulthood. Arguably it was not 
childhood which was invented by the industrial and educational revolution but a particular 
conception of adulthood. After all, up until then, we are told that adults and children shared 
the same games, stories and pastimes: subsequently these activities became the exclusive 
domain of children. In this respect at least it was the adults who changed (became more 
sophisticated perhaps, more focused in relation to labour options, were educated out of 
childhood) not the children. 
What is socially constructed is the way we treat children, the way we organise relations 
between them and adults. If the Ari6s thesis is true and if childhood is indeed simply a 
socially constructed distinction why is it that rites de passage marking the transition from 
the powerlessness of childhood to the privileges and prerogatives of adulthood appear 
almost universal in primitive communities? The passage from one state to another marked 
by rituals of knowledge, endurance, and competence is a recognition of difference, not the 
creation of it. 6 These rites may reinforce the differences and this may in fact be their 
purpose, but they are based on an apparent universal human recognition that there is a 
difference and that children require an extended period of preparation before they can 
assume their place in adult society. 
2 Ari6s, Philippe, Centuries of Childhood, Penguin Books, 1986. On concepdons of childhood, see Archard, D., 
Children: Rights and Childhood, London: Routledge, 1993,21-28, and chapter 3. 
3 Pollock, L. A., The Forgotten Children: Parent Child Relabons from 1500 - 1900, Cambridge University Press, 1903; 
Freeman, M. D. A., The Rights and the Wrongs of Children, Frances Pinter, 1983; Wilson, A., 'The Infancy of the History 
of Childhood, History and Theofy I, 1980,132-53; Vann, R., 'The Youth of Centuries of Childhood, Hj9M and 
Th , 21,1962,279-97. 4 This thesis was popularised by John Holt in Escap@ from Childhood: the Needs and Ri- hts of Children Penguin 
Books, 1975. 
5 Franklin, B., ed., The Rights of Children, London, Basil Blackwell, 1986,11. 
6 The annual phenomenon of terminal secondary school examinations is in many respects a similar practice. 
Those 
concerned are required to show that they have accumulated the requisite 
knowledge, skills, endurance, and self- 
discipline to qualify for membership of the adult community in an active, productive capacity. 
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It has been claimed that childhood is not a universal experience, that it is subject to wide 
variations of time, place and culture, 7 and that there is wide variation in the social and 
cultural structuring of childhood, that is, in the ways in which adults relate to children 
individually and collectively. Further, the division between child and adult is incoherent in 
that the age of transition changes with different purposes threatening 'arbitrary and 
inconsistent relativism'. 8 This incoherence is attributable to the fact that within the age 
range of 'childhood' as distinct from 'adulthood' there is wide discrepancy in terms of 
development and maturation. Crucially, the term 'child' is often interpreted as denoting not 
a chronological, or even developmental, stage at all but a condition of powerlessness. 9 
Yet there is no 'wholly satisfactory generic term' for those who have not attained the status 
of adulthood: 10 there is no straightforward, universally agreed answer to the question 'What 
is a child? ' in terms of role, age, or general characteristics. 'In a society at any one time, no 
general definition of childhood exists'. 11 This is because of the perennial difficulty of 
defining an unexceptionable and consistent demarcation between children and adults. For 
'child', 'childhood' are not free-standing concepts like 'fish' or 'tree. It is only in contrast to 
adulthood that the concept of childhood is meaningful. Even if we distinguish between the 
infant, the child, the juvenile, and the adUlt12 the likelihood that we Gan successfully forge a 
universally acceptable definition is no greater. In relation to the juvenile Campbell, for 
example, writes: 
The characteristic aspect of this stage is a largely adult physical 
development and significant capacities for autonomous choice and conduct 
guided by the juvenile's own perceptions of the social world and her own 
scheme of values and beliefs. 13 
Given this we might well ask just what is the difference between the adult and the juvenile, 
just as we might ask, at any point, what the definitive difference is between an individual at 
7 Franklin, The Rights of Children, 7-9. See also See Purdy, Laura M., In Their Best Interests?: The Case Against 
Egual Rights for Children, London, Cornell University Press, 1992,197-210, for a brief survey of such differences. 
8 Franklin, B., 'The Case for Children's Rights: a Progress Reporr, in The Handbook of Children's Rights: Compgrative 
Poligy And Practice, B. Franklin, ed., Routledge, 1995,8. 
9 See Reed, T. M., Johnston, P., 'Children's Liberation', Philoso2h , 55,1980, p. 
263-6. Kim (Kim, Kj Su, 'Miirs Concept 
of Maturity as the Criterion in Determining Children's Eligibility for Rights', Journal of 
Philosophy of Education, 24,2, 
1990,235-244) concludes that 'in both Mill and Bentham the term "maturity", regardless of 
its equivocal nature, was 
nothing more than a landmark dividing the territories of power and powerlessnessý, 
242. 
10 Haydon, 'Political Theory and the Child'. 1979,408. 
11 Jordanova, Ludmilla, 'Children in History: Concepts of Nature and Society, in Scarre, 
Geoffrey, ed., Children. 
Pareatj and Politics, Cambridge: UP, 1989,10. 
12 Campbell, T. D., 'The Rights of the Minor as Person, as Child, as Juvenile, as Future 
Adulr, Alston, P., Parker S., 
Seymore J., eds., Children. Rights and the , Oxford 
University Press, 1992. It has also been suggested that we 
could replace the portmanteau term 'childhood' by replacing 
it with infancy and adolescence to denote the experience of 
human life up to adulthood. See William Ruddick, When 
Does Childhood Begin7 in Scarre, Children. Parents and 
Politics, 31-34. 
13 Campbell, 'The Rights of the Minor, 19. 
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any given age and an individual one or two years older or younger. Developmental 
psychology, as well as telling us that human development moves through certain fixed 
stages, has also established that our intuition that individuals move through these stages at 
idiosyncratic rates of development is true (a child is described as 'precocious% or as a 'late 
developer'). Over a wide range of capacities individuals of comparable chronological age 
differ significantly in the development of these capacities. Thus, while we continue to 
implement age-specific arrangements in our schools and other social institutions, we also 
recognise that the range of developmental progress among children of the same 
chronological age can vary enormously. 
Popper warns against the lure of essentialism in relation to definitions. 14 It is tempting to 
simply adopt a particular definition of 'child' or 'childhood' and to assert that it is the true or 
real definition. But 'child' or 'childhood' is not like a term in, say, physical science which, 
given agreement on the utility of a particular definition has acquired universal 
acceptance. 15 in any case, childhood is only partially a socially constructed phenomenon. 
Childhood is also an existential experience influenced but not fully determined by social 
practices. It is experienced and lived from within as well as formed and perceived from 
without. Any definition we give is likely to be 'programmatic' or 'Stipulative'16 but it is also 
likely to be contested and equally plausible alternatives suggested. It is only by looking at 
the way in which children manifest themselves in a particular social and cultural milieu that 
we can arrive at an understanding of childhood. But such an understanding will be in many 
ways parochial, in geographical and cultural as well as in historical terms. 
Rather than searching for an a priori, essentialist definition of 'child' or 'childhood' we must 
try to identify the characteristics in respect of which differences between adults and children 
are described at a particular time. Such differences are usually couched in negative terms: 
what the generality of children lack when compared with some (idealised) view of 
adulthood. At best such definitions define non-adult. The essential and fundamental 
weaknesses of children have been identified as their not having political rights, economic 
independence, or autonomous legal status; as being subject to arbitrary authority and 
7 
limitations on their personal liberty; as being subject to constant control and surveillance. 1 
Yet we must ask whether it is because they are children that these absences and 
restrictions exist or because they lack the necessary powers and capacities to make these 
absences and restrictions necessary that their treatment in a certain way (paternalistic) is 
justified? Clearly some of these characteristics are not natural characteristics of children: 
14 Popper, K, Unen j@d Quest: An Intellectual Autobi2graphy, Fontana Books, 1976,18-31. 
15 Terms such as 'mass', 'acceleration', etc. 
16 Scheffler, I., The Language of Education, Charles C. Thomas, 1974. 
17 Franklin, The Rights of Children, 314. 
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they are the consequences of adults' perceptions of children as incapable of exercising 
certain capacities. 18 Political rights, for example, are withheld from children because of this 
kind of perception. On the other hand these characteristics of childhood can be seen as a 
consequence of children's weakness because the children lack the power - which other 
oppressed groups do not - to challenge these deprivations for themselves. In either case 
they are the symptoms of the weakness, not the weakness itself. But the continuing use of 
'children' as a portmanteau term cloaks the reality of a wide variety of capacity among 
those to whom the term is applied, those under the age of 18. 
The central question must be whether children's subordination to adults is contrived by 
keeping them in an unnecessary servility, and in the ignorance necessary to sustain this 
servility, or whether children's subordination to adults is a necessary prerequisite to their 
eventually becoming autonomous individuals themselves. The second option does not 
preclude some oppression of children by individual adults, institutions, or social practices 
whereas the first does not appear to allow for even a 'best case' exception in present 
practices. 
Institutionalised and Normative Conceptions of Childhood 
We can distinguish institutionalised and normative conceptions of childhood. 19 The former 
classifies the person according to some 'customary or legal-like criterion. The latter 
recognises that there is also a normative contrast between the behaviour of children and 
the behaviour of adults. The institutionalised conception appears to be parasitic on the 
normative which has logical priority. The point of the institutional ised conception is to give 
explicit expression (and institutional status) to what are already perceived as significant 
normative differences between adults and children. 
(T)here is good reason to think that a normative concept has priority over 
its related institutionalized concept. There would be no justifiable point to 
the institutionalized contrast were there not thought to be differences of 
some normative significance. 20 
18 The accuracy of these perceptions need not be the issue here; whether they are accurate or not they influence the 
behaviour of adults in relation to children. 
19 Kleinig, J., 'Mill, Children and Rights, Educational Philosophy and ]Lh@M, 8,1,1976,1-16 deals with Mill's 
exclusion of children from his doctrine of non-interference with the self-regarding action of others (the principle of 
liberty 
from interference). This leads to the crucial question What has being a child got to do with the qualification for the right 
to liberty from interference7 Kleinig uses the word 'concepr where 'conception' would be more correct. See Archard 
Children: Riahts and Childh--j 21-28. 
20 lQeinig, J., 'Mill, Children and Rights', 3. 
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Failure to distinguish between the normative and the institutionalized can lead to 
confusion. 21 There is at best a causal connection (from the former to the latter) between 
them. Two possible deleterious consequences follow on this kind of confusion. 
Firstly, some who would qualify morally (i. e. who are nonnatively the equal of adufts) will 
not qualify institutionally (because they are too young - the reality for all those under the 
age of 18 and defined as 'children) and some who would qualify institutionally (they are 
adult by the institutional criterion, e. g. chronological age) will not qualify morally because 
they are not normatively the equal of (other) adults. 22 
Secondly, the institutional isation of the concept of childhood may 'function to extend the 
period of childhood in the normative sense'. 23 The dependent status of children is 
problematic since its relationship to the definition of 'child' is circular. One is a child as long 
as one has dependent status; as long as one has this dependent status, one is (or can be 
treated like) a child. This is a chicken and egg situation: giving institutional expression to 
perceived normative differences is to endorse the latter. This, in turn, reinforces such 
perceptions of normative difference and our responses to them. 24 The period of 
dependence can be extended beyond what is necessary by subjecting a capable individual 
(or an individual-becoming-capable) or an entire category of such individuals, to the 
restrictions of the institutional definition thus depriving them of (or at least delaying) the 
opportunities to develop the capacities picked out by the institutional differences. Our 
perceptions of such distinctions are formed in large part by the institutional practices with 
which we grow up. 
Normative definitions of childhood have become the province of developmental 
psychology. Various developmental definitions invoke a wide range of criteria and 
characterise childhood in terms of the possession of certain interests or needs, certain 
biological characteristics, certain stages of development of various capacities and abilities. 
These accounts provide little guidance to moralists, however, for the multiple criteria 
involved rarely hang together in an integrated way. 25 Possession or non-possession of a 
21 Mill treats a normative definition, those not 'in the maturity of their faculties', and the institutionalised definition, those 
'below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood', as if they were identical, or at least 
interchangeable. 
22 This is the reality for adults who are mentally retarded. See Wilder, Daniel, 'Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded', in 
Rolf Sartorious, ed., Paternalism, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1983,95-104. 
23 lQeinig, J., 'Mill, Children and Rights', 4. See also Baumrind, Diana, 'Reciprocal Rights and Responsibilities in 
Parent/Child Relatione, Joymal of Social Issues, 34,2,1978,179-196,189. 
24 '... it could be denied that children's immaturity is an inevitable feature of human development, and argued that 
it is 
instead a consequence of their oppressed state: the freedom denied them causes their inadequacies rather than 
the 
reverse'. Purdy, _In 
Their Best Interests, 198. Purdy recognises, however, that this is an empirical claim and that 'nothing 
short of full-scale experimental trials would definitively prove it true or false'. 
25 Kjeinig, J., 'Mill, Children and Rights', 5. Yet Erikson (see below), for example, provides an account of human 
development which is integrated, coherent, and morally significant. 
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particular capacity or characteristic is not sufficient to determine whether that person is or is 
not a child, even though the characteristic figures in the prevailing conception of childhood. 
For, whatever their differences, contemporary psychological theories are agreed that 
human development is both gradual and continuous. 26 Yet the absence of a clear and 
distinct point of demarcation between one stage of development and the succeeding stage 
does not mean that a distinction should not be drawn between adults and children. Relevant 
perceptible differences are frequently socially determined (adults have independent status 
and children do not), but this is to beg the question. Why should adults have independent 
status and children not? Two main criteria for the distinction have been mooted: 
chronological age and competence. 27 
Chronological age 
The state of being a child is temporary: the transition to adulthood is marked by a 
succession of developmental shifts. 28 These shifts describe quafitative changes in the 
process of human being. Even a full account of such qualitative shifts leaves the problem 
of deciding when the transition from childhood to adulthood occurs. For the term 'childhood' 
is not a purely descriptive term. It also prescribes the differential treatment of two 
categories of humans: those we designate, as a result of this (moral or linguistic) 
legislation, 'children' and those we designate 'adults'. 
Holt's proposal, for example, that 'the rights, privileges, duties, responsibilities of adult 
citizens be made available to any young person, of whatever age, who wants to make use 
of them'29 appears to entail the virtual abolition of childhood insofar as that institution 
embodies a difference between younger and older human beings. He advocates the 
removal of all barriers that 'deny to young people the possibility of serious, independent, 
responsible participation in the life of the world around them'. 30 These barriers constitute 
the oppression of young people and as such are unjUSt. 31 Yet Holt is not advocating adult- 
26 'Report of the Working Group on Determining the Child's Capacity to Make Decisions', Fordham Law Review , 64, 
1996,1339-1345 argued for a presumption of capacity. 'The ability of the child to express a preference constitutes a 
threshold requirement for determining capacity. Once that threshold is passed, the child is presumed to have capacity. ' 
The Working Group rejected age as a sole determining factor fa poor proxy for maturity or developmental age') since 
age alone did not take individual factors into account. Age is one factor and provides an orientation point: '... the lack of 
any age cut-off would lead to the ridiculous result of considering a one-month old child to have capacity. 1340. 
27 These are, respectively, examples of institutionalized and normative criteria. 
28 Descriptions of such shift can be found in the literature of human development. See Miller, Patricia, H., Theories o 
Develol2mental Psycholggy New York, W. H. Freeman and Co., 1993, for a representative selection of developmental 
theories. For the variety of conflicting views among developmental psychologists see Purdy, In Their Best Interest 
201-206. 
29 Holt, Escap@ from Childhood, 15. 
30 Ibid., 17. 
31 He tells us later (Ibid., 22), however, that he discarded the idea of using the term 'liberation' in his title. One cannot 
use the word oppression' and disown the word 'liberation' as its antithesis. 
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child equality. For his proposal is that children may adopt the adult rights optionally whereas 
adults must assume them as obligation and responsibility. This is an example of the way in 
which 'child liberationists' hedge their bets. Although their rhetoric is radical their substance 
falls short of the rhetorical spirit by leaving 'escape clauses' (as Holt does here) or by 
playing on the vagueness and ambiguity of terminology (such aschildren). 
There are in fact two problems associated with chronological age: one concerns the 
definition of the beginning of childhood, the second the definition of its end: the transition 
from childhood to adulthood. The difficulties associated with the fir'st, whether to define the 
start of human life from conception, quickening, birth, or early infancy need not detain us. 32 
It is sufficient for present purposes to confine our interest to the bom child. 
The UN Convention defines a child as anyone under the age of eighteen. 33 That this is a 
purely conventional, institutionalized definition is manifest. It is also a programmatic 
definition: insofar as we accept it as authoritative it affects how we will perceive certain 
categories of people. 34 It is not helpful to use the word 'child' to refer to all persons under 
the age of 18 (or any other age). Such classification obscures significant differences (in 
terms of knowledge, skills, maturity, rationality, responsibility, in fact any criterion one cares 
to mention) among children of different ages. It also obscures similarities between some 
children and adults in respect of the same criteria. 35 
The 'age of majority' is the conventional demarcation between adulthood and childhood. As 
a critedon it has the virtue of impartiality: it provides a yardstick which is empirical, 
detached, and objective. However since the development to human maturity is gradual and 
32 See Ruddick, When Does Childhood Begin7 for a discussion of the possible starting points and Tooley, M., 
'Abortion and Infanticide', in Singer, P., ed., Applied Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1986 for an argument that infants 
are not human persons at all. John Harris (The Political Status of Children', in K Graham, ed., Contempora! y Political 
Philosol2hy: Radical Studies, Cambridge University Press, 1982) argues that children should be deemed to have 
become persons when they have become 'reasonably competent language users!. (55) 
33 Significantly the substantive articles of the LIN Convention avoid the issue of defining the beginning of childhood (i. e. 
when the rights will apply) in favour of a definition in terms of the end of childhood. Article 1 states 'For the purposes of 
the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to 
the child, majority is attained earlier. ' However, in the non-binding Preamble the earlier Declaration of the Rights of the 
ýýhild is quoted: Ihe child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, 
including appropriate legal protection, before as we# as after birtff (emphasis added). It is notable too that the provisions 
of the Convention which apply to children are subject to limitation by legislation of the jurisdiction in which the child lives. 
By defining the age of majority at an earlier age any state can remove significant numbers of As children from the 
protection of the Convention. Insofar as the Convention is intended to protect children against the abuse or neglect of 
the state among others it is odd that it begins by offering the state a limited way out. 
34 In Article 38.3 for example the Convention allows for the recruitment of those over fifteen into armed forces. This 
tragically points up one facet of the moral problem of the definition of childhood: for we must conclude that either it is 
acceptable to train children to kill or, in some circumstances, childhood ends at fifteen. The former is, indeed, a grim 
equality with adults. 
35 Houlgate, L. D., 'Children, Paternalism and Rights to Liberty, in O'Neill, 0., Ruddick, W., eds., Having Children: 
PhilosoRhical and Lggal Reflections on Parenthood, New York: OUP, 1979,267. 
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idiosyncratic: some who are younger than 18 are more mature - on a wide range of criteria - 
than some older, and in some cases very much older, than 18. Imposing a distinction based 
on chronological age appears to violate the basic principle of justice that we should treat 
equals equally and unequals unequally. 
We are morally required to treat like cases alike and different cases differently. The only 
moral justification for treating human beings differently is that they are seen to differ in 
some morally relevant and non-trivial respect. 36 Is chronological age a morally relevant 
difference, on this view? What makes a difference morally relevant is that it bears on the 
goodness or badness of people's lives. Gender or race, for example, are not morally 
relevant since they have nothing to do with how good or bad a person's life is. On the other 
hand (natural) abilities and : needs are morally relevant. 37 It is not age which is of primary 
importance; it is the capacity for choice and responsibility although there is a widespread 
belief that a person's age correlates with these capacities (a normative criterion justifying 
an institutionalised practice). However, it is alleged that there is no empirical basis for 
drawing a chronological line and asserting that only those under the specified age 'ought to 
be paternalistically restricted from engaging in certain activities'. Consequently those 'Who 
have set the age of majority at eighteen years have no such basis either'. 38 This is crucial 
for it challenges those who set the age of majority to justify, from a normative basis, why 
this particular age has been selected. A search for an exceptionless principle of 
differentiation between adults and children may be ultimately fruitless. There are few 
situations in life in which we can draw unequivocal and exceptionless distinctions between 
categories. We are always challenged to decide whether our exceptions are so significant 
that they undermine the distinction. 
Competence 
The second criterion of differentiation between adults and children is competence. The 
competence criterion continues the tradition of Mills' insistence on 'maturity of faculties' or 
Locke's rationality as the discriminatory criterion. The competence criterion offers the hope 
that once individuals reach a certain level of competence (however it is defined) they can 
immediately join the ranks of adults and come into possession of full political and legal, as 
well as moral, rights. Since a stringent competence criterion would be based on the 
performance or capability of individuals it would avoid the problem of a universal 
discrimination on grounds of age. It would also be congruent with what we know of 
36 Ibid., 273. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 274. 
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human development in that it could take account of varying rates of individual development 
in relation to whatever competence criterion might be selected. 
Competence as a criterion is not without difficulties, however. A perfect competence testing 
system is unlikely: human action is complex and subject to many indeterminacies. 
Competence also raises fundamental political questions: what will be tested? who will 
perform the tests? who will choose what tests to use? how can impartiality be assured? will 
those responsible for developing the test (and consequently for determining exactly what is 
to be tested) not be at least the nucleus of an elite? 
A competence criterion should pick out only those features which are relevant to right- 
ascription: what are the competencies one must possess, or the conditions which one must 
satisfy, if one is to possess rights? Mill requires (for the ascription of the right to liberty from 
interference) maturity of faculties, for example. This criterion is so general and vague as to 
be of little value for it neither specifies the faculties or defines 'maturity'. Mill also stipulates 
that the individual should not require to be taken care of by other's. This, of course, raises 
questions regarding the status of adults (as defined by chronological age) who because of 
infirmity or disability, are unable to care for themselves or whose ability to care for 
themselves is limited. Who is in any absolute sense able to take care of him or her self? 
Kleinig finds Mill's requirement that the individual be capable of being improved by free and 
equal discussion more promising. 39 
Margulies requires that competence in the case of a child should manifest itself in the 
ability to 'explain the reasoning behind a decision'. 40 This is a requirement that the child be 
able to arficuiate a rationally arrived at choice. But we know more than we can tel141 and 
this is especially true of children. It is possible for the child to have good reasons without 
necessarily being able to articulate them. There is also the question of what constitutes a 
good reason. 'I don't like the nurse' is excluded although it may be a legitimate expression 
of a sincerely felt emotional unease. It is precisely the child's expression of such emotional 
unease which is at the core of many child empowerment projects. Margulies may be correct 
that to take the Whimsical or capricious reasoning of the child' betrays the adult the child 
will become, but not to take it may well betray the child the child already is. 
The main difficulty here is that adulthood, as presently defined, and qualification for the 
right to liberty are not necessarily congruent. The passage from childhood to adulthood is 
39 Keinig, 'Mill, 'Children and Rights, 6.1 do not think that what Mill actually said in this matter refers to individuals. 
He 
was talking about states. (Mill, On Libe , 73) 
In any event I-Geinig rightly casts doubt on the validity of this as a device 
for discriminating between children and adults. 
40 Margulies, Peter, 'The Lawyer as Caregiver, Child Clients Competence in Context, Fordharn Law Revi , 64,1996 
(A report on the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of 
Children, 1995), 1473-1504,1487. 
41 Polanyi, M., The Tacit Dimension, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967. 
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not like 'crossing the border from one country into another - unless we adopt some 
institutionalized criterion of childhood'42 which, as we have seen, will anyway ultimately 
depend on a (more or less) arbitrary normative criterion. The process, as has been noted 
already, is developmental, gradual, and variable. 
A possible compromise is to accord children 'the right to liberty from interference 
commensurate with the development of their capacities. 43 Kleinig's proposal appears to opt 
for a presumption of capacity subject to some form of competence test. We must choose 
whether the onus will be to prove capacity or to prove incapacity in individual cases. In 
either case there will have to be a test of competence and this, of course, will be subject to 
all of the limitations already mentioned. 
Mhe onus ought always to be on those who wish to interfere with, another 
to justify their interference in the particular case. 44 ... However, the effect of institutionalization (because of the need for practicability) is to remove 
this onus when dealing with members of an institutionally defined category 
of persons - children. I see no easy way out of this dilemma. 45 
Kleinig retreats from the moral position for pragmatic reasons. The dilemma is that we must 
choose, on the one hand, between a universal criterion, 'an institutionally defined category , 
which allows of straightforward administrative application but which will be unfair in the 
event to many individuals, and a criterion of individualized competence, which would be 
difficult if not impossible to implement, on the other. A number of comments are necessary. 
In the first place it is strange for a moral philosopher to build a case and then concede it on 
grounds of practicability. As was noted earlier46 if a course of action is morally necessary 
then we do not have the moral luxury of conceding it because its implementation will be 
difficult. Secondly, Kleinig's dilemma may be resolvable by a re-consideration of the social 
difference between competence and age as determinants of the way in which children will 
be treated. 
There are two facets to the problem. Firstly, in the case of the child in the intimate 
community of the family, or school classroom, making distinctions on the basis of individual 
competence is entirely feasible and can be consistent with fairness to all. Secondly, what 
we call childhood is significantly different at different stages: the two-year-old and the 
sixteen-year-old are not the same, nor are they subject to the same considerations. The 
two-year-old is virtually exclusively subject to the authority of her parents. The wider 
42 lqeinig, 'Mill, Children and rights', 7. 
43 Ibid., 
44 In other words it is presumed that there is no general right of interference with the liberty of anyone, children 
included. 
45 1(leinig, 'Mill, children and rights', 7. 
46 Chapter 3. 
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community and the state have a role only in ensuring that the parent does not neglect the 
child or exceed the limits which parental authority confers. In general, society is content to 
leave the parent/child relationship undisturbed by outside interference. The teenager, on 
the other hand, has begun the process of moving out into the wider community beyond the 
immediate authority of the parent. This does not mean that they are entirely free of parental 
control but as they grow older the authority claims of the parents are contested by other, 
non-familial associations, notably the peer group. Adolescents are becoming subject to the 
requirements and standards of the wider community and to the minimal standards of 
competence and behaviour which the wider community imposes on all of its members. 
The two aspects of the problem correspond to the age/competence dichotomy. In the 
micro-community of the younger child (the family or classroom) the competence criterion 
can predominate for in the intimacy which this context allows the capacities of the 
individual child are known (they should be known) and the caring adult who contrives 
opportunities for the child to exercise her growing competence is on hand to ensure that in 
doing so she comes to no harm. At the other end of the developmental span the 
individual 'child' (adolescent) is expected to function in the macro-community. This macro- 
community differs in two important respects from the micro-community of the family. In the 
first place the individual is not 'known' in the same way to other members of the 
community, there is no-one in particular who is, as it were, 'looking out' for her, there is no 
intimacy. There is no-one whose particular task or role it is to ensure that, as she develops 
her competence in this wider arena, she comes to no harm. The second difference is that 
this wider community is not deliberately contrived (as is a good home, or playgroup, say) to 
facilitate her experimentation with her growing competence and evolving identity. On the 
contrary, this is the world of the adult, the 'real' world in the sense that it can be gratuitously 
dangerous, impersonal, ruthless, unfeeling, and unconcerned. They only way here of 
providing the necessary protection for the individual adolescent-becoming-adult is the 
imposition of universal rules of constraint prohibiting certain activities (drinking, driving, 
marrying) and severely limiting others. There will also be positive requirements (attendance 
at school, college, place of work or vocational training). These rules are not intended to 
oppress (although, as we will see, it is a feature of this a, ge-group that the imminence of full 
membership of the adult community - and the concomitant delay - is perceived as 
oppressive) but to protect. This is communal paternalism displacing the parentalism of the 
family. 
School is the transitional experience between the home and the wider community, between 
the open, personalised criterion of competence and the closed, impersonal criterion of 
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age. 47 Although at all stages of schooling children are subject to age-specific systems of 
organisation and certain impersonal regulatory rules (attendance, punctuality, social 
behaviour) the experience of contemporary schooling (or at least its theory) reflects the 
transition from an individualized competence standard (progressive or child-centred 
education) in the early years to the more impersonal and institutionally based requirements 
of exam ination-oriented standards. The latter is, of course, a test of various kinds of 
competence but it is imposed in a detached, impersonal manner. Senior school pupils are 
not evaluated on the basis of their personal accomplishments but against publicly 
determined norms of performance. 
I would like to sketch an account of human growth which redresses some of the deficiencies 
of the conventional (liberal/utilitadan) picture and which may buttress the competence/age 
distinction which I have sketched. The sources of this brief picture will be the contextualist 
account of development suggested by the work of Mead48, Vygotsky49 and other 
Icontextualist' psychologists5O and especially the psycho-social developmental stages of 
Erik Erikson5l. 
The contextualist view 
Children are bom into human communities. Their attitudes, beliefs, perceptions of reality, 
even their cognitive styles, are formed to a greater or lesser degree by the community into 
which they are bom. There is no universal ideal endpoint to human development: the ideal 
is a function of the beliefs and practices of the particular culture. Human nature can be 
understood only in such a cultural context. Human beings are not independent entities that 
engage their environment at their discretion: they are part of it -a person-in-context. A child 
is an active, inherently social organism in a broad system of interacting forces in the past, 
477hough surrounded by images of childhood, the intimacy of family life is drawn into touch and sound and movement 
in the shared spaces of our homes, and the image must compete with these other more compelling and immediate 
expressions of the child's presence. Schools, on the other hand, requiring order and stillness, replacing touch with the 
exchange of performance for grades, are dominated by the images of adulthood and childhood and organise their 
curricula that mark the developmental space between them. ' Grumet, Madeline, R., 'The Lie of the Child Redeemer', 
Journal of Education, 168,3,1986, 
48 Mead, George Herbert, Mind. Self. and Society, Charles W. Morris, ed., University of Chicago Press, 1962; also 
Aboulafia, Mitchell, 'Mead and the Social Self, in Burch and Saatkamp, eds., Frontiers in American Philosophy, (Texas 
A&M University Studies in American Philosophy, No. 1), 1993. 
49 An Introduction to NNqotsky, Harry Daniels, ed., London, Routledge, 1996, esp. Daniels, Harry, 'Introduction: 
Psychology in a Social World', 1-27, and Minick, Norris, 'The Development of Vygotskys Thought: an Introduction to 
Thinking and SpMh, 28-52. 
50 Miller, Theories of Develol2mental PWhol 
51 Erikson, Erik, Childhood and Socift, Vintage Books, 1995; Identft and the Life Cygle, London, W. W. Norton and 
Co., 1980. 
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present, and future. A child's actions occur in the context of others' actions and pre-existing 
social and cultural structures-52 
Higher mental functioning has its origins in social life. 53 Children's thinking, their 'self, is 
shaped by their interactions with others in social settings54 (which are shaped by the culture 
and social structures of the community in question) using 'psychological tools', such as 
language, 55 which are also pre-determined by the specific cultural community. Knowledge 
and skill is socially shared by the adult community with the children, gradually and in 
congruence with the child's capacity to benefit from the sharing, in order to advance the 
latter's cognitive and social development. 
The person and the environment (natural and human) are not two distinct entities that 
interact. 56 On the contrary 'a single unit or process exists, in that certain forms of social 
practice relate the child and her needs and goals to the environment and define what the 
environment means to the child'. 57 According to this 'contextualist' view the proper unit of 
study for psychology is not the child in the environment as two separate entities over 
against one another but 'the child-in-activity-in-context. The human and natural 
environment are not just 'influences' on the growing child; together they define children and 
their activities. The context can range from the microsystem of immediate face-to-face 
interaction such as the family, the school, or the peer group to the macrosystem which 
includes the general cultural blueprint which determines the possible activities, shared 
beliefs, symbols, values, knowledge, skills, structured relationships, etc. which pertain at 
the lower, microsysternic levels and which differentiate one cultural group from another. 
52 Miller, Theories of Develol2mental PMLcholggy, 407. Psychological processes 'have their source not in biological 
structures or thelearning of the isolated individual but in historically developed socio-cultural experience'. Minick, 'The 
Development of Vygotskys Thought, 31. 
53 Such as voluntary attention, voluntary memory, and rational, volitional, goal-directed thought. Minick, 'The 
Development of Vygotskys Thought, 32. 
54 Mead, Mind . Self. and Society, Part 3. The self 'is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social 
experience and acWity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and 
to other individuals within that process'. 135. 
55 Psychological tools are tools that are 'directed towards the mastery or control of behavioural processes - either 
someone else's or one's own - just as technical means are directed towards the control of nature'. Vygotsky, cited 
Minick, 'The Development of Vygotskys Thoughr, 32. See also Tappan, M. B., 'Narrative, Language, and Moral 
Experience', Journal of Moral Education, 20,3,1991,243-256. Following Vygotsky and others, Tappan argues that 
language functions as a tool to structure our thinidng, feeling, and acting. 
56'Vygotsky went in search of a philosophical base which moved the debate away from Cartesian dualism into some 
form of monistic account. Daniels, 'Introduction: Psychology in a Social World', 19. We have recognised in words that 
we need to study the child's personality and environment as a unity. It is incorrect, however, to represent this problem in 
such a way that on one side we have the influence of personality while on the other we have the influence of the 
environment. Though the problem is frequently represented in precisely this way, it is incorrect to represent the two as 
external forces acting on one another. In the attempt to study the unity, the two are initia4 torn apart. ' Vygotsky, cited 
Minick, 'The Development of Vygotskys Thoughr, 47. 
ftmental Psyghol 57 Miller, Theories of Deve 375. 
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All human communities demonstrate the ability to construct, and operate in, a culturally 
organised environment: this ability is a universal, species-specific characteristic of humans 
but it is the specifics of the culture which differentiate human communities and societies. 
The culture determines and structures the child's everyday experiences. More 'distant' 
levels of the context, such as generally held cultural beliefs about what kinds of skills 
children should acquire, (tracking and hunting rather than reading and writing) reach a child 
through immediate social relationships in which she engages in activities with a parent, 
sibling, or peer who demonstrates the relevant practice and encourages the learning of the 
relevant skills. 58 
The role of the adult (or, in some cases, peer or sibling) is to bring the child from her 
present level of competence to a level of competence slightly beyond that: this is 
Vygotsky's'zone of proximal development', the distance between what a child can do with 
and without help. 59 The parent, or more competent peer, builds bridges between the child's 
present abilities and new skills which she is required to possess in order to play her full role 
in the community. This is done most frequently not by overt instruction but by an interactive 
process of 'scaffolding' whereby the child's efforts are reinforced, encouraged and directed 
by comments, questions, demonstrations, and so forth. The central regulatory concept here 
is competence rather than chronological age. Children learn the skills which their culture 
values largely by observing other's and responding to informal instruction. Adults provide 
supportive contexts which enable children to perfect the skills which are needed to survive 
or succeed in that culture. Children learn from skilled others by observing every-day 
activities in their natural setting and by having the adult (or peer, or sibling) provide verbal 
and practical commentary on what is going on. The zone of proximal development Gan 
refer to any situation in which some activity is leading children beyond their current level of 
functioning - even in play (or, perhaps in the case of younger children, especially in play). 
60 
The path of development available to the child is not totally open, options are not unlimited: 
they are constrained by whatever patterns of behaviour are sanctioned by the specific 
culture. Each culture excludes a range of possible situations, experiences, and 
engagements which are not then available to the growing child: parents and other child 
carers permit (can permit) only certain kinds of actions and encourage only certain kinds of 
behaviour. Only selected human behaviours and physical objects and particular sanctioned 
ways of interacting with them are available at a given time or in a given culture. 
61 The 
contextualist view stresses a dynamic rather than a static or passive picture of the child's 
58 Ibid., 379. 
59 Daniels, 'Introduction: Psychology in a Social World, 4. 
60 See Minick, 'The Development of Vygotskys Thought, 43. 
61 See Langford's account of what he calls the 'Gombrich' view in Langford, 
G., Education. Persons, and Socift: a 
PhilgMhiol Engui[y, London, Macmillan, 1985,7-32. 
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development. At any given time the process of development is itself more important than 
actual developmental achievement. 62 The metaphor of apprenticeship captures the notion 
of children's active participation in real-life settings (be they verbal or non-verbal) with more 
skilled, supportive others. 
The process of learning is a collaboration between the child and the adult. Learning is 
possible because of inter-subjectivity, a shared understanding based on a common focus of 
attention and a common goal between the child and the more competent person. 63 
Intersubjectivity not only contributes to learning but also results from the social interactions 
involved in learning. The child is an active participant. Gradually, as her level of 
competence increases, she can take more responsibility for the engagement. 
The contextualist approach stresses the social nature and origins of human- communication 
and thought. Thinking, remembering, and attending are not only activities of an individual; 
they were first carried out between individuals. 64 Higher intellectual functions appear first 
between people as intermental phenomena and then within the learner (the child) as 
intramental phenomena. 
Any higher mental function was external (and) social before it was internal. 
It was once a social relationship between two people ... 
We can formulate 
the general genetic law of cultural development in the following way: any 
function in the child's cultural development appears twice or on two planes 
... it appears first between people as an intermental category, and then 
within the child as an intramental category. This is equally true of voluntary 
attention, logical memory, the formation of concepts, and the development 
Of will. 65 
Children internalise (or appropriate) social interactions, and the language in which they are 
conducted and embodied, and so grow into the intellectual life of their community. As a 
consequence they gradually become more self-regulated and less other-regulated. The 
internalisation of interpersonal communication leads to intrapersonal communication: the 
structure of public conversation becomes the structure of private thought. As a result of the 
experience of interpersonal communication the individual becomes capable of the internal 
process of thinking for herself. Although at first speech (non-conceptual speech such as 
babbling) and non-verbal thought are initially separate they begin to merge at about age 2. 
From social speech the child develops egocentric speech which in turn becomes inner 
62 It is the interactive process itself which is of fundamental importance to parents, for example. Even where parents 
find that they'have' a child with a significant disability their interaction with the child continues unabated. 
We do not love 
our children because they are clever, strong, or fast (afthough we take a vicarious pride 
in their achievements); we love 
them because they are 'ours'. 
63 The foundation for this idea may be Bubef's notion of 'the instinct for communion', the primitive urge to relate to the 
world not as a thing but as a person. Buber, Martin, 'Education', 
in Between Man and Man, Fontana, 1961. 
64 Miller, Theo ies of Developmental Psypho4W, 385. 
65 Vygotsky, cited Minick, 'The Development of Vygotskys Thought, 33. 
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speech. 66 This link between thinking and language persists, the two are dynamically 
related: 'comprehending and producing language are processes that transform, not merely 
influence, the process of thinking'. 
Language is primarily a social device for social contact, communication 
and interpersonal influence. This social tool goes into the mental 
underground to direct thinking, control one's own behaviour during 
development, organise categories of reality, represent the past, and plan 
for the future. The intermental becomes intramental. 67 
Much of contemporary Western philosophy tends to separate the individual from the social 
and natural world and to locate cognition in the first instance 'inside' the autonomous 
individual. This isolate, autonomous individual is at the heart of much of the moral thought 
of Western civilization culminating in the disembodied moral intellect of Kant. Some 
contemporary developmental psychologists have reinforced the philosophers' perception by 
concentrating on an individualistic account of human development which sees the 
individual as developing in an environment which is either facilitating or restricting that 
development. In addition developmental psychology has tended to concentrate on the 
cognitive (the acquisition of a personalised rationality) to the exclusion of other important 
features of human experience. Piaget for example, coming as he did from a tradition of 
individual rationality, thought that cognition is prior to and broader than language. 
Piaget's stage theory of development tacitly reflects the ideology of 
individualism. The stage theory is based on an interactionist metaphor in 
which the relation between the person and the social wodd is conceived as 
an individual standing apart from and interacting with a social 
environment. 68 
This focus has been compounded by the contemporary preoccupation with testing and 
measurement which tends to reinforce the individualist stance and marginalise features of 
human experience which do not lend themselves to quantification. The notion that social 
activity shapes the mind is contrary to this view. (It was prefigured in educational thought by 
66 Minick, 'The Development of Vygotskys Thoughf, 36,39-41. 
67 Miller, Theories of Developmental PMholggy, 389. 
68 Bidell, cited Daniels, 'Introduction: Psychology in a Social Worid', 4. 
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such as Pestalozzi. '89) There are alternative socially constructed ways of viewing the 
individual in relation to her environment. 70 
Following the rationalist tradition philosophers often present an inadequate characterisation 
of childhood. Children as seen by philosophers as simply lacking 'the capacity to act 
rationally in pursuit of their own self-chosen goalS'. 71 To say that children are immature is a 
tautology and it is indisputable that they require greater protection than most adults. 
However, the portrayal of children as totally lacking in reason until a particular age 'leaves 
no room in our thinking about children for things like thinking and learning, or development 
in understanding and character and all those other concepts which refer to processes and 
not to states. 72 The philosophers cited by Hughes present 'a pretty unconvincing picture' of 
children and childhood. If we begin with the assumption that children are completely non- 
rational then we must account for the fact that they become so as they pass a certain age. 
'If, on the other hand, you allow rationality to children, then you cannot use their lack of it as 
a criterion to distinguish them from adults'. 73 Hughes' concern is with the way in which 
philosophers concentrate on rationality. She could also have criticised them for presenting 
a static picture of children, when in fact the experience of childhood is dynamic and 
developmental, and for their total failure to recognise adolescence as marking the critical 
transition from childhood to adulthood. 
Erik Erikson: the needs of the child 
Erikson's psychosocial account of human development describes the developmental life of 
the child in terms of a dialectical relationship between the individual and the cultural 
community. 74 The life of the child is presented as a series of challenges for mastery and 
identity integration within the sustaining cultural group. As the individual progresses through 
developmental phases common to all human beings the culture specifies what the person is 
to do and to be and determines how she or he should be recognised within each particular 
culture. 
69 Gertrude's teaching of her children did not set up any formal pedagogical ideal; she simply acted in the role of the 
natural mother. The ordinary conversational and emotional commonplaces were emphasised so that their true 
educational significance was recognised: 'She never adopted the tone of instructor toward her children; she did not say 
to them: "Child, this is your head, your nose, your hand, your finger"; or"Where is your eye? your ear7' but instead she 
would say: "Come here child, I will wash your little hands", I will comb your hair", or I will cut your 
fingemails". Her 
verbal instrucdon seemed to vanish in the spirit of her real ac", in which it always had its source. 
The result of her 
system was that each child was sldlful, intelligent and active to the full e)dent that 
his age and development allowed. ' 
Leonard and GertrAu quoted in L. F. Anderson, Pestaloz7j, London, McGraw-Hill, 1931,25. 
7C) Miller, Theories of Developmental Psygholqgy 402-405. 
71 Hughes, Judith, 'The Philosophers Child', in Rosalind Ekman Ladd, ed., Children's Rights Re-visioned: 
Philosol2hi 
-Re 
dino London, Wadsworth, 15-28,18. 
72 Ibid., 19. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ident v Ind the Life Cygle, 51 -108; Childhood a! 3d Socig! y, 
222-247. 
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Here we need concern ourselves only with the first five of Erikson's eight stages of the 
developmental process as they describe the establishment of childhood and the transition 
to adulthood through adolescence. The point to be noted is that human development is not 
an undifferentiated curve of development but rather a sequence of stages each presenting 
its own distinctive challenge to the individual and each of which is treated differentially by 
different cultural groups. The main importance I wish to attach to this theory, however, is 
the significance it attaches to the fifth stage, adolescence, as a significant watershed 
between childhood and adulthood. The adolescent is neither a child nor yet an adult. 
Adolescence is not a state (none of the stages are) but a process of change from the 
achievements of childhood to the potential of adulthood. 
First stage: Trust v. mistrust: 'I am what I am giveno. 75 
The initial organisation of a person's mental structure is oriented along the axis of trust 
versus mistrust, that is 'reasonable trustfulness as far as others are concemed and a simple 
sense of trustworthiness as far as oneself is concemed'. 76 Basic trust is the comerstone of 
a healthy personality. The first internal representation of the world is made up of inchoate 
feelings about the goodness or the badness of the environment. If the environment is 
cadng and supportive the infant will conclude that the world is basically a good place to be 
in; if it is cold and rejecting, the baby learns to be suspicious and withdrawn with respect to 
the world: an orientation which will be very difficult to change later on. Faith (in God or in 
humanity - any kind of faith) is difficult to achieve for an adult whose first experience of life 
was rejection and neglect. Although this initial experience of trust or mistrust is universal 
the means of achieving it is culturally determined: childrearing practices are related to the 
culture's general aim and system. 77 The 'finn establishment of enduring patterns for the 
balance of basic trust over basic mistrust is the first task of the budding personality and 
therefore first of all a task for maternal care'. 78 The relationship between the maternal carer 
and the child must convey the fundamental belief that what transpires is meaningful, 
dependable, reliable, and worthwhile. 
75 Birth -1 yr. IdentAy and the Life Cyple, 57-67; Childhood and 
Socift, 222-225. 
76 Identgy and the We Cygle, 57. 
777here is a certain leeway in regard to what may happen; different cultures make extensive use of 
their prerogatives 
to decide what they consider workable and insist upon calling necessary. ... (W)hat 
is "good for the child" what may 
happen to him, depends on what he is supposed to become and where. ' IdeOM and the Life QSle, 
59M. 
78 Ibid., 65ffi. 'Anyone who understands the good of deep trust in interpersonal relationships will 
have done so not just 
by having read a masterful account of trust, but by having had a life 
in which deep trust has been enjoyed over a 
sustained period of time. ' Thomas, L., 'Virtue Ethics and 
the Arc of Universalfty. Reflections on Punzo's Reading of 
Kantian and Virtue Ethice, Phijggohicai Pgpholggy, 
9,1,1996,28. 
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Second stage: autonomy v. shame/doubt: 'I am what I will'. 79 
The second shift in the organisation of consciousness occurs along the axis of autonomy 
versus shame and doubt DuHng the first two years or so, the most important skills infants 
develop have to do with the control of their own bodies: moving their limbs, crawling, 
staying uprýight, babbling and then talking, and learning to control eliminatory functions. This 
whole stage 'becomes a battle for autonomy'. 80 If the child's attempts to secure control over 
her body meet with success, she is likely to think of herself as capable. If, however, her 
caretakers discourage autonomy, or expect too much too early, the child is more likely to 
become insecure and develop a dependent, helpless orientation towards her environment. 
From a sense of self-control without loss of self-esteem comes a lasting 
sense of autonomy and pride; from a sense of muscular and anal 
impotence, of loss of self-control, and of parental overcontrol comes a 
lasting sense of doubt and shame. To develop autonomy, a firmly 
developed and a convincingly continued stage of early trust is necessary. 81 
At this stage the child begins to form an understanding of the concept of 'law and order', 
that to each, in his or her social place, is apportioned pdvileges and limitations, obligations 
and rights. 82 The sense of autonomy which is fostered by the carers is a function of their 
'sense of rightful dignity and lawful independence' which reassures the growing child that 
'the kind of autonomy fostered in childhood will not be frustrated later'. The reassurance of 
the dignity of the parents within the social milieu reinforces the child's sense of her own 
dignity as a human person. This is not a one-sided affair, however. 
Social organisation assigns with the power of government certain privileges 
of leadership and certain obligations of conduct; while it imposes on the 
ruled certain obligations of compliance and certain privileges of remaining 
autonomous and self-determining. 83 
What is noteworthy at this stage is the beginning of autonomy as a psychological state and 
its association with security and self-esteem. 84 
79 1-3 yr. IdentRy and the Life Cycle, 67-77; Childhood and SocieA 226-229. 
80 Identft and tbtjft. ý, 70. 
81 Ibid., 70/1. 
82 Ibid., 76. 
83 Ibid., 76/7. 
84 Campbell argues that autonomy is a feature of all but the 'very earliest stages of 
human development'. The autonomy 
interests of the child 'stretch right back into the heart of early childhood. 
Lack of physical independence at these early 
stages is erroneously confused with lack of the capacity 
for choice autonomy which is an everyday feature of a child' s 
life even in conditions of e)dreme dependency. Campbell, 
19. 
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Third stage: initiative v. guilt: 'I am what I can imagine I will be'. 85 
The polarity between initiative and guiff appears when children acquire full mobility and 'a 
firm solution to the problem of autonomy'. 86 With the further development (to the point of 
mastery) of mobility, of language87, and of expanding imagination a high, yet realistic, 
sense of ambition and independence is developed. The issue now becomes not what she 
can do but she may do. The child at this stage gets herself into all sorts of trouble yet a 
surplus of energy allows her to forget failures quickly and to persevere. 88 If her attempted 
explorations and experiments are successful she will learn that taking risks is not 
necessarily bad whereas if she keeps breaking things, spoiling things, failing in her attempts 
to help, with consequent reprimands from adults, then what develops is a fear of letting 
others down. This is likely to result in adult behaviour that lacks daring and spontaneity. 
Conscience begins to influence behaviour and personality. 
Only as a dependent does man develop conscience, that dependence on 
himself which makes him, in turn, dependable; and only when thoroughly 
dependable with regard to a number of fundamental values can he become 
independent and teach and develop tradition. 89 
A sense of responsibility begins to appear: the child's response to the new feeling of guilt is 
to over-restrict herself through repressions, regressions, and resentments. If she can 
transcend this negativity then she is well on the way to developing that sense of 
responsibility which the adult world requires. 
When the child, ..., can gradually develop a sense of responsibility, where he can gain some simple feeling for the institutions, functions, and roles 
which will permit him to anticipate ! his responsible participation as an adult, 
he will soon find pleasurable accomplishment in wielding miniature tools 
and weapons, in manipulating meaningful toys, and in taking care of 
himself - and of younger children. 90 
At this point too the child begins to manifest the need to combine with others for the 
purpose of constructing and planning instead of trying to coerce and use them for her own 
self-interested purposes. 91 She is now 'able and willing to profit fully by the association with 
85 4-5 yrs. Ident9y and the Life Cygle, 78-87, Childhood and Socift 229-232. 
86 Identfty and the Life Cygle, 78. 
87 The child's sense of language at this stage is perfected lo the point where he understands and can ask about many 
things just enough to misunderstand them thoroughtyl Ibid., 78. 
88 Ibid., 78/9. 
89 Ibid., 84. 
90 Ibid., 85. We are so accustomed to the rhetoric (legal and social) about protecting minors 
that we forget that a great 
deal of the work of rearing and protecting the young is done by persons who are 
themselves still minors. ' Boulding, 
Elise, 'Children's Rights', Soci , 15,1,1977,40. 
91 This is similar to what Buber calls 'the instinct for communion'. I-Thou relationships, relationships 
with the world as 
person, go beyond the originative instinct and arise from 
the instinct for communion with other people. in such 
relationships the being of the world is presented to us not as an g§j%t_ which 
can be formed, controlled and 
Paqe 138 
Chapter 7: Re-defining ChildlAdult 
teachers and ideal prototypes, adults other than parents. The successful conclusion of this 
stage leads to the capacity in later life to collaborate freely with others while retaining 
equality in worth regardless of differences in age, kind, or function. 92 
Fourth stage : Industry v. inferiority: 'I am what I leam. 93 
The last stage of true childhood involves leaming to participate in the wodd outside the 
home, to cope with formal institutions outside the family, and to undergo systematic 
instruction. In all cultures most children enter some kind of instructional relationship by the 
age of 6 or 7, or start working in fields or shops. 94 They become subject to impersonal, 
public standards of performance and begin to develop a view of themselves in relation to 
others along the axis of industry versus inferiority. If the child's efforts in school or work 
compare well with that of others, if her skills are seen by others as adequate or useful, a 
sense of industry results. Excessive competitiveness, or a Oppling feeling of inferiority are 
likely to result if one's efforts are not recognised in the public sphere. 95 There is no violent 
inner conflict at this stage: it is what Freud called the latency pedod, a busy, productive lull 
'before the storm of puberty'. 96 
According to the Edksonian account of human development we can say certain things 
about the individual on the verge of puberty/adolescence. Optimally (which is ideally) the 
child will have developed a firm sense of trust in the world and in people, tempered with a 
certain scepticism, the belief that the trust is not invariably well-placed: it is trust rather than 
a simplistic ingenuousness. She will also have developed (a belief in) her capacity to 
control herself with a concomitant sense of her own dignity as a human person and as a 
member of a supportive community. Her capacity to take initiatives and to assume 
associated responsibility is established and she has begun to relate to others as 
collaborators in her activities rather than as means to her ends. Finally she has established 
a positive attitude to work, learning, and competition. 
manipulated, but as a subject; not as a thing, but as a person. Buber, M., Between Man and Man, Fontana Books, 1961, 
109-131. 
92 ldentfty and the Life Cyqle, 86. 
93 6- puberty. Ibid., 87-93, Childhood and Societv, 232-234. 
94 We should beware of simplistic responses to the notion of children worldng. Cultural difference should not blind us to 
the legitimacy of such undertakings in other societies. It is not the employment of children per so which should concern 
us, but their exploitation. See Hart, Roger, A., Children's Participgtion: from Tokenism to Citizenship, Innocenti Essays, 
4, Florence, UNICEF, 1992,25-28. 
95 Erikson advocates a middle ground between the traditional, instructional and progressive, discovery approaches to 
education. 'Both methods work for some children at times but not for all children at all times ... 
Children at this age do 
like to be mildly but firmly coerced into the adventure of finding out that one can learn to accomplish things which one 
would never have thought of by oneself, things which owe their attractiveness to the very fact that they are not the 
product of play and fantasy but the product of reality, practicality, and logic; things which thus provide a token sense of 
participation in the real world of adults. ' And which also provide a necessary sense of mastery and the concomitant 
prestige. IdentRy and the Life Cyple, 88. 
96 Ibid., 93. 
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What is of crucial importance, however, is the role that adults have played in bringing her to 
this point: it has not been a fortuitous and haphazard growth (although in real cases 
influenced, positively and negatively, by fortuitous and haphazard circumstances) but the 
result of intervention and formation in a context of loving care and support. 97 
Ideally, at the end of the fourth stage, the growing individual has developed a 
consciousness that experiences the self and the wodd in terms of trust, autonomy, 
initiative, and industry. She has established a good relationship to 'the wodd of skills and to 
those who teach and share the new skills'. 96 She is well prepared to grow into a vital 
adolescence and a productive adulthood. But she is no longer a child. 99 
Fifth stage: identity versus identity diffusion: adolescence. 100 
Youth begins and with it come significant (disturbing) physical, sexual, and social changes. 
When 
the body changes its proportions radically, when genital maturity floods 
body and imagination with all manner of drives, when intimacy with the 
other sex approaches and is, on occasion, forced on the youngster, and 
when life lies before one with a variety of conflicting possibilities and 
choices. 101 
Identity development is closely associated with the acquisition of competence and a sense 
of being worthwhile to oneself and others. The identity struggle of adolescence carries with 
it a sense of mastery of childhood issues and an increasing readiness to face the 
challenges of the adult community as a potential equal. The identity crisis typical of 
adolescence is not a pathological condition. It is an inevitable turning point in the life of the 
individual, for better or for worse. The dynamic of development in the adolescent stage 
should be emphasised. It is adolescence-becoming-adult, not simply a static condition 
requiring remediation or treatment. The ego synthesis or sense of ego identity 
977he child, lacldng the capacities necessary to being a self-governing moral agent, can improve only as a result of 
chance or the intervention of others'. lQeinig, 'Mill, Children and Rights', 6. 
98 IdentRy and the Life Cycle, 94. 
99 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 23405. This account of childhood is a far cry from Franidin's characterisation of the 
adult-child relationship in terms of 'an adult political elite which, in the name of protection, interferes 
in children's lives 
and represses and damages their potential for learning and development by denying them the possibilities of growth'. 
Franldin, The Rights of Children, 34. Or Freeman's endorsement of de Mause's description of childhood (de 
Mause, L., 
Histojy of Childhood: Untold Stofy of Child Abuse, Bellew Publishing Co., I W) as a'nightmare'. 
'(M)any would confirm 
that childhood as experienced by English children comes close to this description'. 
Freeman, Michael, 'Children's Rights 
in a Land of Rites', in Bob Franldin, ed., The Handbook of Children's Rights: 
Compgrative Policy and Practice London, 
Routledge, 1995, M. 
100 Identfty and the Ufe Cyrle, 94-1 W, Childhood and SocigV, 234-237. 
101 Identft and the Life Cygle, 97/8. 
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is the accrued confidence that one's ability to maintain inner sameness and 
continuity (one's ego in the psychological sense) is matched by the 
sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others. 102 
It is noteworthy that the ego identity has two polarities, an inner (the individual's self-worth) 
and an outer (the individual's worth for others). It is only as reflected in the esteem of 
significant others that the individual's self-valuation is confirmed. The esteem is, in part at 
least, a function of the achievement of the personal developmental goals which are valued 
by the individual's community or social group (such as peer group). The enhancement of 
ego identity requires 'wholehearted and consistent recognition of real accomplishment' in 
engagements that have meaning in their culture. 103 However, confrontation is also a 
feature of the adolescent experience. Many of the conflicts of earlier stages have to be re- 
fought even though this means 'artificially appoint(ing) perfectly well-meaning people to 
play the roles of adversaries,. 104 
The danger at this stage is identity diffusion. This is the inability, for the time being, to 
assume a stable and coherent identity based on strong convictions regarding one's ethnic 
and sexual identity, one's social status and role, and a suitable occupational identity. The 
adolescent takes refuge in the peer group which offers identity, support, affirmation, but 
only at the cost of conformity to the sometimes petty requirements of the group. 105 
Adolescence is a time of deep intolerance. 106 The sources of this intolerance are, largely, 
dissatisfaction with the self and with the lack of secure identity which would allow for the 
acceptance of others on their own terms: 
It is difficult to be tolerant if deep down you are not quite sure that you are 
a man (or a woman), that you will ever grow together again and be 
attractive, that you will be able to master your drives, that you really know 
who you are, that you know what you want to be, that you know what you 
look like to others, and that you will know how to make the right decisions 
without, once for all, committing yourself to the wrong friend, sexual 
partner, leader, or career. 107 
Moving into adulthood adolescents gradually establish a synthesis within this period of self- 
standardisation in their search for identity as an adolescent, as members of a sexual and 
102 Ibid., 94. 
103 Ibid., 95. This is relevant for HoWs observabon that in effect we have caused the 
'problem' of adolescence by 
trivializzing it: 'One reason why teenagers seem to be so preoccupied with (their personal, emotional, and social 
lives) is 
that we do not allow them to be preoccupied with much of anything else. 
We have made a cult, a way of life, and (for 
adults) a profitable industry out of adolescence. ' Holt, 
Escap@ 122. See also Gaden, Gerry, 'Rehabilitating 
Responsibility, Journal of Philosoft gf Education, 24,1,1990,27-38. 
104 Childhood and Soci , 235. 
105 Ident9y and the Life Qt0% 97. 
106 Childhood Land 
S-0-d-41Y, 236. 
107 Identft and the Life Cygle, 90. 
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sociocultural age group, as members of a community, and as persons with a present and a 
future. Crucially, though, 'the adolescent mind is a mind of the moratorium'. It is in transition 
between the morality learned by the child and the ethics to be developed by the adult. 108 
Adolescence 
Prior to adolescence parental control can be absolute or developmental. The best case 
scenariolm is that the wise and judicious parent, conscious of the child's need for both 
growing freedom and diminishing protection, will try to balance the two. ' 10 The continuation 
of an absolutist approach into adolescence will leave the young person with little alternative 
but radical rebellion. A developmental approach already established as the norm for 
parent/child relations will provide a much more flexible context for the resolution of the 
difficulties of adolescence. 
Contrary to Holt's assertion that 'There are no breaks or gaps in (the curve of human 
life)"" and to the belief that the facts of human development do not justify the 
conventional distinction between adult and child112 there is in fact a sharp demarcation, 
adolescence, which marks the social recognition of the biological transformation from 
childhood to adulthood through puberty. 113 There are generally recognised physical, 
psychological, and biological changes which mark the transition which is not a modem or 
recent invention historically: it has been marked since time immemorial by appropriate rites 
of passage (rites de passage) which publicly mark the transition of the individual from the 
earlier to the later stage of development. Rituals and initiation ceremonies are both the 
social recognition of this transition and its legitimation. These rituals have often been 
accompanied by tests, of endurance, stamina, courage, initiative, knowledge, skill etc., in 
short, the qualities necessary to function adequately in the adult world. Evidence of the 
individual's possession of the requisite qualities was necessary before he or she was 
admitted to full participation in the adult life of the community. 
108 Childhood and Soci , 236. 
109 Baumrind, 'Reciprocal Rights!. 
110 See also Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 'Contexts of Optimal Growth in 
Childhood, Daedalus: Journal of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 122,1,1993,41-44. Significantly Csikszentmihalyi 
does not mention rights at all in an 
extended account of children's development but rather considers 
it in terms of adult, parental, school, or community 
responsibilities. 
I 11 Holt, Escam 21. 
112 Harris, 'The Political Status of Children', 38. 
113 In accordance with the Concise Oxford Dictionary 
I take puberty to mean: being or becoming functionally capable of 
procreation through natural development of reproductive organs. 
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In Western industrialized societies adolescence is a 'considerably longer transitional period 
than it used to be. 114 it is being extended at both ends with earlier puberty and longer 
periods of dependence and semi-dependence. In addition to 'status ambiguity' (it is unclear 
in Western industrialized societies when young people actually become adults) 
adolescence suffers from pervasive negative stereotypes; deviant behaviours are seen as 
the norm with the result that negative expectations are created which focus predominantly 
on the problems of adolescence rather than on its positive aspects. 115 
It is difficult for the parent of an adolescent to have clear sense of how exactly to behave. 
Parenting itself at this age is poorly defined with regard to, for example, the monitoring and 
supervision of behaviour, the growing autonomy of the young person, and the difficulty of 
control against the wishes of the adolescent. A general erosion of authority in contemporary 
industrialized societies is reinforcing the erosion of parental authority. Role confusion is 
compounded by changing family structures. As the individual grows through infancy, 
childhood, adolescence and late teens (pre-adulthood) parents' rights to supervise her 
upbringing will diminish, certainly their power to control, if not to influence, the behaviour of 
the adolescent will. Individual adolescents increasingly fall under the influence of other 
agencies, many of which may be the result of their own choosing116 and some of which at 
least will be antipathetic to both the familial value-base and the method of parental control. 
It is here that the need for a developmental model of autonomy as basic to human welfare 
is important. The parents are in this view no more than custodians (trustees) whose claims 
over the child diminish with time, not as a matter of fact - though it is a matter of fact in the 
context of parental/child power relations - but as a basic principle of regulation. 
Relations between adolescents and their parents might be more fruitfully considered in the 
first instance in terms of the exercise of power rather than in terms of the assignation of 
rights. Anyone who has lived through the experience (and as a young person who has not? ) 
knows that autonomy is not conferred un problematically upon adolescents. It is asserted, it 
is fought for (often with traumatic consequences), it is seldom if ever conceded in a non- 
confrontational way. 117 As a rule we do not grant young people their freedom, they take it 
(at best the adult can concede with some grace). This is an important distinction, for the 
difference between power and powerlessness cannot be eliminated by conferTing power on 
others as some kind of delegation or favour. Power conferred can be withdrawn: it belongs 
114 Coleman, John C., 'The Parenting of Adolescents in Britain Today, Children and Socift 11,1997,43-51,45. This 
is a review of the relevant literature. 
115 Ibid., 45M. 
116 Hobson, P., 'Some Reflections on Parents' Rights in the Upbringing of Their Children', Journal of 
Philosopby o 
Education, 18,1,1984,63-74,65. 
117 The notion that the power conflict manifests itself in Ihe daily round of grumbling 
disputes over homework, untidy 
bedrooms, too much television, late bedtimes and so on' (Colernan, 'The 
Parenting of Adolescents', 49) is only trivially 
true. More seriously it concerns life-styles, beliefs, values, attitudes, aspirations, and 
peer-group behaviour. 
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(if that is the right word) to the person who conferred it. The only way to overcome 
powerlessness is to take power. It is arguable that adolescents recapitulate the historical 
assertion of rights as they make the transition from dependent child (subject) to 
autonomous adult (citizen). 
This issue points up the ambiguity of the terminology of 'child' or 'childhood'. If there is a 
struggle between infants and adults it is for the immediate gratification or deferral of the 
infant's desires; if there is a struggle between the adolescent and the adult it is a struggle 
for the former's freedom to do as she wishes i. e. to form her own life plan, make her own 
choices, and take responsibility for the consequences. 
There is surely a major difference between the sensitivities of a rebellious 16 year-old and 
the status of a contented (or even discontented) two-year-old with regard to paternalism. 
What the rebellious 16-year-old wants is the right to determine her own destiny. What the 
two-year-old wants is gratification: the continuation or restoration of the status quo of 
provided care and comfort. It is simply not possible to consider the two categories 
meaningfully under the common rubric of 'child'. Yet philosophers appear to play on the 
ambiguity of the word 'child' which can mean what they want it to mean depending on the 
rhetorical point they wish to make. Conceptual clarity is not to be found in using the word 
'child' promiscuously. 
Parental sovereignty is morally justified by the dependent status of children and by the 
moral obligations to protect and nurture which the parents undertake. 118 Adult sovereignty 
over children has two objectives: the short-range objective of maintaining order in the 
family (that is, the stability necessary to accomplish the purposes of the family) and the 
long-range objective (to which the former is subordinate) of producing 'a self-determining 
person from a dependent child'. 1 19 This is a process of emancipation or empowerment. The 
twin parental aims of familial order and individual emancipation are in constant tension and 
parents must strike a balance between them. Parents must also make their children feel 
emotionally secure and attached to society at the same time as they teach them practical 
coping skills (survival skills) and the values necessary to maintain their identity and integrity 
within the prevailing social order, even if this means challenging the prevailing social 
order. 120 
118 Legal justification and Obligation follow from the communal perception and endorsement of 
the moral. If there is a 
change in the latter then the former will, eventually, change to comply. 
119 Baurnrind, 'Reciprocal Rights', 193. 
120 On the personal dynamics of the process of social criticism see 
Mead on the difference between the'me'and theT, 
Mind. Self. and Socidy, 173-178,199-200. 
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Parental control will be predominantly either authoritarian or authoritative. 121 Authoritarian 
I control 
places arbitrary limits on the developing child's autonomous strivings, 
arbitrary because they are static and unrelated either to the child's actual 
competencies and needs or to the requirements of family living. 122 
Authoritative control on the other hand is positively related to social independence: parental 
interventions are firm but not restrictive, children are left with significant opportunities, 
appropriate to their perceived competence, to make their own decisions, and reasons are 
given for parental commands. Adults who exercise legitimate rational authority 'model a life 
in which the mores and laws of the society may be circumvented, but only for principled 
and not for prudential or capricious reasons. 123 Such democratic and inductive modes of 
relating to adolescents are more likely to have positive benefits. 124 Parents' monitoring and 
supervision have to be balanced against the adolescent's growing requirement for her 
privacy and growing capacity to make informed decisions. The function of parents (and 
teachers) is not to prevent children from making mistakes but to protect them from the 
worst consequences of their mistakes and to structure and encourage a critical and 
reflective response. 125 In short, this form of control acknowledges a developmental growth 
in human autonomy. While there is a sense of powerlessness among young people there is 
also a growing realisation of power. Adults must be prepared to relinquish some of their 
power and to be flexible about it. 
In relation to the perception of their parental control there is evidence to support the 
intuitive belief that 
the more parents perceive that they are in control, the more effective they 
will be in managing the child care environment and in providing 
authoritative rather than coercive discipline. 126 
Among the most important weaknesses of Holt's case, for example, is his failure to 
understand the family dynamics of adolescence and young adulthood. He tells us that 
he 
has known many children 
121 Baumrind, 'Reciprocal RighW, 187. This is similar to the distinction which Coleman 
CThe Parenting of 
Adolescents', 64) identifies between 'power-assertive or coercive control' and 'firm control with consistency of 
discipline. 
122 Baumrind, 'Reciprocal Rights% 187. 
123 Ibid., 188. 
124 Coleman, 'The Parenting of Adolescents', 48. Inductive modes refer to 'attempts 
by parents to legitimise their 
authority by providing explanations for rules, and by 
helping young people see things from the parents' perspective as 
well as their own'. 
125 We must 'distinguish between mistakes which promote 
learning and mistakes, including irreversible mistakes, 
which prejudice the ability to learn in the future% 
Margulies, 'The Lawyer as Caregiver, 1485. 
126 44. 
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who for years have been living happily with their parents (and) have 
suddenly found them intolerable and have become intolerable to them. The 
happier was their previous life together, the more painful will this be for the 
parents, and perhaps for the young person as well. 127 
These 'children' he tells us are 'usually' in their'late teens or early twenties'128 and there 'is 
too seldom any sensible and gradual way to move out of (childhood) and into a different 
life, a different relationship with the parents'. 129 One is prompted to ask what kind of 
'sensible and gradual way' out of this situation would serve? Most young adults simply 
move out when the parental home becomes too restrictive. There is a more serious aspect 
to this, however. For it illustrates clearly how Holt slips between the use of 'child' to 
describe a biological relationship and 'child' to describe the dependent relationship of the 
young. The dynamic of family life is that at some point children become adults (and they 
spend some time becoming adults) and need their own autonomy and social space. They 
must make this autonomy and social space for themselves. The separation from the 
parental home is traumatic only if a sense of over-dependence on either side has been 
allowed to develop over the years. Children who have been allowed and encouraged to 
assume responsibility and autonomy appropriate to their developmental experience will 
have no difficulty leaving home, with their parents' blessing, despite whatever temporary 
sadness and regrets there may be on either side when the final break comes. 
Accounts of childrearing such as that proposed by Baumdnd and other's do not claim to be 
descriptive accounts of how any or all parents rear their children. They present, as it were, 
a best case scenario, how best parents will relate to their children. Such parents' treatment 
of the children will not be arbitrary. It will be informed by a specific plan based on the best 
interests of all concemed, parents, children, siblings, and the wider community, within the 
context of a comprehensive conception of the good. 
Freedom and Responsibility 
If I invoke the Freirean conception of freedom130 I do not mean to suggest that the 
condition of children in family relationships is one of oppression, although it often is. What I 
wish to suggest is that the dependent relationship of the child on the parent (based, ideally, 
on a warm and nurturing primary paternalism) must at some point come to an end and be 
replaced by a relationship between equals. I wish to suggest that this point comes at the 
end of an extended process of disengagement from the paternalistic relationship rather 
127 Hoft, Esca , 23. 
128 Ibid., 24. 
129 Ibid. 
130 See Freire, Paulo, pedggggy of the Opl2ressed, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books, 1985, Ch. 1 
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than in an all-at-once fashion. 131 It is only in cases where the dependency relationship 
persists that we might speak of oppression in Freirean terms. The denial of freedom, often 
disguised as paternalistic concern for the 'welfare' of the oppressed who cannot be trusted 
to pursue their own interests, is central to oppression. What needs to be stressed is a 
dynamic of freedom, a process to be pursued by the growing individual rather than a gift to 
be received on a certain birthday. Freedom is central to humanisation, it is something we 
must continually struggle for: 
Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly 
and responsibly. Freedom is not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it 
an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the 
quest for human completion. 132 
This conception of freedom is dynamic because it requires constant reaffirmation by the 
individual. It is not a state which, once achieved or acquired, is permanent. 
While knowledge (or capacity) is a pre-condition of autonomy it is not synonymous with it. 
Aristotle's downgrading of women, for example, was not based on the belief that they lack 
the capacity to make good and wise judgements but that they lack the authority to follow 
through on such judgements. Aristotle's women lack autonomy because they lack authority, 
not because they lack abilities or capacities. Their lack of authority is a function of the 
absence of the acknowledgement of their right to make decisions and to speak for 
themselves. Such acknowledgement is absolutely essential, 'for without it no mental act 
which they perform, however well, will count as a decision at all'. 133 
An essential but often neglected aspect of concern about autonomy (especially in relation 
to children) is responsibility. 134 Responsibility involves more than free will and reason albeit 
these are essential elements of autonomy. There is a social context which involves 
assigning responsibility, holding people responsible for their actions and decisions, 
requiring people to take responsibility. We may say, indeed, that without responsibility 
human action does not have a moral dimension at all. 'The whole apparatus of right and 
wrong, duty, obligation, and rights may seem undercut by absence of responsibility, as in 
cases of insanity or accident'. 135 When we tell an adult to 'grow up' we do not mean that 
they are physically stunted or intellectually deficient. We are recognising that, ultimately, 
the demarcation between adult and child is neither physical size nor intellectual capacity 
but emotional stability, consistency, and the capacity to carry responsibility. People are not 
131 Buber provides a model of this transformation in Between Man and Man, 126-9. 
132 Freire, Ped@gggy of the ORpressed, 24. 
133 Hughes, 'The Philosopher's Chilcr, 23. 
134 Gaden, 'Rehabilitating Responsibility, 27J8. 
135 Brown, D. G., 'The Rights of Children', Journal of Education, University of British Columbia 
1971,8 - 20,11. 
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only responsible for something they are also responsible to someone. It is only in a social 
context that it makes sense for the concept of responsibility to be invoked. 136 
We can identify a number of requirements for the assignation of responsibility. The first is 
dispositional: we expect the individual to show a willingness to engage in the activity in 
question in a way which is socially appropriate to the activity, that is, to be true to the spirit 
of the activity as socially constructed. Secondly, we require competence. This has two 
separable but related components. There is cognitive competence, the knowledge and 
understanding necessary to undertake the task with some hope of success and, in addition, 
the practical competence necessary to accomplish the task. Thirdly, we require a free 
acceptance of the associated responsibility, the acceptance of the engagement as a matter 
of personal concern. To be responsible is to be able to4satisfactorily for one's 
actions. This is a moral account rather than a simple narrative account, it is to account for 
one's actions, to be accountable. Being responsible is being able to, and prepared to, 
accept responsibility for an area of life into which one has entered freely, in relation to 
which one has an adequate understanding, and over which one exercises appropriate 
control. 137 
There is a further requirement which is conditional on, but separable from, the combination 
of the others, which is crucial to our understanding of responsibility in relation to children. 
This is the capacity to bear the burden of responsibility. For when we speak of responsibility 
an important component of our understanding of individual responsibility is this capacity of 
the individual to carry the burden. In the case of children in particular we can find, or 
imagine, situations where all of the necessary requirements are present but where, in the 
event, the burden of the responsibility involved is disproportionate to the capacity of the 
child to carry it. 138 
An illustration of this feature may be instructive. It is provided in A. Rutgers van der Loefrs 
classic children's novel Children on the Oreoon TraiI139 which is an imaginative 
reconstruction of the travails of the Sager children, in 1844, following their decision to 
remain true to their dead parents'dream of reaching Oregon. The oldest child, John (who is 
not yet 15 when the Sager parents die), assumes leadership and shows clearly that he 
lacked none of the preliminary requirements. He freely and willingly undertook the 
engagement - to lead his brothers and sisters from Fort Hall in Idaho to 
Oregon. The 
136 Hughes, 'The PhilosopWs Child', 25. 
137 Gaden, 'Rehabilitating Responsibility, 32. 
1-38 How many adults do we know who lack nothing of the requirements with regard to engagement, competence, and 
personal commitment but whom, nonetheless we would not require to assume the 
burden of responsibility for a 
particular task? When we consider people for promotion, for example, a crucial question, when 
the preliminary 
questions have been answered satisfactorily, is one of character, whether the candidate 
is equal to the responsibility. 
139 London, Puffin Books, 190. 
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account of the journey shows that he lacked neither sufficient knowledge and understanding 
of what was required nor the practical competence necessary to accomplish the task. 
Lastly, not only did he freely assume the engagement of the task itself but as evidenced by 
his decisions, actions, and demeanour to his siblings he also accepted the concomitant 
responsibility. And he succeeded. Through an iron will, a relentless commitment to his 
parents' dream, through almost fatal deprivation and suffering he finally delivers his small 
family to the sanctuary of the home of Dr. Marcus Whitman. 
But it was too much. Despite his eventual success the burden was too great. His relief was 
not the relief of an adult who had accomplished a trying and dangerous mission and 
achieved a temporary respite, but of a child who could at last throw off the burden of 
disproportionate responsibility and reclaim his childhood. 
At first John Sager had excited merely cold admiration from (Dr. Whitman). 
The boy had achieved something, and caused something to be achieved, 
which was unbelievable. He must necessarily be a bom tyrant and a bully. 
Yes ... those had been the Doctors first feelings. But now? 
Marcus Whitman smiled in the darkness. Before they went to bed, 
something had happened. He could still feel that shaking, thin body against 
his, that boy's head on his shoulder .... 
'Take the load off me', John had sobbed. 'I can't go on, I can't. They don't 
love me any more, they couldn't understand, and I love them so much. ... I 
had to be so strict and horrid to them, I've beaten them, I've dragged them 
along ... and now we've got here, and they 
don't love me any more! Please, 
please, won't you be our father, I can't go on! Won't you, pleaseT 
Dr. Whitman had patted him on the back. He had spoken soothing words to 
him. 
But that had not been any use. John had repeated his question, urgently, 
imploringly, with burning eyes. 
'Won't you be our father? I want to ... play with them again. 
' That last had 
been spoken very softly. Like an admission of guilt. 140 
In a similar story, 141 also based on actual events, Ruth Balicki leads her brother, sister, and 
an orphaned urchin through the chaos of war-tom Europe in an effort to be reunited with 
their parents in Switzerland. She is successful, but again the responsibility has taken its toll. 
We are told that 
(Ruth) had all the time been so brave, wise and unselfish that you might 
have expected her to present no problem at all. But she had grown up too 
quickly and shouldered responsibilities far beyond her years. As she 
wanted to be a teacher, her father lost no time in arranging for her to go 
away to university to be trained. She refused to go. Her parents and 
her 
140 Children on the 0 Trail, 203/4. 
141 Ian Serralier, Dle-5jlvýerwýOr Puffin Books, 1981. 
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new home meant so much to her that she could not bring herself to leave 
them. She behaved like a young child, clinging to her mother and following 
her about everywhere. It seemed as if she were trying to recover the lost 
years of her childhood. 142 
While these stories celebrate the heroic qualities of children in situations of extreme 
challenge they also point up the inappropriateness of adult responsibility to the capacity of 
children to carry it. It was not that John Sager or Ruth Balicki lacked a sense of 
responsibility. They clearly accepted the responsibility that they had assumed for the 
duration of their respective quests. What they lacked was the capacity to carry the burden 
of the responsibility indefinitely. The point about these stories is that they are persuasive to 
children themselves. 143 Despite the heroic and thrilling adventures child readers know that 
the true vocation of the child is to be a child, not an adult, and that the transition from the 
one to the other is gradual, not precipitate. 
Children cannot be declared responsible simply on the grounds that they knew what they 
were doing. While knowledge and understanding are necessary conditions for autonomy 
(they allow us to ascribe agency to the child) they are not sufficient. It is not the harm which 
they may do to themselves which is the main reason why we exclude children from the 
benefit of the liberal principle (which was Mill's reason) but the burden of the responsibility 
for their actions. It is not that children cannot plan and execute actions, it is that they are 
not capable of assuming the full responsibility for these actions in a way which adults are 
presumed to be. Responsibility is a matter of interaction. We cannot simply ascribe it to 
children without their co-operation. 
Growing up, maturing, emerging into autonomy is the process of the child assuming more 
and more of the responsibility for those actions which she does knowingly. Respect for the 
dignity and freedom of the child consists in the recognition that the burden of responsibility 
shifts from the adult to the child as the child herself demands it. 144 it is a gradual 
developmental process, not a once-for-all commission. 
This assumption of responsibility is the child's claim for membership of the moral 
community. In dealing with children we must be sensitive to the child's claim to have her 
'decisions treated as authoritative' and her readiness to bear the concomitant responsibility. 
'Holding a child responsible is not the same as making her responsible; we may succeed in 
the former, without her co-operation we can never succeed in the lattee. 145 
142 Serralier, The Silver Sword, 158. 
143 This is demonstrated by the perennial popularity of the books since their publication.. 
144 Hughes, 'The Philosopher's Child', 26. 
145 Ibid., 26/7. 
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The difference between adults and children in this regard is that we presume that adults are 
responsible whereas we presume that children are not. This does not mean that adults 
always are or that children never can be: it means that in each case the presumption 
prevails until we have evidence to the contrary. In the case of the adult, for example, it may 
be that we are shown that this particular adult lacks the knowledge or understanding or 
capacity for responsibility which we presume of all adults. In the case of children we 
presume incapacity until the children themselves tell us they are ready to assume the 
burden of responsibility for their actions. 146 
Should we liberate children? 
To grant that children should have freedom rights now possessed by adults (and bearing in 
mind that the rights carry with them the associated responsibility) would sacrifice the 
welfare of children to their presumed rights. 147 Such a concession of rights contradicts a 
number of convictions which have both popular and scientific support. 
Firstly, as we have seen, human development involves successive qualitative 
transformations which require commensurate changes in social status from one stage of 
development to the next. 
Secondly, children are inferior to adults in the competencies required to survive 
independently (they are in the process of acquiring these competencies) and therefore they 
require special protection. This is not unique to childhood: it applies equally to adults who 
have disabilities and to people in advanced old age who must be treated paternalistically 
because in relevant respects their situation is identical with that of young children. Adults 
with mental or other disabilities which militate against their being able to make crucial 
decisions for themselves may legitimately be treated paternalistically. The problem is to 
decide when such paternalism is justified and when it is wrongfully imposed in order to 
confine people in an oppressive, dependant relationship. One could go further and say that 
the adults' situation is even more demanding of paternalistic intervention. For children are, 
as it were, on an upward developmental curve while the elderly are on a downward curve. 
Children are being prepared for autonomy while ageing adults are being prepared for 
increasing dependency. 
Thirdly, self-determination in adulthood is a product of maturation, it is not a gift which can 
be bestowed by permissive caretakers. 
146 The legal principle of doff incapax is a good example of this. 
147 Baumrind, 'Reciprocal RighW, passim. See also Hafen, Bruce, C., Hafen, Jonathan 0., 'Abandoning Children to 
their Autonomy: the United gations Convention on the Rights of the Child', Harvard International Law Journal, 37,2, 
Spring 1996. 
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(N)o child psychologist would seriously contend that the child is equal to an 
adult in instrumental, intellectual and moral competence. And not even 
child liberators deny the immense differences in knowledge, experience, 
and power, separating the child from the adolescent or the adolescent from 
the adult. 148 
The freedom made possible by this maturation is itself a product of knowledge, 
understanding, and responsibility and must be claimed in practice. 
Finally, properly exercised adult authority in the early years is a necessary precondition for, 
and is positively related to, later independence. ' 49 
Self-determination is developmental and is promoted by opportunities for self-determination 
commensurate with the child's actual ability and experience and by providing appropriate 
conditions for stability of self-concept. 150 Self-determination is a capacity to be developed 
and asserted, not a right to be exercised indiscriminately. It assumes that the individual can 
choose between known alternatives where the consequences of such alternatives are also 
known and accepted responsibly. The difficulty in the case of children is that they lack the 
experience to form an appreciation of the consequences of a decision and/or the maturity 
to accept and bear the burden of the consequent responsibility. Experience is a critical 
element of knowledge and decision-making. Without the relevant experience some 
consequences are more difficult to appreciate and others, while easier to appreciate are so 
only because of relative triviality. (Long-term issues regarding the significance of lost life 
opportunities, about identity and values, are crucially different from short term issues about 
how to spend one's pocket money. )151 Someone who has the capacity to make a decision 
with short-term consequences and minor risks might not have the capacity to make more 
significant, long-term, life-threatening decisions. 152 
The search for 'morally relevant differences' between adults and children which are 
qualitative rather than 'a very gradual development of powers which are always present to 
some degree, or if a gradual development, at least one that does not stretch out over the 
entire life span'153 is unlikely to succeed for the candidate capacities such as knowledge, 
understanding, autonomy, and moral responsibility are present from the earliest age in 
however rudimentary a form. 
148 Baumrind, 'Reciprocal Rights', 184. 
149 ibid., 181. See also Kandel, Denise, Lesser, Gerald S., 'Parent Adolescent Relationships and Adolescent 
Independence in the U. S. and Denmarle, in Urie Bronfenbrenner, ed., Influences on Human Qgvftment, Illinois, 
Dryden, 1972. 
15C) Baumrind, 'Reciprocal Rights', 185. 
151 Margulies, 'The Lawyer as Caregiver', 1489/90. 
152 'Report of The Worldng Group On Determining The Child's Capacity To Make Decisions', 
Fordham Law Revi 
64,1996,1341. 
153 Schrag, F., 'The Child in the Moral Ordee, PhilosoRby, 52,200,1977,1 M. 
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Baumrind, for example, suggests that there are three conditions for Irue freedom of 
personality': intellectual and physical competence, internal locus of control, and an 
understanding of moral reciprocity. 154 
Firstly, competence in any field of human activity is itself developmental. There are 
degrees of competence ranging from barely capable to what may well be an open-ended 
continuum of expertise in the relevant capacity, a 'range property' which still requires a 
decision on the precise point along the range which will be taken to constitute 'full' 
competence. 155 
Secondly, 'internal locus of control' (the ability to get what one wants and to direct one's 
affairs through one's own efforts) is evident from very early on in infancy. Babies begin very 
early in life to control the grasping instinct so that they can grasp deliberately targeted 
objects of desire. This is 'internal locus of control' in rudimentary form: it may be primitive 
but it is none-the-less identifiable as deliberately initiated action. 
Baumrind's third requirement, moral reciprocity, meaning the capacity to understand the 
universal norm of reciprocity: 'those whom you have helped have an obligation to help you, 
and ... you should help those who help you'156 is too narrow. It fails to capture fully the 
fundamental role of imagination in morality. If we are not to be restricted by a purely 
cognitivist morality (such as Kant's or Kohlberg's) which has no compelling emotional 
appeal beyond whatever commitment we might have to the abstract principle of 'duty' then 
we must conceive of morality as the sympathetic engagement with the subjective 
experience of others. 157 This is the task of the imagination and it is present from the child's 
earliest engagement with story. Children do not listen to stories with a detached 
moral judgement but with an engaged moral sympathy. They identify with the plight of the 
protagonists and develop their sense of the values by which to judge human action from the 
engagement. 158 
154 Baumrind, 'Reciprocal Rights!, 186. 
155 See Wilder, 'Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded', 85-91. 
156 Baumrind, 'Reciprocal Rights!, 193. 
157 For the limitations of the Kohlbergian view see Punzo, V. A., 'After Kohlberg: Virtue Ethics and the Recovery of the 
Moral Self, Philosophical Psyphol , 9,1,1996,7-23; 
Straughan, R., Why Act on Kohlbergs Moral Judgements7, in 
S. Modgil & C. Modgil, eds., Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and ýontroyeW Philadelphia, FE. I mer Press, 1986,149 
-161. 
158 See Inglis, Fred, The Promise of Happiness: Value and Meaning in Children's Fiction, Cambridge, University 
Press, 1982, Chapter 1; Bettleheim, Bruno, The Uses of Enchantment, Introduction. 'The development of a moral self 
has cognitive and mofivational prerequisites. While basic knovAedge about moral rules appears to 
be available to rather 
young children already, the motivation to accept these rules as strictly binding 
for the self lags behind in development. ' 
Keller, M., Edelstein, W., 'The Development of a Moral Self from Childhood to Adolescence', Moral Education Forum, 
18,1,1993,11-19,11. 
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Role-identification in story is paralleled by perspective-ta king in life. 159 This is the ability to 
view one's own actions through the meanings these actions acquire for others. In interaction 
with others the individual acquires the experience that violating normative standards not 
only affects other's but also influences others' perception and evaluation of oneself and this 
in turn affects one's own perception of oneself. 'Through perspective-taking the self comes 
to share the others world cognitively. Through emphatic feelings the self comes to share 
the world of others emotionally'. ' 60 
In the last analysis, given what we know about the needs and limitations of children in their 
pre-adolescent years we cannot endorse the open agenda of the liberationist programme. 
The responsibility of adults is to provide children not 'with a multitude of pseudo- 
possibilities, but rather with genuine choices among a few good options'. 161 The kinds of 
options which are available to parents and to children are not unlimited, they are available 
within the comprehensive conception of the good life to which the parents and their 
sustaining community or communities subscribe. As in all cases of human behaviour, 
however, the parameters set by these conceptions cannot be absolute for they contain 
within them the possibility of being transcended. 162 
Childhood is a developmental process, not a condition to be overcome. Childhood ends 
when the individual is capable of taking control and responsibility for his/her own affairs. 
When this happens will vary from individual to individual. In no case will it happen in a 
sudden once-for-all fashion which would allow an inclusive definition of childhood and an 
unproblematic distinction between children and adults. If we must choose between age and 
competence options then the age-criterion seems the more realistic (that is to say, the more 
manageable). The age criterion can be differentially set depending on the capacities 
159 What Mead calls 'social intelligence' depends upon Ihe given individual's ability to take the roles of, or "put himself 
in the place of', the other individuals implicated with him in given social situations; and upon his consequent sensitivity 
to their attitudes toward himself and toward one another. Mind . Self. and Soci , 141 n. Midgley argues that the 
capacity for sympathy the capacity 'for entering directly into some of the feelings (of others) and responding to them' is 
crucial to our understanding of human morality. This is 'an ability to put oneself imaginatively in the place of others and 
to see how it is with them'. '(I)magining them as subjects like oneself, subjects who experience life in the same way and 
are not of a quite different status'. The important point about sympathy is that its emotional and cognitive aspects are 
inseparable, it bridges the gap between feeling and reason. The Idnd of intelligence which it involves is not exclusively 
intellectual, 'it is a development of communication, which is, among animals as opposed to machines, always an 
emotional as well as an intellectual business!. Midgley, M., The Ethical Primate: Humans. Freedom and Moralfty 
London, Routledge, 1994,142-145. 
160 Keller, Edelstein, 'The Development of a Moral Self, 2. 
161 Baumrind, 'Reciprocal Rights!, 194. Contrast this with Gutmann, A., 'Children, Paternalism and Education: a Liberal 
Argumer, X, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9,4,1930,338-358. 
162 'The "I" is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the "me" is the organised set of attitudes of 
others which one himself assumes. The attitude of the others constitute the organised "me", and then one reacts toward 
that as an "1"! 175. A common example of such transcendence is the way in which learning to read for the purpose of 
having access to sacred texts confers the ability at the same time to read profane texts. 
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required in relation to specific activities: the resulting 'incoherence" 63 is not necessarily 
undesirable. On the contrary it can reflect a flexibility of response to the differential 
capacities of young people at different ages. But it will be the same for all of the same age. 
While an age criterion might not be fair to all affected it is intended to be equally protective 
of all. There seems no rational solution to the age/competence dilemma: we must choose 
between fairness to the few or safety for the many. 
'It is the focused attention of caring adults that a child needs most if he or she is to develop 
a positive attitude towards the wodd. '164 The appropriate context for the task of rearing 
children is the family. This does not necessarily mean the conventional nuclear family or 
any other particular conception of family. But it does require, at least 
the continuous presence of one or more adults who have the means and 
the willingness to provide for the physical needs of the children, who can 
prepare them for the opportunities and challenges of adulthood, and who 
love them - i. e. express genuine pleasure in their existence and hold their 
well-being to be as important as their own. 165 
If these conditions are not met it is unlikely that the child will achieve the developmental 
levels identified by Erikson which are necessary for a satisfactory adulthood. 
Children (whether infants, children, or adolescents) have at every point needs which require 
to be met and interests to be accommodated if they are to live full lives, or even if they are 
to achieve a minimal level of human functioning appropriate to the developmental stage 
they are at. Identifying such needs requires a conception of human being which is socially 
(communally) determined: what it is (maximally) to be a child in that community and what is 
the ideal of human adulthood within that community. 
Summary 
The concept of childhood is meaningful only in contrast to adulthood. The temptation to 
adopt an arbitrary definition of 'child' or 'childhood' as the true or real definition should be 
resisted. On the contrary, we must try to identify the salient characteristics in respect of 
which adult-child differences are described, while at the same time accepting that 
possession or non-possession of any singular capacity or characteristic is not sufficient to 
determine whether a person is or is not a child. 
One of the central questions in relation to children, rights, and adults is whether adults' 
subordination of children is contrived by keeping them in the state of ignorance necessary 
163 Franldin, 'The Case for Children's Rights!, 8. 
164 Csikszentmihalyi, 'Contexts of Optimal Growth in Childhood', 41. 
165 Ibid., 42. This is the 'psychological parent model' proposed by Goldstein and his colleagues. 
See Goldstein, J., 
Freud, A., Solnit, A. J., ýBWad the Best Interests of 
the Child, New York, The Free Press, 1984,53-63. 
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to sustain servility, or whether children's subordination is a necessary prerequisite to their 
eventually becoming autonomous individuals. 
Institutionalised conceptions of childhood presume normative differences between 
childhood and adulthood. Yet, the state of being a child is not static, it is a dynamic 
condition marked by a succession of developmental transformations. An 'age of majority' is 
the conventional institutionalised demarcation between adulthood and childhood. As a 
criterion it has the virtue of impartiality, but only at the cost of not being strictly equitable. 
Perceived competence is the normative criterion on which age distinctions are based. 
Since normative criteria are neither universal nor evenly distributed a normative criterion 
cannot be applied consistently without some form of individualized testing which would be 
both onerous and politically unacceptable; for if a competence criterion were consistently 
applied it would disenfranchise individuals who are already deemed adult. The dilemma is 
that we must choose, on the one hand, between a universal criterion, 'an institutionally 
defined category', which allows of straightforward administrative application but which will 
be unfair in -the event to many individuals, and on the other hand, a criterion of 
individualized competence, which would be difficult if not impossible to implement. 
A possible compromise is to accord children a liberty commensurate with the development 
of their capacities. 
The transition from the intimate, protected world of the family to the freer, but more 
threatening, life of the wider community bridges the competence-age dichotomy. The 
competence criterion predominates in the intimacy and individualized protection of the 
micro-community of the younger child. The macro-community in which the adolescent is 
expected to function differs in two important respects from the micro-community of the 
family: the individual is not personally known to other, authoritative, members of the 
community and the wider community is not deliberately contrived to facilitate her 
experimentation with her growing competence and evolving identity. The individualized and 
flexible regulation of the home is replaced by universal rules of constraint. These rules are 
designed to be protective of all; communal paternalism displaces the parentalism of the 
family. 
School is the transitional experience between the flexible, personalised criteria of 
competence and the rigid, impersonal criterion of age. The experience of contemporary 
schooling (or at least its theory) reflects this transition from an individualized competence, 
to impersonal, institutional requirements which test the individual against publicly 
determined norms of performance. 
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Children acquire higher mental capacities in the context of human communities. The path 
and outcome of their development is constrained by the specificities of their cultural 
community. They internalise the prevailing social interactions in order to grow into the 
social and intellectual life of that community. This contextualist view is at odds with 
contemporary views which radically separate the 'autonomous individual' from the social 
and natural world. Erikson, in particular, locates human development within a formative 
social context. The needs of the growing child are met by a wide range of socially specific 
and culturally determined measures according to the ideal of adult functioning which 
prevails in the relevant community. 
The development of identity is inseparable from the acquisition of competence and a 
concomitant sense of self-worth. The identity crisis typical of adolescence is a critical 
watershed in the life of the individual. It is a dynamic transformation from the secure and 
protected world of childhood to the fraught world of adulthood with its associated freedom, 
choices, and responsibility. 
Adolescence is a time of an overt struggle for power: autonomy is not conferred, it is 
asserted. The process of parenting is a process of empowerment; ideally, parents are 
conspiring at their own redundancy. The ultimate aim of authoritative parental control is 
independence. Authodtative control attempts to build the emotional security, practical skills, 
and moral values necessary to maintain identity and integrity, while at the same time 
inculcating a social attachment or commitment. The dependent relationship of the child is 
eventually replaced by a relationship of equality which comes at the end of an extended 
process of disengagement from the patemalistic adult-child relationship, and the 
assumption of adult responsibilities. 
Responsibility is an essential aspect of autonomy. In addition to free will and reason 
autonomy entails a social context in which responsibility is assigned and assumed. It is 
essential to the moral dimension of human action and requires, as a necessary moral 
feature, a requisite capacity to bear the burden of responsibility. 
Growing into autonomy involves the individual assuming increasing responsibility for her 
own self-initiated and self-directed actions. It is a process promoted by opportunities for 
self-determination which are commensurate with the child's actual ability and experience. 
Respect for the dignity and freedom of the child requires that adults recognise that 
responsibility is a gradual acquisition in which the consensual participation of the child is 
crucial. The incremental assumption of responsibility indicates the child's growth towards 
full membership of the moral community. 
Childhood ends with the assumption of control and responsibility. This is a gradual, 
developmental process not a once-for-all transformation which precludes an inclusive, 
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universal definition of childhood and an unproblematic adult-child distinction. An age 
criterion appears to be more realistic than a competence criterion because it is more 
manageable. While an age criterion might not be fair to all affected it is intended, in the first 
instance, to be equally protective of allk it sacrifices fairness to the few for safety for all. 
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As generally understood 'paternalism' means interfering with the freedom of another in the 
name of the other's best interest. Whether the individual involved recognises the benefit of 
the intervention does not materially affect the situation. Dworkin's definition may be taken 
as authoritative: 'the interference with a person's liberty of action, justified by reasons 
referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the 
person being coerced. 1 Paternalism is predicated on the belief that it is permissible to 
interfere with another's liberty in order to promote his or her we fare. Such nte eren is I, i rf ce 
specifically prohibited by Mill who declared that the only justifiable interference is to prevent 
harm to oneself or to others. We cannot interfere in the name of the moral good of the 
individual who is capable of choice which is both voluntary and rational. This is why 
paternalism is normally objectionable: it violates people's 'independent moral right to be 
free to act as they choose'. 2 Mill famously excluded children from his principle of liberty. 3 
If the possession of liberty becomes counterproductive regarding the benefits for which 
liberty is normally valued (e. g. happiness and self-respect) then it appears reasonable to 
suggest that it should be restricted appropdately. 4 This is the position of children. If they 
were to be allowed complete freedom from the beneficent coercion of adults 'it is hardly 
credible that they should achieve happiness (or even, in many cases, survive at all)'. 5 This 
echoes Worsfold's view that children have traditionally been treated patemalistically due to 
the perceived need to protect them from themselves and from others (because) 'they lack 
an adequate conception of their own present and future interests'. 6 Adults are presumed to 
have such an 'adequate conception'. 7 
Liberty, as the absence of restraint, does not, however, necessadly produce the desired 
results. It is surely arguable that happiness and self-esteem are both possible under 
conditions of restraint. It is Edkson's view, for example, that children before adolescence 
can be both happy and have a high measure of self-esteem even though their lives are 
1 Dworldn, Gerald, 'Paternalism', in Sartorius, Rolf, ed., Paternalism, University of Minnesota Press, 1967,20. 
2 Sartorius, Paternalism, 1987, A. 
3 Mill, j.. S., On Libe , in H. 
B. Acton ed., Utildarianism. Libedy. Regresentative Government, London, J. M. Dent & 
Sons Ltd., 1972,73. Mill did not, as Brown suggests (Brown, D. G., 'The Rights of Children', Journal of Education, 
University of British Columbia 1971,8 - 20,9) 'wash his hands of children' for purposes of ethical theory. As we will see 
below Mill was concerned with the educational consequences of his proposal to exclude children. 
4 This is a principle proposed by \Ilastos, G., 'Justice and Equality, in Waldron, J., ed., Theories of Oxford 
University Press, 1984,48/9: We must find reasons fbr our natural tights which wN be the only moral reasons forjust 
excepdons to them in special circumstances'. 48. 
5 Scarre, G., 'Children and Paternalism', Philosoph , 55,19W, 
117-124,122. All of the foregoing presumes a definition 
of children which appears to mean the very young. But in the first instance when we argue 
for freedom for children it is 
the case of older children - those approaching the age of 18, however - that we mean'. and 
they are, it is not implausible 
to assume, capable of (some oo the Idnds of things which Scarre appears 
to have in mind. 
6 Worsfold, Victor, 'A Philosophical Justification for Children's Rights', Harvard Educational Review 44,1,1974,142. 
7 jbid., 143. This is identical with the conventional position. 
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circumscribed by adult prohibitions. In fact, in childhood both happiness and self-esteem 
are likely to diminish, if not disappear altogether, if all restraints are removed. For restraints 
are not always merely negative prohibitions, they may sometimes be (and ideally in 
childhood frequently are) enabling conditions providing the space and safety necessary for 
individual development. 
To descdbe someone as autonomous means that on appropdate occasions they assert 
their own preferences against those which are being imposed by others. Cleady children up 
to a certain age (puberty/adolescence) have some capacity for autonomous action (which 
must include the notion of appropdate responsibility). Yet it is equally clear that they have 
not achieved the level of self-directed and responsible action sufficient to be described as 
'autonomous' in the fullest sense. 
In some instances paternalism is justified, in some not. If we condone paternalistic action in 
some circumstances there will inevitably be those who will be mistakenly identified as 
proper candidates for paternalistic treatment. 8 This is undoubtedly true in the case of 
children. Lacking a clear and unambiguous criterion of demarcation between adults and 
children it is not always possible to identify unerringly on which side of the boundary a 
particular individual may be situated. Paternalism is justified on the part of parents or other 
adult carers until it becomes problematic through the developing autonomy of the growing 
individual. This problematic period is when the individual begins to assert him- or her-self 
consistently as a morally independent individual. 
Insofar as paternalism is justified in relation to children it cannot be challenged by citing 
examples of the wrongness of patemalism in relation to adults, either singly or in 
categories: it is precisely that they are not children which makes treating adults as if they 
were objectionable. The adolescent-becoming-adult, however, presents the most 
problematic marginal category because of its transitional nature. 
Parentalism 
It is surprising that Locke's suggested substitution of the word parentai for the word patemal 
has not gained any, much less widespread, support. He rejected the view that the mother's 
relationship with the child was in any way inferior to the father's: 
It may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism ... to 
find fault with 
words and names that have obtained in the world: and yet possibly it may 
not be amiss to offer new ones when the old are apt to lead men into 
mistakes, as this of Paternal Power probably has done, which seems so to 
place the power of parents over their children wholly in the father, as if the 
mother had no share in it, whereas if we consult Reason or Revelation, we 
Sartorius, R99MAfiM, )6i- 
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shall find she hath an equal title. This may give one reason to ask, whether this might not be more properly called Parental Power. 9 
Parentafism is certainly a more inclusive and exact description of the parent/child 
relationship embracing as it does both the maternal and the paternal relationship. It also 
eliminates any suggestion of patriarchy which the word 'paternalism' evokes. It would be 
desirable, for instance, to adopt the term 'parentalism' in order to distinguish between the 
treatment of children by their parents and the paternalistic treatment of adults. Despite 
these advantages it is not intended to adopt the practice suggested by Locke here for the 
simple reason that to introduce such a change unilaterally would lead to confusion. 10 
However, the priority of the parent-child relation (parentalism) as foundational of human 
relations should ýbe borne in mind in what follows. 
The parent-child relationship is one of the definitive relationships of human experience. It is 
not reducible to, or describable in terms of, other relationships. On the contrary, it is the 
parent-child relationship itself which is used to illustrate other, non-parental relationships. 
Claims such as 'He/she was like a father/mother to me' are immediately understandable 
because the relationship being invoked is part of the irreducible texture of human 
experience: it usually requires no further elaboration. This is not to say that everyone has 
had a uniform experience of parental caring. It is simply to suggest that despite great 
variety in childhood experience there is a common and widespread understanding of what 
parental roles, properly exercised, should entail in a general way. The significance of 'Our 
Father which art in Heaven ... 'does not need to be explained although it can be elaborated 
on. 
Literal and metaphorical paternalism 
Like many words in the English language 'paternalism' as it is most commonly used in 
philosophical discussion is a metaphor. A clear distinction should be maintained between 
what I will call primary paternalism and its metaphorical derivatives. The Primafy sense of 
paternalism is the relationship between the parent (especially the father) and the child. This 
is a sui _qenefis relationship. 
It is not reducible to description in terms of other relations: it is 
, not described in terms of anything other than itself. On the contrary, because it is more 
fundamental and universally understood, the parental or paternal relationship is used 
metaphorically to describe other relationships: God the father, Mother Church, Fatherland, 
Motherland. Metaphorical paternalism is the use of our understandings of certain aspects of 
primary paternalism in order to describe relationships which are not parental, paternal, or 
9 Locke, John, 'Paternal Powee, in O'Neill, 0., Ruddick, W., (eds. ), Having Children: Philosophical ard Lggal 
Reflections on Parenthood, New York: OUP, 1979,240-246,241. 
10 A confusion which would be compounded by the orthographic similarity of the words. 
Paqe 161 
Chapter 8: Patemalism 
maternal. In the metaphorical use (as in all metaphors) we invoke selected features of 
primary paternalism in order to illustrate, explicate, or elucidate features of non-parental 
relationships. 1 1 
DouglaS1 2 makes a similar distinction referring to 'genetic paternalism (or matemalism)' and 
'extensions of paternalism'. The former denotes the normal loving relationship between the 
parent and the child in which the parent acts in ways which are sincerely believed to be in 
the child's best (long-term) interests; this is what I have called primary paternalism. 
I(E)xtensions of paternalism' denote relationships in which those who wish to influence or 
control others mimic (hence metaphorical) the parent/child relation and make claims 
regarding their love, concern for best interests, etc., in order to justify continuing dominance 
and exercise Gontrol. 13 
The context of primary paternalism is, ideally and most frequently, a context of loving care 
which is not necessarily, ideally, or even usually present in non-parental paternalistic 
relationships. Parent/child relations are, in the first instance personal relations, they are 
fundamental to human society, and they normally involve powerful emotional attachment. 
This emotional attachment is not incidental to the parent-child relationship. On the contrary 
it is, in Douglas's words, 'the genetically determined motivational guarantee that matemal 
and paternal care will, on average, be provided'. 14 Without such care being the norm in 
human reproduction, the human race would not have survived; for devoting time, energy, 
and self-sacrifice to children is a very long-term, and ultimately, unrewarding investment if 
the 'pay-off is to be solely the adult success (however defined) of the children. 
Whenever a species depends on a limited reproductive strategy, it must 
find mechanisms for ensuring that adults will take care of their offspring. In 
humans, attachment behaviour generally arises spontaneously whenever 
an adult and infant interact. We are genetically programmed to respond 
protectively to a baby's facial features, sounds, and smells. Of course, 
parenting behaviour, like any other genetic instruction, can get scrambled 
in the transmission from one generation to the next. Yet if most individuals 
did not feel attracted to and protective towards children, humans long ago 
would have joined the ranks of the foSSilS. 15 
11 Gutmann points to an illustrative example. When the Laws and Constitution of Athens speak to Socrates in the Crito 
of his duty to obey, they claim not that they are right but that they have a right to rule him: "Did we not give you 
life in the 
first place? Was it not through us that your father married your mother and begot you? ... (S)inoe you 
have been born 
and brought up and educated, can you deny, in the first place, that you were our child and servant, 
both you and your 
ancestors7' Gutmann comments: 'The advantage of resting the authority of the family state on parental 
imagery is 
obvious'. Gutmann, A., Democratic Education, Princeton, University Press, 1987,24. 
12 Douglas, Jack D., 'Co-operative Paternalismvs. Conflictful Paternalism', in Sartodus, Paternali 171-200. 
13 ibid., 172. He adduces a long list of examples. 
14 ibid., 173. 
15 Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 'Contexts of Optimal Growth in Children', in (Daedalus: Joumal )f the 
American Academv 
of As and Sciences, 122,11,1993,33. 
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This emotional attachment is at the very centre of the parent-child relationship. Parent-child 
relationships which are not informed by such emotional attachment are perceived as 
exceptions and acknowledged to be exceptions. In a sense they prove the rule, for unless 
we had a general expectation of a standard of loving care we would have no criterion 
against which to measure performance and identify exceptional cases. Nor is this a 
question of duty. Parents do not normally act out of a sense of duty although they may be 
aware of their responsibilities as duty. Their primary motivation is love for their child and 
concern for her welfare. This loving care is the natural and normal context of primary 
paternalism. Parents' care for their children is directed towards the child's best interests 
over the course of the child's life. The point and purpose of parental care is to make an 
individual child eventually independent of the paternalism of the parent at an appropriate 
time. 
Many (if not most) of the relationships which are termed paternalistic do not involve the 
loving care which we believe to be typical and necessary in parent-child relations. 115 This is 
a significant difference between primary paternalism and metaphorical paternalism. 
'Sincerely co-operative' and 'conflictful' paternalism 
We can also distinguish between 'sincerely co-operative paternalism' and 'conflictful 
paternalism'. The former is paternalism which attempts to help the recipient become more 
independent and competent in the long term. The latter is not aimed at long-term 
independence and equality, but at the maintenance of submission and dominance. 17 The 
relationship of sincerely co-operative paternalism is based on the mutual perception of 
reciprocal love. The aim is an eventual equality. 18 
The point of sincerely co-operative paternalism is to promote the autonomy and freedom of 
the patemalized individual. For this to happen the paternalistic intervention must be 
exercised in such a way that it provides opportunities to develop the necessary powers of 
judgement, to accumulate the relevant experience, to develop the required capacities for 
freedom and responsibility. Such powers do not come into being all at once, 19 they can be 
16 State paternalism is perhaps the most important case in point. 
17 Douglas, 'Co-operative Paternalism', 1746. This distinction is very close to that outlined in McLaughlin, 
T. H., 
'Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children', Journal of Philosophy of 
Education, 18,1,1984,75-83. He 
contrasts a non-indoctrinatory form of religious up-bringing based on the transmission of 
'stable' (but not unshakeable) 
fixed beliefs which would be compatible with the aim of the eventual autonomy of 
the individual with an indoctrinatory 
form based on unshakeable fixed beliefs which would make eventual autonomy extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to 
attain. See also Callan, Eamonn, Creating Citizens: Political 
Education and Liberal Democragy, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1997,152-157, on 'ethical servility as an obstruction to moral development. 
18 For a description of such a relationship in an educational setting see 
Buber, M., Between Man and Man, Fontana 
Books, 1961,124-128. 
19'The mental and moral, like the muscular, powers are improved only 
in being used'. Mill, On Li 11168. 
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developed only by use in an environment which is encouraging and supportive of tentative 
efforts. 20 Developmental efforts involve making mistakes and learning from them. This 
means that the child must be allowed to act on her own initiative and to exercise her own 
judgement from time to time (and increasingly as she grows older) and in relation to 
increasingly non-trivial matters even when we believe that she is mistaken. The point of 
sincerely co-operative paternalism is not to eliminate mistakes but to minimize the adverse 
effects of such mistakes while maximizing opportunities to make them. It is a risky 
business. We can only eliminate the risk by replacing sincerely co-operative paternalism 
with conflictful paternalism. 21 
Two issues relating to the treatment of children as children (that is treating them 
paternalistically) require a definition of limits. In the first place we need to know what are 
the justifiable limits to our treatment of them. (This cannot be decided with reference to 
paternalism in general. The sui generis case of parents and children is itself the paradigm 
of paternalism: it cannot be elaborated on in terms of the metaphorical uses which are 
drawn from it. ) Secondly, we need to know when individuals cease to be children and ought 
no longer to be subject to parental control. 
Paternalism in relation to children 
A number of justifications for the paternalist treatment of children have been suggested. 
Firstly, since they lack rationality, knowledge, and understanding, children have a limited 
conception of their present and future interests. This, together with a limited capacity to 
defer gratification, means that their capacity to make decisions in their own interest is 
deficient. They are unable to formulate systematic purposes of action and, consequently, 
they must rely on their parents' (or other adults) superior understanding of their best 
interests. Secondly, their general lack of self-sufficiency and maturity means that there are 
many dangers which threaten them over which they have no control. If left entirely to their 
own devices children would make mistakes which would be harmful and damaging to 
themselves and others. Thirdly, if present paternalistic intervention is successful the 
children concerned will come to see the necessity for, and wisdom of, the intervention 
(future oriented consent). Finally, their own future well-being will be enhanced by 
paternalistic intervention which will not only prevent them from engaging in action which 
20 See Hughes, Judith, 'The Philosopher's Chikr, in Children's Rights Re-visioned: Philoso2hical Readi%lgs, Rosalind 
Ekman Ladd, ed., London, Wadsworth, 15-28; Gaden, Gerry, 'Rehabilitating Responsibility, Journal of Philosor)hv o 
Education, 24,1,1990 27-38. 
21 For a detailed description of the dynamics of conflictful paternalism see Freire, The Pedag2M of the Oppressed, Ch. 
1,20-44. The distinction is similar to Baumrind's distinction between authoritative and authoritarian parental control. 
Baumrind, Diana, 'Reciprocal Rights and Responsibilities in ParenttChild Relations', Journal of Social Issues, 34,2, 
1978,179-196,187. 
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would impair their capacity for autonomy and freedom in the future, but which will also 
promote this capacity. 
Whether children are likely to harm themselves or to fail to promote their own good or 
welfare if left to their own devices is, however, a matter of fact to be decided in individual 
cases. There is evidence that in situations where they are deprived of parental or other 
adult care children can care for themselves very well even in the most testing 
circumstances-22 We can make general statements only about very circumscribed 
categories and if we are to take this assertion as being universally true of a category of 
children then it can only refer to very young children in a very open environment. We will 
look at each of the proposed justifications in turn. 
Rationality, knowledge, and understanding 
Dworkin23 argues that we are justified in acting paternalistically towards children because 
they lack some of the 'emotional and cognitive capacities' which rational decision-making 
requires. The many deficiencies in children's conception of their own present and future 
interests include the inability to defer gratification for more than a short time. 24 In addition 
many danger's threaten children and consequently it is not only permissible, but even 
obligatory, for parents to restrict their freedom in various ways. It is generally true that 
parents have an understanding of the best interests of their children which is superior to 
that possessed by children themselves. (Although superior understanding alone would not 
be sufficient to justify intervention which overruled the wishes of an adult: a presumed 
knowledge of my best interest on the part of another would not entitle them to act against 
my wishes. Even if such superior understanding is possible or present no intervention is 
necessarily warranted. ) 
Scarre argues that it is possible to justify the conventional belief that paternalist 
intervention in the case of children does not infringe their rights, and 'to remove any 
suspicion that we treat children and adults according to a morally invidious double 
standar, d'. 2'5 He believes that the search for a distinguishing feature which constitutes a 
qualitative difference between adults and children is misguided since it begins with the 
22 See Holt, Escape from Childhood, Penguin Books, 1975,20JI, about the Italian twin boys who survived on their own 
'for several years, in a large city, in a country terribly torn and dislocated by wae. Also Van der Loeff, A. Rutgers, 
Children on the O[e-gon Trail, Roy Edwards, trans., Penguin Books, 1961, and Serrallier, Ian, The Silver Sword Puffin 
Books, 1960. Both of these depict historical events. In each a family of children copes with significant hardship and 
adversity. If not literally true these stories are at least fictionally plausible. 
23 Dworkin, 'Paternalism. 
24 The law shares Dworkin's view of the child in this regard. See Margulies, Peter, 'The Lawyer as Caregiver: 
Child 
Client's Competence in Contexr, Fordham Law Review 64,1996 1473-15D4,1475. The law sees the child as'prone'to 
preferring short4erm over long-term thinking. 
25 Scarre, 'Children and Paternalism', 118 
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presumption of a morally relevant difference between the two. 26 On the Contrary what we 
require, he thinks, is a rationale for the conventional belief that we may treat children, but 
not adults, paternalistically. Such a rationale must be impartial as between children and 
adults. In other words it must not presume a relevant difference between the two, it must 
establish it. '(I)t must locate a feature of persons, without distinction, which when present 
makes it reasonable for them to be subjected to paternalist Goercion. 127 It is wrong to 
exclude adults from paternalistic intervention tout court. We must find some feature or 
features of persons (which is independent of whether they are adults or children) which may 
be possessed by both but which will, in the event, in practice be possessed by far more 
adults than children. 28 
Strangely, in view of the programme he has set (to find 'some feature or features of 
persons which will in principle be capable of being possessed by both children and adults) 
Scarre continues '(t)his leaves us the task of locating the specific features of children which 
make paternalism appropHate in their case'. 29 He suggests the notion 'which has much 
common-sense backing', that it is a person's rationality or lack of it which is 'a relevant 
factor in determining whether he is a suitable subject for paternalist intervention'. 30 So 
we're back to Mill and Locke despite the attempt to diverge from an absolutist theory of 
freedom. 
Absence of rationality, knowledge, or understanding does not distinguish children from 
adults but the rational from the irrational, the knowledgeable from the ignorant, the wise 
from the stupid. Adults, as well as children, Gan be irrational, ignorant, and stupid yet liberal 
defenders of adult autonomy are not willing to accept what appears to be the inevitable 
conclusion: either such adults should be treated paternalistically (that is, as children) or the 
conditions of irrationality, ignorance, and stupidity are not (individually or jointly) sufficient 
warrant for justifying paternalistic interventions. Like Dworkin, Scarre3l has argued that 
since children are not capable of planning 'systematic policies of action' for themselves 
'adults must impose a comprehensive "system of purpose" on them'since children have no 
such 'systems of purpose of their own'. Scarre rebuts the objection that this could justify 
paternalist intervention in the affairs of some adults. Adults have 'plans and policies of their 
own' whereas 'children do not have such systems of purpose of their own so it does not 
infringe their rights to intervene in their behalf when their irrationality threatens their well- 
26 Ibid., 120fl. 
27 ibid., 121. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 122 (emphasis added). 
30 Ibid., 123. 
31 Ibid., 117-124. 
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being'. 32 It would appear then that even when the adult (Scarre instances the 'akratic 
alcoholic') is determined on a course of action which will significantly shorten his life, and/or 
reduce the value of it and radically affect his loved ones, a policy of non-intervention is 
obligatory because of his 'right to equal concern and respect'. Scarre does not allow 
paternalistic interference in the case of the alcoholic because the alcoholic as an adult 'has 
plans and policies of his own', but it is not clear how the behaviour of the 'akratic alcoholic' 
manifests rational action, or constitutes a systematic policy of (rational) action. 
Lomasky also thinks that children are incapable of having their own plans and policies, 
certainly in the earliest stages of their lives: '(u)nder no reasonable construal can infants be 
taken to be pursuing projects during their infancy'. 33 But at least Lomasky is careful to 
specify infants rather than using a global exclusion which does not differentiate between 
one year-olds and seventeen year-olds. Yet children clearly can and do plan things, that is, 
they appear to be, from the earliest post-natal behaviour, capable of self-directed effort, 
however minimal it might be. The question as to when such self-directed behaviour 
becomes a systematic policy of action remains open. 
Mistakes, self-sufficiency, and maturity 
It is further argued in defence of patemalism that children, if left to their own devices, will 
make mistakes which may be harmful and damaging to themselves and to others. Franklin 
is correct in pointing out that the error here 'lies in confusing the right to do something with 
doing the dght thing". 34 Adults make mistakes (many of which Gan have very far-reaching 
consequences) without having the associated rights withdrawn. There is a developmental 
aspect to this. We leam from mistakes: error's are an inescapable part of the maturation 
and leaming process. It is by making mistakes that we leam how to do things. Franklin 
thinks that our treatment of children is indicative of a double standard: 
Confronted by the apparently irrational behaviour and mistakes of both 
adults and children, paternalism is deemed appropdate only for the latter 
group. ... 
(P)atemalism, sanctioned on this ground, produces an adult 
political elite which, in the name of protection, interferes in children's lives 
32 Ibid., 12314. 
33 Lomasky, Loren E., Persons. Rights. and the Moral CommgM, Oxford University 
Press, 1987,155. 
34 Franklin, B., ed., The Rights of Children, London, Basil Blackwell, 1986,33. 
This point is also made by Page in 
relation to parents' rights. See Page, E., 'Parental Rights', 
Journal Of Apl2lied Philosop , 1,2,1984,190. 
Aristotle is 
clear that acting unjustly as a citizen does not disqualify one as a citizen. 
'Some would go further and question whether 
anyone can be a citizen unless he is justly so, on the ground 
that unjust and false mean the same thing. But when 
persons exercise their office unjustly, we continue to say 
that they rule, though unjustly; and as the citizen has been 
defined by some kind of office ... we cannot 
deny the propriety of using the term even in these cases. ' Aristotle, Politics, 
trans., T. A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented by Trevor J. Saunders, 
Penguin Books, 1992,172. 
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and represses and damages their potential for learning and development 
by denying them the possibilities of growth. 35 
This judgement raises two separate issues. The first is the portrayal of the treatment of 
children by adults. Even allowing for rhetorical flourish the depiction of adult treatment as 
arbitrary36, repressive, damaging, and growth inhibiting goes too far. There is no reason 
whatever to believe that the general treatment of children by adults is such. Undoubtedly 
there are many deficiencies in the practice of even the best parents, as, undoubtedly, many 
children suffer greatly at the hands of some adults. However, Franklin is making a much 
more sweeping condemnation: adults generally and systematically oppress children to the 
point that their lives are significantly damaged. A possible corollary of this judgement is that 
the majority of adults in the world are radically dysfunctional. 
The second issue is the issue of the double standard: Franklin is saying that we cannot treat 
children and adults differently in the absence of a relevant difference. This is to confuse 
primary paternalism and metaphorical paternalism; it ignores the affective GOnteXt of the 
former and uses metaphorical paternalism as the standard. Paternalism is prima facie 
objectionable in the Gase of adults precisely because they are not children. Paternalism is 
the appropriate way to treat children because they are children; in a sense paternalism is 
not the issue, the issue is when an individual ceases to be a child so that primary 
paternalistic treatment is no longer appropriate. The purpose of sincerely Go-operative 
paternalism, or authoritative parenting, in relation to children is not to prevent their making 
mistakes but to protect them from the more threatening consequences of such mistakes, 
and to help them to learn from the mistakes. 
It is argued that since children are dependent i. e. incapable of 'self-maintenance', they must 
be looked after by adults who will make paternalistic decisions on their behalf. Now, apart 
from the apparent tautology, this argument cannot be used to distinguish children from 
adults since no-one is entirely self-sufficient. Even Mill recognised the interdependency of 
individuals: echoing Donne he wrote 'No person is an entirely isolated being' and argued 
that 'it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, 
35 Franklin, The Rights of Children, 34. His position on this matter makes it all the more surprising that Franklin adopts 
such a cognitivist and non-participatory view of political action. See chapter 9. 
36 Ibid., 314. During Erikson's third stage of development (initiative vs. guilt) when parents thoughtlessly exploit the 
inequality in power between the child and the adult the result is that the child 'comes to feel that the whole matter is not 
one of universal goodness but of arbitrary powee. Erikson, Erik H., Ideoft and the Life Cygle, New York, Norton and 
Co., 1994,84. Harris's rhetoric in the matter of parent/child relations is equally extreme: 'Certainty the idea that children 
do have a moral obligation to obey their parents and to attend school during the working day is of great utility to adults. 
, Perhaps, though, 4 would 
be more realistic to regard this situation as resulting from the exercise of naked power by 
adults, and to think of the status of children as a consequence of their losing out in the perpetual struggle 
between the 
generations in power and the generation seeking powee. Harris, J., 'The Political Status of 
Children', Contempgrary 
Political PhiLc§MbZ Radical Studi , Ed., K 
Graham, Cambridge University Press, 1982,45. 
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without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond theMI. 37 
The notion that adult human beings are, or even in principle can be, self-sufficient is a 
radical misconception. Human life is social life, it is life made possible and lived only as a 
consequence of the contributions of others to our well-being. Even the fictional Robinson 
Crusoe was not self-sufficient for he could not have survived to build a human life for 
himself without the inheritance of human culture he brought to his island with him. This 
does not mean just the hardware that he salvaged from his ship (although the tools, 
materials, and weapons were vital). Of more critical importance was the cultural knowledge 
that he brought with him, in his language, his rationality, his conceptual schemes, his 
memories and understanding of human activities. 38 He embodied a selection of the 
concepts and practices of a particular cultural milieu; this was what enabled him not just to 
survive but to survive in some security and comfort. 39 The requirement that children should 
somehow manifest a high level of self-sufficiency as a prerequisite to not being treated 
paternalistically, especially in a technologically advanced culture in which mutual inter- 
dependence is becoming more critical, is not only too stringent, it betrays a radical 
misunderstanding of the nature of human existence. No one is totally self-sufficient and the 
degrees of dependency and self-sufficiency are as gradual and tricky as degrees of 
maturity or rationality. 
Self sufficiency is too vague and runs the risk of including within our definition of 
permissible paternalism those whom we would not wish to include: those such as the ill, the 
elderly, the unemployed etc. who although they may require our assistance, give us no 
reason to suppose that, as a general policy, they should be coerced in their own best 
interests. 40 
The notion of 'maturity' is no more helpful in determining a demarcation between children 
and adults than rationality or self-sufficiency. Since Mill the acquisition of rights has always 
been associated with the process of maturing. Mill's principle of liberty is meant to apply 
'only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties'. 41 Mill tells us that the exclusion of 
children from the prerogatives of adults ends at 'the age which the law may fix as that of 
manhood or womanhood' but not before. 42 The exclusion is justified on the grounds that 
children must be 'protected against their own actions as well as against external injury' and 
37 Mill, On Libedy, 136. 
38 While it is 'impossible to conceive of a self arising outside of social experience when the self 
'has arisen we can 
think of a person in solitary confinement for the rest of his life, but who still 
has himself as a companion, and is able to 
think and converse with himself as he had communicated with otherV. 
Mead, George Herbert, Mind. Self. and Socig! y, 
University of Chicago Press, 1962,140. 
39 We may say that while Crusoe lacked human company he did not 
lack human community.. 
40 Schrag, F., 'The Child in the Moral Order, Philosophy, 52,200,1977,167-177,173. 
41 Mill, Libe , 
73. 
42 Ibid. Like Locke, Mill quicldy transforms his normative criterion into an 
institutional one. 
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on grounds of the general utility of the community. 43 So it would appear as if it is the case 
not that children are incapable of choosing and pursuing their own goals but that they will, 
for some unexplained reason, choose and achieve goals which will in fact endanger 
them. 44 
The central question however is, what definition Gan be given to this notion of the 'maturity 
of faGUIties'? The central ethical principle in Mill's moral philosophy is the principle of utility, 
it is 'the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions. 45 The right to liberty is to be judged on the 
basis of its utility, and the exercise of liberty is available only to the individual 'in the 
maturity of his faculties'. We are entitled to deny liberty where the individual is not 'in the 
maturity of his faculties' because such an individual is both incompetent to judge what is in 
his own interest and is incapable of pursuing the happiness of the community. 46 Such 
intervention must always have an educational objective involving the 'permanent interests 
of a man (or woman) as a progressive being'. 47 So that, with respect to the status of 
children, Mill argues that the denial of rights and intervention are justified, not only on the 
basis of communal utility, but also by the development of the child as a 'progressive 
being'. 48 
The child must undergo a developmental process before he or she can qualify to benefit 
from the principle of liberty. The child must rely on the authority of adults until she develops 
her ability to make appropdate judgements in matters related to utility. There are a number 
of problems with this argument. Firstly, subjecting the child to authodty is unlikely to 
promote autonomy, quite the reverse: at first blush subjection to authority would appear to 
promise submission and dependency rather than independence and autonomy. Secondly, 
the meaning of 'faculties' is far from clear: are they purely intellectual Cassociating right 
means with desired goals'), or more general (including imaginative, emotional capacities), 
do they imply not just the ability to make a judgement, but the ability to carry it through? 49 
43 Ibid.. 
44 Hughes, The Philosophers Child, 19. 
45 Mill, Libe , 74. It 
has been pointed out, however, that Mill was not a complete utilitarian but that his works display 
an unresolved tension between utilitarianism and liberalism'. See Nordenbo, Sven Erik, 'Children's Rights, 'die 
Antipadagogen', and the Paternalism of John Stuart Mill', Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 31,4,163- 
180,1987; Habibi, D. A., 'The Status of Children in John Stuart Mill's Theory of Uberty, Educational Theo 33,61-72. 
46 Habibi, 'The Status of Children, 64. This article, however, offers little to our understanding of the criterion of 'maturity 
of faculties'. 
47 Mill, Libe , 74. 48 Kim, IýQ Su, 'Mill's Concept of Maturity as the Criterion in Determining Children's Eligibility for Rights', Journal o 
Philosophy of Education, 24,2,1990,235-244,237. 
49 Ibid. This is analogous to the difference between moral thinking and moral action. See 
Straughan, R., Why act on 
Kohlberg's moral judgements7, in S. Modgil, C. Modgil, eds., Lawrence 
Kohlbecg: Consensus and Controvem, 
Philadelphia Farmer Press, 1986,149-161. The distinction is even closer to S. I. Benn's distinction 
between what he 
calls 'autoarchy (the ability to make rational choices) and 'autonomy 
(the ability to make and act on rational choices). 
(Cited in Nordenbo, 'Children's Rights'. ) 
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With regard to the ambiguity of the term 'maturity' Kim identifies a difference between the 
young (classic utilitarian) Mill for whom 'faculties appear to be Purely intellectual or rational 
and involve determining right means for desired ends 1, and the older Mill for whom 'maturity 
in faculties can be construed in a broad sense to include intellectual, moral and aesthetic 
dimensions'. 
In short, maturity in the classical utilitarian sense is specifically intellectual, 
whereas in the revised utilitadan sense it is overall and total, covering 
moral and aesthetic as well as intellectual aspects. 50 
Kim considers that despite Mill's equivocal use of the term, 'maturity' was 'nothing more 
than a landmark dividing the territories of power and poweriessness'. 51 
Future oriented consent 
According to the liberal view parental intervention is limited by the notion that children will 
eventually come to see the correctness of the parents' decisions made in their behalf. 
Dworkin compares paternalistic intervention to a wager52 by parents that children, at some 
point in the future, will come to welcome the constraints which parents now place on their 
freedom, that is, come to see that the intervention was for their own good or in their own 
best interests. The retrospective justification requires that we believe that the individual in 
question will actually come to accept that our decisions were in his best interests. However, 
not every means available to increase the individual's endorsement of the components of 
his life is acceptable. 'We would not improve someone's life, even though he endorsed the 
change we brought about, if the mechanisms we used to secure the change lessened his 
ability to consider the critical merits of the change in a reflective way'. 53 This retrospective 
justification is 'methodologically dubious', however, since the adult who retrospects is the 
adult who has been formed as a result of the interventions. 54 
This is a developmental difficulty: the retrospective endorsement might be 'manufactured', 
that is, the endorsement might be no more than a self-fulfilling prophecy, a function of the 
formation of the person and their values and standards: 'My parents were right to do as they 
did because I am the person I am! 'There is a further logical difficulty in attempting to justify 
present actions on the grounds that the person affected by them might subsequently 
50 Kjm, 'Mill's Concept of Maturity, 238. 
51 Ibid., 242. 
52 Dworkin, 'Paternalism', 28 
53 Dworkin, Ronald, 'Liberal Commundy, in Gerald Dworkin, ed., Moraft. Harm. and the Oxford, Westview Press, 
date? 42. 
54 Campbell, T. D., 7he Rights of the Minor as Person, as Child, as Juvenile, as Future Adult, in Alston, P., Parker S., 
Seymore J., eds., Children. Rights and the Law, Oxford University Press, 1992,21. 
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endorse them: it means that there is no present way of knowing whether the actions are in 
fact justified or not. 55 
The future-oriented-consent argument also presents difficulties because it situates the 
future adult, as well as the present efforts of the parents, in radical isolation from the social 
milieu in which they live. The parents are not simply 'producing' an individual, isolate 
human being. They are also, within the context of a given cultural community, reinforcing 
and contributing to the developmental continuity of that community. The retrospective 
endorsement depends on whether the individual remains a member of that cultural 
community or not, or on whether the cultural community has changed radically in relative 
respects in the intervening period. 56 
A further difficulty is that the method of retrospective judgement does not 'play fair and 
equally with the interests of the child as they are manifested in the expedences of 
childhood'. 57 The crucial consideration appears to be the future adult interests of the 
individual rather than the present childhood interests. The two are not the same. We can 
assert present childhood interests without denying that the needs of the future adult should 
be considered. The retrospective judgement argument gives no status to the present 
interests of the child at all. 
Well-being 
Dworkin's concern is entirely future-oriented. He is anxious to ensure that individuals do not 
make irreversible decisions now (or have them made in their behalf) which would damage 
their capacity to exercise autonomy in the future. That is, given a commitment to individual 
autonomy and freedom, 
we would be most likely to consent to paternalism in those instances in 
which it preserves and enhances for individuals their ability to rationally 
consider and carry out their own decisionS. 58 
This is true of both adults and children. Paternalism is justified when goods such as health 
or education, which contribute to the autonomy and freedom of the individual, are promoted 
55 For a discussion of the moral and epistemological problems involved in using possible future events 
to justify present 
y, 6,2,1989,159-169; de- decisions see: Elliott, Robert, 'The Rights of Future People', Journal of A2plied PhjlgWph 
Shalit, Avner, 'Community and the Rights of Future Generations', Journal of Applied Philosol? h , 
9.1,1992,105-115; 
Marshall, Peter, 'Thinking for Tomorrow: Reflections', Journal of Apl2lied Philoso"h , 10,1,1993,105-113. 
56 Many who were raised in the repressive and punitive ethos of Irish Catholic schools and society 
in the 195CYs for 
example would certainly hesitate to endorse the way they were treated as children without any 
loss of affection for 
parents and teachers who, in most cases, did what they thought was best according 
to the mores of the time. There 
were of course occasions when children were abused by parents, teachers, and other carers 
even by the standards of 
the time. 
57 Campbell, 'The Rights of the Minoe, 21. 
58 Dworkin, 'Paternalism', 31,33. 
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even when they are not recognised as beneficial at the time by the individuals concerned. 
'At one level therefore, paternalism seems to treat others as means (with the important 
difference that it is a means to their ends, not Ours). 59 In the case of primary, or parental, 
paternalism, however, this distinction is not so clear or so easy to make. The child's ends 
are, for a long period of childhood, identical with the parents' ends. The parents have a 
comprehensive conception of the good life which they believe to be most valued 
inheritance they can give to their children. The parents' aspiration is to raise the child so 
that the parents' conception of the good life becomes the child's, not just for the child's 
sake, but also for the sake of the continuity of that conception of the good life which is 
central to the parents' self-definition and identity. Even on a liberal account, a significant 
part of the parents' expression of autonomy is their right, subject to minimum limits of care 
and to protecting the future autonomy of the child, to initiate their children into their own 
cultural community. 60 
In many cases over-ruling the present interests of the child in the interests of the future 
adult is only an apparent conflict: they are not two different people. The child who is 
required to visit the dentist, even though she does not want to, is the same person as the 
adult who will suffer toothache if her teeth are neglected. 61 It is part of the point of bringing 
her to the dentist that she learns the consequences of good oral hygiene so that as a child 
and an adult she may enjoy an improved standard of well-being. This is not to say that any 
intervention on the part of the parent is justified. The burden of proof for intervention ought 
always to be on the intervenor and the test must be whether, on balance of probability, and 
to what degree, the intervention is likely to lead to an improved standard of well-being now 
and in the future. 62 
59 Dworkin, Gerald, 'Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts', Sartorius, Paternalism, 107. 
60 See McLaughlin, 'Parental Rights'. This is not a view shared by all liberals some of whom do not scruple to advocate 
the imposition of a liberal education. See Nino, Carlos Santiago, The Ethics Of Human Rights, Oxford, University Press, 
1991, Appendix i, 299-300, 'The principle of personal autonomy requires that the state provide across society a liberal 
education which puts minors in contact with the most diverse conceptions of the good so as to enable them to choose 
freely when reaching "the age of reason" ; also Kolakowski, Leszek, 'On the Practicability of Liberalism: What About 
the Children7, Critical Review, 7,1,1993,1-13, argues that a liberal society must educate its young, and this means 
engendering liberal principles in them. "Mhe civic virtues on which the viability of the liberal state depends are not 
simply bom spontaneously; they demand a type of "indoctrination". A perfectly neutral liberal state is unviable'; also 
Gutmann, Democratic Education, in which she argues for mandatory education embodying the principles of 
nonrepression and nondiscrimination irrespective of parents' actual comprehensive conception of the good life. Her 
views are challenged, especially her 'contestable, value-laden conception of autonomy, in Gilles, Stephen G., 'On 
Educating Children: a Parentalist Manifesto', The Univers4y of Chicago Law Review, 63,3, Summer, 1996,937-1034, 
938. 
61 1 am aware that this is a naive metaphysical view. If people did not believe in this continuity then it would raise serious 
questions regarding the point of education. For a full discussion of the persistence of human identity see Parfit, Derek, 
Reasons and Persons, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, Part 3. 
62 '(T))he lawyer for a child really has two clients: the child today, and the future adult whose life will be irrevocably 
changed by the decision in which the lawyer is involved. The lawyer must consider the interests of "both" clients. ' 
Margulies, 'The Lawyer as Caregiver', 1491 n. 
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Rationality 
It is necessary to say more about rationality since it is so often invoked as a distinguishing 
feature between adults and children. 
Rationality is too imprecise a notion on which to base a distinction: for possession of 
rationality excludes some adults as well as some children from the benefit of the liberal 
principle. It also begs the question as to when rationality is achieved or the requisite 
gquantity' of rationality accomplished. Even as this question is addressed it raises another 
we have no warrant that the individual designated as rational will actually behave rationally 
in all (or even in any) situations. There appears to be a tacit moral requirement that rational 
people ought to behave rationally and be able to distinguish those situations where and 
when a rational calculus is appropriate. Furthermore we expect that they will know what the 
appropriate response is and be able to act accordingly with some competence. 63 It could be 
built into our definition of rationality that 'being rational' requires that we behave rationally 
on all appropriate occasions: those who don't are not rational in the required sense. But 
there is a feeling of interminable circularity about such a position. In addition we know, we 
must know because it is an integral part of human experience, that at many of the most 
crucial decision points in our lives we do not necessarily act rationally at all: making friends, 
failing in love, having children, supporting our team, choosing a career, etc. Very few of our 
decisions rest on purely rational considerations. 
There is no clarity in, nor is there any universally agreed operational definition for, the 
notion of 'rationality'. Dworkin, for example, writing about the exclusion of children from the 
liberal principle, tells us that 
what justifies us in interfering with children is the fact that they lack some of 
the emotional and cognitive capacities required in order to make fully 
64 rational decisions. 
It is not clear what these emotional and cognitive capacities might consist of: they certainly 
include 'an adequate conception of present and future interests' (cognitive), the capacity to 
significantly defer gratification (emotional), and the Very real and permanent dangers which 
may befall' children. Such uncertainty of meaning raises difficult problems for anyone who 
wishes to distinguish between children and adults. For either rationality is a simple notion or 
it is complex. If it is a simple notion and if we accept, for example, a performative 
cognitivist definition of rationality (such as the ability to solve certain 
kinds of intellectual 
problems) then it will be easy to identify and easy to measure. 
If, on the other hand, as 
63 There is a similarity between the limitations of an undefined rationality 
and the leaming of morality. See Straughan, 
Why act on Kohlberg's moral judgements7- 
64 Dworkin, 'Paternalism', 28. 
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Dworkin appears to be suggesting, it is complex, comprising emotional as well as cognitive 
capacities and also being affected by extraneous contingencies, then the prospect of 
arriving at an unproblematic operational definition appears to recede in proportion to the 
complexity. 
At some points Locke appears to consider a gradualist, developmental approach to the 
acquisition of reason: 'age and reason as they grow up loosen (the bonds of the parental 
subjection) till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal. 65 He 
advocates reasoning with children66 
(W)hen I talk of reasoning, I do not intend any other but such as is suited to 
the child's capacity and apprehension. No body can think a boy of three or 
seven years old should be argued with as a grown man. Long discourses 
and philosophical reasonings, at best, amaze and confound, but do not 
instruct children. When I say, therefore, that they must be treated as 
rational creatures, I mean, that you should make them sensible, by the 
mildness of your carriage, and the composure even in your correction of 
them, that what you do is reasonable in you, and useful and necessary for 
them; and that it is not out of caprichio, passion or fancy, that you 
command or forbid them anything. 67 
What Locke advocates is closer to a concept of reasonableness than it is to a concept of 
rationality. Not only should children be given only 'such reasons as their age and 
understanding are capable of`68 (an eminently reasonable principle) but he opposes the use 
of 'reasonable' to 'capfidhio, passion or fancy', not, as one would expect if he was 
advocating a purely cognitivist rationality, to 'irrational' or'non-rational'. 
Rationality has been suggested as a criterion for deciding whether a person is suitable 
subject for paternalist intervention and as a demarcation between adult and child because 
'a rationally selected action has a greater chance of increasing the agent's stock of good 
than an action which has not been rationally considered'. 69 This depends on what one 
means by a 'stock of good'. Purely rational calculation may indicate ways in which I may, 
for example, increase my personal wealth but only at the cost of my personal relations. 
How does one rationally choose between these outcomes? What we need is a reasonable 
consideration of the alternatives in terms which are broader, but less liable to quantification 
and logical analysis, than in a purely rational approach. 
Scarre proposes what he calls a 'reasonable rule'for paternalist intervention: 
65 Locke, 'Paternal Power, 243. 
66 Locke, John, Some Thoughts ConcerniM Education, Cambridge, University Press, 1899,60/1. 
67 bid., 60/1. 
68 Ibid., 61. 
69 Scarre, G., 'Children and Paternalism', PhilosoRh 55,1980,123. 
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the patemalist should intervene in an individual's affair's only when there is 
reason to believe his decisions are not based on rational considerations, 
and that they are likely to result in a diminution of his stock of existing 
good, or under-achievement of his possible stock of good. 70 
Who is to decide, and what are to be the cdteria, on what is one's 'stock of existing good' or 
'possible stock of good'? And if 'rational considerations' are to be the sole, or even pdmary, 
cdteda where does this leave those whose decisions are taken on the basis of religious 
belief, political commitment, aesthetic preferences, personal affection? If 'rational' means a 
narrow calculation of what is in one's immediate self-interest then these other 
considerations have no force. To suffer or die for one's lover, Mend, people, country, 
beliefs is not a rational action. 
Harris acknowledges that many personal decisions are not made on rational grounds and 
that of those which are, many are not good decisionS. 71 He refers to Scarre's two hallmarks 
of rationality: rational actions are those which aim at maximising the utility of the agent, and 
they are part of a systematic approach. 72 Harris rightly notes that this is really one test 
@since acting rationally and being a utilitarian with respect to one's own good turn out to be 
one and the same'. He continues 'I am unhappy with Scarre's narrow account of rationality 
which seems to make self-sacrifice, lack of competitiveness, and modesty, etc., 
73 irrational'. 
Hobson74 suggests that the three 'essential elements' rational decision making are 
being able to decide what are one's goals or where one's interests lie, 
knowing the means towards achieving these goals or realizing these 
interests, and knowing how to act accordingly given one's own particular 
capacities. 75 
Those who would be unable to achieve these minimal conditions for rational choice (i. e. 
knowledge of one's interests, knowledge of effective means, competence in implementing 
the means) include those who are too young to understand the issues involved; those who 
are temporarily excluded because of temporary mental disturbance; those who are 
permanently mentally deficient. A further source of disqualification would be ignorance of 
the facts of the particular case. 76 
70 Ibid., 123 (emphasis added). 
71 Harris, 'The Political Status of Children', 40. 
72 Scarre, 'Children and Paternalism', 12314. By these criteria a squirrel hoarding nuts is rational. 
73 Harris, 'The Political Status of Children, 40. 
74 Hobson, Peter, 'Another Look at Paternalism', Journal of Applied Philosoghy, 1,2,293-304. 
75 Ibid., 297. 
76 Are we ever assured of possession of all of the facts in particular cases? 
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It should be noted that the elements in Hobson's definition are hierarchical: given 
knowledge of the facts one must know one's goals or interests before the question of the 
means is appropriate, one must know the relevant means before the question of taking 
action is appropriate, and one must be in a position to take suitable action given a 
knowledge of one's relevant capacities. So rationality involves knowledge of the relevant 
facts, knowing one's interests, being able to discern means/ends relations, liberty, and the 
capacity to act. It is far from being a simple cdtedon. 
Rational and reasonable 
A less stringent criterion, and one which is closer to the realities of human experience, may 
be reasonableness. The development of the capacity of reason takes two forms: rationality 
and reasonableness. These are not the same. Rationality is the ability to calculate the 
cause and effect relations between things - quantities, events - and is quite independent of 
the value of the things in themselves. Even very small children are capable of some 
rationality. The prudential behaviour of a four-year-old who refrains from a particular course 
of action because she anticipates an unpleasant outcome can be legitimately described as 
rational behaviour: it is certainly behaviour based on a logical and calculating thought 
process. If this is rational behaviour then we must ask: how much rationality is required to 
qualify as a competence criterion? We are not, at present, in possession of a 
comprehensive calculus of rationality (whether we ever shall be is another question) which 
would enable us to quantify it. 77 But, even if we were, where would we draw the line 
between sufficient or insufficient rationality without begging the perennial question of the 
adult/child distinction? Or is there some critical point at which one simply is rational? That 
is, is there a sudden qualitative change from non-rational to rational analogous to the 
transformation of water into steam? (This appears to be implied in traditional doctrines of 
age of reason. ) Developmental theories such as Kohlberg's, however, show that 'pure' 
rationality (the development of universal ethical principles) does not ever fully displace 
'lowee forms of motivation and justification. 
We have seen that cognition and language are closely linked. Children are bom with a 
capacity for language and for non-verbal thought. This does not mean that they are bom 
with a language but that they are sufficiently equipped, physiologically and cognitively, to 
acquire a language. From their earliest age infants manifest this capacity in their vocal 
behaviour. Left to their own devices, however, children would not progress to the mastery 
of speech in any language, for human language is a social phenomenon and can be 
mastered only in a linguistic environment. In an analogous way children are bom with the 
77 1 do not consider IQ tests as tests of rationality per se although they may be a significant move 
in the direction of 
such a test. 
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capacity to reason. It is only through the social interaction of thought and language, and the 
internalisation (or appropriation) of public, interpersonal communication that the child 
becomes capable of structured thinking. 78 
The calculations of the young child may be erroneous and his predictions mistaken, but 
even mistaken calculation is still calculation. The small child can reason (even if the 
reasoning is faulty) in the same way as a young child can speak (even if the utterance is 
grammatically flawed, syntactically incorrect, or factually untrue). Human development is a 
matter of learning the appropriate application of the power of reason as it is a matter of 
learning the appropriate application of the power of speech. 
Scientific rationality, which is the dominant paradigm in industrialized societies, is not the 
only legitimate form of rationality. Any thought process which involves a calculation of the 
optimum cause/effect relation within a given cultural belief set is a rational calculation. 79 
Western rationalism has appropriated the notion of rationality so that thought processes 
which do not conform to the scientific rationalist paradigm are considered to be iffational 
thought rather than an alternative form of rational thought. So although we do not any 
longer consider placing dishes of smoking meat in designated situations at appropriate 
times to be rational behaviour, within the context of a different belief set it is a calculated 
effort to influence events and hence, within that belief set, rational. 80 Just as we learn our 
specific language from within the context of our own linguistic community we learn our 
rationality from within the belief set and practices of our own community. 
Rational behaviour is just adaptive behaviour of a sort which roughly 
parallels the behaviour, in similar circumstances, of the other members of 
some relevant community. Irrationality, in both physics and ethics, is a 
M See An Introduction to AgotsEy, Harry Daniels, ed., London, Routledge, 1996, especially Daniels, Harry, 
'Introduction: Psychology in a Social World', 1-27, and Minick, Norris, 'The Development of Vygotskys Thought: an 
Introduction to Thinking and SpMh', 28-52. 
79 See Evans-Pritchard, E. E., Witchcraft. Oracles. and Magic Among the Azande, abridged, Introduction by Eva 
Gillies, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976, and Polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, 2nd. 
edition, London, 1962,286-292 for an account of the internal consistency and rationality of 
Zande beliefs. Taylor 
(Taylor, Charles, Philosophical Papqrs Part 2: Philosophy and the Human ScienM, Cambridge, University Press, 
1985,134-151) argues that other cultures cannot be accused of irrationality (it 'seems a foolish as well as an arrogant 
thing to say) but we can at the same time argue that the consequences of our form of rationality are superior 
in effect to 
others' in that they deliver a superior form of life (in particular control over the forces of nature). 
80 The predominant world-view in modem industrial societies is the naturalistic world-view which 
is the basis of 
science. Differences in world-view are not due to qualitative differences between 
the working processes of the mincr. 
On the contrary, Ihe kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modem science'. 
Levi Strauss, C. 
Structural AnthropgjQgy, Jacobson and Schoepf, trans., New York, 1963,230. It is not that the thought process of 
the 
naturalistic conceptual framework are superior to others (for what does 
'superior' mean in this context? ) but that it is 
preferable to others in that it 'opens up such a noble vista of the natural order of 
things ... and establishes so much more 
decent and responsible relationships between human beings. ' Polanyi, 
M., Science. Faith. and Society, 2nd. edition, 
London, 1964,26. Alternative conceptual frameworks lead to less human and less responsible 
life-views. 
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matter of behaviour that leads one to abandon, or be stripped of, 
membership in such a community. 81 
The question of which version of rationality is better makes as little sense as asking which 
is the better natural language. We may say that the way of life represented by a particular 
belief set (with a concomitant form of rationality) is preferable to another. But in either case 
there is a rationality appropriate to the belief set in question. So the choice is not between 
rationality and iffationality but between different forms of rationality, or between what is 
rational and what is reasonable. 
Ryle82 has argued that philosophers have adopted a narrow exclusionary conception of 
thinking (rationality) which is not true to the reflective life of ordinary individual men and 
women. The scholar's theoretical reason has no cause for precedence over the practical 
reason of everyday life. Theoretical reason is, in Ryle's words, 'thinking that has achieved a 
sort of autonomy'. 83 It is more methodical, has stricter standards of rigour and evidence, is 
more general and objective; it has, in short, its own disciplines. Our tendency to equate 
rationality with logical reasoning is inadequate. Even the professional scholar (whatever her 
discipline) manifests more intellectual virtues than logical rigour. 84 
The preoccupation of philosophers with theoretical reasons or justifications 
has often induced them to treat practical reasons and justifications as mere 
varieties or off-shoots of theoretical reasons, as if all scruples and all 
carefulness reduced, somehow, to theorists scruples and theorists 
carefulness. 85 
The rational is distinct from the reasonable. 86 People are rational insofar as they use 
powers of deliberation and judgement in pursuing their own ends and interests: rationality 
determines how the ends and interests are selected, adopted, affirmed, and prioritized. The 
rational selection of means is guided by beliefs about the effectiveness of means to ends. 
81 Rorty, Richard, 'Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism', Journal of Philosol2hy, 80,10,1983,586. Williams refers to 
the 'rationalistic conception of rationality' which 'comes ... from social 
features of the modem world, which impose on 
personal deliberation and on the idea of practical reason itself a model drawn from a particular understanding of public 
rabonaft This understanding requires in principle every decision to be based on grounds that can 
be discursively 
explained'. (Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philosoph , Fontana 
Press, 1985,18. ) 
82 Ryle, G., 'A Rational Animal', in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, eds., Education and the Develogment o 
Reason, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972,176-193. 
83 Ibid., 188 
84 Ibid., 191 
85 Ibid., 192. In the same volume Black (Black, Max, 'Reasonablenese, in R. F. Dearden, 
P. H. Hirst, R. S. Peters, eds., 
Education and the Development of Reason, London, Routledge & Kogan 
Paul, 1972,194-207) takes 'rational' to be'a 
mere stylistic variant upon 'reasonable'. (194) That he is mainly concerned with 
'rational' as I understand it is evident 
from his conclusion that 'A man will be acting reasonably to the extent that 
he tries to form a clear view of the end to be 
achieved and its probable value to him, assembles the best information about available 
means, their probable efficiency 
and the price of failure, and in the light of all this chooses the course of action most 
strongly recommended by good 
reasons'. 205. 
86 Rawls, John, Politi al Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993,48-54 
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Nothing in the notion of rationality debars the rational agent from having interests or 
affections other than the self i. e. rational agents are not necessarily purely self-regarding 
(although they may be) or self-interested. What the purely rational agent lacks, however, is 
the peculiar form of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in 
fair co-operation as such, and to do so on terms that others as equals might 
reasonably be expected to endorse. 87 
Reasonable people are prepared to engage in dialogue with others about the pdnciples and 
standards which might constitute fair terms of co-operation between them; they are 
prepared to abide by agreed principles and standards if they are assured that others will do 
the same. They are prepared to discuss others' proposals regarding fair terms and to see 
others' points of view and give them fair consideration. They are motivated by the notion of 
'a social world in which they, as free and equal, can co-operate with others on terms all can 
accept'. 88 To engage in co-operative schemes only insofar as it suits one's own interests is 
rational, not reasonable. Similarly, to be prepared to violate fair terms whenever it is in 
one's interests is rational calculation, not reasonableness. 
The reasonable is not derived from the rational (although Rawls thinks it may not be 
possible to prove this): they are complementary ideas. 
Merely reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they wanted to 
advance by fair co-operation; merely rational agents lack a sense of justice 
and fail to recognise the independent validity of the claims of others. 89 
The reasonable is public in a way the rational is not. It is through reasonableness that we 
engage with others as equals and 'stand ready to propose, or to accept, as the case may 
be, fair terms of co-operation with them'. 90 Being reasonable is being prepared to work out 
an agreed 'framework for the public social world'. It is reasonable to expect that such a 
framework will be endorsed and acted on by all, provided we can rely on others to do the 
same. 
Reasonable disagreement9l results from a number of causes: the complexity of the 
evidence relevant to any particular case, the weighting we attribute to this evidence even 
when we agree on its relevance, the indeterminacy of our political and moral concepts, the 
difficulty of choosing between conflicting normative considerations on both sides of an 
87 Rawls, Polftical Liberalism, 51 
88 Ibid., 50. 
89 Ibid., 52. 
90 Ibid., 53. Bubers Insfinct for communion' which is the essential prerequisite for 'sharing in an undertaldng and 
entering into mutuality' (_Between Man and Man, 113) is substantively related to reasonableness rather 
than rationality. 
91 There appears to be no possibility of rafional disagreement given the acceptance of shared a)doms 
and mutually 
accepted procedures. Dissent in such cases can only be irrational. Given the premises of 
the classical syllogism I 
cannot deny that Socrates is a man without being irrational (or, at least, arational. 
) 
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issue, the reality that we are necessarily confined to a selection of all the possible moral 
and political values that might be realized. For present purposes however, the most 
important consideration is that 
the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is 
shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our 
total experiences must always differ. Thus, in a modem society with its 
numerous offices and positions, its various divisions of labour, its many 
social groups and their ethnic variety, citizens' total experiences are 
disparate enough for their judgements to diverge, at least to some degree, 
on many if not most cases of any significant complexity. 92 
Taking this distinction as a starting point what can we say about the relationship between 
rationality and the child/adult demarcation? 
In the first place rationality is purely a matter of calculation regarding ends and means. It 
can be either a purely self-interested calculation or a calculation regarding social utility. In 
either case it does not require consulting the views of others, it is sufficient that it is 
consistent with its own premises. On this view a small child can be rational and a utilitarian 
of the ethical hedonist stripe. A small child can make a rational prudential judgement (albeit 
in limited circumstances) regarding the balance of (her personal) happiness over 
unhappiness. 
Even a more rigorous and precise definition of rationality (Piaget's for example) lacks 
relevance to the kind of competence we require for ordering our affairs in the social 
world. 93 Anyway we know that some adults do not ever reach the final stage in the 
Piagetian scheme of cognitive development: the stage of formal operations. What are we 
to do with them? The concept of 'rationality' itself cannot provide us with a clear answer. 
Perhaps a 'clear' answer is not possible but a conception of reasonableness which connects 
with such things as sympathetic moral engagement, knowledge, understanding, autonomy, 
and moral responsibility, provides a more promising standard of difference since each of 
the components listed requires developmental time and accumulated experience before 
they can be collectively deployed in relevant ways. 
What is to count as paternalism 
Hobson94 proposes five conditions which must be met if an action is to count as 
paternalism. A is acting paternalistically toward S if and only if A's behaviour 
(correctly) 
92 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 56f7 
93 For a fuller discussion of the meaning of rationality in relation to educational objectives 
see Michael Bonnett. Children 
Thinking: Promoting Understanding in the Pdma[y School, London: Cassell, 1994. 
94 Hobson, 'Another Look at Paternalism'. His analysis of the conditions for paternalism 
follows Gert, B., Culver, C. M., 
'Paternalistic Behaviour, in Cohen, M., Nagel, T., Scanlon, T., eds., Medicine and 
Moral Philg§goy, New Jersey, 
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indicates that A believes that: (1) his action is for S's good; (2) he is qualified to act on S's 
behalf ot'ý5 he is in a better position than S to promote the latter's interests; (3) he is 
justified in acting on S's behalf independently of S's past, present, or immediately 
forthcoming (free, informed) consent; (4) his action involves violating (or doing that which 
will require him to violate) S's rights in some way; 96 (5) S believes (perhaps falsely) that S 
generally knows what is for his own good. 
How does this apply to the parent-child relationship, the relationship of primary 
paternalism? Most parents sincerely believe (most of the time) that they are acting in the 
best interests, of their child. So the first condition is met. They further believe that they are 
qualified (in terms of obligation, competence, and experience) to act in behalf of the child 
as well as being in a better position than anyone else to promote the child's interests. So 
the second condition is met. Certainly parents sincerely believe that they are justified in 
acting in their child's behalf independently of whether the child has given, is giving, or will 
eventually give (free, informed) consent to the present restriction or intervention. For the 
future oriented consent argument is not decisive. Parents act in the hope (Dworkin's wager) 
that their child will grow up to be the kind of adult who will give retrospective assent to their 
present actions. Whether, in the event, the child does so or not cannot be relevant since 
the rightness of present decisions must be decided now. So the third condition is met. 
However neither the fourth nor the fifth conditions are relevant to the parent-child 
relationship. Parents do not believe that their intervention in behalf of the best interests of 
their child involves violating a moral rule (or doing that which will require the violation of a 
moral rule). On the contrary, the parental obligation of care for the child is itseff the relevant 
moral rule in the circumstances. This is one crucial difference between primary paternalism 
and metaphorical paternalism. Hobson's qualification that the action involves violating (or 
doing that which will require the violation of) the child's rights poses a problem, however. It 
can be argued that the purpose of the parental intervention is to fulfil the welfare rights of 
the child, so that the question of violation does not arise at all. To consider the parental 
intervention a violation of the child's freedom rights actually begs the question as to 
whether the child has such rights independently of the parental obligations. For the crucial 
dilemma in relation to the freedom rights of children is whether (and if so when) the child's 
putative freedom rights over-rule the parental obligation to treat the child paternalistically. 
Princeton University Press, 1981, with one 'amplification' and one 'qualification'. I have changed the ordering of these 
conditions to suit the present argument. 
95 This is Hobson's amplification. 
96 This is Hobson's qualification. Originally this read 'his action involves violating a moral rule (or doing that which will 
require him to do so) with regard to S'. Hobson later declares that 'paternalism as it is most commonly understood 
( ... ) 
aNvays involves a violation of human rights and thus directly or indirectly harms the sulýect 
in some way. Hobson, 294 
Paqe 182 
Chapter 8: Patemalism 
The notion that in imposing requirements on their children parents are in some way 
violating a liberty is strange. Certainly it could not be consistently argued that parents who 
take their infant child on their choice of holiday are violating any liberty, for the child has no 
power of choosing an alternative. This is not because the child has been denied that power 
by scheming parents but because the relevant power has not yet been developed. Similady 
it would be nothing short of perverse to suggest that parents are violating a liberty by 
obliging their child to acquire an education (by attending school, say). What 'liberty? What 
are the alternatives? While there have been approaches to limit the imposition of 
compulsory formal schooling97 or state schooling9B I am not aware of any conclusive 
argument that parents should refrain from requiring their children to acquire an education 
altogether. 99 In general parents are aware that if they are to enhance their children's 
capacity for liberty and the concomitant capacities (knowledge, understanding, 
responsibility, deferral of gratification) some form of prolonged educational experience is 
necessary. 
The fifth condition might be used to mark the beginning of the child's transition to 
adulthood. It is arguably part of the definition of autonomy and freedom that the individual 
comes to believe that he generally knows what is for his own good. This belief may be 
short-sighted, ill-informed, irrational, and unreasonable but none-the-less it is a belief that 
generates consistent self-directed activity on the part of the individual. 
Given his analysis Hobson suggests two criteria which are 'jointly necessary and together 
sufficient' if paternalism is to be justified. These are that 
(i) the subject is not able to make a rational decision about his own best 
interests by virtue of some special feature about him which prevents 
rational deliberation in the case in question, or he is ignorant of relevant 
facts; 
(ii) the paternalistic interference is necessary to avoid serious harm 
befalling the subject and the harm thus avoided outweighs any harm (loss 
of liberty etc. ) brought about by the interference. 100 
The first criterion is certainly met in the case of infants or very young children and arguably 
even in the case of adolescents but it should be added that with the effects of an 
97 Illich, Ivan, Deschooling SocieA Penguin Books, 
98 There is a wide range of apologias in favour of private schooling (see Gilles, 'On Educating 
Children', 937-1034) and 
home schooling. 
99 Although Gutmann uses the possibility that they might as a hypothetical case. See 
Gutmann, A., 'Children, 
Paternalism and Education: a Liberal Argument, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9,4,1980,33B-358. 
But see Nordenbo, 
Sven Erik, 'Against Education', Journal of Philosogby of Education, 30,3,1996,401-413, which oubines and analýyses 
the ideas of the Movement Against Education (do An&Padagogik). It is suggested 
that the Movement is a critique of 
the conduct of formalised education rather than a proposal of a sustainable alternative. 
1 OC) Hobson, 'Another Look at Paternalism', 297 
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appropriate educational experience rationality and reasonableness (under some 
description) is increasing (this, after all, is the point of education) and ignorance of relevant 
facts is diminishing. An educational enterprise may be criticised in terms of its failure to 
bring about these results but the fact that some educational enterprises may fail in this 
programme of increasing rationality and reducing ignorance does not refute the central 
point. Parents coerce their children (and states coerce parents to coerce their children) to 
undergo education in the belief that the experience will maximise their opportunities to live 
more rewarding and satisfying lives. They know certainly that the absence of such 
experience will inevitably reduce their children's future well-being significantly. 
The second cdterion appears to be fulfilled when the harm to be avoided by the 
paternalistic intervention outweighs the harm that may be caused by it. 101 The problem with 
this criterion is its vagueness; it provides no operational definition to guide substantive 
decisions in individual cases. How, and according to what values, are we to compare 
alternative harms, for example? Where the two conditions are 'clearly satisfied it could 
even be argued that the use of paternalism would not only be legitimate but morally 
obligatory'. 102 How can this be reconciled with the notion that paternalism always involves 
the violation of a human right (condition 4)? Rights are very strange things indeed if they 
can be over-ruled by a moral obligation to the individual claiming the right. 
It would be more correct to say that in the case of children there is no moral or rights 
violation and that the issue of a conflict between the freedom of the child and the 
obligations of the parent do not become sharply defined, other things being equal, until 
adolescence. It is at this point that the individual's claim to know what is best for him or 
herself begins to come into overt conflict with the primary paternalism of the parents. 
Hobson's analysis illustrates at least one anomaly which arises when metaphorical 
paternalism is taken as the paradigm case. The context within which primary paternalism 
operates is not the same as its metaphorical derivative. His analysis appears to be correct 
in relation to paternalistic intervention in the lives of other adults. Such intervention does 
indeed conflict with their presumptive right to make their own decisions and to plan their 
own lives. But there are no such presumptive rights in the case of infants or 
children before adolescence. On a wide range of criteria (rationality, reasonableness, 
knowledge, understanding, experience, maturity) they lack the capacity to form a life plan 
for themselves. There is no infringement of right or liberty since liberty has not yet been 
established (that is, consistently asserted). By taking metaphorical paternalism as 
the 
starting point and presuming it to be sufficient to cover all cases we create the problem of 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., 3()l. 
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trying to justify paternalism towards children in the same terms as we justify it in the case of 
adults. This entails presuming rights and liberty in the case of children where they do not 
(yet) exist. 
A related feature of this approach is that it completely ignores the affective context of 
primary paternalism. Parents do not simply operate out of a sense of duty or moral 
obligation with regard to their children. This is not to say that they do not have duties and 
moral obligations. They have, of course, but these become manifest as such only when the 
normal context of loving care is absent or deficient in some way. 
The conclusion that there is no clear distinction between children and adults which will 
un problematically justify paternalism in the case of the former without at the same time 
making it less controllable in the case of the latter appears inevitable only when we take 
metaphorical paternalism as the standard case. This leads inevitably to subjecting children 
to the same considerations as adults, considerations which are not relevant to children (at 
least until adolescence) because they are not adults. It is important that, in all matters 
relating to primary paternalism, we remember that children are not adults, that paternalism 
is the natural form of parental relation to the child, that the purpose of the primary 
paternalism is to promote the development of the child's well-being (including autonomy), 
and that metaphorical paternalism is parasitic on primary paternalism. When we begin with 
a consideration of metaphorical paternalism, as if it were the paradigm case then we have 
difficulty justifying the distinctions necessary in dealing with children. If, however, we begin 
(as we logically should) with primary paternalism then the distinctions are already reflected 
in the difference between children and adults. 
Is the paternalist dilemma irresolvable? 
Schrag103 does not want to argue against paternalistic intervention in the case of children: 
he wants a critedon or pdnciple which will allow us to justify paternalistic intervention in the 
case of children while not opening the door to such intervention in the case of adults. 104 He 
attempts a defence of current arrangements. The purpose of these arrangements, he 
believes, is the utilitarian maximization of human happiness. Those with 'some experience 
and understanding of the wodd' are more likely to be the best judges of what will make 
them happy. Those whose understanding and experience is limited are less likely to be the 
best judges of what will make them happy. 
103 '7714L Ckýlv il-, ne 14a,, -ai ' 
104 He appears to have forgotten the'moral distortion' which he claims paternalism 
in relation to children represents in 
the human moral order. Ibid., 169. 
Paqe 185 
Chapter 8: Patemalism 
In the case of children the chances of their achieving happiness if left to 
pursue their own good in their own way are slim. They must submit for a 
time to the paternalistic rule of others. 105 
It is an easy move from this declaration to accepting that the establishment of a precise 
point of transition between childhood dependence and adult autonomy'can safely be left to 
convention'. 106 Schrag is not happy with his'solution: 
If the freedom of some may justifiably be limited by others under certain 
circumstances may not our freedom be justifiably limited in analogous 
circumstances? So the spectre of extensive paternalism beyond childhood 
will continue to haunt US. 107 
Reed and Johnston are cdtical of Schrag because he simply offers a 'new argument for the 
traditional view, whose incoherence and arbitradness he himself exposes', 101B that 
patemalism is acceptable in the case of children and unacceptable in the case of adults. 
They conclude that 'the problem is not with the traditional arguments but with the tradition 
itself. What is distorted in the traditional account is 'the fact that, from a very early age, 
children have essentially the same rights as adults; and what it conceals is the failure of 
Westem morality to provide for those dghts'. 109 
This is not an argument. As is so often the case in liberationist rhetoric it is a declaration. It 
is, as so many such declarations are, characterised by vagueness where we might 
reasonably expect specificity. We are given no real indication as to what a very early age 
might be, nor an explanation of the coyness of the phrase 'essentially the same rights as 
adults'. The phrase 'a very early age' on its own is so vague as to be useless. It is worse 
than useless: its rhetorical force is to mislead us into thinking that there is an unproblematic 
'very early age'. Given that the span of childhood as conventionally defined goes from birth 
to eighteen 'a very early age' might be any time from birth to ten, twelve, or fourteen. 110 
When excluded categories of adults demanded that they be treated in a fashion similar to 
white males they sought the same rights as white males, not the more vague 'essentially 
the same rights'. It is important for liberationists to leave this vagueness, however. For, on 
the one hand they would not wish to demand equal rights for some categories of children 
(infants, say) or certain rights (such as equal access to alcohol, powerful cars, freedom not 
105 Ibid., 174. This is not a solution to the problem. The problem is to find a morally relevant principle of 
differentiation 
between children and adults which will jusbfy paternalistic intervention in the case of the 
former without threatening the 
freedom of the latter. It is not a solution to declare that there is one. And anyway how 
does this differ from the classic 
Millsean position? 
106 Ibid., 175. 
107 Ibid., 176. 
1M Reed, T. M., Johnston, P., 'Children's Liberation', Philosoph 55,19so, 26314. 
1 (ý9 ibid., 266 (emphasis added). 
110 Would fourteen be 'a very early age' to give children the vote, the right to marry, enlist 
in the army, drive high- 
powered motor-cycles, and so forth? 
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to be coerced to attend school) for most categories of children. On the other hand by 
refusing to be specific with regard to age or individual rights they can avoid the difficult 
issue of drawing the line that Spencer, their intellectual predecessor, called for. Those who 
maintain that whilst children have Gertain rights, their rights are not equal 
with those of men, are Galled upon to draw the line, to explain, to define. 
They must say what rights are common to children and adults and why. They must say where the rights of adults exceed those of children, and 
why-111 
Wikler addresses Schrag's dilemma in terms of the treatment of the mentally retarded. If 
we (the 'normal' people of the world) feel that we are justified in paternalist action towards 
the mentally retarded then, by whatever justification we care to use, those who are 
intellectually superior are similarly justified in paternalistic action towards us. This point is 
directly relevant to the adult/child dichotomy 
It would seem that if the intellectual superiority of normal persons 
legitimates their controlling the decisions of the mildly retarded, the same 
difference in intellect would justify their being regulated by the gifted. Our 
right to self-direction, however, is a right to be free from constraint by any 
person ... even when our decisions are poor, and when others happen to know better. We are in the position, then, of using relative intellectual 
superiority as our rationale for regulating the retarded, while rejecting the 
possibility of the same rationale being imposed upon us. Unless the 
apparent inconsistency is resolved, we shall have to either find new 
foundations for our paternalistic policy towards the mildly mentally 
handicapped or abandon it. 1 12 
What would be the effect of substituting 'adult' for 'normal persons' and 'child' for 'mildly 
retarded', 'mentally retarded', or 'retarded' in this passage? We would see at once that 
Wikler is referring to a category of aduffs. If we were to extend his argument to children it 
would be illicit since they are not adults. 113 
We must always leave open the possibility of an adult's needing our paternalistic 
intervention. Though we might agree that most adults are the best judges of their own 
interests it is in the definition of the most that the trouble arises. Under what circumstances 
are we entitled - or even morally obliged - to intervene in the affairs of an adult in a 
paternalistic way? We cannot say 'never' for there are too many real and conceivable 
occasions when we feel intuitively that we must intervene. If paternalistic intervention does 
111 Spencer, Herbert, Social Statics, London, Williams and Norgate, 1868,193. 
112 Wilder, Daniel, 'Paternalism and the Mildly Retardecr, in Sartorious, Paternalism, 85. 
113 Many of the analogies used in the debate about the moral or political differences between adults and children 
depend on misleading analogies: Schrag's own allegory of the Tludas and Dlihcs (The Child in the Moral Order) has 
force only because we are temporarily deceived into considering the Dlihcs as a group of adults. Similarly Harris's 
example of an alien race of beings who are 'naive in comparison with ourselves' (Harris, 'The Political 
Status of 
Children') confuses the issue by comparing alternative sodal groups rather than the adult/child distinction found in any 
social group. 
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lead to 'the vilest exploitation' in which the recipients of the paternalistic concern 'lost both 
their freedom and their happiness'114 we would have to reply that exploitation is not a 
function of paternalism simpficiter but of the gross misuse of power by the paternalist. 
Maybe Ihe spectre of extensive paternalism beyond childhood' shou/d 'continue to haunt 
us'. Maybe the problem must be left unresolved to allow for concerned intervention in cases 
of adults who can no longer (be relied upon to) make correct choices for themselves. The 
price we pay for this openness is the possibility that it will lead to abuse. We make a 
presumption of adults' capacity to use freedom appropriately - even if, in some cases, its 
exercise leads to self-harm. But would we really allow a loved one to exercise without 
restraint a freedom which, on balance of probability, would lead to his or her being harmed? 
Would we not judge, or at least consider as a moral option, that intervention was the lesser 
oftwo evils? 
The potential for abuse seems more manageable if we remember that freedom is a 
condition of life which we acquire, hold and exercise in a condition of continuous struggle. If 
unwarranted paternalistic intervention is a possibility in the case of a given adult or 
category of adults it is for them to assert their freedom in opposition to the paternalist 
intervention. Maybe we could say that if they accept the intervention they require it? Or that 
the fact that they accept it means have gone beyond the exercise of autonomy. Freedom is 
asserted and paternalism declines at the same time: they are not two different things which 
co-incidentally happen together: they are two aspects of the same thing, the power relations 
between the parties involved. When the franchise is accorded to a new category it is 
because they have demanded it: it is at once an assertion of their maturity and a 
declaration of their freedom. If 5-year olds could muster sufficient political force to acquire 
the right to vote then they would no longer be treated paternalistically in that regard. But of 
course they don't. If some one or group other than 5 year-olds acquired the vote on their 
behalf then that would not be a sign of autonomy but the displacement of one paternalism 
by another. This is a fundamental weakness of the position of Holt and other liberationists: 
it is not children (undifferentiated) who are looking for, much less demanding, liberation 
from adult paternalism but adults who are seeking it for them. We do not know whether the 
wishes or preferences of the children have even been consulted in relation to the objective, 
the means, or the selection of their putative spokespersons. The presumption of speaking 
on behalf of children and demanding what we think they want (or might be good for them) is 
itself paternalistic. It differs from the conventional adult/child relationship only in terms of its 
specific programme. ' 15 
114 Schrag, 'The Child in the Moral Ordee, 176. 
115 Holt, for example, writes: 'I make myself - uninvited -a spokesman for children in this matter 
because they have so 
few other spokesmen and are in so poor a position to speak for themselves. ' Escapg from Childhood, 
17. 
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The transition between childhood and adulthood comes as the growing individual realises 
that to acquire freedom one must assert it: this at least would explain the perennial conflict 
between parents and adolescents over control of the adolescent's life. So there must be two 
points of departure: the difference between the literal and the metaphorical use of 
'paternalism', and the redefinition of freedom to a more dynamic mode which was 
attempted in the preceding chapter. 
It is an inescapable feature of the debate regarding the justification of primary paternalism 
that we address the issue of the difference between adults and children. The crux of this 
issue is not an inability to define 'children, or to point to real (and in some instances 
measurable) differences between the generality of people of different ages, but the political 
problem of determining, for a wide range of practical purposes, the point at which people 
will be deemed to be capable of assuming adult responsibility. 
Summary 
Paternalism involves interfering with the liberty of others in order to promote their welfare. 
If children were freed in the long term from the beneficent coercion of adults they would not 
survive, at least under any understanding of normal human functioning) 16 
If adults do not have an adequate conception of the child's present and future interests then 
who has? Paternalism, expressed through adult prohibitions and imperatives, does not 
preclude children's happiness and self-esteem which are more likely to diminish if adult 
restraints are removed. Restraints in childhood establish the space and safety necessary 
for individual development. 
There is a difference between primary and metaphorical paternalism. The ideal context of 
primary paternalism is the loving care of the adult carer for the child. This emotional 
attachment is definitive of the parent-child relationship. Parental care is not a matter of 
duty; the primary motivation of the good parent is love for their child and concern for her 
welfare. This is the natural, and normal, context of primary paternalism. Metaphorical 
paternalism is dedvative in that it uses understandings of aspects of primary paternalism in 
order to describe and justify relationships which are not parental. What makes paternalism 
objectionable in the case of adults is that they are not children. 'Sincerely co-operative 
paternalism' attempts to help the individual develop long term competence and 
independence. 'Conflictful paternalism' aims at the maintenance of submission and 
dominance. 
116 We cannot overlook occasional cases of 'feral children'. 
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Learning from mistakes is more than a pedagogical shibboleth. Children need to make 
mistakes and to learn from them. The child must be allowed opportunities to act on her own 
initiative and judgement in relation to increasingly non-trivial matters even when we believe 
that she is mistaken. 
Paternalist treatment of children has been justified on several grounds, including their lack 
of rationality, knowledge, and understanding, their limited conception of their own interests, 
their limited capacity to defer gratification, their inability to formulate systematic purposes 
of action, and their lack of self-sufficiency and maturity. In addition it is argued that if the 
paternalistic intervention is successful the children concerned will come to consent to it at 
some future time. In any case the future well-being of the individual will be enhanced by 
promoting the capacity for autonomy and freedom even by paternalistic interventions. 
Thus, for example, paternalism is justified when goods (health or education, for example) 
which contribute to autonomy and freedom are promoted irrespective of the consent of the 
individual concerned. 
Rationality as a criterion on which to preclude paternalistic intervention is too narrow. Many 
of our most significant decisions are not made on rational grounds at all, and many of our 
rational decisions are not good decisions. In any case, even very small children are capable 
of prudential behaviour which can be legitimately described as rational, that is, guided by 
beliefs about the effectiveness of means to ends. Reasonableness is an alternative, and 
richer, criterion. It is less stringent and is closer to the realities of human experience. It 
allows for public engagement with others as equals, for mutually agreed purposes, in 
pursuit of shared values. 
An analysis of Hobson's five conditions for paternalistic action reveals that there are 
significant differences between paternalism in relation to children and in relation to adults. 
His proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for justified paternalism are not entirely 
congruent with the requirements of primary paternalism. The operational context of primary 
paternalism is not the same as that of its metaphorical derivative. It is disregard for the 
affective context, coupled with the parental mission to liberate the child when the capacities 
necessary to the exercise of reasonableness have been developed, which gives primary 
paternalism its unique (foundational) character. 
The conclusion that paternalism in relation to children cannot be justified without making it 
less controllable in the case of adults appears inescapable only when we take metaphorical 
paternalism as the paradigm case. This in turn leads inevitably to subjecting children to the 
same considerations as adults, considerations which are not relevant to children 
(at least 
until adolescence) because they are not adults. 
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A specific practical proposal that addresses the adult/child dichotomy is the proposal to 
extend the franchise. The lafter has heretofore been used, in effect, as a public 
endorsement of the adult-child distinction. Children have been systematically excluded 
from the democratic process as exercised in the universal franchise and treated as 
marginal members of the community. ' And since the passage from childhood to adulthood 
is not 'sharply demarcated 2, but gradual and highly variable from person to person, the 
exclusion is problematic. Who is eligible to pass from disfranchised childhood to 
enfranchised adulthood and on what basis can the eligibility judgement be made? 
Exclusion 
It is a matter of justice that people should possess a vote :3 'democracy requires that 
everyone should have the right to participate in making political decisions which will affect 
their lives. 4 The exclusion of children from political involvement is 'not simply the denial of 
citizen rights but the right to be a citizen,. 5 It is a 'clear example of the violation of the 
democratic principle that no individual or group should be subject to laws which they have 
16 not participated in making. As a consequence of this exclusion children are the only group 
in a democracy whose political rights are exercised on their behalf by others without any 
7 formal mechanism of restraint, accountability or democratic control . 
The ground for the exclusion is age, not incompetence (which might exclude many adults). 
Harris8 argues that we should consider'full political status' for children since 
If full political status is to be granted only to the competent, then a large 
and significant proportion of children must be granted full political status 
and a very great number of adults must be disenfranchised? 
1 Schrag, F., 'The Child's Status in the Democratic State', Political Theo[Y, 3,4,1975,441-57. 
2 It is not Ihe sort of metamorphosis manifested in the caterpillars becoming a butterfly', Ibid., 443. This view is an echo 
of John HoIrs assertion that 'There are no breaks or gaps in (the curve of human life). We do not, like some insects, 
suddenly turn from one kind of creature into another that is very different. Holt, J., Escap§ from Childhood, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975,21. Yet Holt's entire argument is based on the premise that there are 'greater and more 
important differences' between someone aged two and someone aged sixteen than there are between someone aged 
sixteen and someone aged twenty-two. 
3 Holt, Esca , 118-121. 
4 Frarildin, B., ed., The iRights of Children, London, Basil Blackwell, 1986,43. 
5 Ibid., 24. 
6 Ibid. 'No taxation without representation' is not a robust conception of participation. Electing representatives 
is a 
substitute for political participation not the same as participating in the democratic process 
itself. 
7 Ibid., 24. 
a Harris, J., 'The Political Status of Children', in K Graham, ed., Conternpqra[y Political Philosophy: Radical 
tudies, 
Cambridge University Press, 19132,35-55, 
" Ibid., 36. 
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A capacity criterion (a combination of 'competence and rationality) applied to children 
910 simply distinguishes 'the competent from the incompetent . Such a criterion will include 'a 
large and significant proportion of children'while excluding many adults: 
If freedom from control and full political status are things that we qualify for by the acquisition of a range of capacities, then as soon as anyone 
possesses those capacities they qualify, and if they never acquire them 
they never qualify. " 
Once we posses the relevant capacities we qualify for freedom from control and full 
political status. There are numerous children 'whom it would be implausible to regard as 
incompetent and numerous adults whom it would be implausible to regard as anything 
, 12 else. 
Under present arrangements children are denied political rights simply because they are 
13 
children, they acquire them simply by ceasing to be children . The exclusion is arbitrary 
and touches on many of the central concerns of political philosophy such as the nature of 
equality, the significance of rationality in human affairs, the distribution of power, the ways 
in which subordination is legitimated, the nature of democracy, the definition of citizenship, 
defensible grounds for exclusion from the political process, the possession of rights, and 
participation in the making of laws. 14 
Two possible justifications for exclusion could be advanced: the paternalist argument and 
the competence argument. 
The paternalistic argument holds that the young child is not affected by the decisions of the 
polity in the same way as adults would be and therefore does not have the same claim to 
participation in the electoral process. This view is false. Firstly, many of the decisions which 
affect the child's parents affect the child directly or indirectly; secondly, the child has a 
direct stake in many of the decisions taken (educational provision, welfare etc. ); and, 
thirdly, the child might be expected to live longer than his parents and therefore to be 
affected by the decisions taken over a longer period. 15 But can the child's concerns not 
safely be left to others? One of the convictions which sustains the present exclusion is that 
adults will, for the most part, consult the best interests of children in matter's affecting them. 
, Now while it is certainly true that it is 'dangerous 
for one class to have its interests entrusted 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 37. Any attempt to include some children on the basis of a capacity criterion will also exclude 
some adults. 
Unless proof of capacity will not be required of adults but only of children, 
in which case a significant distinction is still 
being made between the two groups. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Franklin, The Rights of Children, 24. 
14 Ibid., 25 
15 Schrag, 'The Child's Status in the Democratic State', 4445. 
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to another' 16 in the case of adults, to presume that it is so in the case of adult-child relations 
is to beg the question, In the case of the adult groups they are not children and therefore to 
treat them pate ma listically is to deny them the freedom and autonomy which in a relevant 
sense defines their adulthood. 
(M)odern writers are fond of describing the Political enfranchisement of 
children as a natural and inevitable follow-on to the enfranchisement of 
women and blacks, a move which women and blacks may care to ponder. We did not spend a couple of centuries arguing that we were not children but adults simply to be told that, in that case, children are too. 17 
Children are children: this is a fundamental datum of human experience. There is no 
reason to suppose that we can dispense with the long period of development and 
maturation necessary to become an adult human being capable of functioning with at least 
minimal competence in human society. The necessary knowledge, understanding, and 
skills take a long time to acquire. Their acquisition may be delayed by excessive 
protectionism but this raises the question not of adult-child equality but of a need for reform 
of child-rearing practices and, possibly, for an adjustment in the age of transition from child 
to adult. 
The second possible justification of exclusion is the child's alleged lack of appropriate 
competence. There is no generalised conception of competency and therefore there is no 
clear test for determining the competence of a child. Competence must be assessed in the 
context in which it is being exercised: thus the competence to vote, if there is such a thing, 
must be assessed in the context of exercising the franchise. 18 
There does not appear to be any general agreement on the capacity required in order to 
vote. If the vote is exercised to represent the general welfare then it will require a higher 
capacity than if it simply records a personal interest or preference. Likewise, the capacity 
required to judge general policy is not as great as that required to evaluate specific 
legislative enactments. 19 Schrag proposes, as a minimal qualification, the capacity to 
match correctly two major parties with their respective ideologies and major policy 
orientations even though the individual may not be able to translate these into specific 
,a Ibid., 445. And even the word 'entrusted' is too weak: for 'entrusted' denotes the free transfer of competence 
to 
another, as in conferring power of attorney, for example. In order to entrust a responsibility or power to another one must 
have it in the first place. It is the case of infants and children that they do not already have the power which adults 
presume to exercise on their behalf. While the adult may claim to be acting in the best interests of 
the child it is some 
adult's conception of this best interest which is decisive. 
17 Hughes, J., 'Thinking About Children', in Scarre, G., Children. Parents. and Politics, Cambridge University 
Press, 
1989,37. 
,a For a full discussion of competence in the legal context see Margulies, 
Peter, 'The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Clients 
Competence in Contexr, Fordharn Law Revie , 64,1996 
(A report on the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal 
Representation of Children, 1%5), 1473-15134. 
'0 Schrag, 'The Child's Status in the Democratic State', 446. 
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policy recommendations. 20 He does not anticipate that such a situation would yield a 
greater number of incompetent voters than existing arrangements 
. 
21 A maximal 
qualification - the ability to make a detailed evaluation of separate policy and legislative 
initiatives - involves such a burden of knowledge and judgement that the voter "who had not 
reached the highest level of cognitive functioning would be severely handicapped. 22 While 
empirical data on the actual political development of older children is inconclusive, it is 
clear that the kind of competence required to vote is not universal among adults nor 
universally absent among children. One advantage of the proposed test is that it would 
discriminate relevantly only against those who lack the capacity to vote (as required by the 
minimal formulation). This is its purpose. The present arrangement is unjust because it 
1 23 discriminates against 'capable voters under eighteen . The real question concems the 
basis 'for iincluding or excluding any particular person. o24 
This is not necessarily so. If the real question is the basis for including or including any 
particular person then the only plausibly consistent position is an individual test of 
competence of some description, some kind of 'customized, subjective determinations of 
25 personal capacity rather than traditional age-based classifications'. A general criterion, 
such as an age criterion, will not, cannot, be just to all individuals. The difficulty is that while 
it is relatively easy to come to an agreement on a general criterion in principle, it is 
extremely difficult to come to an agreement on a specific application of that principle (such 
as the age to be the cut-off point). A 'principle generally acceptable in its abstract 
20 Simple two-party electoral systems are rare, certainly in European countries. Even in the traditional U. S. 
Republican/Democrat division voters are required to decide between various positions within the general partisan 
categories. Who can easily differentiate globally between right wing Democrats and left-wing Republicans? 
21 Schrag, 'The Child's Status in the Democratic State', 452/3. It is not clear how existing arrangements yield 
incompetent voters, unless we count those who spoil their votes. The point is surely that present arrangements presume 
that because those under the voting age are actually incompetent to vote they are not voters at all; those over the age are 
presumed to be competent voters. 
22 Ibid., 450. It 'seems reasonable that either formulation (or any in between) would exclude most children below age ICY. 
Why does it 'seem reasonable'? Is there any evidence to show that some children under the age of ten are not capable 
of malcing even finer judgements than the minimal formulation requires? See the work of Gareth Matthews, (Diaiggues 
with Children, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1984, Philosophy and the Young Child, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1980) and other 'philosophy for children' programmes which appear to show that at least some children are 
capable of much finer metaphysical, epistemological, moral and political discriminations than they are usually given 
credit for. Accounts of the representative organisations of 'street children' in Brazil and the Philippines show that 
children are capable of organising and representing their own interests given appropriate adult support. See Hart, 
Roger, A., Children's ParticiMtion: from Tokenism to Cftize[jý "i, Innocenti Essays, 4, Florence, UNICEF, 1992, 
section 7,29-36. 
23 Schrag, 'The Child's Status in the Democratic State', 453. The ground for the discrimination is not relevant and 
therefore thediscrimination is unjust. Schrag, however, appears to miss the point: the excluded category are not voters. 
That is, they are not acknowiedged voters who have had their franchise withdrawn for arbitrary reasons; they belong to a 
category which has not had the vote. The problem is the universal exclusion of this category not the deprivation of the 
rights of individuals. 
24 Ibid, . 450,451. 25 Hafen, Bruce, C., Hafen, Jonathan 0., 'Abandoning Children to their Autonomy: the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child', Harvard International Law Journal, 37,2,1996,449-491,453. 
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26 formulation, commonly meets with uncertain and flexible application. In short the demand 
appears to be self-contradictory: we cannot consistently have a test of individual 
competence and an age criterion. The former will almost certainly rule out many who now 
qualify for the franchise, while the latter, no matter what age is selected, will exclude all 
under that age irrespective of their individual capacity. There does not appear to be a 
middle ground which will allow us to include all individuals on the basis of measured 
capacity while at the same time fairly protecting the prerogatives of those who qualify 
because of their age. (And this raises the question as to why their prerogatives should be 
protected anyway if they are demonstrably incompetent. ) 
Three objections to any proposal for a test of competence are possible. Firstly, a test 
cannot ensure that the capacity to vote will be accompanied by the determination to vote 
responsibly, that is, possession of the information and knowledge necessary to pass the test 
of competence does not guarantee maturity - which only comes with age, experience, and 
understanding. Secondly, while the age criterion is non-partisan, in that it discriminates 
against all who fall under the prescribed age-limit equally, a test requirement might well 
confer benefit along traditional lines of privilege by favouring certain groups. An age 
requirement does not do this. Finally, a test is open to interference by those who have 
control of the testing procedure : 27 powerful groups can manipulate the test to suit their own 
purposes. No such opportunity for interference is available in the context of an age 
qualification: barring mass murder, those who are at present under eighteen will become 
eighteen and so qualify to vote. 28 
Schrag considers such objections to a test of competence to be persuasive. So, having 
identified what he appears to consider a major injustice he is prepared to tolerate it. Other 
considerations reinforce this conclusion. The interests of children will not be seriously 
disregarded under the present arrangements because voters will wish to protect the 
interests of their own children and grandchildren. 29 (He appears to have forgotten the 
principle that 'it is always dangerous for one class to have its interests entrusted to 
another'. ) Under the present arrangements the disfranchised group will, in time, become 
enfranchised and the knowledge of this will keep present voters honest. (This is an 
optimistic reading of present practice. Even among those with political power the 
knowledge that their opponents will someday replace them and have access to the files is 
26 Cohen, Cad, 'On the Child's Status in the Democratic State: a Response to Mr. Schrag', Political Theo[y, 3,4,1975, 
458-463,459. 
27 This could be said of any test - school examinations, say, or driving 
tests - but it does not prevent us having them: 
and they make highly significant differences to children's welfare and future which go 
largely unchallenged. 
28 Schrag, 'The Child's Status in the Democratic State', 45314. Unless, of course, someone 
(some group) changes the 
rules and the age of qualification. 
29 Ibid., 454. 
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often insufficient to keep them honest. ) Although the present injustice is real the injury is 
temporary, probably unconscious, and 'does not normally impair the self respect of the 
30 
victim'. It is not temporary. It is a permanent condition of children as a class. Individual 
children can acquire political rights by growing up, but there are always children. Schrag 
confuses the child as an individual with children as a group. While individual children grow 
and move up into political enfranchisement children as a group 'remain permanently 
disfranchised and politically ineffectual' . 
31 Even if children are unconscious of a wrong this 
would not make the wrong any less or diminish the reality of the injustice that Schrag 
appears to acknowledge. 
What is required to vote? 
The crucial question is not when the change from child to adult may be-judged to occur 
(generally or in individuals) but the set of aftributeS32 which is being invoked in defining or 
recognising the change. The fact is that, whether it happens suddenly or gradually, 
something happens in the course of the change from infancy to adulthood 'that is critical for 
democracy' although 'the identification of that critical turn remains elusive, imprecise ,. 33 
According to Cohen the attribute that full members of the (democratic) community must 
have is 
rationality, in a broad and powerful sense of that term .. understood as the 
capacity of the members to do certain fundamental kinds of thinking. The 
absence of such rationality is the reason it makes little sense to talk of 
democracy among brutes, or infants. It is not just that they cannot operate 
a democracy well; they cannot operate one at all. 34 
He distinguishes between rational capacities and intellectual abilities or attainments. 
Possession of the rational capacities as a generai characteristic of a group is a 
presupposition of democracy, whereas increase of the latter on the part of individuals tends 
to make democracy more successful. 35While it is true that the possession of a certain set 
of capacities is essential for democracy this does not mean that a test is suitable to 
distinguish between those who should have the franchise and those who should not. 'The 
right to vote cannot hang upon attainments, or the ability to pass tests. If some must 
be 
deprived of that right it will be because, in them, the capacities democracy presupposes are 
largely absent. '36 
30 Ibid., 4545. 
31 Franklin, The Rights of Children, 38. 
32 '(A) set of capacities to be possessed by voters', Cohen, 'On 
the Child's Status', 460. 
33 Ibid., 459. 
34 lbd., 4W. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid,, 461. The oonte)d makes 9 clear that Cohen is thinking of categories rather 
than individuals. 
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There is a danger of confusing full membership of the democratic community and the right 
to vote. Full membership of the democratic community comes first. The right to vote is a 
prerogative of full members. Membership of the community is decided on the basis of 
rationality and the capacity to 'do certain fundamental kinds of thinking' . 
37 That is, 
membership of the community 'looks to capacity, not ability or aftainment'. 38 Once it is 
presumed that people have these capacities then their membership is assured irrespective 
of their individual intellectual attainments: 'The many stupid, foolish citizens must have 
their right to vote protected; the rational capacity presupposed by participation is theirs'. 39 
The difference in the case of children is that although some children display striking 
precocity at an early age, in general the young do not have the rational capacity which 
democracy presupposes. The aim of an age critedon is not to sort potential voters by some 
contingent capability. 
Rather, the age cdterion aims simply to delay the full membership of those 
who, by nature, cannot be expected to deal satisfactorily with questions of 
the kind facing voters in a democracy. It looks to capacity, not ability or 
attainment. ... Chronological age does this bluntly. But no abstract 
examination can do it at all. 40 
So the question becomes one of reviewing the age for full membership of the community 
rather than replacing the age criterion in principle. 
If the age is to be reviewed, Schrag argues, any new age should not diverge too much from 
present arrangements. In addition the minimum age for voting ought, in justice, to be close 
to the minimum age for exercising other rights (but he does not say how these will be 
decided). There is also a developmental aspect to making the age of franchise lower. This 
is that the exercise of the franchise might itself lead to more responsible use: participation 
is a learning process. 41 Schrag arrives at a position very close, if not identical, to the 
present system but ultimately gives us no compelling reason why we should endorse the 
present age-criterion. 
If age is not to be the criterion then how is the problem of political inclusion to be resolved? 
Franklin endorses Holt's solution: give the vote to everybod Y. 
42 But he does not explain how 
the inclusion can be un problematically defined. To say that everyone should have the vote 
begs the question of how we define the limits of 'everyone'. (It cannot be intended to 
include infants, for example. ) Franklin adduces evidence to suggest that children are 
37 Ibid., 46o. 
38 Ibid., 462. 
39 
Ibid., 461. 
40 Ibid., 461/2. 
41 Schrag, 'The Childs Status in the Democratic State, 45516. 
42 Franidin, The Rights of Child 39; Holt, Escapp, 118-120. 
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capable of political judgement long before they are allowed to exercise it through the vote. 
He assumes that granting political status to children will make no difference to the overall 
distribution of support for the political parties. 43The point of the exercise would be to give 
children the opportunity to put their concerns on the political agenda. This would require all 
political parties to take children's issues sedously in order to win their support. If we can 
know in advance that children will make no difference to the distribution of party support 
why would parties need to do this? 
Neither is there evidence to support the belief that children would cast their votes any more 
frivolously than adults; 44 children are not any more likely to vote for personalities than 
adults are. But would children not be more likely to come under the controlling influence of 
their parents? Apparently not, for if children had greater political status from the start they 
would not be as easily influenced by their parents or others in matters of political choice 
and judgement. (Which neatly begs the question of the extent to which they are capable of 
autonomy and responsibil ity. 4 ) Holt believes that 
a society which had changed enough in its way of looking at young children 
to be willing to grant them the vote would be one in which few people would 
want or try to coerce a child's vote and in which most people would feel this 
was a very bad and wrong thing to do. 46 
The ballot will be secret and this ensures autonomy of selection; parents need never know 
how the child voted. Finally, however, Franklin concedes that parental influence is one of 
the determining factors in how a great many people vote anyway. 47 If it is so in the case of 
adult voters we might expect it to be much more significant in relation to children. 
What kind of politics? 
Franklin and Schrag both address politics as exemplified by national, electoral politics, that 
is as representative politics; their approach appears to be very liberal, the broadest possible 
in fact, enfranchisement equal to adults'. Yet neither makes mention of participatory 
politics, that is of participation in the exercise of power at what might be called the 
43 He does not explain how he can know this in advance. 
44 Franklin, The Rights of Children, 43. There is no evidence to the contrary either. 
45 Holt advocates the vote for a# children, not just older children who are capable of autonomy and/or responsibility. 
Holt, 
Escap@, 120. 
46 Ibid., 129. Note the similarity between Holts optimism, regarding a transformed social context which would 
be 
associated with children's, right to vote, and Spencer's. Thelatter stopped short of giving children 
the franchise on the 
grounds that it is not the principle of equality of rights which is called into question 
by the issue of children's franchise 
but the imperfection of human society. If the moral law were 'universally obeyed, government would not 
exist. Spencer, 
Herbert, Social Statics, London, Williams and Norgate, 1868,212. 
47 Franklin, The Rights of Children, 446, Holt, ELcýa, 129. 
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'vernacular level: home, school, association, local community, etc. 48 Their approach 
stresses a narrowly cognitivist view of political understanding, not an active participation, it 
endorses representative politics where participation largely consists in selecting someone 
else to act on our behalf rather than participatory politics where we act for ourselves. It 
could be argued that real political power is participatory: actually influencing what is to be 
done rather than merely selecting who does it. Franklin presumes that the franchise would 
'lead to the democratisation of a whole range of educational, social and welfare institutions 
49 of which young people are currently the major consumers' . Yet the most significant of 
these institutions in the life of most children, the school, usually denies any form of 
significant political participation through which children might learn how to operate 
politiGally and to take politiGal responsibility proportionate to their capacities. 50 
The school, the first community that the child experiences outside the home, is organised 
and managed on hierarchical and authoritarian lines, administrative principles which set 
powerlessness as the norm. Teacher's view the issue of control as of central, crucial, 
professional importance. As a result of systemic disempowering individual pupils survive by 
leaming appropriate behaviour: how to lie to those in authority, to ingratiate oneself, to 
secure anonymity, to make friendships which will provide support and a sense of 
individuality. There are no mechanisms through which students can constructively express 
dissent or even preference, either individually or collectively. Dissatisfaction is frequently 
48 See Sarason, Seymore, B., The PLeLdictable Failure of Educational Reform, San Francisco, 1990, on the exercise of 
power in the classroom and Neill, A. S., Summerhill: a Radical ApProach to Child-rearing, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
1985, on school government. See also Smeyers, P., 'On the Unavoidability of Power in Child-rearing: Is the Language of 
Rights Educationally Appropriate7, Studies in Philosophy and Education, 14,1,1995,9-21; Tony Jeffs, 'Children's 
Rights at School', in Franklin, The Rights of Children, 54-72, also 'Preparing Young People for Participatory 
Democracy, in Bruce Carrington, Barry Troyna, eds., Children and Controygrsial Issues: Stratggies for the Early and 
Middle Years of Schooft London, The Falmer Press, 1988,29-53. Jeffs argues for the kind of development and 
participatory political involvement that Franklin appears to be ignoring. This participatory approach is also advocated by 
Hart (Children's Participation . " Franklin, The Rights of Children, 46. 
'ýOSee for example Langford, Peter, E., Lovegrove, H., Lovegrove, M. N., 'Do Senior Secondary Students Possess the 
Moral Maturity to Negotiate Class RuIes7, Journal of Moral Education, 23,4,1994. The moral reasoning of post-primary 
students appears to be more mature than predicted by Kohlbergian theory. Their most important source of information 
for making moral decisions in relation to their own governance is the general welfare of other students and teachers. 
The majority thought that there ought to be class rules to protect others' right to learn. There was a small dissenting 
minority, whose main aim was revenge upon schools and teachers, and a rather larger minority, who were not prepared 
to uphold such rules even in theory when it came to classes in which they ware not interested. The authors conclude 
that while it is possible to reach a consensus with the great majority of students of this age about rules to protect the 
learning of others, sanctions are needed to back class rules opposed by a minority even in theory. Three remarks are 
necessary. Firstly, it is unlikely, even if the rules are formulated by the majority, that the need for sanctions vAll be 
entirely obviated. This is how democracies work in practice: we may have laws which rest on the consent (of the 
majority) of the governed but we still need a judicial and penal system to deal with those who do not obey the laws. 
Secondly, if this is the case with regard to secondary students is it likely that Sarason's proposals for elementary 
classes will work? Sarason's is an educational programme, however, not an administrative proposal. Thirdly, the support 
for self-governance at secondary level would be greater if it came as part of an on-going developmental, educational 
programme begun in the primary school. 
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expressed as rejection of the school or disruptive behaviour which is damaging to the well- 
being of all. Schools reflect a general refusal to accept that children have the dght to be 
51 treated with the same respect as other people, inside the school as well as outside. 
It seems, then, that the kinds of 'skills and potentials' that children are likely to develop from 
proposals to extend the franchise are the cognitive skills involved in 'discussing politics, and 
not the skills required to participatekin -political processes, that is, the negotiation 
and the exercise of power. Franklin appears to acknowledge the narrowness of his own 
proposal and to contradict his belief that children's voting choices would not be unduly 
influenced by their parents or other adults: 'to give young people rights is of little use unless 
they also achieve an understanding of how to exercise them. The mere possession of rights 
without this knowledge can lead to the worst kind of tokenism, with young people being 
manipulated by more experienced participants. 52 
Development, experience, and insult 
Harris agrees with Schrag that the facts of human development do not justify the 
conventional distinction between adult and child. 53 Yet this claim depends on what 'facts 
about human development' are being invoked. Insofar as developmental theories can be 
deemed reliable at all they do show reasons why distinctions could be justified. If Harris 
means the differential development of individuals (including the fact that some individuals 
never 'complete' the developmental process) then distinctions can still be made but only on 
an individualized basis. 
Schrag contends that it is children's lack of experience and understanding rather than 
powers or faculties which might justify their exclusion. A delay in granting them full 
freedoms is required to give them the opportunity to gain the relevant experience and 
understanding. 54 But the possession of this experience and understanding is a question of 
fact in individual Gases: many children may have it earlier and many adults not at all. Many 
of the decisions routinely made by those of us who claim the relevant capacities, 
experience, and understanding are often of doubtful wisdom and long-term utility. Adults' 
exercise of freedom, individually and collectively, has not led to signally positive results; 
adults have not been singularly expert in the choices they have made; much of what they 
do is injurious to themselves, to others, and to future generations (smoking, motor deaths, 
waste of resources, wars, nuclear weapons, etc. ). 
55 
51 Tony Jeffs, 'Children's Rights at School', in Franklin, The Rights of Children, 54-72. 
52 Franklin, The Rights of Children, 47. 
53 Harris, 'The Political Status of Children', 38. 
54 That is, to become adults? 
55 Harris, 'The Political Status of Children', 39. 
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Harris concludes that Schrag's suggested alternatives (the development argument and the 
experience and understanding argument) 'license paternalism for many adults and 
emancipation for many childrens. 56 While Schrag ends with an affirmation of the traditional 
demarcation, which he describes as a 'noble lie' in which we all believe for our own good, 
Harris declares that 'many children don't believe' this 'noble lie' because it isn't true, 57 but 
he doesn't say how he knows that many children don't believe it. 
To insult someone by imposing our plans for his life upon him when he has plans of his own 
is wrong; it is to treat him as less than equal and to withhold the same concern and respect 
that we accord to other autonomous agents. 58 Harris argues that if we could show that 
children are not capable of being insulted in this way and 'that they do not have the right to 
be shown a concern and respect equal to that which adults deserve or can command', then 
the distinction between adults and children and the paternalistic treatment of the latter by 
the former adults would be justified. 5-9 However, he believes that many children 'do have 
plans of their own and are insulted'. 60 
Is it the case that denying children control of their own lives is to offer them a most 
profound insult? Do 5,7, or 10 year-olds live in a continuous condition of 'profound insult'? 
Arguably adult control is insulting only to those who have already developed the capacity to 
govern themselves. In relation to children it is question begging: being insulted requires a 
certain level of subjective consciousness and a certain kind of sense of self-worth. One 
cannot insult a dog or a new-born infant (although one can harm them). To be insulted by a 
denial of one's freedom and integrity it is necessary that one has already achieved the 
kinds of developmental states in which freedom and integrity are important elements denial 
of which is perceived by the individual as damaging to her self-esteem and sense of self- 
worth. 
Persons 
The crucial distinction which Harris wishes to make with regard to being 'deserving of equal 
concern and respect' is between 'persons and non-persons'. We need an account of who is 
valuable as a person: 
58 Ibid., 39. 
67 Ibid., 4o. 
niM., '58 Scarre, G., 'Children and Paternalism', Etk§gphy, 55,1980,120. Walsh (Walsh, P., 
Education and Meanh 
Philosophy in Practice, Cassell Education, 1993,88) points out that only to angels, who have'sprung 
into being without 
parentage or nurture, already fully-formed and spiritually self-possessed', would external 
direction or restraint 
necessarily be an indignity. Our human being falls short of such perfection, especially 
in our earlier years. 
Harris, 'The Political Status of Children', 44. 
Ibid. This is trivially true. Even small infants can have plans and be insulted; consider 
how they throw a tantrum when 
their wishes are thwarted. While it may be empirically true that many children 
have plans of their own and are insulted 
there is a logical gap between the matter of fact and how children ought 
to be treated. 
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If we value people, and if we are committed to a conception of equality which protects a person's dignity and independence by requiring that each person is shown the same concern and respect as that shown to any, then we need some account of who is valuable and who is protected by the 
principle. 61 
There are plausible ways, other than conferring 'full political status', of showing 'concern 
and respect' and for acknowledging others as persons. The proper treatment of small 
babies, for example, is predicated on the recognition that their welfare, comfort, safety, 
security, happiness, nutrition, etc. must be taken care of. This is concern. We show respect 
for them as separate individual human beings by acknowledging their rights to bodily 
integrity, to freedom from pain and want, and to having their various needs met, at least 
minimally. (It is significant that Harris nowhere mentions the needs of children as the basis 
of our treatment for them. ) We afford them this concern and respect because we recognise 
them as human persons. Are they persons? We do not determine who will be deemed a 
person by definition: on the contrary the verbal definition proceeds from established 
practice. Defining babies out of the category of human persons is of course one way of 
going about changing our perceptions and ultimately our practice in relation to them. At 
present, however, we do not relate to babies as some kind of non-person. On the contrary 
the general practice is too address them, acknowledge them, recognise them at least as 
'becoming-persons'. Their responses, their growing capacity to recognise and respond to 
human communication, are important to us. We constantly look for indications that they are 
becoming-persons. Human infants are presumptive members of the human community. 
HarTis appears to be confusing the concepts of personhood and adulthood. 'Person' 
signifies a moral rather than a political status, although its attribution carries political 
implications. 'Adult' in the present context signifies a certain kind of political status, based 
on developmental considerations. To say that children are not adults is not to provide a 
reason for treating them as non-persons; it is to treat them as young persons. Where adult 
status is expressed in terms of voting rights it seems reasonable that this coincides with 
ceasing to be legally subject to the jurisdiction of parents or other adult carers. 
How do we recognise human beings as persons for the purpose of assigning them 'full 
political status'? What kinds of characteristics are deserving of our 'concern and respect'? 
Harris's answer is 'creatures who value their own lives!, who have 'a conception of their life 
as their own', who are self-conscious, who have an awareness of being 'an independent 
being existing over time', who are aware that life is an enterprise over which they have 
32 direction. 6 
6' Ibid., 47. 
621bid., 47/8. 
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To have a life to lead, then, is to have decisions and plans to make and things to do, it is to be aware of doing it all, to understand roughly what doing it all involves and to value the whole enterprise. 63 
What is required is 'notoriously difficult to quantify' and will include recognition of other 
subjectivities, an understanding of the causality of human action, awareness of danger, 'in 
short, the sort of knowledge that allows us to say that beings are responsible for their 
actions, the sorts of knowledge and awareness that make praise and blame appropriate I, 64 
What Harris does not acknowledge is that the criteria he has identified (selected) are not 
the kinds of things which are susceptible to quantification at all. How, for example, even in 
principle, would one measure recognition of other subjectivities? Taken together, however, 
his selected criteria add up to an adult human being 
Harris himself suggests that the requisite qualities would be possessed in sufficient 
quantities by a 'reasonably competent language user', a criterion which is more likely to be 
associated with age 10 than 18.65 This is a highly contestable criterion. It has been claimed, 
with some persuasiveness, that whatever the borderline between persons and non-persons 
might be children are well past it by the time they begin formal schooling. Even a five year- 
old has mastered complex language skills, has a recognisably developed personality, has 
an awareness of her own identity, and 'is quite capable of implicitly invoking a 
generalisation principle to protest unfair treatment by a parent or teacher'. 66 In more general 
terms we might say that the definition of linguistic competence is crucially affected by the 
context in which the language is to be used. 
What might equality mean given Harris's criterion of being a 'reasonably competent 
language user? A principle of equality 'is a principle of protection: 
If children are genuinely regarded as the equals of adults, then they are 
regarded as being entitled to equal protection, as being entitled to be 
shown the same concern and respect as adults. 67 
There are a number of weakness in this position. Whatever else equality might entail it 
certainly entails equal treatment and equal status. But the first of these (equality of 
treatment) is certainly not appropriate to children. Whatever reservations we might have 
0 Ibid., 48. This is very like Lomaskys project pursuit. 
84 Ibid. 
"5 Ibid., 49. However this criterion is not an absolute. Where we have reason to suppose that beings, while not 
possessing language (or not giving evidence of such a capacity), are nonetheless self-conscious 
beings, aware of 
themselves as existing over time and valuing existence, then we will have reason to include 
those creatures as well. ' 49. 
Harris does not explain how such beings will be able to persuade us of their self-consciousness, awareness of 
temporal 
persistence, and so forth, in the absence of a common language in which such abstract conceptions 
can be 
communicated. 
08 Brown, D. G., 'The Rights of Children', Journal of Education, University of British Columbia 
1971,8-20,15. Given 
such criteria We are certainly thinldng about people, very young and rather strange people, 
but people nevertheless. ' 
67 Harris, 'The Political Status of Children', 50. 
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that our treatment of children is inadequate or flawed in some way (such that it reinforces 
their dependence, for instance) there is certainly no doubt but that we should treat thelm 
differently from adults. Although we might recognise their individual human worth as being 
the equal of adults' we also recognise that their needs are different, their developmental 
condition is demonstrably different, their capacities, especially their capacity to assume 
responsibility, are different. We should treat them equitably, not equally. According to 
Vlastos' doctrine of equality people vary in 'merit', but each has the same 
'individual human worth'; and justice requires that people be treated in accordance with 
their identical human worth, not in accordance with their various merits . 
68 Children need 
more protection than most adults, not equal protection. This does not affect the matter of 
concern and respect which allow for differential treatment where such is warranted by the 
needs of the person who is the object of the concern and respect. 
It also raises the question of priority: which comes first, our perception of children, including 
babies, as deserving of our concern and respect or our perception of their equality? 
Perhaps these are not two separate things, one causally affecting the other, but alternative 
descriptions of the same thing: showing concern and respect is recognising a certain kind of 
equality, acknowledging equality is affording others concern and respect. Harris goes on, 
however, 
(t)o regard people as equals is precisely to recognise that they are not 
equally able to protect themselves, or further their own interests, or are 
necessarily the same in any other sense. '39 
He appears to want the best of both worlds: to extend equality to a certain category of 
children but to want to continue to treat them differentially for certain purposes: children 
must be accorded concern and respect 'irrespective of their ability to achieve that state for 
themselves'. It is precisely that children have been 'treated as children and not as equals 
that they have been fair game for adults'. We should grant them the states of equality 
'merely out of paternalistic concern for their welfare' . 
70 Now if children are to be accorded 
concern and respect irrespective of their ability to achieve it for themselves, if their equality 
is to be differential, if our reason for acknowledging their equality is 'paternalistic concern 
for their welfare' then there seems little point in introducing a criterion at all. Surely we 
should be paternalistically concerned for the welfare of afi children? 
" \Aastos, Gregory, 'Justice and Equality, in Waldron, J., ed., Theories of Rig , Oxford 
University Press, 1984,41- 
76. 
" Harris, 'The Political Status of Children', 49. 
70 Ibid., 50. The problem is not that children have been treated as children which illustrates 
that they have been 'fair 
game for adults, but that they have, and continue to be, r4streated as children. Any adult who considers 
children 'fair 
gamW is not treating them as children oýught tobe treated. There is an appropriate way of 
treating children with the 
necessary concern and respect. 
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Even if we accept his criterion of 'reasonably competent language use' we are left with very 
little guidance as to what this might entail. He appears to be saying that the reasonably 
competent language user is one who can recognise other subjectivities, understand the 
causality of human action, have an awareness of danger, etc., in short, be responsible for 
their actions, suitable candidates for praise and blame. Yet in the first place the phrase 
itself is redolent with tacit assumptions and evasions: it assumes that we will agree on the 
exact extension of 'competent', and that such competence is more than a matter of the 
ability to utter grammatically and syntactically correct sentences. The vagueness of 
'competent' is compounded by the equally vague 'reasonably'. Is there a test of such 
competence? Who decides what constitutes reasonably competent language use? This 
appear's to be a different but no less problematic competence criterion. Every objection that 
Harris himself has levelled at other candidate competence criteria can be brought to bear 
on this. 
Whatever the linguistic competence of children of a particular age it is only when they 
begin (individually or collectively) the struggle for freedom that they begin to make their 
claim to recognition as adults. This requires understanding and experience as well as 
linguistic facility. Anyone who has had any dealings with children will be familiar with the 
linguistically precocious child who, at the same time, lacks the kinds of responsibility, 
maturity, cognitive development, knowledge, and experience to be taken seriously as an 
adult with a comparable linguistic facility. Such experience shows us that, on its own, 
linguistic competence is no guarantee of maturity. Children must 'find their voice' as well as 
learn the language: they must have something to say which is to some purpose and be able 
to explain the reasoning behind a decision . 
71 Not only do children require to learn the 
language of their social group they also need to learn a great deal more. They need 
education and connection with others. 72 They need opportunities to learn from their 
mistakes and their adult guardians need to recognise the distinction between mistakes 
which are relatively short-term and trivial, if not revocable, and those which are irrevocable 
and have long-term consequences for the welfare of the adult which the child will become. 
What would be the consequences of treating children (who are competent language users) 
as equals? Harris does not follow through on his own programme. What would be 
'reasonable', he suggests, would be some kind of 'junior citizen, status with reduced 
opportunities for work and correspondingly increased opportunities for education (but 
without the element of compulsion in the case of the latter). 
71 Margulies, 'The Lawyer as Caregiver, 1487. 
72 Ibid., 1480-1482, 
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Perhaps this sort of status would enable us to treat children as equals while 
recognising their special needs. Or perhaps it would highlight the 
deficiencies of our provision for the eldeHy? 73 
Harris compounds confusion by suggesting that in relation to certain adult prerogatives 
children, even those who are linguistically competent, should be subject to an age 
74 requirement. Yet he claims that what he is granting is 'full political status' . (If it is full 
political status then there should be no difference between adult and child; if there are 
certain rights which are restricted by age or expertise then political status must be 
differential. ) He manages the matching between the 10-year-old child's political status and 
the electoral process by reducing the franchise to matter of making a mark on paper or 
pulling a lever. 'The whole apparatus of voting, whether by making an X-shaped mark 75 on 
a ballot form or by pulling a lever, is designed so that a child could perform it., 76 
Do we really believe that electoral responsibility in a democracy comprises no more than 
the ability to perform a simple physical act - so simple 'that even a child could perform it'? 
The crucial question is not whether a child could perform the act of voting but whether a 
child could vote responsibly. More is required to establish equality than the observation that 
two categories can perform the same simple physical act. 
Excluded from the category of 'full political status'77 are foetuses, babies and young 
children (presumably under 10), and 'adults who through severe disability had ceased 
temporarily or permanently to be persons'. This invention of a category of non-persons who 
would have political disabilities' is a chilling corollary of Harris's case. 
I do not see however that the disqualification of adults who had ceased to 
be persons could be anywhere near as worrying as the disqualification of 
children, and many mental patients, who are clearly persons. 
78 
One consequence of the extension of 'limited political status'to children would be'common 
ownership of the family home'. Quite how this proposal is supposed to work is not clear. 
The analogy he draws with women is not only beside the point, it is insulting to women: 
women are adults, not children. Children are ex hypothesi different (if they were not he 
would not be advocating dividing children into those who have linguistic competence and 
those who have not, or advocating limited political rights for the former category). 
The 
psychological literature makes clear that there are significant attitudinal and behavioural 
73 Harris, 'The Political Status of Children', 50. 
74 jbid 
. '51. 
75 What is that but anX? 
76 Harris, 'The Political Status of Children', 55. It is not: it is designed to facilitate adult participation so 
that there is no, 
or minimal, qualificabon required. 
77 Or even from the limited political status he proposes later. 
78 Harris, 'The Political Status of Children', 55 (emphasis added). 
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differences between adolescents and adults. It is presumptuous to suggest that an 
adolescent who shared ownership of the family home would act as responsibly as a mature 
woman: even in the best case the adolescent is significantly different. Fears about the 
adverse effects of recognising the equal rights of women were themselves functions of the 
prejudicial view (prejudicial because based on irrelevant perceptions) that one category of 
adults was inferior to another category and would therefore be less likely to behave 
responsibly. Such objections (prejudicial fears) have always been expressed. Retaining 
control ; over the lives and thoughts of children while they are children is not comparable 
because they are children, not adults. The perceptions of general differences are not only 
relevant, they are empirically demonstrable. 
While Harris and others are clearly concerned about the existential condition of childhood 
and respect children enough to search conscientiously for the most appropriate way of 
showing them concern and respect, Harris's difficulty is that he cannot accept that different 
categories of human beings - or different stages in human being - require different 
responses. The phrase 'the same concern and respect' is unsatisfactory given that the 
terms can mean radically different things depending on circumstances: the golden rule is 
that we treat equals equally and unequals unequally. 
With his language competence criterion Harris has already set limits to equality. It is only 
within that definition that the differential treatment of equals is justifiable since those 
excluded are not equal in the relevant respects. But human equality is not an equality of 
any measurable characteristics or capacity - including the capacity to use language. It is a 
recognition of individual human worth which is independent of the personal capacities, 
talents, or achievements of any particular individual. 
Harris is inconsistent in offering 'junior citizen' status to certain categories of children (those 
over 10 - competent language users). Either these people are equal or they are not. 
What 
Harris is in fact doing is creating a new category of human individual who is neither child 
nor yet adult. This is an unexceptionable idea but needs to be seen for what it is. it is not 
the extension of the franchise to children it is the creation of a new non-child/non-adult 
category. If we postulate a middle ground we are accepting that children are not the equal 
of adults and that (despite their developmental sophistication) they continue to require 
unequal treatment. He suggests that in relation to certain adult prerogatives (the right 
to 
use certain mood altering drugs, drive powerful cars, run for political office) children 
(even 
those who are linguistically competent) should be subject to an age requirement. 
What is 
being invoked here is knowledge and experience as a competence criterion. 
The discussion of the political enfranchisement of children of any age may remain an 
academic pursuit but understanding the distinction between children's capacities 
and 
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performance in legal contexts is an urgent priority for both psychology and the law . 
7' As a 
matter of fact under present arrangements children receive more protection than adults 
because of their immaturity. Not alone are children up to age 10 deemed mentally 
incapable of committing a crime but under the doli incapax rule a minor between 10 and 14 
has the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of incapacity. This presumption may only be 
overcome by evidence of mischievous disposition or that the child knew that what he was 
doing was wrong. W Concern about the difficulties faced by child witnesses in legal systems 
has led to relaxation of competence and corroboration requirements, and to the introduction 
of special procedures and physical facilities to reduce the emotional pressures of 
81 testifying . In other words in the legal context, rather than extending adult prerogatives to 
children, reform recognises their developmental differences. 
In the end Harris's attempt (and others') to justify extending the franchise to children fails 
because he does not address the realities of childhood and adolescence. He confines 
himself to a rather austere conception of childhood which is excessively cognitive and does 
not take account of the other vital dimensions of human experience without which true 
human agency is impossible. He is searching for a legalistic either/or demarcation which, 
given the nature of human development cannot be found. Ultimately his search appears to 
evade the issue of adult responsibility. Responsibility for the state of the world is not 
children's, it is adults'. 
Denying the vote to children is not based on some false assumption about 
10-year-old's political knowledge, nor to deny that they have interests, nor 
to protect them from the harm their votes might do. It is to take 
responsibility to ourselves for the way the world iS. 82 
79 Cashmore, J., Bussey, K, 'Judicial Perceptions of Child Witness Competence', Law and Human Behaviour, 20,3, 
1996,313-334. Magistrates and judges in New South Wales differed considerably in their views about the competence 
of child witnesses and the need for appropriate protective measures in court. There was, however, more consensus 
about those aspects of children's ability to testify that give rise to judicial concerns about their competence. They were 
generally regarded as being at least as honest as adults, if not more so. They were, however, perceived as highly 
suggestible and susceptible to the influence of others, and prone to fantasy. See also Carter, C. A., Bottoms, B. L., 
Levine, M., 'Linguistic and Socioemotional Influences on the Accuracy of Children's Reports', Law and Human 
Behaviour 20,3,1996,335-358, regarding the impact of certain questioning tactics on the accuracy of children's 
reports. 
80 Walker, D. M., The Oxford Comggnion to L, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980,372A. This is also the situation in the 
Republic of Ireland. See Shatter, A. J., Fami! y Law in the Republic of Ireland, (third edition), Dublin, Wolfhound Press, 
1986,41617,417n.. 
81 See Woolard, J. L., Reppucci, N. D., Redding, R. E., 'Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Studying Children's 
Capacities in Legal Contexts', Law and Human Behaviour 20,3,1996,219-228; Mlyniec, Wallace J., 'A Judge's Ethical 
Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, Fordham Law Review, 64,1873-1915. 
82 Hughes, 'The Philosopher's Child', 27. See also Grumet, Madeline, R., 'The Lie of the Child Redeemer', Journal o 
Education, 16B, 3,1986,87-97. The child redeemer is a 'special class born to bear the burden of their parents' 
lost 
innocence 
... 
The child redeemer has become the adorable symbol of society's self deception, a means of 
foisting the 
mission of our own liberation upon those least able to effect it. 
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It is not being denied here that adult voters are of variable competence. It is not being 
denied that there are even adults who, for reasons of basic incompetence, are unable to 
vote at all. Nor is there any doubt that there are certain children who, if given the 
opportunity, would exercise the franchise circumspectly and judiciously. But those who 
advocate the franchise for children have confused cause and effect: it is not the vote which 
is the demarcation between adult and child, it is the distinction between them which is the 
basis for assigning the vote. People do not become full member's of the political community 
by acquiring the right to vote, they acquire the right to vote by becoming full members of 
the political community. In a sense it doesn't matter whether children are competent or not. 
What matters is that they are children, still engaged in the process of growing to adulthood. 
The present situation does not discriminate against 'capable voters under eighteen' since 
there are no voters under eighteen. If we must take exception to anything it must be to the 
adult/child distinction itself. Voting is only a symptom of this. 
Summary 
The exclusion of children from political involvement appears to endorse the adult-child 
distinction in violation of the democratic principle that individuals and groups should be 
allowed to participate in making laws which affect them. Children's exclusion is usually 
justified in terms of paternalism and competence. 
A general criterion, whether of exclusion or inclusion, cannot be just to all. While an 
agreement on a general criterion (age) is possible, specific application of the criterion (what 
age? ) leads to difficulties. Deciding by means of a test of competence would exclude many 
who now qualify for the franchise, while an age criterion would exclude all under that age 
irrespective of individual capacity. 
A test of competence does not ensure that any individual will vote responsibly. In addition 
such a test is open to manipulation by those in control and could be used to reinforce 
traditional distinctions and privileges. An age criterion is not any worse in relation to the first 
objection and is clearly preferable in relation to the second. Giving the vote to everybody is 
not an unproblematic solution since the inclusion, the 'everybody', must be defined in any 
case. 
Proposals to extend the franchise focus on representative rather than participatory politics. 
The skills involved are passively cognitive, not the skills required to participate actively in 
the negotiation and exercise of power. True political power is participatory, influencing 
decisions rather than merely selecting representatives. The most significant non-familial 
institution in the life of children, the school, would be unaffected by such apparently radical 
proposals, and could continue to deny significant participation in the exercise of power and 
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the corresponding sharing of political responsibility. In-school powerlessness would remain 
the norm with students denied constructive opportunities for dissent or preference. 
A crucial question in relation to the political issue is who is to count as a person. 
Personhood is not conferred by definition; on the contrary definitions follow from 
established human practices. Even human infants are treated as at least presumptive 
members of the human community. Personhood and adulthood are not identical: 'person' is 
a moral category and although its attribution carries political implications it is not decisive in 
the ascription of political rights. Non-adults are not necessarily non-persons, and there is 
nothing inherently objectionable or logically contradictory in considering all children as 
young persons. 
Children should be treated equitably, not equally. There is no moral inconsistency in 
treating children differently to adults. Recognising that their needs, their developmental 
condition, and their capacities are different does not entail denying their equal human 
worth. Human equality is a recognition of individual human worth independent of personal 
capacities, talents, or achievements. Children need more protection, not equal protection. 
Concern and respect allow for differential treatment which is required by the needs of the 
person. 
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The 'atomistic' individual 
Hegel was among the first to reject the Kantian notion that universal obligations can prevail 
over those which are contingent on our membership of a community. ' On the contrary, he 
believed that we can achieve our highest and most complete moral existence only as 
members of a community. Individuals are part of a larger social, cultural, and historical 
reality. They derive their identity partly (even largely) from their membership in their given 
community: we are what we are because we belong to a cultural community. 2 
The liberal ethic, which is articulated in terms of individual human rights, opposes the 
conception of self identity which is constituted by social and cultural particularities. Socially 
and culturally defining elements of human experience are excluded in favour of a notional 
universe in which prior experience and knowledge of individuating circumstances, are 
considered irrelevant to the construction of a moral order. 'The implication ... is that the 
moral universe which the independent self in the deontological conception must inhabit is a 
world devoid of inherent meaning, a world "disenchanted" in Max Weber's word, a world 
without an objective order. ' 3 
Liberalism assumes that morality is constituted by rules that any rational individual would 
accept under ideal circumstances. A heuristic for the derivation of such rules is to be found 
in Rawls' 'original positiono. 4 Such rules would be neutral between, and equally constrain, 
competing interests. They would also be neutral with regard to whatever conception of the 
good particular individuals might hold, for the individual is both the subject matter and the 
agent of morality. Finally, the standpoint of every moral agent is deemed to be the same 
regardless of his or her social context. 5 
' For an account of Hegel's view of freedom and community see Singer, Peter, Begel, oxford, University Press, 19M, 
Chapter 3,24A4. A definite content cannot be given to morality on the level of pure inwardness: for the content of 
morality we must turn to the idea of the organized society. 'Concrete ethics is for Hegel social ethics. It is one's position 
in society which specifies one's dubes. Hence social ethics is the synthesis or unity at a higher level of the one-sided 
concepts of right and morality. Copleston, Frederick, A Histo! y of Philosophy, 7,1, New York, Image 
Books, 1965, 
252/251. 
2 See Taylor, Charles, 'Atomism', in Philosophical Papgrs Part 2: Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Cambridge, 
University Press, 1965. 
3 Tao, Julia, 'The Chinese Moral Ethos and the Concept of Individual Rights', Journal of Apglied Philosophy, 
7,2,1990, 
119-127,122. 
4 Rawls, John, A Theo[y of Justice, Oxford, University Press, 1973,17-22.1 use the term 'heuristic' 
to reflect both the 
dimension of discovery and the dimension of demonstration in Rawls' method. He writes, 
'The idea here is simply to 
make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments 
for principles of justice... '. 18. 
5 MacIntyre, A., 'is Patriotism a Virtue7, The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 1904, &9. 
See also Nino, Carlos 
Santiago, The Ethics Of Human: Ri", Oxford, University Press, 1991,87/8- 
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Atomistic conceptions of human being arise from moral theories which promote a social 
vision as constituted by individuals for the Pursuit of individual ends. Such 'primacy-of- 
rights-theories' (for which Locke provides the paradigm) ascribe rights to human beings as 
unconditionally binding on other human beings, but without there being any concomitant 
principle of belonging, or of obligation to other human beings. Such an approach 'affirms 
the self-sufficiency of ... the individual ,. 
7 
Communitarians reject the liberal ideal because they hold that moral rules derive their 
scope and content, not from abstract rational heuristics but from particular social settings. 
The goods which justify moral rules are goods connected with a particular conception of 
social life. Indeed, outside of a particular community there is no reason to be moral: an 
unattached individual would not have access to the goods which justify morality. In addition, 
such an 'unencumbered' individual would lack the strength to be moral, for the strength to 
be moral is drawn from the support of the social environment. Without a strong attachment 
to a particular community a person cannot flourish as a moral agent. 8 
The principal communitarian objection to liberalism is that the latter presupposes an 
atomistic conception of the self which is unaffected by commitments to particular traditions, 
cultures, communities, or ways of life. This 'unencumbered self stands outside all particular 
ties and influences and surveys the world from a detached, decontextualised, 
depersonalised, almost quasi-divine perspective. The communitarian asserts, on the 
contrary, that the human agent's identity is, as an inescapable matter of contingent fact, 
constituted by a matrix of specific commitments which form the starting point for 'ethical 
appraisal and debate'. 9 Outside of some form of social organisation the individual human 
being could not develop the distinct human capacities which primacy-of-rights atomistic 
theories appear to require. 
Liberal individualism demands respect for selected human capacities which are deemed to 
be constitutive of human being. These respect-commanding' capacities help to define the 
rights: possession of the relevant capacities by an individual commands respect from other 
6 See Langford, Glenn, Education. Persons. and Socig! y: a Philosophical Engui , London, 
Macmillan, 1985,27-32, for 
the limitations of the Lockean account of practical principles. 
7 Taylor, 'Atomism', 188/9. 
a Maclntyre, 'is Patriotism a Virtue7 It is worthwhile to note that Article 29.1 of the United Nations 
Declaration of Human 
Rights (U. N. General Assembly, Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217A (111), 10 December, 1948), recognizes 
the individual's obligation to the community when it observes that 'Everyone has duties to the community 
in which alone 
the free and ftiff development of his personaW is possible. ' (Emphasis added. ) The individuailcommunity 
relationship is 
a reciprocal (even synergistic) relationship. It is not a matter of the individual taking what 
he or she can get from the 
community but of having reciprocal obligations to the community which protects and sustains 
whatever rights the 
individual might have. 
9 O'Neill, J., 'Should Communitarians be Nationalists7, Journal of Applied Philos-02ah-Y, 11,2,1994,135-143,135. 
O'Neill concludes that communitarians need not be committed to nationalism. 
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human beings. This requires, however, a prior consensus regarding the moral status of the 
selected capacities: not all human capacities command respect. The selected capacities 
carry a special moral status: their normative force is contingent on the shared conviction 
that they are valuable. 
In other words, our conception of the specifically human is not at all irrelevant to our ascription of rights to people. 
The affirmation of certain rights involves us in affirming the worth of certain 
capacities and thus in accepting certain standards by which a life may be 
judged full or truncated. 10 
In addition liberal ethics favour the ascendancy of regulatory over substantive principles. 
But the source and the justification of these regulatory principles over other possible 
alternatives must be some conception of the good, that is, a substantive preference. Values 
such as toleration, freedom and fairness for example, cannot be defended by the claim that 
no values be defended, that there is substantive equality between contending conceptions 
of the good. What is the source of these values if not some conception of the good which is 
presumed to override others? It is only because of a commitment to a community of values 
(even a notional community) that liberals can assert their values as superior to others. " As 
Sandel asks: 'How is it possible to affirm certain liberties and rights as fundamental without 
embracing some vision of the good life, without endorsing some ends over others? '12 The 
liberal commitment and the procedural and regulatory values it espouses is itself a 
preferential vision of the good for man. 
Once we acknowledge the relevant human capacities (and the associated values) and their 
crucial role in the identification, ascription, and protection of rights, we must further 
acknowledge that aid and encouragement should be given to the development of these 
capacities in ourselves and in others: a negative attitude of non-interference is not 
sufficient. If it can be shown that the relevant capacities can develop only in some kind of 
10 Taylor, 'Atomism', 193,199. 
11 See Rothfork, J., 'Postmodem Ethics: Richard Rorty and Michael Polanyi', South ýrn Humanities Review, 29,1, 
1995,15-48. When the day-to-day tacit process of belief, decision, dedication, and community 
involvement breaks 
down, principles often assume an exaggerated, even a saivific, importance. For they promise 
to restore the very thing 
that was lost. The problem is that what was lost was not a principle, but a lived way of 
life, embodied knowledge, for 
which the principle is, at best, an abstraction, at worst, a caricature. it is in these actual communities 
where moral life is 
lived out, rather than in moments when principles are announced or analyzed. ' 
21 Langford points out that practical 
principles are abstract only in the sense that they are abstracted from already existing practices. 
The latter are the 
primary reality, the social principles are simply abstract summaries of existing or proposed 
practice which cannot, in 
themselves, provide a practice with external guidance. Education, Personsand 
SOCIOY, 36. 
12 w of Mgigo Sandel, Michael J., 'The Political Theory of the Procedural Republic', -ReAe-N 
yajpýand Moraft 93,1988, 
57-68,60. This point is nicely illustrated in Singer, Hegel, 25-29. it is of interest 
that three formidable defenders of the 
liberal view consider it necessary to require (coerce? ) children to be educated 
into the values of liberalism. See chapter 
8, note 60. 
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human society then this entails that 'we ought to belong to or sustain ... this kind of 
society'. 13 
The small community of the family (even the extended family) cannot be sufficient (though 
it may be necessary) to the development of the capacities in question. These capacities 
(which would be engaged collectively in the freedom to formulate one's own life plan, for 
example) require an entire culture or civilization. Human beings are not bom with an 
identity or with self-understanding. They can acquire identity and self-understanding only by 
participating in social practices which embody elements necessary to identity and self- 
understanding: how people recognise and treat each other, how they deliberate together, 
how they engage in various forms of exchange. The autonomous individual agent 
can only achieve and maintain his identity in a certain type of culture ... but these ... 
do not come into existence spontaneously each successive 
instant. They are carried on in institutions and associations which require 
stability and continuity and frequently also support from society as a 
whole. 14 
Taylor concludes that the assertion of 'primacy-of-rights' is impossible. To assert the rights 
is to affirm the capacities and to affirm the capacities is to endorse commitment to the kind 
of social organisation necessary for the acknowledgement, promotion, and development of 
these capacities. This 'commits us to an obligation to belong'. 15 Hence the assertion of 
rights is inseparable from the obligation to belong. 
It appears, then, that a liberal ideal of radical individual autonomy is ultimately self- 
contradictory. 16 It argues for the recognition of certain 'respect-commanding' capacities so 
that there is an obligation to preserve and expand these capacities (and the conditions 
necessary for such preservation and expansion). These capacities are contingent on 
membership in a society since they cannot exist without, for example, language, conceptual 
schemes, institutions, all of which are irreducibly social. Consequently, even on the liberal's 
own premises, the ascription of rights presupposes the duty to belong to, and to preserve, 
forms of community which nurture the development of the capacities which underlie rights. 
There is also a procedural contradiction, for the rules which govern fundamental 
relationships between people cannot be the outcome of theorizing based on an even more 
fundamental set of rules. 
For suppose someone were to deny this and to embark upon the project of 
co-operating with others in constructing a theory designed to provide them 
with a rational justification. In order to do so successfully, she or 
he would 
13 Taylor, 'Atomism', 195. 
14 Ibid., 205. 
15 Ibid., 197. 
16 Mulhall, S., Swift, A., Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992,23. 
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first have to enter into co-operative relationships already informed by 
allegiance to just those rules for which he or she aspired to provide a justification. 17 
A description of the morality based on a disembodied reason is incoherent. Such a 
procedure has, for example, no symbol system through which it can express or organise its 
cognition. Further disembodied selves (as in Rawls' original position) cannot differ in their 
traits and interests so as to bargain with each other and to reach an agreement. How could 
disembodied, decultured selves differ in their opinions of what would constitute a just 
arrangement? They are different in no respect. Robbed of the particularities of individual 
identity they become, not individual selves but a collective reason, they are not many, but 
one. The self proposed is too empty to choose principles of justice and conceptions of the 
good. Nor does such an account take cognizance of aspects of our moral experience which 
indicate that some attachments and commitments partly define our identity and are an 
essential object of our self-knowledge and of the knowledge of others. 18 
The liberal idea that persons can be detached from their conceptions of the good fails to 
reflect the ways in which people actually do relate to these conceptions. In the first place 
this notion misrepresents the person as independent of the ends and values which give her 
life meaning and value. We are not, in the first instance, persons who, once our 
personhood has been secured, turn to the choice of our most fundamental and defining 
beliefs. Even if we were we would have no distinguishing characteristics which would affect 
our choice. So that, in the event, our choice could only be arbitrary. In the second place the 
notion that the two (the person and her choice of conception of the good) are detachable 
trivialises the notion of conceptions of the good itself. It makes it appear as if there is a 
range of equally legitimate conceptions from which we can freely choose, the only 
difference between them being that we will (for the time being) endorse one rather than 
another by choosing it. Simply choosing something does not confer worth or value. The 
choice must be made with reference to some pre-existing value which persists 
independently of my choosing. 19 
Even if we accept that for purposes of the heuristic we should detach the individual 
choosers from certain aspects of their experience we have no reason to accept that 
freedom and equality should be exempted rather than other values: 20 too much is left out 
17 Maclntyre, A., 'Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods', Amen ýan 
Cath-ol-ic-P--h-il-o-s--Opbi-caI 
Quarterly, 66,1,3-19,10. 
18 See Punzo, V. A., 'After Kohlberg: Virtue Ethics and the Recovery of the Moral Self, Philoso hical 
Ps hology, 9,1, 
1996,7-23; Thomas, L., 'Virtue Ethics and the Arc of Universality: Reflections on Punzo's 
Reading of Kantian and 
Virtue Ethicsý, Philosophical PM&holggy, 9,1,1996,25-32; Tappan, M. B., 'Narrative, Language, and 
Moral Experience 
Journal of Moral Education, 20,3,1991,243-256. 
19 Taylor, C., The Ethics of Authenticft, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1991,32-36. 
20 As in Rawis'original position. 
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(there are aspects of our humanity which we might choose in preference to individual 
freedom as a basis for political morality2l) and what is left in is cleady selective for 
purposes of making a specific political case. Detachment from values (other than freedom 
and equality) and the endorsement of a value-free position from which values can be 
chosen is ultimately incoherent. 
This procedure is also acultural in a way which is at odds with human experience. it does 
not appear to allow for cultural particularity whereby different ways of organising society are 
appropriate, and morally justified, in different cultures. It is universalist, in that it presumes 
that what is good for the rationalist individual of post-Enlightenment industrialized societies 
will equally hold good for other cultural groups. Yet we have no reason to accept that this is 
so: 'Do those who have a higher order interest in their freedom to frame, revise and 
rationally pursue their own conceptions of the good have it even if they have never heard of 
it, do not think that they have it, and would not want it if it were explained to them? '22 There 
is the suspicion that liberalism is being presented, not as one possible form of social 
organisation, but as the one true form in comparison with which all other's are more or less 
deficient. 23 
The significance of the social matrix which communitarians stress does not necessarily 
neglect the importance of individual freedoms. It all comes down to the value we ascribe to 
the capacities which alternative views promote. The liberal promotes the value of 
individualism, autonomy, and the freedom to choose an individualised conception of the 
good life. Communitarian views stress the value of co-operation, mutual assistance, and 
fidelity (not blind obedience) to received traditions. The individual can only be what she is 
by virtue of the fact that she grew in a particular community. Her choices of the good life 
are6'ýGvAllained by the way in which that growth has formed her perception of alternatives. 
In effect she can only live the kinds of life that her community makes available to her. 
The communitarian critique is not purely theoretical. It is also a critique of contemporary 
'Western' society and its institutions insofar as they embody liberal values. 24 It is an 
argument against the disappearance of special ties and commitments in favour of an 
21 This is the force of Freeden's objection referred to in chapter 3. 
22 Mulhall, Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 12. One is reminded of Mill's endorsement of 
the ruler'full of the spirit 
of improvement in using whatever means are necessary to ameliorate backward states of society. 
Mill, J. S., Qn-_Liberty, 
in H. B. Acton, ed., Utilitarianism, Libeft Representative. _Govemment, 
London, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1972,73. 
23 This tendency in liberal thought is well illustrated in Francis Fukuyama's The End of 
Histo f and the Last Man, 
London, Hamilton, 1992 and his thesis that, now that liberal democracy has (apparently) triumphed 
in the 20th century 
EastNVest, communistIcapitalist confrontation, it is only a matter of time before 
it triumphs universally. This shows a 
shallow view of history, and a parochial view of political variety, for, in historical 
terms, liberal democracy can be 
considered as no more than an interesting, and so far successful, social experiment. 
24 Mulhall, Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2213. 
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untrammelled individualism. 25 From the communitarian point of view, on the contrary, 'all 
human beings are bom into societies and obtain rights by dint of that membership'. 26 Rights 
are relative to historical and/or cultural contexts: a rights view provides only one possible 
conception of human dignity and social justice, it is not synonymous with human dignity or 
social justice. 27 
Science 
The liberal moral agenda derives much of its persuasive force from the positivist ideal of 
science: it is an effort to enlist the reductionist methodology and the deductive certainties of 
the 'hard' physical sciences to the reflective interpretivism of ethics. But such a totally 
detached methodology is impossible even in the context of science itself. 'Detachment in 
the ordinary and true sense always means commitment to a particular approach ... '. 
28 For 
example, scientists working within the prevailing paradigm of science (what Kuhn calls 
'normal science' or, less flatteringly, 'mopping up operations', that is, solving residual 
problems in the context of the prevailing paradigm) are so fully committed to the paradigm 
within which they are operating that it is, for them, beyond question or discussion. It is only 
because prevailing paradigms can evoke a passionate commitment from individuals that 
progress in science is possible; for when individual scientists can take the paradigm for 
granted they need not begin from first principles each time and justify each new concept. 29 
The intellectual standards invoked by practising scientists are public standards enshrined in 
the culture of science and perpetuated through an articulate framework. Because they 
accept the authority of the cultural milieu in which they find themselves (the scientific 
community) individual scientists accept the intellectual standards set by the culture. In 
doing so they set these standards for themselves, acknowledging them as the proper 
objects of their intellectual passions. These standards are neither of their own making nor 
are they objectively chosen. In this sense a 'passion for mental excellence believes itself to 
be fulfilling universal obligationst. 30 
The general authority of science resides in the consensus of the opinions of individual 
scientists and this consensus is regarded as 'competent to decide all questions for science 
25 'There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are 
families. ' Margaret Thatcher, 
Conservative Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, reported in the _Observer, 
27 December, 1987. 'Mo an (subjective 
Preference theory) economist ... there 
is no such thing as society, only the individuals who constitute 
if - Ormerod, 
P., 
The Death of Economics, London, Faber, 1994,34. 
26 Freeden, Michael, 'Human Rights and Welfare: A Communitarian View, _Ethics, 
100,3, April, 1990,500. 
27 See Tao, 'The Chinese Moral Ethos'. 
28 Polanyi, M., The Lggic of Liberty, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951,25. 
29 Kuhn, T. S., The Structure of Scientific Revotutions, Chicago, 1962,10-22. 
30 Polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical PtqgNphy, 2nd. edition, London, 
1962,17314. 
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as a whole'. 31 In accepting science and the premises of science as valid, individual 
scientists accept the community of science, and its general authority to which they 
contribute. This community accepts that members are competent to judge their own 
contribution in the context of the tradition, in the atmosphere of free discussion and 
criticism within the tradition itself. Indeed it is the discussion and criticism which ensures the 
continuity of the tradition as fundamental aspects of it. 32 In presenting a novel finding, or a 
revolutionary paradigm, scientists are not attempting to destroy the community or authority, 
for in submitting their vision to the judgement and criticism of their peers they are tacitly 
proclaiming their fealty to these institutions. In such a situation, however, scientists are 
attempting to change the tradition: 'Such processes of creative renewal always imply an 
appeal from a tradition as it is to a tradition as it ought to be. ' For this reason it must be 
accepted that the consensus of scientific opinion at a given moment represents 'only a 
temporary and imperfect embodiment of the traditional standards of science'. 33 
So, the actual practice of science provides no warrant for the ab inifid discovery and 
justification of principles of morality. Science is a practice, it is neither purely rational nor is 
it an individual pursuit although it is pursued by individuals. It is a communal tradition. 
The communitarian alternative 
Morality is based, not on abstract principles of regulation and distribution of freedom but on 
virtues which are embedded in particular communities. 
The enacted narrative of each human life is embedded in the story of the community from 
which that individual derives identity: community traditions are essential for defining what is 
, S34 good in human live . 
Open-ended though it be, the story of my life is always embedded in the 
story of those communities from which I derive my identity - whether family 
or city, people or nation, party or cause. On the communitarian view, these 
31 Polanyi, M., Science. Faith. and Socift, London, 1964,46. 
32 Polanyi's account of the scientific tradition is similar to that put forward by Popper. See Popper, K. 
R., 70ward a 
Rational Theory of Tradition', in Coniectures and Refutations: the Growth of Scientific Knowledge, London, 
Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1972,120-135. 
33 Polanyi, M., Science. Faith. and Soci , 46-56. 34 Macintyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, chapter 15. Narrative has a central role 
in virtue 
ethics. See Maclntyre, A., 'Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and 
Goods', American Catholic 
Philosophical Quartedy, 66,1,3-19. Maclntyre holds that we need narratives which point beyond themselves 
to 
theories. See also Tappan, 'Narrative, Language, and Moral Experience', and Punzo, 'After 
Kohlberg'. Erikson insists on 
unity of 'life histoq, the role of story/narrative to structure human experience. Jostein 
Gaarder, author of Sophie's Worid 
considers story the fundamental language of human experience: I think the story 
is our mother tongue. Our human 
brain is made for stories, more than iVs made for storing information'. _ldshTimes, 
21 June 1996, See also Egan, 
Kieran, Teaching as Storytelling: an Alternative ARproach to Teachi ig and 
Curri. -ulum in the Elementary School, 
University of Chicago Press, 1986 for an account of the centrality of story for children 
in an educational context. 
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stories make a moral difference, not only a psychological one. They situate 
us in the world, and give our lives their moral particularity. 35 
Four different conceptions of community have been set in opposition to liberal 
individualism. 36 In the first place there is community understood simply as the imposition of 
majority rule Le. the right of the majority to impose its view of the good life on all of the 
members of the community. Secondly, there is the idea of a paternalistic community in 
which each member is deemed to have a responsibility towards the others for the sake of 
the community as a whole. This communal interest justifies intervention to prevent, or 
reform, the self-threatening behaviour of some members of the community. Thirdly, there is 
the idea of community for mutual self-interest. In a wide variety of ways individuals (who 
are not atomistically self-sufficient) need community to serve these needs which they 
cannot adequately meet by their unaided efforts. 37 Finally, there is- the integrated 
community. In this view the value of the life of the individual is inseparable from the value 
of the life of the community. It is only through participation in the life of a community that 
the individual can thrive. 
There is an ascending order of significance of 'community' here, from a purely numerical 
grouping, to community as a political group with a shared responsibility, to a recognition of 
community as necessary to the individual well-being of each of its members, to the notion 
of community as independent of, and prior to, individual citizens: the 'root idea' in this last 
conception is that 'people should identify their own interests with those of their political 
community'. 38 This conception is reminiscent of Aristotle's account of the state and is the 
one which I wish to adopt here as the central meaning of community. 
Aristotle's view of the nature of the state, 39 as the supreme form of human association, 
involves three fundamental claims. The first of these is that human beings have natural 
ends, the realization of which constitutes an important part of the human good life. The 
second stresses the collaborative nature of groups: human beings cannot fully realise their 
ends without living in a poffs, that is, in association with others. The third claim is that the 
polis develops naturally and exists for the sake of the human good life, the two are 
35 Sandel, 'The Political Theory', 62. 
Westview Press, 36 Dworkin, Ronald, 'Liberal Community, in Gerald Dworkin, ed., Morality. Harm. and the Law, Oxford, 
1994,36[7. 
37 This is the sense outlined by Plato. The Republic, trans., G. M. A. Grube, London, Pan Books, 
1961,369-375. 
38 Dworkin, 'Liberal Community, 37. 
39 Adstotle, Politics, trans., T. A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented by Trevor J. Saunders, 
Penguin Books, 1992. The 
translator reminds us that the use of 'constitution' as a translation of pofta is inadequate. 
The latter 'embraces the 
whole social, political and economic organisation of the state; and also that "virtue" 
(aret6, excellence, efficiency) is often 
conceived in terms of civic function rather than of character or mental or spiritual condition: 
'What I can do" as well as 
'What I inwardly am". ' 177. In contemporary usage 'community may be a more appropriate 
term from this point of view 
than 'state'. The latter has come to be seen in opposition to the individual, something which 
threatens the individual and 
which must be held in check. 
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inseparable. So, in the Adstotelian account, the natural ends of human life are achievable 
only in association with others in the sustaining context of a COmmunity. 40 The state exists 
by nature and man is by nature a political animal. 'Anyone who by his nature and not simply 
by ill-luck has no state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman ..., 
41 
Furthermore the state has a natural priority: it is both natural and prior to the individual. 42 
This does not mean that somehow the state pre-dates the individual historically (which 
would be absurd) but that we are bom into, and die out of, a community. The community 
transcends the lives of its individual members. 
A community is more than a simple aggregation of people and is not necessarily defined 
geographically. It has a number of crucial characteristics. Firstly, it embodies an identifiable 
set of values, interests, concerns, etc., that is, a certain conception of 'the good'. Secondly, 
there must be a common sharing of these interests. This is the central, and even dominant, 
social dimension. Thirdly, there must be mutual awareness of this common sharing of 
interests. Fourthly, within the community, the rights and duties of individuals are relative to 
their relationships with other individuals and to the community itself. Finally, social and 
moral criticism depend upon social and moral practices embodied in the traditions, 
institutions, and culture of the community itself. People derive their cultural and moral 
identities, and the meaning of their values, from their community. The community defines 
the appropriate cultural interaction, the relevant discourse on the ideas, values, and 
aspirations that constitute the community's identity, and hence its members' identities. 
Cultural and moral debate are an essential part of every vital community. Although the 
members of a community generally undergo the same political, social and cultural 
formative experiences, they must individually interpret the significance of events and 
43 
reflect on the relevance and adequacy of their received values to these events. 
Community reaches forward and backward in time, beyond the immediate environment of 
the individual, to embrace past generations as well as future generations; it is trans- 
generational. It perpetuates the heritage of past generations. The communal process of 
cultural and political debate regarding common norms, values, and ways of life may 
be 
40 All communities are part of the political community since the latter aims at advantage 
for the whole of life. 'It appears, 
then, that all these associations are parts of the political community; and the secondary 
friendships that we have 
described will correspond to these limited associations. ' Aristotle, _Ethics, 
trans., J. A. K Thomson, (revised, Hugh 
Tredennick), London, Penguin, 1976,27314. 
41 Aristotle, Politics, 59. 
42 Ibid., 60/1. This should not be taken to mean that, somehow, the state/community as 
an idea or institution, pre-dates 
human individuals but that without some form of natural human community the 
human race - and the individuals who 
comprise it - could not have survived. 
43 de-Shalft, A., 'Community and the Rights of Future Generations% Journ kI of 
A )glied 9,1,1992,105-115, 
112. This re-echoes Polanyi's description of the scientific community. 
That these experiences are not uniform can be 
seen in the way that communities divide in disagreement about 
how they develop into the future. See Arons, 
Stephen, 
Comppiling Belief the Culture of American Schooli , New 
York, McGraw-Hill, 1983, passim. 
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directed to the past in an attempt to acquire self-understanding44 (the community re- 
interprets its heritage: this is the limit on how conservative it may be) or to the future to 
direct self-becoming. 45 The future is also a dimension of our'selves'. This is reminiscent of 
Erikson's concept of a stage of generativity in normal human development. Generativity 
refers to the interest which the older generation has in establishing and guiding the next 
generation in the beliefs, practices and values which have already given their lives stability 
and meaning. Generativity presumes continuity of family, community and species. 46 It 
involves faith in the future, not as an open-ended possibility, but as a continuation of the 
past through the present. It involves the ability to care about others. There is a dynamic in 
human community; human communities have, as it were, a life of their own which is greater 
than the sum of the interests of their individual members. Consequently, communities are 
concerned not just with physical protection and survival but also with the continuity of their 
unique identity. This continuity can only be assured through its treatment of its children. 
A community, like a friendship, has a mutual orientation. In each case narrow self-interest 
is moderated by concern for the common good, that is for the good of the mutually enjoyed 
relationship. The well-being of the other members of the friendship or larger community 
constrains the self-concerned actions of the individual. Individuals, who have been formed 
by communities, friendships, and other close relationships, will often consider acts of self- 
denial, if not outright self-sacrifice, which contribute to the common good, to be in their own 
self-i nte rest. 47 
It is not necessary to abandon liberal institutions in order to espouse communitarian values, 
nor is it being suggested that we should. Rorty48 follows the Hegelian tradition in holding 
that morality should be conceived, not as a set of universal abstract principles establishing 
rights, but as the interests of a historically conditioned community. The moral self is not an 
entity separate from interests, attachments and causal influences, but a network of beliefs, 
desires and emotions which is constantly reweaving itself: 'For purposes of moral and 
political deliberation and conversation, a person just is that network, as for purposes of 
ballistics she is a point-mass, or for purposes of chemistry a linkage of molecules., 49 Our 
loyalties and beliefs consist entirely in the fact that living by them cannot be separated from 
understanding ourselves as the people we are: we are who we are because of these 
loyalties and convictions. There is no objective court of appeal against which they can be 
44 See Walsh, P., Education and Meaning: Philosophy in Practi Cassell Education, 1993, chapter 
12 on 'History and 
Piety. 
45 de-Shalit, 'Community and the Rights of Future Generations', 113. 
46 Erikson, Erik H., Identity and the Life Cycle, New York, Norton and Co., 1994,10314. 
Significantly, Erikson sees the 
opposite of generativity as stagnadon. 
47 Meyer, Michael J., 'Rights Between Friends', Journal of ENLqsý, 89,9,467-483,1992,470. 
48 Rorty, R., 'Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism', Journ il of P 2jjgý, 80/10,1983,583 
989. 
49 Ibid., 586. 
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tested. Moral conflicts are resolved, not by appeal to abstract rules and principles, but by 
invoking shared social aspirations and history. 
The appropriate epistemology is pragmatic: it promotes the discussion of any subject with 
tolerance for the opinions of others, curiosity for new ideas, etc. It Promotes the idea that 
the search for truth and goodness is a quest for a community which permits free encounters 
and promotes solidarity-50 Our morality is an appeal to the part of our'beliefs, desires, and 
emotions' which overlap with those of other members of our communities: morality is a 
matter of 'we-intentions. Most moral dilemmas are reflections of the fact that most of us 
identify with several communities and do not wish to marginalise ourselves in relation to 
any of them. 51 
One of the functions of education is to increase the number of communities with which a 
person may identify. Each of the different communities will maintain a distinctive social 
ideal to which we subscribe, more or less critically. But there is also a broader, over-arching 
community which gives meaning to the notion of human rights, the community of human 
beings. 
For someone to ask me to concede something to him as a human right is 
implicitly to ask whether I admit the notion of a human community at large, 
which transcends the various special communities of which I am a 
member; whether I admit him as a member of this larger community; and 
whether I admit a conception of the good life for this community. 52 
Calling 
The Polanyian conception of 'calling' is relevant here to explain how we can speak of 
personal responsibility when it seems that the conceptual framework within which we 
operate is the product of a local culture and that 'our motives are mixed up with forces 
holding onto social privilege'? 53 The answer is that we are more than mere products of a 
culture for our mental growth, although it is conditioned by circumstances, is never fully 
determined by circumstances. 54 
50 Historically the Socratic method. For an analysis of the associated idea of dialogue see Buber, 
M., B an Man and 
Man, Fontana Books, 196, and Freire, Paulo, The Pedag%ly of the Opp , trans. 
Myra Bergman Ramos, Penguin 
Books, 1972. Mead acknowledges a higher community, 'a wider social environment (like 
Golding's 'human community 
at large', see below) to which the individual can appeal over the immediate formational community. 
See Mead, George 
Herbert, Mind. Self. and Socift, Charles W. Morris, ed., University of Chicago 
Press, 1962,260-273. This is also 
clearly related to Polanyi's account of the scientific community. 
51 The dilemma is illustrated in Sartre's example of the young man who had to choose 
between loyalty to his family 
(mother) or nation (war-time France). Sartre, J-P., Existentialism and Humanism, 
Philip Mariel, trans., London, Methuen 
& Co., 1948,35-37. 
52 Golding, M., 'Towards a Theory of Human Rights% Monist, 52,4,1968,521-549,549. 
53 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 322. 
54 Polanyi, M., 'Scientific Outlook: Its Sickness and Cure, _Science, 
125,1957,483. 
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Human individuals are placed, through no choice of their own, at a particular point in space 
and time which determines their education and up-bringing. The ultimate limitation, their 
own bodies, confines them and their experience for the span of their lives: 'All thought is 
incarnate; it lives by the body and by the favour of society'. -95 The received limitations 
determine the individual's calling: they are beyond individual responsibility, yet they 
constitute a personal situation for which each is responsible. 
'in any given situation', Midgley wdtes, 'only a certain range of responses makes any sense 
at all'. But the 'possible paths are limited, and the landscape around us has features ... 
which must limit them still further'. 56 There are many constraints on human action: the 
fundamental nature of human being, the socio-cultural context in which the individual is 
brought up, the specific natural talents and capacities which the individual possesses, and 
the specific familial and educational nexus in which he or she grows. For there to be any 
meaningful choices there must be an existential coherence which recognises these features 
and accepts their limitations - without accepting these limitations as being completely 
determinant. 
Within the narrow ýconfines of the accidents of personal existence individuals must exercise 
their personal responsibility 'to fulfil the universal obligations to which (they are) subjeCt'. 57 
This personal calling both offers the individual opportunity for seeking the truth, and limits 
responsibility for arriving at individual conclusions. 58 
Polanyi does not attempt to create a new system of thought, a new'meta-narrative, built 
on some rationally discovered or intuited first principles beyond doubt or contradiction. 
Nothing we know can be known independently of the confines within which we accept the 
sense of our calling. On the contrary since birth we have subscribed to a complex of beliefs 
and assumptions which are ultimately beyond question for we have no alternative base 
from which to question them. Mentally (and, a fortiori, morally), as well as physically, each 
of us is a prisoner of the accidents of our birth and education: there Gan be no complete 
escape from the conceptual framework which is a necessary condition of thought. 
59 
55 Polanyi, M., 'Knowing and Being', in M. Grene, ed., Knowing and Being, London, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1969, 
134. 
56 Midgley, M., The Ethical Primate: Humans. Freedom. and Morality, London, Roudedge, 1994,150. 
57 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 3220. Note the similarity to Freire's notion of the 'ontological vocation'. 
Freire, 
Pedaggg 
, chapter 
1. 
58 Polanyi, 'Knowing and Being', 133. 
59 Even Peters' search for 'a rational form of morality, which enables a person 
to adopt a stance that is critical of 
tradition but not subjective' is conducted within a tradition which allows 
for the rational appraisal of received ideas. 
Peters, R. S., PWhol and Ethical DeveloRment, London, Allen and Unwin, 
1974, especially chapter 17, 'Moral 
Development and Moral Learning'. The 'group of rational passions' required 
to support the undertaidng cannot be simply 
invented or randomly selected by the individual. A regard for things 
like 'consistency, order, clarity and relevance' is 
learned, it is part of a tradition. 
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Polanyi's philosophical programme is, ultimately, an interpretivist one: it is a process of 
probing to the depths of our knowledge and beliefs and interrogating the precise nature of 
their foundations. The ultimate objective of philosophy is not the discovery of objective 
foundational principles but 
to realise that we can voice our ultimate convictions only from within our 
convictions - from within the whole system of acceptances that are logically 
prior to any particular assertion of our own, prior to the holding of any 
particular piece of knowledge. If an ultimate logical level is to be attained 
and made explicit, this must be a declaration of my personal beliefs. I 
believe that the foundation of philosophical reflection consists in bringing to 
light, and affirming as my own, the belief implied in such of my thoughts 
and practices as I believe to be valid; that I must aim at discovering what I 
truly believe in and at formulating the convictions which I find myself 
holding; 
Logically the whole of my argument is but an elaboration of this circle; it is 
a systematic course in teaching myself to hold my own beliefs. 60 
Philosophy is a programme of self-identification. An inquiry into our fundamental beliefs will 
not uncover beliefs which were not part of our faith in the inquiry itself. 61 
The calling of the educated mind is situated within the frame of reference of the culture to 
which it belongs. Children accept a culture 'constructed on the premises of the traditional 
interpretation of the universe' and rooted in the idiom of the social group to which they 
belong. 62 The educated mind is committed to the given culture and idiom beyond its 
responsibility, for, in accepting the conceptions which the given culture and idiom 
communicate as true the educated mind is accrediting them with this truth: they must be 
true since they provide the only criteria of truth which it has. Intellectual standards are 
public standards enshrined in the culture and perpetuated through an articulate framework. 
Because they accept the authority of the cultural milieu in which they find themselves., 
human beings accept the intellectual standards which are set by their culture. By doing so 
they set these standards for themselves and acknowledge them as the proper objects of 
their intellectual passions. Clearly these standards are neither of an individual's own making 
nor are they subjectively chosen. But the individual is not completely constrained by them. 
60 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 267,299. This is similar to the Socratic injunction to 'know thyself - 
it may be that 
Gutmann has something similar in mind when she distinguishes between our principles and our'firmest 
convictionsý. In 
general, she writes, We cannot understand a political theory or use its principles 
to evaluate e)dsting practices until we 
engage in the process of formulating its principles, translating them into practices, and 
judging the practices against our 
convictions. ' Gutmann, A., Democratic Education, New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press, 1987,18. 
61 Sandel similarly believes we cannot consider ourselves as disembodied creators of our 
own moral meaning Wthout 
great cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly 
in the fact that living by them is 
inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular people we are - as members 
of this family or community or 
nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that revolution, 
as cibzens of this republic'. Sandef, 
M. J., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, University Press, 1982,179. 
62 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 112. 
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G. H. Mead63 has described the process by which individuals acquire the prevailing 
symbolic representations and interpretations of the world which are embedded in a form of 
symbolic representation (language). Through this means they are empowered; they acquire 
a tool with which they can reflect upon the received representations and interpretations, and 
the significance which these have for their own particular experience. This enables them to 
recognise and assert their own individuality. 
Mead's symbolic interactionism attempts to explain how the mind and self are generated in 
a social process. Language is the mechanism by which mind is socially constituted and 
through which the self becomes aware of itself as an object: 'self is the capacity of the 
human organism to be present to itself as an 'other'. This happens through our taking the 
role of the other. 'We cannot realise ourselves except insofar as we can recognise the other 
in his relationship to us. It is as he takes the attitude of the other that the individual is able 
to realise himself as a self. 64 
The self which is constituted by intemalising various specific and generalised roles is the 
'me'. But this is not the full story: this would simply lead to a view of the individual and 
society in which the former is totally dominated and determined by the latter. We need to 
be able to account for individual freedom and responsibility, creativity, or, for that matter, 
for social change or evolution. Freedom and creativity come about as a result of the T: the 
capacity of the individual to respond to what is received (intemalised) in a reflective and 
potentially novel way. The social process of communication, which the individual 
internalizes in the formation of the 'me', confers the capacity for reflective thought (I can 
talk to my 'self) which is the ability to direct action in terms of the anticipated consequences 
of alternative courses of action. Symbolic representation is a tool with which individuals can 
reflect upon their culture's representations and the significance of these representations for 
themselves. It is by this means that they are able to recognise and realise their own 
individuality. 'The T reacts to the self which arises through the taking of the attitudes of 
others. Through taking those attitudes we have introduced the 'me' and we react to it as an 
1111.65 
By implanting itself in each individual, society ensures a measure of predictable regulation: 
a population of me's subordinate to the overall pattern of society. But the mechanism 
involved also equips the individual with the capacity to transcend conformity and orthodoxy 
and consequently to contribute to the transformation of society. The unqualified 
'me' would 
63 Mead, Mind. Self. and Soci 
64 Ibid., 194. 
65 Ibid., 174. 'The T is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; 
the 'me' is the organised set of 
attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute 
the organised 'me', and then one 
reacts towards that as an T'. 175. See also I 9M. 
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be a creature of unremitting conformity. An 'unencumbered' T (if such were even 
theoretically possible) would be a creature of unrestrained self-interest. In reality the 
conformity of the 'me' is leavened by the constrained creativity of the T. The response of 
the T is unpredictable: our response to any situation will not be - cannot be - thoroughly 
conditioned. 
(A)n individual is constantly reacting to such an organised community in 
the way of expressing himself, not necessarily asserting himself in the 
offensive sense but expressing himself, being himself in such a co- 
operative process as belongs to any community. The attitudes involved are 
gathered from the group, but the individual in whom they are organised has 
the opportunity of giving them an expression which perhaps has never 
taken place before. 66 
The contrast between 'tribal' and 'critical' communities is that the individual in the former is 
almost totally determined and constrained by the community of which she is a part while in 
the latter the individual is more liberated and engages in more creative, innovative, or 
novel responses. Nonetheless the liberated individual is not - and cannot be - totally 
liberated from the sustaining community since no individual has a mind which operates 
completely autonomously, 'in isolation from the social life-process in which it has arisen or 
out of which it has emerged, and in which the pattern of organised social behaviour has 
consequently been basically impressed on it. '67 By the same token it is difficult to imagine 
an individual completely unable to act with some autonomy in any community. 68 
Human beings form their ethical dispositions naturally, but 'naturally' does not mean 
'spontaneously': the formation requires education and rearing. The ethical life involves 
convention, human beings live naturally by convention. We are, collectively and 
individually, identified with a set of ethical considerations which derive from our socially 
constituted conception(s) of well-being. As a consequence we wish to educate our children 
to share these ethical beliefs and other cultural conceptions we may have. This process is 
not just good for us but also for our children, 
both because it is part of our conception of their well-being and also 
because, even by more limited conceptions of happiness or contentment, 
we have little reason to believe that they will be happier if excluded from 
the ethical institutions of society. 69 
66 Ibid., 197/8. 
67 Ibid., 221/2. Later Mead writes that 'There is no necessary or inevitable reason why social 
institutions should be 
oppressive or rigidly conservative, or why they should not rather be, as many are, 
flexible and progressive, fostering 
individuality rather than discouraging it. 262 (emphasis added). 
68 See Langford, Education- Persons. and Soci , 
2143. For an account of the individuakommunity nexus within a 
traditional community see Tao, 'The Chinese Moral Ethos'. 
69 Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of atflgggphy, Fontana Press, 1985,47/8- 
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Rights and community 
Individual rights are constrained not just by the rights and freedoms of others but also by 
the just requirements of the general welfare. As well as being balanced against other 
individual rights they must be harmonised with the interests of the sustaining community. 
Although certain rights are individual in kind (privacy, the right to fair due procedure in 
criminal trials) the individual must be able to act collectively (this is, after all, the point of 
rights of assembly and of association7O) in cultural, religious and linguistic contexts. In fact 
there are certain individual rights which cannot be exercised in isolation from the 
community. Economic, social and cultural rights by their nature are collective, and even 
though the individual is a beneficiary, the collective, too, benefits over and above the 
benefit to individuals. It may be that the communal benefit is more than the sum of the 
individual benefits. 71 In fact, as Triggs argues, not to grant special rights to (ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic) groups to protect their cultures, religious practices, and languages, is 
to treat them unequally and unjustly. 'Minority rights thus have the purpose of ensuring the 
effective implementation of fundamental individual human rights. 72 In addition unequal 
treatment which could lead to the decline of minority groups will irretrievably impoverish the 
human community. The fate of the rights, entitlements, and prerogatives of diverse 
human communities is of inestimable benefit to human well-being. 
One of the main constraints on the exercise of individual rights comes from the spread of 
technology and its increasing availability for individual use. Technologically and 
demographically the world in which rights are exercised has been transformed. As a 
consequence if traditional rights of freedom continue to be exercised in a context of 
growing technological development, and increasing accessibility of the fruits of these 
developments to increasing numbers of individuals, then there is 'considerable potential for 
diluting or diminishing societal quality of life'. 73 We must either question the viability of 
modem western individualism or radically revise the traditional concept of individualism: 
untrammelled exercise of individual rights will inevitably come into conflict with a greater 
good: the societal (communal) context in which the rights are exercised. 
74 
McGinn asserts that a dght may justifiably be restricted if it threatens the very existence of 
society, or continued effective social functioning, or some natural resource vital 
to society. 
7C) There is also a collective dimension to rights of freedom, thought, and opinion. 
For the purpose of these rights is 
surely to change and influence communal perceptions. This, at least, appears 
to be Mill's view. 
71 Triggs, G., 'The Rights of 'Peoples' and Individual Rights: Conflict or Harmony7, 
in Crawford, J., ed., The Riahts 
Peoples, Oxford, University Press, 1988,156. 
72 Ibid., 145. 
73 McGinn, Robert E., 'Technology, Demography, and the Anachronism of 
Traditional Rights', Journal of Awlied 
PhilgMhy, 11,1,1994,57-70,66. 
74 Ibid., 67. It should be remembered that Mill's rights are so contextualized: 
his Iftmus test is social benefit. 
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It may also be restricted if a seriously debilitating financial cost is imposed, or if some 
phenomenon of significant aesthetic, cultural, historical, or spiritual value is jeopardised, or 
if some highly valued social amenity would be seriously damaged or eliminated. 75 All of 
these limitations presume precedence for community over untrammelled individual choice. 
They provide for a contextualised theory of rights. An acceptable theory of rights in 
contemporary technological society must account for the implications of their exercise in a 
context in which a rapidly changing, potent technological arsenal is diffused throughout a 
populous, materialistic, democratic society. Use of such a technological arsenal by a large 
and growing number of individual rights holders has considerable potential for diluting or 
diminishing societal quality of life. 76 
A conception of individual rights requires a view of the social ideal of the good life as well 
as a view of the nature of human community. The content of these rights, and their 
distribution, must ultimately be decided with reference to the social ideal embodied in that 
community. Community, in other words, is of the very essence of rights: every claim of 
right invokes reference to a community. No one can assert a right who is not a member of a 
community of at least two. It would be pointless to speculate about the rights of Robinson 
Crusoe prior to his rescue of Friday. Until there were two inhabitants (or, more correctly, co- 
habitants) on the island there could be no question of regulatory rights being necessary, 
much less invoked: there was no social environment. Once Friday appeared on the scene 
the type of community required to give rise to talk of rights came into existence. In such a 
community there are at least two individuals who are capable of communicating demands 
to one another, each has a capacity to respond to these demands, and the possibility of a 
clash between competing demands is present. 77 Rights are always 'possessed' in relation to 
a community. When someone claims a right they immediately raise the question of 
community membership. It is not rights which create community but communities which 
create rights. 
There is no necessary incompatibility between a community which promotes close mutual 
bonds (friendship and family for example) and the exercise of rights which co-ordinate 
relationships within such a community, although having and exercising rights seems most 
appropriate in an atmosphere which is individualist, adversarial, and egotisticaLM Justice is 
75 This raises serious questions about the viability of rights at all: at least about 
the criteria which will be used in the 
event of any one of these conflicts occurring. For if rights are not the principal 
deciding factor in conflicts between the 
individual and the collective then what is? 
76 McGinn, 'Technology, Demography, 66. 
77 Golding, 'Towards a Theory of Human Rights', 528/9. 
ism', Journal of Philosoov, 78 Meyer, 'Rights Between Friends', 4-A)11 . See also 
Smfth, Tara, 'Rights, Friends and Ego 
90,3,144-148, March, 1993. 
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a remedial virtue: it is not prior to other social values. 79 It is resorted to when other virtues 
fail (e. g. a deterioration in the links of fratemity - friendship, family, or community). Appeal 
is made to rights most appropriately when the natural context of mutual regard, love, 
benevolence, and shared aspirations for mutual well-being, begins to fragment. 
Appeal to rights in a properly functioning relationship is inappropriate and may well damage 
the relationship. In cases where one has rights without claiming them rights operate as 
'unneeded reminders' of mutual obligations. They provide a sense of individual self-worth 
which does not necessarily undermine the relationships involved. 30 In a community without 
rights, on the other hand, one is dependent for one's welfare exclusively on the good will of 
others. There is no separate ground, apart from the attitude of the others, for one's self- 
esteem. If, for whatever reason, their regard is withdrawn one is left with no- resource at all. 
Granted that we have rights we may refrain from claiming them because of the disruption 
such claiming may cause to the constitutive relations. On the other hand rights are there to 
be claimed when regulative relations were never properly established, have already begun 
to deteriorate, or have changed to a new mode, as in the case of the ad ol escent/pa rent 
relation. Although as a child one may have rights against one's parents it is generally 
unnecessary to claim them because they simply operate as guides to the proper operation 
of the parent/child relationship. 81 In ordinary Cnormal) circumstances this relationship 
functions adequately (without recourse to rights) because of the understandings of the 
regulative relations. (These understandings become mutual as between parents and 
children as the latter adopt the understandings of the former. In this sense 'regulative' has a 
formative, as well as a regulative sense. 8ý When the regulative relations are in the process 
79 Sandel, M. J., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, 1982. Callan (Callan, Eamonn, Creating Citizens: 
Political Education and Liberal Democrac , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) takes issue with Sandel on this point 
arguing that the language of justice is needed as much in intimate relationships as it is in more impersonal, political 
relationships. Although his case is persuasive, it is not compelling because he bases it on an ambiguous understanding 
of 'care' . In the first place he uses 'care' in the sense of selfishly value Clf I care for my wife merely as a source of 
domestic service, emotional solace, and sexual gratification' 72) and while he admits that such a use is morally 
uninteresting he has nonetheless succeeded in devaluing the concept. He then uses the word in conjunction with the 
idea of exploitation ('the caring exploitation of others'). The 'care' that is at issue is not 'care' in the sense of looking after 
a valuable statue or a race horse. To 'care! for one's car is no more than the prudent protection of an investment. When 
we use the word in the context of human relationships we normally mean A to connote concern, interest, regard, 
affection, etc. We do not care in this sense out of duty (or in response to demands of justice) but out of emotional 
attachment at some level of engagement. In institutional settings, for example, we expect the care provided to be more 
than the mechanical provision of food, shelter, medical attention, etc. If these things are not done in a context of concern 
for the individual's well-being as the person she is then we would rightly condemn it as an 'uncaring' environment even 
though the basic physical needs were being met. 
80 Meyer, 'Rights Between Friende, 474. 
81 KJeinig concludes that we should assert our rights 'only when adequate moral relations are absent or 
have broken 
down'. For children to get their rights 'only because they have asserted them is not so much a triumph for morality 
but a 
sign of its "scarcity' or breakdown. ' 140einig, J., 'Mill, Children and Rights!, Edu tional Philosoghy and 
Theo , 8,1, 
1976,1-16,15. 
82 This is the sense in which the law has an educative as well as a regulative function. This 
formative sense alkYWS for 
the distortion of parent-child relations which leads to the prolonged exploitation and abuse of children until such 
time as 
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of transformation or deterioration it may be appropriate to invoke rights. We may threaten 
to claim a right, or note that a right has been violated, without actually claiming the dght. 83 
This may be sufficient to regulate the relationship, to restore the proper functioning when it 
has, for whatever reason, been disrupted. Recourse to rights claims is an indication that 
normal regulative relationships have broken down. 
It will be remembered that Bobbio84 accepts that the widespread adoption (or acceptance) 
of human rights is a sufficient basis for action and decision. His programme is pragmatic: 
the priority is action on the basis of established rights rather than a search for a rational 
grounding for rights. It is the historical development of moral ideas which gives legal ideas 
their force. The universal assent of the intemational community (and its evolution over 
time) is itself the moral warrant for rights. 35 But how do we ensure that the community, at 
any level of generality, will not simply oppress individuals into a lock-step conformity to 
orthodox belief and behaviour? 
Nino argues that Bobbio's position, and that of communitarians generally, can result in quite 
unacceptable, even appalling, extremes: Nazi or Fascist totalitarianism (right defined by the 
power to impose a particular conception of the good), or collectivist, tribalist, or nationalist 
attitudes which can justify the sacrifice of the individual in the interest of the colleCtive. 86 
The primacy of the good over individual rights allows for the justification of 
perfectionist policies which intend to impose ideals of excellence or 
personal virtue, even when individuals do not perceive them and thus do 
not subscribe to them. 87 
Communitarians, in turn, are skeptical about the possibility of subjective and arbitrary 
moral conclusions' in the liberal canon: the notion that 'noumenal beings', abstracted from 
particular interests, conceptions of the good, and social circumstances may, on the basis of 
their culturally conditioned 'enlightened' views, attempt to impose moral conclusions which 
are antipathetic to local and historical realities. 88 
children acquire alternative models of parent-child relations which provide them with a stance from which 
they can 
challenge and critique their own childhood experience. 
83 Meyer, 'Rights Between Friends', 474. 
84 Bobbio, Norberto, The Age of Rights, trans., Allan Cameron, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996. 
85 See Searle, John, R., The Construction of Social Realfty, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1996, especially chapters 
4 and 5 for an account of the way in which institutional facts are established. 
86 Nino, Carlos Santiago, 'Positivism and Communitarianism: Between Human Rights and 
Democracy, Eatio ý"n , 7, 
1,1994,14-40,25-27. 
87 Ibid., 27. The 20th century is replete with illustrative examples. 
88 As already mentioned Mill excused 'a ruler full of the spirit of improvement 
in the use of 'any expedients that will 
attain an end' when dealing with Ihose backward states of society in which 
the race itself may be considered as in its 
nonage'. Mill, On Libe , 73. 
But it is noteworthy that Mill's entire argument in 
favour of individual liberty is utilitarian, 
made out of concern for the general welfare (or general utility) which 
is the ultimate criterion of moral worth. Individual 
liberty is instrumental, not an end in itself. See Lyons, D., 'Human Rights and 
the General Welfare', Philosopby and 
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Nino is silent about the (equally expedenced) excesses of liberal individualism which have 
led to alienation, oppression, human suffedng, the impoverishment of individuals, the 
fragmentation of communities, and the destruction of ecological environments. In recent 
times commitment to radical economic individualism has led to the dismantling and 
curtailment of social welfare provision and increasingly regressive taxation policies in the 
name of liberalism. This does not mean that such outcomes are a necessary corollary of 
this philosophy. But it does indicate that it, too, is prone to excess. 
Nino's response to the fear of individualist excess is to argue that the mechanisms of 
democracy are sufficiently strong to prevent abuse in the absence Of perfect rational 
discourse about important social and political decisions. The 'resort to democracy about the 
extent, balance, and modes of violations of human rights is what prevents the elitism, 
subjectivism and arbitrariness which positivists like Bobbio and Communitarians perceive 
behind liberal moralism-'89 He offers no explanation as to why this democratic control 
cannot extend to preventing communitarian views degenerating into totalitarianism. He 
appears to believe that it is only liberalism which has access to democracy as a form of 
political regulation. 
One possible solution to the problem of relativism is Mackie's theory which is individualist 
'in that individual persons are the primary bearers of rights'. But it is not radically 
individualist since 'even the most independent individuals constitute their distinctive 
characters not by isolating themselves or by making "existential" choices but by working 
with and through inherited traditions'. This does not mean that ethical discrimination 
between alternative collectives (communities) is impossible. It will discriminate between 
those which 
express and realise the rights of their members and those which sacrifice 
some or even most of their members to a supposed collective interest, or 
to the real interest of some members, or even to some maximised 
aggregate of interests. 90 
Communitarian moral criticism is dependent on embodied moral practice so there is no 
evident way to adjudicate between alternative traditions or conventions because there are 
no independent principles. On the other hand Williams9l alleges that ethical theory of the 
Kantian tradition cannot itself proceed without social understanding. It needs the 
understanding of institutions, how they work, and how they generate belief in themselves, 
in 
orderto 
Public Affairs, 6,1977,113-129. Also Sandell, 'The Political Theory: 'The utilitarian calculus treats people as means 
to 
the happiness of others, not as ends in themselves, worthy of respect. '59. 
89 Nino, 'Positivism and Communitarianism', 37 
90 Mackie, J. L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wron , Penguin 
Books, 19w, 117. 
91 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Phfllý. 
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answer questions about itself that it cannot ultimately avoid, about its relation to social life, its social or psychological connections with practice, and the ways it might hope to turn its supposed rational authority into 
power. -'2 
Summary 
Moral existence is contingent on membership of a Community from which individual identity 
can be acquired: we are who and what we are because we belong to a cultural community, 
this is an inescapable starting point. Identity and self-understanding can be secured only 
through developmental participation in social practices which embody the necessary 
elements: forms of inter-personal recognition and regard, political deliberation and social 
exchange, accepted restrictions and freedoms. 
This view is contrary to conceptions of human being which derive from : Moral theodes in 
which society is constituted by self-sufficient individuals for the pursuit of individual ends. in 
such views individual rights are ascribed as being unconditionally binding but without any 
concomitant principle of belonging or of obligation to others. 
Human beings are sociable: the natural ends of human life can be achieved only in 
association with others in the sustaining context of a community. Human communities are 
natural features of human experience and transcend the lives of their individual members. 
Communitarians reject individualist conceptions on the grounds that morality is based on 
virtues which are embedded in the culture and practices of particular communities. Moral 
rules derive not only their scope and content but also their authority from specific social 
settings and particular cultural traditions. Moral identity is constituted by a pattern of 
particular social practices which form moral capacities which constitute, but do not 
irreversibly determine, moral identity. Possession of the moral capacities commands 
respect from other members of the relevant community because of the shared conviction 
that they are valuable. These capacities require the promotion and protection of an entire 
culture. They cannot exist without the appropriate symbolic and conceptual schemes, 
institutions and practices, which are irreducibly inter-personal. It follows that commitment to 
the selected capacities presupposes forms of community which nurture their development. 
Personhood is not a prerequisite or precondition of the choice of fundamental beliefs and 
values, on the contrary, it is a function of constitutive beliefs and values. 
People cannot 
become radically detached from the ends and values which give their 
lives meaning and 
value without incurring significant self-harm. For there is not a range of equally 
legitimate 
conceptions of the good from which we can make an unconstrained choice. 
Individual 
92 Ibid., 199. 
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choices must be made with reference to already existing values which persist 
independently of individual choices. The choice to abandon a value or change a preference 
can only be made with reference to another deeper, more fundamental value. 
Communitarian values do not entail the abandonment of liberal institutions. The 
communitarian insistence on the social odgin and validation of values does not deny the 
importance of individual freedoms, but such freedoms must operate within a social context 
which requires co-operation, mutual assistance, and fidelity to shared traditions. The 
freedoms of the individual are constrained by the way in which her perception of 
alternatives has been influenced by social practice and inherited values. In a healthy 
community the well-being of others constrains the scope of the self-concemed actions of 
the individual, narrow self-interest is moderated by concern for the common good. 
Science is not a model for an individualist moral agenda. Even in the context of science 
itself radical detachment is impossible. The method of science is a communal method in 
which the findings of individual scientists are constantly subjected to the consensual values, 
standards, and traditions of the community of science as a whole. 
An essential part of every community is its discourse on the ideas, values, and aspirations 
that constitute its identity and, consequently, its members' identities. The individual 
members of a community can re-evaluate the significance of events and the relevance and 
adequacy of their received values to these events to the point where they can propose re- 
interpretations (often to the point of radical revision) of the community's perception of its 
own identity. 
Education increases the range of communities within which a person may re-evaluate ! her 
identity. Each of these communities will maintain a distinctive social ideal and these 
various social ideals may come into conflict. When this happens commitment to the 
conflicting communities must be critically interrogated before a resolution can be found. 
Personal responsibility can be reconciled with commitment to a community through the 
notion of calling. Individual human beings are more than mere products of a culture for their 
individuality, the reflective T, is never fully determined by circumstances. Nonetheless 
human action is constrained by several contingencies over which we have limited, 
if any, 
control. As well as the givens of human being these include, the constitutive socio-cultural 
context, individual natural endowments, and specific familial and educational 
circumstances. These limitations do not completely determine our existence. 
We can 
extend them, however, only when we recognise their existential reality and 
the nature of the 
limitations they impose on our freedom. We exercise personal responsibility 
within the 
confines which these accidents of personal existence impose. 
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Although our ethical dispositions are natural they do not emerge spontaneously, they are 
formed by education and rearing within an ethical tradition. The ethical tradition becomes 
part of our identity: it is part of us and we are part of it, it gives our lives value and 
meaning. As part of our conception of the good life we wish our children to share the ethical 
beliefs endorsed by the tradition as well as our other cherished cultural conceptions. 
In addition to the constraints imposed by the rights and freedoms of others individual rights 
are also constrained by the requirements of the general welfare. Individual rights must be 
accommodated within the general interests of the sustaining community. In the particular 
case of the spread of technology it is clear that the continued individual use of 
environmentally and socially damaging technologies must be constrained by the greater 
good, however this is to be defined. 
Community membership provides the context for rights. Communities create rights by co- 
ordinating inter-personal relations, and adjudicating in cases where claims of rights 
violations are made. Without such a context rights would be contentless. Any conception of 
individual rights entails a view of a shared ideal of the good life which includes a view of 
individual entitlements within constraints imposed by this shared ideal. The content of the 
rights, their distribution, and their vindication must ultimately be decided with reference to a 
social ideal embodied in a community: every claim of right invokes reference to a 
community. 
Communities which promote close mutual bonds (such as friendship and family) and 
regulatory rights are not incompatible, although rights are usually associated with 
adversarial situations. The justice provided by appeal to rights is resorted to when the 
virtues which are constitutive of close human relationships begin to deteriorate or fail. 
Recourse to rights claims is appropriate only in situations where normal regulative 
relationships are no longer functioning properly. A too hasty resort to rights claims may well 
be destructive of more intimate relationships. 
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Rights 
We should heed Aristotle's warning not to 'expect more precision in the treatment of any 
subject than the nature of that subject permits; for demanding logical demonstrations from 
a teacher of rhetoric is clearly about as reasonable as accepting mere plausibility from a 
mathematician'. ' The search for an unassailable grounding for rights, for a rigorously 
systematic classification of rights, for an unambiguous demarcation between childhood and 
adulthood, for an unproblematic definition of best carers or best interests, 2 for a neat 
universal description of human ontogenesis, for an unproblematic distinction between the 
individual and her community, has not led so far, nor is such a search likely to lead, to 
uncontroversial conclusions. Human life is complex and ultimately unpredictable, and 
although we can construct theoretical models to explain aspects of it we should never 
expect such models to yield the precision, completeness, or control offered by theories 
about the non-human physical world. Complex moral problems are not amenable to clear- 
cut either/or solutions. 
In contemporary democratic societies no-one is more circumscribed by authority and more 
dominated by authority figures than the child. When adults complain that they are being 
'treated like children'they are identifying precisely this aspect of the quotidian experience of 
the child: absence of liberty, powerlessness, not being taken seriously as a significant 
individual. 
The case of children's rights differs from adults' in two ways. In the case of adults the 
principal forms of exclusion from the realm of rights can be contested on the grounds that 
perceived differences - gender, race, colour, religion, ethnicity, etc. - are 
irrelevant to the 
ascription of rights; more crucially, perhaps, they can be - and have been - contested by 
members of the excluded groups themselves. In the case of children, however, some of the 
perceived differences are more likely to be relevant - knowledge, immaturity of 
understanding and judgement, adequacy of life-experience, capacity for autonomous action 
or for moral responsibility - and as a consequence the child's ability 
to contest exclusion is 
proportionally reduGed. 
Children are children. There is no reason to suppose that we can dispense with 
the long 
period of development and maturation necessary for therin to become adults capable 
of 
1 Aristotle, Ethics, trans., J. A. K Thomson, (revised, Hugh Tredennick), London, Penguin, 
1976,65. 
2 In the 'Report Of The Woridng Group On Determining The Best Interests Of 
The Child', Fordham LawReviý, 64, 
1996,1347-1350, it is concluded that the definition of best interests varies according 
to circumstances. The best 
interests of a child in a custody case would not be the same as the best 
interests Of a child in an educational placement 
case. It comes down to the specific needs of the child in each situation. 
There is no global declaration of what the best 
interests are. 
Conclusion 
functioning with at least minimal competence in human society. The necessary knowledge, 
understanding, sympathies, values, and skills take a long time to acquire. If this acquisition 
is delayed by excessive paternalist protectionism the solution is not to pretend that Children 
are the equals of adults in relevant ways but to reform child-rearing practices. As children 
grow towards and through adolescence what they require from adults is not increasingly 
intrusive paternalism but supportive understanding and the kinds of structures necessary 
for them to practise their developing competencies in relative safety. The objective is 
autonomy for the new adult; parental autonomy 'must run out, and paternalism must wind 
down'. But this change must be gradual: growing autonomy for the child and a 'gradual 
restriction' of the autonomy of the parents except in cases where the normal development 
of the child is'in some way impeded I. 3 
In the case of children a preliminary distinction must be made between what might be 
called 'enabling' rights and 'instrumental' rights, that is, rights in respect of which the holder 
is a passive recipient (thle infant's right to nutrition) and rights in respect of which the holder 
4 is an active participant (the adult's right to freedom of speech). To what extent do different 
rights apply to the child immediately or must all, or any, of them be acquired by training, 
education, use, or maturation? What limits Gan be justifiably placed on their exercise 
because of the specific characteristics of childhood? In this work I have tried to sketch out a 
developmental account of moral and social being which takes account of the proGess of 
entering into possession of rights. 
Categorically excluding children from the application of rights and freedoms ignores the 
developmental nature of childhood. Ironically the attempt to extend rights to children in 
exactly the same way as they are extended to adults5 also ignores the developmental 
nature of childhood and the gradualist nature of the child's capacity to deal with moral 
responsibility. 
However strongly they may be defended, parental rights are not absolutes: the interests of 
society and the existence of the dghts of others legitimately place limits on the extent of 
6 ristotle it has parental rights. Compulsory schooling is a case in point . 
As far back as A 
7 
been recognised that the state has a 'legitimate interest' in the education of the young . 
Contemporary justifications of this 'legitimate interest' include the need to protect the rightS 
3 183 96,92f3 Bigelow, J., et ai., 'Parental Autonomy, Journ 31 of Applied EtjLqý, 5,2,1 
W, -11 
4 This is similar to the distinction which Rogers and Wrightsman make between rights 
of nurturance and rights of self- 
determination. Rogers, C. M., Wrightsman, L. S., 'Attitudes Towards Children's 
Rights: Nurturance or Self 
Determination', Journal of Social Issues, 34,2,1978,59-69. 
See, for example, Holt, J., Escapg from Childhood, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
1975. 
Page, Edgar, Parental Rights', Journal of ARpljed-Eft929Qft, 1,2,1984,187-203,202. 
7, But since there is but one aim for the entire state, it follows that education must 
be one and the same for all, and that 
the responsibility for it must be a public one. ' _Pollics, 
trans., T. A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented 
by Trevor J. 
Saunders, Penguin Books, 1992,452. 
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of other citizens and the community in general, and to protect the interests of the child: 
children are not mere property and their welfare is a public responsibility. 
I have suggested that paternalism is not a problem for children until they perceive it as 
problematic. The reason why children are not clamouring for liberation from adult 
oppression is because the majority of children in western industrialized societies are not 
oppressed in a relevant way. Even if their situation was as dire as child liberationists allege 
the children themselves are incapable of developing or assuming their own leadership, not 
because they are oppressed but because they are unequal to the task in terms of 
knowledge, understanding, competence, and responsibility, They are not oppressed adults, 
they are children. If they are oppressed by adults then the necessary reforms must be 
undertaken by adults. 
It has been alleged, with some justification, that the world of the liberal theorist is a 
,8 'childless universe , that is that the liberal theorist tends to 'conceive of the world as 
consisting entirely of fully-formed adults (usually adult males)'. 9 The 'contract myth', 
according to Midgley, relies on a conception of human nature radically divorced from its 
past, both social and individual, as if human beings start life 'grown up, without infancy or 
childhood'. 10 Where children do appear in liberal theory they are rather pallid, bloodless 
creatures, notable for the deficiencies of their intellect but for little else which reflects the 
reality of childhood or adolescence. What we get is a rather austere conception of 
childhood which is excessively cognitive and does not take account of the other vital 
dimensions of human expedence without which true human agency is impossible. 
The only moral sense in ascribing rights to children is that the rights entail a claim to 
'positive action on the part of others, not to mere non-interference. 
"' Once we take 
childhood into account we cannot ignore the extent to which rearing children in a particular 
community with particular values is 'constitutive of the individual; it is not just information 
that the child requires'. 12 Indeed not, children also require formation. 
Schools 
Education is the initiation of the child into the life of the diverse, and often conflicting, 
communities in which he will participate throughout his life. 'Conscious social reproduction 
on' Political Stud, e, Hayclon, G., 'Political Theory and the Child: Problems of Individualist Traditi 
27,3,1979,405-420, 
414. 
" Van Wyk, R. N., 'Children and Community: A Reply to Jonathan Schonshecles 
"Deconstructing Community Self- 
paternalism",, Law and Philosogh , 15,1,1996,75-80,75. 
'0 Midgley, M., The Ethical Primate: Humans. Fr-eedom, -_andMO)-r-a-YA, 
London, Routledge, 1994,112. 
11 Hayclon, 'Political Theory, 415. 
12 Ibid., 416. 
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is the primary ideal of democratic education'. 13 The best we can hope for is an individual 
who is capable of making defensible moral decisions within the complex contingencies of 
life. This is surely true of all education - in this regard it is a trivial point. But there is also a 
reformative dimension to the task. Gutmann, for example, is not just trying to understand 
how actual democratic societies work, she is attempting to explain and persuade how they 
ought to work. Her conception of education is unabashedly political, it is an 
acknowledgement that, ultimately, all educational theory is political. 
A democratic state of education tries to teach virtue ... democratic virtue: the ability to deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social 
reproduction. 14 
Taking rights seriously means that as well as taking our own rights and the rights of others 
seriously we accept the concomitant responsibilities to the community which recognises 
and supports the rights which we claim for ourselves and others. Rights should not be a 
one-way arrangement; a right is an implied covenant. Rights must be balanced by the 
notion of service and obligation to the community which acknowledges and sustains their 
exercise. Children need to learn that as well as having rights they have responsibilities 
which go along wýith these rights whether the rights are freedom rights or welfare rights. In 
the first place they have an obligation to respect the rights of others and to intervene 
actively when they can to protect and promote those rights. This is no less than they come 
to expect in relation to their own rights. Secondly they must learn that rights (rights of 
freedom) must be exercised responsibly, freedom is not licence, and that this responsibility 
is owed to the community and individuals who sustain these rights. Thirdly they must ieam 
that the rights they poss4come to them at some cost to others. This is especially true of 
welfare rights but is also true of freedom rights where the cost to others is their acceptance 
of the limitations on their own freedom. 
In a democracy citizens are allowed to consider changes in their form of government. In 
general there is no recognition of this principle in school curricula or practices. Schools 
present children with existing forms of government of the world outside the school as an 
historical fait accompfi. Consent to the political system is not so much manufactured as 
assumed. Schools engage in political indoctrination because it is believed necessary 
to 
establish stable, democratic government through the creation of a 
faithful citizenry. By 
offering their pupils a fixed set of beliefs, rather than opportunity 
for political engagement, 
schools fail to prepare young people, as Jeffs puts it, 'to join democratically 
with others in 
the kind of flexible response to a changing world that is ultimately necessary 
for genuine 
stability,. 15 The culture of school embodies a culture of fear of 
democracy, a fear on the part 
13 Gutmann, A., Democratic Education, New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press, 1967,45. 
14 Ibid., 46. 
, 
London, Basil Blackwell, 1%6.43. '5 Jeft, Tony, 'Children's Rights at School', in Frankiin, 
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of teachers and school administrators that meaningful Pupil participation will lead, if not to 
chaos, then to an unacceptable dilution of the schools, proper role. 
The important issue is not the existence of rules: all social contexts require rules. What is 
important is the way in which the rules are made and enforced. What is needed is not 
simulated democracy which leaves the authority of the teacher untouched 16 but a 
participation appropriate to the developmental status of the pupils and a recognition of their 
capacity to participate responsibly. We become responsible by practising responsibility. 
Williams acknowledges that 'an education which enhances the capacity for considered 
choice is at odds with the culture of communities whose way of life emphasises the 
following of tradition and in which obedience to authority autocratically exercised is highly 
valued'. 17 He does not suggest how the democratic virtues necessary for the maintenance 
of democratic societies will be developed by the schools, whether these are GOmmon, 
secular, or religious. Indeed, he does not acknowledge that the communities which best 
typify his description of autocratic control are schools. There is no 'emphasis on individual 
autonomy in conventional schools 1.18 On the contrary schools which emphasise individual 
autonomy in a real rather than a theoretical sense (such as Summerhill) are rare and 
controversial. 
In a detailed assessment of the responsibilities to be faced by a 'common' school 
McLaughlin concludes that it must be a complex institution and that 'It might be wondered 
whether (the) responsibilities are too difficult, or perhaps impossible, to discharge'. 19 Any 
hope that a school (be it common or not) might develop a democratic tolerance among its 
pupils will depend very heavily on the ways in which the pupils' own immediate needs and 
interests as members of the school community are addressed. Directing their attention to 
social issues which do not impinge directly on their experience as members of the 
immediate community might be seen as irrelevant to their immediate interests and as 
distracting their energies from matters over which they might reasonably expect to have 
some control. 
Everything about a school (its structures, organisation, programmes, content, rituals, 
traditions, expectations, the relationships it promotes, etc. ) has the purpose of 
furthering the 
educational objectives which the school embodies: a school (whether 
it is religious or 
secular, public or private) exists to promote certain values, attitudes and 
beliefs. The notion 
"' Hart, Roger, A., Children's Partici ation: p, Innocenti 
Essays, 4, Florence, UNICEF, 
1992,43. 
17 See Kevin Williams 'Education and Human Diversity: the Ethics of Separate 
Schooling Revisited', -B-rTtsh -129MAI-0-f 
Educational Studies, 46,11, March 1998,26-39,37. 
18 Ibid., 37. 
19 journal of Philoso of 
Education, 29,2,1995, 
McLaughlin, T. H., 'Liberalism, Education and the Common School', 
MY -OfUCO-- 
252. 
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of a school which does not promote these kinds of things appears to be contradictory. 
'Children do not leave their souls at home when they enter school. , Gutmann's remark is 
necessary to remind us that the choice facing us therefore is not whether we should provide 
moral education in our schools, but what sort of moral education we should provide. 20 
The issue of democracy in the school is not a simple confrontation between oppressive 
authoritarianism and a libertarian absence of constraint. The contdbution of the school to 
democratic formation must begin in the communities of the schools themselves with 
structures which recognise, and accommodate the growing moral awareness and 
competence of pupils to order their own affairs individually and collectively. After the family 
the most rudimentary community is the school community. I have already suggested that 
the school bridges the gap between the home and the world at large. 21 It is where the 
transition is made from the protected life of the cherished individual child to the impersonal 
life of the autonomous adult in an open society. 22 How that transition is experienced will 
have deep and far reaching effects. The daily experience of life in school forms children's 
expectations and acceptances of how life in a community should be lived. 
In particular, the competence, confidence, and willingness to become involved in political 
participation at any level must be acquired by practice: forms of meaningful participation 
must be available to children. There is a stark contrast between the liberal democracies we 
value, endorse, and promote and the autocratic schools and classrooms in which our 
children are prepared for life in such democracies. At best our schools teach the pdnciples 
of democratic procedures as verbal constructs illustrated by flow-charts, diagrams and 
other gaudy representations purporting to show democracy at work. But if the culture of the 
classroom and the schools are anti-democratic then the lessons are mere empty promises, 
as relevant to the real lives of the pupils as a dead language. 
Rights are granted to children conditionally. This Gan mean either that the rights are simply 
institutional rights which may be withdrawn and which do not reflect underlying 
moral rightS23 or a recognition that children have developing moral rights which can 
be 
recognised in institutional practices but which are subject to supervision or to some other 
condition . 
24 The latter option requires an intimate context in which the individual capacities 
of children are known and guided. Given appropriate opportunities children can 
become 
20 _R_ggrt 
to the same effect: ieachers can only Gutmann, Democratic Education, 54. Kelly quotes the -Newsom 
e 
escape from their influence over the moral and spiritual development of 
their pupils by closing their schools'. Kelly, 
A. V., 
Education and Democragy: Principles and Practi London, Paul Chapman, 
1995,175. 
21 Chapter 7. 
22 1 do not mean 'open' in the Popperian sense but merely in the sense 
that the protection of the individual afforded 
by 
Parental home and school is no longer there. 
23 Brown, D. G., 'The Rights of Children', Joum M of E Jucatico, University of 
British Columbia 1971,8 - 20,11-13. 
24 Ibid., 14115. 
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competent in specific activities and engagements before they assume general responsibility 25 
for their own affairs. 
This means that there are two options open to educators. The first is to consider children (of 
whatever age) as individuals who are ignorant and incapable of significant social 
participation and whose activities must be constrained so that they will do as little damage 
to themselves or others as possible. The second option is to recognise that children are 
evolving the capabilities necessary for participation and that their involvement in the public 
sphere should be gradual and determined by their interests and abilities. 26 
Giving children opportunities to take responsibility includes recognising their right to learn 
from their mistakes. The freedom to make mistakes is crucial in acquiring experience. But 
a distinction must be drawn between mistakes which are relatively short-term, and trivial if 
not revocable, and those which are irrevocable and have long-term consequences for the 
present welfare and for the welfare of the adult which the child will become: some mistakes 
further education while some mistakes retard it. Adults (parents and teachers) must 
discriminate between the two in formulating and supervising the conditional rights of 
children. 
The structures of the school organisation itself are based upon the denial of basic human 
27 
rights'to those who occupy the lower echelons'. School rules are profoundly undemocratic 
and if there is a mechanism for pupils to participate in rule formation and implementation it 
is usually not a recognition of a right but a 'grace and favour' concession which Gan be 
withdrawn if the results are unacceptable to those in authority. School pupils 'by law and 
practice have no power, right or mechanism by which they may involve themselves in the 
creation or administration of those rules, they can never be viewed as citizens in 
miniature'. 28 Under the same criteria as apply to adults children cannot be morally obliged 
to follow such rules. If they are obliged to follow them it is coercion, similar to that of 
the 
coerced slave. 29 It is a fundamental principle of democracy that there should 
be no 
government without the consent of the governed. The crucial difference, 
however, is that in 
the case of schools the governed must learn how to give responsible consent. 
Children 
must learn to exercise rights of limited self-determination within the context of 
limiting and 
enabling rules and under sympathetic supervision in home and school. 
Homes cannot be 
25 Ibid., 16. 
ly, 15,1,197 2e Boulding, Elise, 'Children's Rights', Socie 739-43 4 
27 Jeffs, Tony, 'Children's Rights', 58. 
28 Ibid., 64. See also Smeyers, Paul, 'On the Unavoidability of 
power in Child-rearing: is the Language of 
Rights 
Educationally Appropriate7, Studies in Philoso pLhy _and 
Ed_ucation, 14,1,1995,9-21. 
29 It is not irrelevant that one of the most potent paradigms of teaching 
in the history of education is the incident 
in MenQ 
where Plato has Socrates teach an anonymous slave. Paqe241 
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reformed by public order but schools can because they, not the family, are the appropriate 
arena for public control. As Gutmann writes 
Parents command a domain of moral education within the family that is - and should continue to be - largely immune from external control. If there 
should be a domain for citizens collectively to educate children in the democratic virtues of deliberation, then primary schools occupy a large part of that domain, although they do not monopolise it. 30 
Political formation 
Children must be encouraged to develop towards political maturity through opportunities for 
political action which is relevant to their position as members of a community of leaming 
and which reflects their growing capacity to function as members of a community. 
Kelly argues persuasively that education in a democratic society must promote democratic 
ways of thinking which are rooted in a programme of moral education and which tailor 
individualism to communal responsibility. 31 This requires that any form of authoritarianism 
must be eschewed in favour of more democratic practices within the schools themselves. 
He is dismissive of religious education on the grounds that any truly moral behaviour must 
entail a willingness to accept the law without being coerced by 'an acknowledgement of, or 
even respect for, the authority of its source'. 32 This is altogether too extreme, however. In 
the first place part of a properly democratic education must be to instil in pupils a respect 
for the authority of democratic institutions. No individual is going to re-start the process of 
evaluating laws from first principles each time. Even the most critical democrat will afford 
democratic institutions a presumption of legitimacy and authority. 
Secondly, young people need to develop a set of stable beliefs and values in order to 
acquire stable moral identities. The danger of too much Critical reflection, or critical 
reflection encouraged too soon, 33 is that children will fail to form a stable self-identity. 
Supporters of separate schools, for example, will argue that children need to encounter 
religion as part of the total experience of growing up because otherwise they will not 
assimilate and maintain a religious faith. Religion, or some ideology, is necessary 
to 
provide individuals with a world view which lends coherence to their lives and provides a 
foundation for their moral commitments. Thirdly, a capacity for rational choice requires 
that 
some prior limitations be placed on children's choices, limitless choice would 
be disabling. 
'To have a rational sense of what we want to become, we need 
to know who we are; 
30 Gutmann, Democratic Education, 52. 
3' Kelly, Education and Democracy, 170-182. 
32 Ibid., 172. oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, 
33 Callan, Eamonn, Creating Citizens: Politic Education and Liberal 
Demouragy, 
151319. 
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otherwise our choices will be endless and meaningless. 134 But of C-Ourse our choices cannot 
be endless and meaningless for then, not alone would we not know who we are, we would 
be nobody, in effect, a dis-embodied rationality, unable to choose at all. 
In any case Kelly's dismissal of authoritarianism within the schools is too quick. He 
acknowledgee a distinction between the teacher as an authority (based on expertise) and 
in authority (based on position). Yet the teacher is in authority and it is unrealistic to pretend 
otherwise or that it could be otherwise. Firstly, school is a place of coerced attendance, at 
least for those up to 16 years of age. Secondly, it is the teacher who is ultimately 
responsible, to school authorities and to parents, for the safety and welfare, including the 
educational progress, of the child. This responsibility cannot be abandoned in the name of 
pupil freedom. Thirdly, as I have suggested already, the teacher must supervise and 
contain the exercise of the child's conditional rights. It may be objected that this is a matter 
of professional expertise also. This is so but insofar as the teacher must take decisions 
regarding the freedom of action of the pupil she is in authority. Whether she draws this 
authority from her position as an agent of the school and parents (or of the state) or from 
her professional expertise is irrelevant in that the result is the same: she must impose 
limits. At best she can do this in a way which is authoritative (see chapter 7) but, like the 
reasonable parent, the ultimate decision must be hers. 
Democracy is necessary within the school because of the priority of cultivating an ethos of 
self-regulation and mutual co-operation among pupils. It is desirable, however, only if it 
recognises the need to avoid the 'disorder and arrogance' which Gan 'threaten the very 
enterprise of education within schools'. 36 The enterprise of education and the promotion of 
'participatory virtues' is contingent on the maintenance of the 'disciplinary virtues', which 
are at the core of teachers' professional obligations (imparting knowledge, instilling 
emotional and intellectual virtues). Democratic participation must be constrained by the 
professional obligation of the teachers to teach the disciplinary virtues as well as promoting 
the participatory ones. This is not a denial of the democratic ideal. it is not being argued 
that schools are, or can be, fully functioning democracies. Children are in schools 
to leam 
participative democracy through controlled, supervised engagement. 
A set of balances 
must be contrived between the pupils' coerced attendance and their 
freedom to participate, 
between the demands of equality and freedom and the professional obligations 
of the 
teachers, between the pupils' right to take, and act on, their own 
decisions and the 
responsibility Of the school for their health, safety, and welfare. 
34 Gutmann, Democratic Education, 35. 
35 Kelly, 179. 
3a Gutmann, Democratic Education, 90. 
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The moral education of children must involve a PrOGess of self-reflection, a critical 
awareness of their own beliefs. 37 But this, like so much rhetoric about children and 
schooling, is too vague. At what point can children begin the process of interrogating their 
own received beliefs to begin with? There must be an opportunity for the beliefs to become 
theirs in the first place. The process of critical questioning and re-evaluation cannot begin 
until the beliefs have been established and the preliminary (i. e. pre-adolescent) self-identity 
of the child has been formed. There would appear to be a case for postponing the radical 
critique of beliefs and values at least until secondary school. This is not to say that 
preliminary work on the formation of democratic character cannot begin before that. The 
organisational and pedagogic structures associated with primary schools are much more 
conducive to the process of democratic formation than those associated with secondary 
education. The primary classroom, presided over by a single teacher for most of the time, 
provides the temporal and developmental space to engage in the leaming of the skills 
needed to engage in co-operation, political understanding and decision making. This is not 
so in the secondary classroom in which, because of the exigencies of a subject-centred 
timetable, pupils are faced with a succession of subject specialists in encounters which are 
of necessity relatively brief and intensive. 
Kelly rightly stresses the social and moral dimension of every area in the curriculum38 and 
the responsibility of every teacher to contribute to the moral development of the pupils. He 
is also aware of the multi-faceted nature of moral education which, in addition to a cognitive 
capacity, must recognise the affective dimension which is indispensable in moral 
judgement, the need to develop respect, empathy, inter-personal skills, an ability to 
formulate 'general moral principles' and to implement these into decision and action . 
39 The 
contribution of diverse subject areas must be co-ordinated and pupils must be given 
opportunities to explore 'controversial issues of social importance'. 40 But Kelly has little to 
say about issues of fundamental immediate importance to the pupils in the school: how 
they are treated as individuals and as a community, how the rules which govern their day- 
to-day lives in the school community are formulated and implemented, how a balance is 
struck between the imperatives of the teachers' professional obligations and the freedom of 
pupils to order their own affairs and concerns within the community of the school. 
There 
cannot be a growth towards individual autonomy where freedom, of pupil and teacher alike, 
is severely restricted. 41 
37 Kelly, Education and Democragy, 174. 
3a Ibid., 175. 
39 Ibid., 176. The alternative to a cognitivist approach is virtue ethics. See 
PunzO, V. A., 'After Kohlbergý Virtue Ethtcs 
and the Recovery of the Moral Self. Philoso hical P 9,1,1996,7-23, 
and Tappan, M. B., 'Narrative, Mhical Psyoh-01=6 
Language, and Moral Experience', journglof oral Education, 20,3,1991,243-256. 
40 Kelly, Education and Democrapy, 176. 
41 Ibid., 177. The first Prerequisite which P. H. Pearse the great Irish educational 
reformer demanded for any educatm 
system was freedom - freedom for schools, for teachers and 
for pupils. 'In particular I would urge 
that the I nsh schod 
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Parents and teachers must be empowered if their children and Pupils are to be empowered. 
Hart remarks that better-off families are more likely to value independence and autonomy 
in their children than those who are lessWell_off. 42 Parents who have little freedom in their 
own daily lives value obedience and efficiency, not autonomy. In the same way, as Sarason 
rightly remarks, teachers are likely to treat their students as they themselves are treated by 
their superiors. 43 A disempowered teacher, subject to the decisions and requirements of 
administrators who are often remote from the realities of the classroom, is unlikely to 
accept that her pupils are capable of dealing with issues of power when she herself has no 
opportunity to do so. 44 
A cognitivist, view of electoral democracy, a programme of 'civic, social, and political' 
education which, however necessary it might be to inform pupils about structures and 
practices, duties and obligations, is insufficient to prepare them for participation. Indeed if 
such programmes go no further than the transmission of information they are more likely to 
induce apathy and passivity rather than a determination to play a positive role in the life of 
the community. Of course participation in the school context would have to be controlled by 
some kind of constitution, a covenant which would protect the legitimate professional 
obligations and responsibilities of teachers at the same time as it provided opportunities for 
pupil empowerment. In addition schools must have some form of continuity to allow for a 
developmental approach, a 'whole school programme'. 
Neill recognised that younger children do not have the same interest in self-govemment as 
older children and yet they need the opportunity to develop such an interest over time. The 
Surnmerhill system depended on the presence of a cadre of older pupils who took it 
seriously. Although the younger children participated in the system they were incapable of 
running it on their own. 
Frankly younger children are only mildly interested in government. Left to 
themselves I question whether younger children would ever form a 
government. Their values are not our values, and their manners are not our 
manners. 45 
system of the future should give freedom - freedom to the individual school, 
freedom to the individual teacher, freedom 
as far as may be to the individual pupil. Without freedom there can be no right growth; and education 
is prOperly the 
fostering of the right growth of a personality. ' Pearse urged that individual teachers should 
be free to impart their mn 
individuality, their own gifts, their own enthusiasms to the work of education and 
that pupils should be free to follow their 
Own strengths, interests and capacities. See 6 Buachalla, S., (ed. ), 
ialig: The Educational 
WritincjsofP. H. Pea The Mercier Press, 1980. 
42 Hart, Children's Participation, 38)9. 
43 Sarason, S. B., How Schools Might be Govern !q _and 
"Wty, New York, Teachers College Press, 1997. 
44 Apple, M. W., Oliver, A., 'Becoming Right: Education and the Formation of 
Conservative Movements', Teachers 
College Record, 97,3,1996,419-445, argue that people are driven into conservative 
stances by the inflexib4e and 
unresponsive nature of official institutions. 
45 Neill, A. S., Summerhill: a Sadigil Apl2roa,, h to Qb LIdL-r-? &d-nA, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 19B5,60. 
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But through participation in a meaningful system the younger children learned; and in their 
turn they became the older students who were committed to the ideal of self-government. 
The promotion of democratic capacities cannot be done by exhortation, but only by 
developmental practice. By developmental practice I mean that there must be an 
incremental approach to the amount of control children are required to exercise and this 
must be congruous with their capacity, collectively and individually, to exercise the control 
and to carry the concomitant responsibility. This requires more than curricular changes. In 
order to escape from the cognitivist, notion of self-government and autonomy it is necessary 
to introduce practical measures in the day-to-day life of the school, in its organisation and 
administration. 
The competitive ethos of schools need not necessarily be an obstacle to democratisation 
any more than the competitiveness of life in a capitalist society is in general. Despite Kelly's 
assertion that it is 'a nonsense to expect schools and teachers to be able to develop 
attitudes of co-operation and caring for others in their pupils when those pupils are being 
expected for most of their time to be competing with their fellows'. 46 Competitiveness in 
capitalist societies is a fact of life. It may be considered by some to be an unfortunate fact 
of life but it is there nonetheless. Pending any radical transformation of social life towards a 
more co-operative and caring ethos we must prepare children for the reality of the life they 
will be expected to live after school. It is possible to address the need for competitiveness 
within an ethos of care, equality, and respect. The analogy of sport ýmay be more 
appropriate than the analogy of the wider society in explaining this. 
School councils are a significant development in promoting school democracy. 
47 Their 
worth, however, depends on the participation of individual pupils who are not elected to 
relevant bodies. For school councils (like student representation at third level) too easily 
become versions of the passive democracy of the wider society whereby individuals 
transfer their responsibility and participation to others so that they can get on with other 
things. It is the quality of consultation, answerability, and individual responsibility which will 
determine whether efforts in this regard are successful or not. There 
is little point in 
allowing a minority of pupils to 'play' politics unless the effect on the majority results 
in a 
democratic maturing. 
Values 
The practice of adult-child dialogue must begin from the earliest 
stages of the child's 
encounter with the world of adult values, in the family home, 
in the pre-school setting, in the 
46 Kelly, gducation and Democrac , 180. 
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primary and secondary school. Such practice will certainly not be 'Combative' dialogue48 in 
the sense that Callan deploreS49 but neither will it necessarily be informed by the Iruth' 
regarding the great moral issues that he IiStS. 50 The Priority for the child must be an aduft- 
child dialogue in which the point is neither to 'win' the argument with the child, nor to 
engage in some shared Socratic search for essential truth. The developmental priority is to 
build the child's confidence and self-esteem, her understanding of the modalities of human 
communication, and of the foundational values that the adult cherishes, so that the child 
may later engage in more ethically significant conversation/dialogue as a practised, if not 
accomplished, participant. 
In order to exercise freedom appropriately (indeed to exercise it at all) children must 
develop their'voice. Obviously they must have opportunities to make decisions individually 
and collectively and to take responsibility for these decisions. Less obvious is their need to 
learn how to articulate their own interests in ways which are true to their own integrity. 
Finding one's voice is important for instrumental as well as for expressive reasons . 
51 The 
child's 'voice' is the sharing of experienced insights, participation, and a sense that others 
value one's opinions and sentiments. The participation of children, the hearing of their 
voice, can only be brought about by the specific effort of the adult to empower the child to 
contribute to the discussion. 
It should not be inferred from anything I have written that foundational values are imposed 
52 
on the child. The proper mode for teaching is influence, not interference . Yet the teacher 
53 
cannot be neutral. Callan provides a neat example. The student teacher who listened to 
the 'sheer ignorance' and 'morally puerile under'standing of democracy' in a class discussion 
failed as a teacher not only because he adopted a stance of 'scrupulous neutrality' but also, 
in a professional sense, because he failed to address the ignorance and to advance the 
understanding. His failure was not only the moral failure to assert his own more informed 
and deeper point of view (and to assert it in a way which did not impose it as the 'true' 
answer to the question at issue) but the pedagogical failure (also moral) to address the 
deficiencies of knowledge, understanding, information, and appropriate values. 
Participation in the communal life of the school must be real and the consequences of 
children's participation must be irreversible, otherwise it is no more than a sham. 
In schools 
as presently constituted there is little freedom of choice for pupils and certainly 
not in 
48 a contradiction in terms in the Buberian or Freirean senses of 'dialogue'. 
49 Callan, Creating Citizens, 202-20& 
so Ibid., 204.996 
51 Margulies, Peter, 'The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Clients Competence 
in Context', Fordham _Law 
Review, 64. 
1473-1504,1482. 
52 Suber, M., Between Man and Man, Fontana Books, 1961,117. 
53 Callan, Creating Citizens, 21 W. 
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relation to anything significant. in general children intemalise the Perception of themselves 
which they receive from their teachers: as ignorant, incapable, irresponsible, When this 
view persists into adolescence it results in an alienation from school (and education and 
learning) or a docility which masks the real feelings of the student. 
Gutmann says that schools are capable of teaching the morality of association (Kohlberg's 
second stage). This morality is characterized by the acceptance of rules which are 
lappropdate to fulfilling the roles that individuals play within various associations'. 54But it is 
questionable whether this is a success of the school or simply a developmental 
achievement of children. Children demonstrate the morality of association in their games 
and play quite independently of their schools. The schools may reinforce and structure this 
morality, they do not create it in the first instance. She mentions the 'co-operative moral 
sentiments that go with morality of association: empathy, trust, benevolence, and fairness. 
These moral sentiments are necessary to the development of democratic virtues. They are 
not sufficient. What the school needs to do is to provide structures to harness and to 
educate them. 
Life in a democratic society requires that the members of the school community acquire the 
civic virtues necessary to the well-being of the sustaining community. That community 
cannot be neutral or indifferent to the formation of its future members. This is true of the 
liberal approach no less than of any form of communitarian approach: the children of the 
community require to be formed in the values of the community in the first instance. The 
democratic school community should inspire the sense of community and civic 
engagement that the larger community requires. 
Our conception of individual freedom must account for a wide range of moral and political 
obligations (loyalties to family and familial culture, to local or other restricted communities, 
to professional organisations and the values they promote, etc. ) that we commonly 
recognise. Insisting that we are bound only by ends and roles we choose for ourselves 
'denies that we can ever be claimed by ends we have not chosen - ends given 
by nature or 
God, for example, or by our identities as members of families, peoples, cultures, or 
traditions. '55 Accommodating these sources of value and loyalty by de-coupling the private 
and the public/political and assigning unchosen ends to the former raises 
the difficulty of 
justifying this personal/public dichotomy in the first place: 
Why insist on separating our identity as citizens from our 
identity as 
persons more broadly conceived? Why should political 
deliberation not 
reflect our best understanding of the highest human ends? 
Don't arguments 
54 Gutmann, Democratic Education, 60. 
56 Sandell, Michael J., 'America's Search for a New Public PhilosophY, Lh_eAktlantA 
Y-Q! Itftý 277,3, March, 1996.57- 
74,70. 
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about justice and rights unavoidably draw on particular conceptions of the good life, whether we admit it or not? 56 
Liberals fear that a communitarian approach to Political behaviour would have a coercive 
character and eliminate individual freedoms in favour of a general will of some description. 
But it is by no means inevitable that the 'soulcraft, of the communitarian, the formation of 
the character of the individual, will be absolutist in nature. Any effective programme of 
moral formation works its way, not by coercion but by a mixture of habituation57 and 
persuasion. It bears repeating, however, that, at least until the age of 16, children are in 
school involuntarily. They may like being there but they do not have a choice: the school 
community is already premised on coercion. We are faced with the apparent paradox 
(exploited with relish by de-schooling advocates') of using coercion to make children free. 
Political science has not paid much attention to the home, the school, or the classroom 
despite the fact that each is a political organisation in which power is exercised. The 
authority which parents, teachers and school administrators wield over pupils is taken for 
granted as justifiable by reference to the purposes of schooling and family life. The issue of 
power in these settings is unquestioned only because it has become invisible. 
How does power get defined in the classroom? What understanding of 
power do we want children to obtain? Should students have some kind of 
role in defining power, thus giving them some sense of ownership, not only 
in regard to definition but also to implementation? Is the unilateral definition 
and exercise of power desirable for the development of children? Does it 
tend to breed the opposite of what it intends to achieve? *' 
Teachers formulate the classroom constitution and assign themselves the roles of 
legislator, executive and judiciary. They articulate the rules (sometimes post hoc) but do 
not necessarily provide a rationale. They are unlikely to assign a role to pupils in 
collaboratively addressing question as to how the communal life of the classroom should be 
lived. When should children begin to experience the nature and dilemmas of power in 
ca a group living? Perhaps one reason why adults are often scepti I about politics and cynic I 
about their elected representatives (and consequently unsupportive and apathetic) is that 
we have never experienced the difficulties of governing, not even on a minor scale. 
If they are to promote democratic formation as part of a virtuous individual schools 
should 
accord their pupils the right and responsibility to participate in appropriate 
forms of self- 
government. Those who inhabit classrooms should feel that they will 
be governed by rules 
and values which they have helped to formulate The long-term educative 
goal is not the 
formulation of rules, but learning the complexities of power 
in a group setting. The 
se Nd. 
. Saunders, 
Penguin Books, 1992,43". 
57 Aristotle, Politics, trans., T. A. Sinctair, revised and re-presented by Trevor 
J 
5" See Nordenbo, Sven Erik, 'Against Education', uq&-n, 
30,3,1996,401-413. 
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development of the child's moral self takes place in community with others: in the family, in 
the peer group, in the school. The virtuous self is a relational, interdependent self which 
needs a community of other individuals 'in and through which moral lives are played out'. 
These others continually clarify and expand the agent's moral vision. The 'Cognitive, 
affective and behavioural qualities which are constitutive of the virtuous self cannot be 
formed and maintained in isolation'. 59 
Nothing that I have written in the course of this work should be taken to mean that I 
disavow democratic procedures and principles. On the contrary, the social context which 
best promises to promote human well-being is one that encourages and facilitates the free 
exchange of ideas and social political criticism. My position is that we cannot justify an 
educational programme (much less an entire moral order) on a priori principles and must 
look to models of functioning communities in order to find a reasonable justification. Like 
Callan my use of the concept of reasonableness is removed from 'a tidy moral calculus' 
such as Kohlberg's. Callan writes that 'justice as reasonableness' is reducible to a cluster of 
more fundamental, mutually supportive 'habits, desires, emotional propensities, and 
intellectual capacities'. The co-ordination of these requires judgement which is contextually 
sensitive. The capacities that we need to promote include imaginative sympathy, respect 
for reasonable differences, a spirit of moderation and compromise, an awareness of the 
responsibilities imposed by the rights of others, as well as a sense of one's own rights- 
based dignity. These accomplishments 'may be subsumed under the idea of justice only so 
long as we bear in mind that the idea captures no master-rule rule for moral choice'. 60 They 
cannot be effectively taught without meaningful opportunities for practice. It is in 
community, and centrally the educative community of the school, that these capacities are 
promoted or impeded. 
Teaching, education, cannot avoid some level of indoctrination. Indeed it is arguable, given 
the unavoidable social responsibilities of education, schools and teachers in relation to the 
creation and maintenance of social cohesion and order and to the pursuit of shared social 
aspirations and ideals, (whether these are liberal or not) that a certain element of 
indoctrination is obligatory as well as unavoidable. Although such indoctrination may be 
obscured by the rhetoric of 'education' there is no doubt that every education system 
embodies a set of values, perceptions, and judgements which, though invisible within 
the 
system itself, exercise a profound influence on learners. Education is not neutral; neither 
is 
philosophy of education. The history of educational thought is a history of 
the attempt to 
influence the way in which society initiates and socialises its young, and 
forms their beliefs, 
knowledge, judgements and behaviour. It is also a history of the struggle within society 
to 
5" Punzo, 'After Kohlberg', 19/20. 
"0 Callan, Creating Cftizens, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997,8. 
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exercise that control. The leading educational thinkers of the past were not engaged in a 
detached, objective evaluation of contending educational ideas. They were attempting to 
influence the way in which education was being conducted. They were attempting this in 
order to promote the political and social ideals which they advocated. 
Education is future oriented; it is about the way in which the people of the present think the 
people of the future should live and the kind of society they should live in. It is prescriptive 
by its very nature. It is not for the sake of detachment or objectivity that churches, states, 
political parties and other interest groups contest the control of education in any society. 
Their primary interest is not the description of the society as it is but the definition of the 
society as it ought to be in the future. 
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